CHARMIDES.
As in Lachês, we have pursued an enquiry into the nature of Courage--so
in Charmidês, we find an examination of Temperance, Sobriety,
Moderation.[1] Both dialogues conclude without providing any tenable
explanation. In both there is an abundant introduction--in Charmidês,
there is even the bustle of a crowded palæstra, with much dramatic
incident--preluding to the substantive discussion. I omit the notice
of this dramatic incident, though it is highly interesting to read.
[Footnote 1: I translate [Greek: sôphrosu/nê] Temperance, though it
is very inadequate, but I know no single English word better
suited.]
[Side-note: Scene and personages of the dialogue. Crowded
palæstra. Emotions of Sokrates.]
The two persons with whom Sokrates here carries on the discussion,
are Charmides and Kritias; both of whom, as historical persons, were
active movers in the oligarchical government of the Thirty, with its
numerous enormities. In this dialogue, Charmides appears as a youth
just rising into manhood, strikingly beautiful both in face and
stature: Kritias his cousin is an accomplished literary man of mature
age. The powerful emotion which Sokrates describes himself as
experiencing,[2] from the sight and close neighbourhood of the
beautiful Charmides, is remarkable, as a manifestation of Hellenic
sentiment. The same exaltation of the feelings and imagination, which
is now produced only by beautiful women, was then excited chiefly by
fine youths. Charmides is described by Kritias as exhibiting
dispositions at once philosophical and poetical:[3] illustrating
the affinity of these two intellectual veins, as Plato conceived
them. He is also described as eminently temperate and modest:[4] from
whence the questions of Sokrates take their departure.
[Footnote 2: Plato, Charm. 154 C. Ficinus, in his Argumentum to this
dialogue (p. 767), considers it as mainly allegorical, especially the
warm expressions of erotic sentiment contained therein, which he
compares to the Song of Solomon. "Etsi omnia in hoc dialogo mirificam
habeant allegoriam, amatoria maxime, non aliter quam Cantica
Salomonis--mutavi tamen nonnihil--nonnihil etiam prætermisi. Quæ enim
consonabant castigatissimis auribus Atticorum, rudioribus fortè
auribus minimé consonarent."]
[Footnote 3: Plato, Charm. 155 A.]
[Footnote 4: Plato, Charm. 157 D. About the diffidence of Charmides
in his younger years, see Xen. Mem. iii. 7, 1.]
[Side-note: Question, What is Temperance? addressed by Sokrates
to the temperate Charmides. Answer, It is a kind of sedateness or
slowness.]
You are said to be temperate, Charmides (says Sokrates). If so, your
temperance will surely manifest itself within you in some way, so as
to enable you to form and deliver an opinion, What Temperance is.
Tell us in plain language what you conceive it to be. Temperance,
replies Charmides (after some hesitation),[5] consists in doing every
thing in an orderly and sedate manner, when we walk in the highway,
or talk, or perform other matters in the presence of others. It is,
in short, a kind of sedateness or slowness.
[Footnote 5: Plato, Charm. 159 B. [Greek: to\ kosmi/ôs pa/nta
pra/ttein kai\ ê(suchê=|, e)/n te tai=s o)doi=s badi/zein kai\
diale/gesthai . . . sullê/bdên ê(suchio/tês tis.]]
[Side-note: But Temperance is a fine or honourable thing, and
slowness is, in many or most cases, not fine or honourable, but the
contrary. Temperance cannot be slowness.]
Sokrates begins his cross-examination upon this answer, in the same
manner as he had begun it with Laches in respect to courage.
_Sokr._--Is not temperance a fine and honourable thing? Does it
not partake of the essence and come under the definition, of what is
fine or and honourable?[6] _Char._--Undoubtedly it does.
_Sokr._--But if we specify in detail our various operations,
either of body or mind--such as writing, reading, playing on the
harp, boxing, running, jumping, learning, teaching, recollecting,
comprehending, deliberating, determining, &c.--we shall find that
to do them quickly is more fine and honourable than to do them
slowly. Slowness does not, except by accident, belong to the fine and
honourable: therefore temperance, which does so belong to it, cannot
be a kind of slowness.[7]
[Footnote 6: Plato, Charm. 159 C--160 D. [Greek: ou) tô=n kalô=n
me/ntoi ê( sôphrosu/nê e)sti/n? . . . e)peidê\ _e)n tô=| lo/gô|_ tô=n
kalô=n ti ê(mi=n ê( sôphrosu/nê u(pete/thê.]]
[Footnote 7: Plato, Charm. 160 C.]
[Side-note: Second answer. Temperance is a variety of the
feeling of shame. Refuted by Sokrates.]
Charmides next declares Temperance to be a variety of the feeling of
shame or modesty. But this (observes Sokrates) will not hold more
than the former explanation: since Homer has pronounced shame not to
be good, for certain persons and under certain circumstances.[8]
[Footnote 8: Plato, Charm. 161 A.]
[Side-note: Third answer. Temperance consists in doing one's
own business. Defended by Kritias. Sokrates pronounces it a riddle,
and refutes it. Distinction between making and doing.]
"Temperance consists in doing one's own business." Here we have a
third explanation, proposed by Charmides and presently espoused by
Kritias. Sokrates professes not to understand it, and pronounces it
to be like a riddle.[9] Every tradesman or artisan does the business
of others as well as his own. Are we to say for that reason that he
is not temperate? I distinguish (says Kritias) between _making_
and _doing_: the artisan _makes_ for others, but he does
not _do_ for others, and often cannot be said to _do_ at
all. _To do_, implies honourable, profitable, good, occupation:
this alone is a man's own business, and this I call temperance. When
a man acts so as to harm himself, he does not do his own
business.[10] The doing of good things, is temperance.[11]
[Footnote 9: Plato, Charm. 161 C--162 B. [Greek: sôphrosu/nê--to\ ta\
au(tou= pra/ttein . . . ai)ni/gmati/ tini e)/oiken.]
There is here a good deal of playful vivacity in the dialogue:
Charmidês gives this last answer, which he has heard from Kritias,
who is at first not forward to defend it, until Charmides forces him
to come forward, by hints and side-insinuations. This is the dramatic
art and variety of Plato, charming to read, but not bearing upon him
as a philosopher.]
[Footnote 10: Plato, Charm. 163 C-D. [Greek: ta\ kalô=s kai\
ô)pheli/môs poiou/mena . . . oi)kei=a mo/na ta\ toiau=ta ê(gei=sthai,
ta\ de\ blabera\ pa/nta a)llo/tria . . . o(/ti ta\ oi)kei=a te kai\
ta\ au(tou= a)gatha\ kaloi/ês, kai\ ta\s tô=n a)gathô=n poiê/seis
pra/xeis.]]
[Footnote 11: Plato, Charm. 163 E. [Greek: tê\n tô=n a)gathô=n pra=xin
sôphrosu/nên ei)=nai saphô=s soi diori/zomai.]]
[Side-note: Fourth answer, by Kritias. Temperance consists in
self-knowledge.]
_Sokr._--Perhaps it is. But does the well-doer always and
certainly know that he is doing well? Does the temperate man know his
own temperance? _Krit._--He certainly must. Indeed I think that
the essence of temperance is, _Self-knowledge_. _Know
thyself_ is the precept of the Delphian God, who means thereby the
same as if he had said--Be temperate. I now put aside all that I have
said before, and take up this new position, That temperance consists
in a man's knowing himself. If you do not admit it, I challenge your
cross-examination.[12]
[Footnote 12: Plato, Charm. 164-165.]
[Side-note: Questions of Sokrates thereupon. What good does
self-knowledge procure for us? What is the object known, in this
case? Answer: There is no object of knowledge, distinct from the
knowledge itself.]
_Sokr._--I cannot tell you whether I admit it or not, until I
have investigated. You address me as if I professed to know the
subject: but it is because I do not know, that I examine, in
conjunction with you, each successive answer.[13] If temperance
consists in knowing, it must be a knowledge of something.
_Krit._--It is so: it is knowledge of a man's self.
_Sokr._--What good does this knowledge procure for us? as
medical knowledge procures for us health--architectural knowledge,
buildings, &c.? _Krit._--It has no object positive result of
analogous character: but neither have arithmetic nor geometry.
_Sokr._--True, but in arithmetic and geometry, we can at least
indicate a something known, distinct from the knowledge. Number and
proportion are distinct from arithmetic, the science which takes
cognizance of them. Now what is that, of which temperance is the
knowledge,--distinct from temperance itself? _Krit._--It is on
this very point that temperance differs from all the other
cognitions. Each of the others is knowledge of something different
from itself, but not knowledge of itself: while temperance is
knowledge of all the other sciences and of itself also.[14]
_Sokr._--If this be so, it will of course be a knowledge of
ignorance, as well as a knowledge of knowledge?
_Krit._--Certainly.
[Footnote 13: Plato, Charm. 165 C.]
[Footnote 14: Plato, Charm. 166 C. [Greek: ai( me\n a)/llai pa=sai
a)/llou ei)si\n e)pistê=mai, e(autô=n d' ou)/; ê( de\ mo/nê tô=n te
a)/llôn e)pistêmô=n e)pistê/mê e)sti\ kai\ au)tê\ e(autê=s.] So
also 166 E.]
[Side-note: Sokrates doubts the possibility of any knowledge,
without a given _cognitum_ as its object. Analogies to prove
that knowledge of knowledge is impossible.]
_Sokr._--According to your explanation, then, it is only the
temperate man who knows himself. He alone is able to examine himself,
and thus to find out what he really knows and does not know: he alone
is able to examine others, and thus to find out what each man knows,
or what each man only believes himself to know without really
knowing. Temperance, or self-knowledge, is the knowledge what a man
knows, and what he does not know.[15] Now two questions arise upon
this: First, is it possible for a man to know, that he knows what he
does know, and that he does not know what he does not know? Next,
granting it to be possible, in what way do we gain by it? The first
of these two questions involves much difficulty. How can there be any
cognition, which is not cognition of a given _cognitum_, but
cognition merely of other cognitions and non-cognitions? There is no
vision except of some colour, no audition except of some sound: there
can be no vision of visions, or audition of auditions. So
likewise, all desire is desire of some pleasure; there is no desire
of desires. All volition is volition of some good; there is no
volition of volitions: all love applies to something beautiful--there
is no love of other loves. The like is true of fear, opinion, &c.
It would be singular therefore, if contrary to all these analogies,
there were any cognition not of some _cognitum_, but of itself
and other cognitions.[16]
[Footnote 15: Plato, Charm. 167 A.]
[Footnote 16: Plato, Charm. 167-168.]
[Side-note: All knowledge must be relative to some object.]
It is of the essence of cognition to be cognition of something, and
to have its characteristic property with reference to some
correlate.[17] What is greater, has its property of being greater in
relation to something else, which is less--not in relation to itself.
It cannot be greater than itself, for then it would also be less than
itself. It cannot include in itself the characteristic property of
the _correlatum_ as well as that of the _relatum_. So too
about what is older, younger, heavier, lighter: there is always a
something distinct, to which reference is made. Vision does not
include in itself both the property of seeing, and that of being
seen: the _videns_ is distinct from the _visum_. A movement
implies something else to be moved: a heater something else to be
heated.
[Footnote 17: Plato, Charm. 168 B. [Greek: e)/sti me\n au(tê\ ê(
e)pistê/mê tino\s e)pistê/mê, kai\ e)/chei tina toiau/tên du/namin
ô(/ste tino\s ei)=nai.]]
[Side-note: All properties are relative--every thing in nature
has its characteristic property with reference to something else.]
In all these cases (concludes Sokrates) the characteristic property
is essentially relative, implying something distinguishable from, yet
correlating with, itself. May we generalise the proposition, and
affirm, That all properties are relative, and that every thing in
nature has its characteristic property with reference, not to itself,
but to something else? Or is this true only of some things and not of
all--so that cognition may be something in the latter category?
This is an embarrassing question, which I do not feel qualified to
decide: neither the general question, whether there be any cases of
characteristic properties having no reference to any thing beyond
themselves, and therefore not relative, but absolute--nor the
particular question, whether cognition be one of those cases,
implying no separate _cognitum_, but being itself both
_relatum_ and _correlatum_--cognition of cognition.[18]
[Footnote 18: Plato, Charm. 168-169. 169 A: [Greek: mega/lou dê/ tinos
a)ndro\s dei=, o(/stis tou=to kata\ pa/ntôn i(kanô=s diairê/setai,
po/teron ou)de\n tô=n o)/ntôn tê\n au(tou= du/namin au)to\ pro\s e(auto\
pe/phuken e)/chein, a)lla\ pro\s a)llo\--ê)\ ta\ me\n, ta\ d' ou)/;
kai\ ei) e)/stin au(= a(/tina au)ta\ pro\s e(auta\ e)/chei, a)=r' e)n
tou/tois e)sti\n e)pistê/mê, ê(\n dê\ ê(mei=s sôphrosu/nên phame\n
ei)=nai. e)gô\ me\n ou) pisteu/ô e)mautô=| i(kano\s ei)=nai tau=ta
diele/sthtai.]]
But even if cognition of cognition be possible, I shall not
admit it as an explanation of what temperance is, until I have
satisfied myself that it is beneficial. For I have a presentiment
that temperance must be something beneficial and good.[19]
[Footnote 19: Plato, Charm. 169 B. [Greek: ô)phelimo/n ti ka)gatho\n
manteu/omai ei)=nai.]]
[Side-note: Even if cognition of cognition were possible,
cognition of non-cognition would be impossible. A man may know what
he knows, but he cannot know what he is ignorant of. He knows the
fact _that_ he knows: but he does not know how much he knows,
and how much he does not know.]
Let us concede for the present discussion (continues Sokrates) that
cognition of cognition is possible. Still how does this prove that
there can be cognition of non-cognition? that a man can know both
what he knows and what he does not know? For this is what we declared
self-knowledge and temperance to be.[20] To have cognition of
cognition is one thing: to have cognition of non-cognition is a
different thing, not necessarily connected with it. If you have
cognition of cognition, you will be enabled to distinguish that which
is cognition from that which is not--but no more. Now the knowledge
or ignorance of the matter of health is known by medical science:
that of justice known by political science. The knowledge of
knowledge simply--cognition of cognition--is different from both. The
person who possesses this last only, without knowing either medicine
or politics, will become aware that he knows something and possesses
some sort of knowledge, and will be able to verify so much with
regard to others. But _what_ it is that he himself knows, or
that others know, he will not thereby be enabled to find out: he will
not distinguish whether that which is known belong to physiology or
to politics; to do this, special acquirements are needed. You, a
temperate man therefore, as such, do not know _what_ you know
and _what_ you do not know; you know the bare fact, _that_
you know and _that_ you do not know. You will not be competent
to cross-examine any one who professes to know medicine or any other
particular subject, so as to ascertain whether the man really
possesses what he pretends to possess. There will be no point in
common between you and him. You, as a temperate man, possess
cognition of cognition, but you do not know any special
_cognitum_: the special man knows his own special
_cognitum_ but is a stranger to cognition generally. You cannot
question him, nor criticise what he says or performs, in his own
specialty--for of that you are ignorant:--no one can do it except
some fellow _expert_. You can ascertain that he possesses some
knowledge: but whether he possesses that particular knowledge to
which he lays claim, or whether he falsely pretends to it, you cannot
ascertain:--since, as a temperate man, you know only cognition and
non-cognition generally. To ascertain this point, you must be not
only a temperate man, but a man of special cognition besides.[21] You
can question and test no one, except another temperate man like
yourself.
[Footnote 20: Plato, Charm. 169 D. [Greek: nu=n me\n tou=to
xugchôrê/sômen, dunato\n ei)=nai gene/sthai e)pistê/mên e)pistê/mês--i)/thi
dê\ ou)=n, ei) o(/, ti ma/lista dunato\n tou=to, ti/ ma=llon oi(=o/n
te/ e)stin ei)de/nai a(/ te/ tis oi)=de kai\ a(\ mê/? tou=to ga\r
dê/pou e)/phamen ei)=nai to\ gignô/skein au(to\n kai\ sôphronei=n.]]
[Footnote 21: Plato, Charm. 170-171. 171 C: [Greek: Panto\s a)/ra
ma=llon, ei) ê( sôphrosu/nê e)pistê/mês e)pisê/mê mo/non e)sti\ kai\
a)nepistêmosu/nês, ou)/te i)atro\n diakri=nai oi(/a te e)/stai
e)pista/menon ta\ tê=s te/chnês, ê)\ mê\ e)pista/menon prospoiou/menon
de\ ê)\ oi)o/menon, ou)/te a)//lon ou)de/na tô=n e)pistame/nôn
kai\ o(tiou=n, plê/n ge to\n au(tou= o(mo/technon, ô(/sper oi(
a)/lloi dêmiourgoi/.]]
[Side-note: Temperance, therefore, as thus defined, would be
of little or no value.]
But if this be all that temperance can do, of what use is it to us
(continues Sokrates)? It is indeed a great benefit to know how much
we know, and how much we do not know: it is also a great benefit to
know respecting others, how much _they_ know, and how much they
do not know. If thus instructed, we should make fewer mistakes: we
should do by ourselves only what we knew how to do,--we should commit
to others that which they knew how to do, and which we did not know.
But temperance (meaning thereby cognition of cognition and of
non-cognition generally) does not confer such instruction, nor have
we found any science which does.[22] How temperance benefits us, does
not yet appear.
[Footnote 22: Plato, Charm. 172 A. [Greek: o(ra=|s, o(/ti ou)damou=
e)pistê/mê ou)demi/a toiau/tê ou)=sa pe/phantai.]]
[Side-note: But even granting the possibility of that which
has just been denied, still Temperance would be of little value.
Suppose that all separate work were well performed, by special
practitioners, we should not attain our end--Happiness.]
But let us even concede--what has been just shown to be impossible--that
through temperance we become aware of what we do know and what
we do not know. Even upon this hypothesis, it will be of little
service to us. We have been too hasty in conceding that it would be a
great benefit if each of us did only what he knew, committing to
others to do only what they knew. I have an awkward suspicion
(continues Sokrates) that after all, this would be no great
benefit.[23] It is true that upon this hypothesis, all operations in
society would be conducted scientifically and skilfully. We should
have none but competent pilots, physicians, generals, &c., acting
for us, each of them doing the work for which he was fit. The
supervision exercised by temperance (in the sense above defined)
would guard us against all pretenders. Let us even admit that as to
prediction of the future, we should have none but competent and
genuine prophets to advise us; charlatans being kept aloof by this
same supervision. We should thus have every thing done scientifically
and in a workmanlike manner. But should we for that reason do well
and be happy? Can that be made out, Kritias?[24]
[Footnote 23: Plato, Charm. 172-173.]
[Footnote 24: Plato, Charm. 173 C-D. [Greek: kateskeuasme/non dê\
ou(/tô to\ a)nthrô/pinon ge/nos o(/ti me\n e)pistêmo/nôs a)\n pra/ttoi
kai\ zô=|ê, e(/pomai--o(/ti d' e)pistêmo/nôs a)\n pra/ttontes eu)= a)\n
pra/ttoimen kai\ eu)daimonoi=men, tou=to de\ ou(/pô duna/metha
mathei=n, ô)= phi/le Kriti/a.]]
[Side-note: Which of the varieties of knowledge contributes
most to well-doing or happiness? That by which we know good and
evil.]
_Krit._--You will hardly find the end of well-doing anywhere
else, if you deny that it follows on doing scientifically or
according to knowledge.[25] _Sokr._--But according to knowledge,
of _what_? Of leather-cutting, brazen work, wool, wood, &c.?
_ Krit._--No, none of these. _Sokr._--Well then, you see,
we do not follow out consistently your doctrine--That the happy man
is he who lives scientifically, or according to knowledge. For all
these men live according to knowledge, and still you do not admit
them to be happy. Your definition of happiness applies only to some
portion of those who live according to knowledge, but not to all. How
are we to distinguish which of them? Suppose a man to know every
thing past, present, and future; which among the fractions of such
omniscience would contribute most to make him happy? Would they all
contribute equally? _Krit._--By no means. _Sokr._--Which of
them then would contribute most? Would it be that by which he knew
the art of gaming? _Krit._--Certainly not. _Sokr._--Or that
by which he knew the art of computing? _Krit._--No.
_Sokr._--Or that by which he knew the conditions of health?
_Krit._--That will suit better. _Sokr._--But which of them
most of all? _Krit._--That by which he knew good and evil.[26]
[Footnote 25: Plato, Charm. 173 D. [Greek: A)lla\ me/ntoi, ê)= d' o(/s,
ou) r(a|di/ôs eu(rê/seis a)/llo ti te/los tou= eu)= pra/ttein
e)a\n to\ e)pistêmo/nôs a)tima/sês.]]
[Footnote 26: Plato, Charm. 174.]
[Side-note: Without the science of good and evil, the other
special science will be of little or of no service. Temperance is not
the science of good and evil, and is of little service.]
_Sokr._--Here then, you have been long dragging me round in a
circle, keeping back the fact, that well-doing and happiness does not
arise from living according to science generally, not of all other
matters taken together--but from living according to the science of
this one single matter, good and evil. If you exclude this last, and
leave only the other sciences, each of these others will work as
before: the medical man will heal, the weaver will prepare clothes,
the pilot will navigate his vessel, the general will conduct his
army--each of them scientifically. Nevertheless, that each of these
things shall conduce to our well-being and profit, will be an
impossibility, if the science of good and evil be wanting.[27] Now
this science of good and evil, the special purpose of which is to
benefit us,[28] is altogether different from temperance; which you
have defined as the science of cognition and non-cognition, and which
appears not to benefit us at all. _Krit._--Surely it does
benefit us: for it presides over and regulates all the other
sciences, and of course regulates this very science, of good and
evil, among the rest. _Sokr._--In what way can it benefit us? It
does not procure for us any special service, such as good health:
_that_ is the province of medicine: in like manner, each
separate result arises from its own producing art. To confer benefit
is, as we have just laid down, the special province of the science of
good and evil.[29] Temperance, as the science of cognition and
non-cognition, cannot work any benefit at all.
[Footnote 27: Plato, Charm. 174 C-D. [Greek: e)pei\ ei) the/leis
e)xelei=n tau/tên tê\n e)pistê/mên] (of good and evil) [Greek: e)k
tô=n a)/llôn e)pistêmô=n, ê(=tto/n ti ê( me\n i)atrikê\ u(giai/nein
poiê/sei, ê( de\ skutikê\ u(podede/sthai, ê( de\ u(phantikê\
ê(mphie/sthai, ê( de\ kubbernêtikê\ kôlu/sei e)n tê=| thala/ttê|
a)pothnê/skein kai\ ê( stratêgikê\ e)n pole/mô|? Ou)de\n ê(=tton, e)/phê.
A)lla\ to\ eu)= te tou/tôn e(/kasta gi/gnesthai kai\ ô)pheli/môs
a)poleloipo\s ê(ma=s e)/stai tau/tês a)pou/sês.]]
[Footnote 28: Plato, Charm. 174 D. [Greek: ê(=s e)/rgon e)sti\ to\
ô)phelei=n ê(ma=s], &c.]
[Footnote 29: Plato, Charm. 175 A. [Greek: Ou)k a)/ra u(giei/as e)/stai
dêmiourgo/s (ê( sôphrosu/nê). Ou) dê=ta. A)/llês ga\r ê)=n te/chnês
u(giei/a, ê)\ ou)/? A)/llês. Ou)d' a)/ra ô)phelei/as, ô)= e(/taire;
a)/llê| ga\r au)= a)pe/domen tou=to to\ e)/rgon te/chnê| nu=n dê/;
ê)= ga/r? Pa/nu ge. Pô=s ou)=n ô)phe/limos e)/stai ê( sôphrosu/nê,
ou)demia=s ô)phelei/as ou)=sa dêmiourgo/s? Ou)damô=s, ô)= Sô/krates,
e)/oike/ ge.]]
[Side-note: Sokrates confesses to entire failure in his
research. He cannot find out what temperance is: although several
concessions have been made which cannot be justified.]
Thus then, concludes Sokrates, we are baffled in every way: we
cannot find out what temperance is, nor what that name has been
intended to designate. All our tentatives have failed; although, in
our anxiety to secure some result, we have accepted more than one
inadmissible hypothesis. Thus we have admitted that there might exist
cognition of cognition, though our discussion tended to negative such
a possibility. We have farther granted, that this cognition of
cognition, or science of science, might know all the operations of
each separate and special science: so that the temperate man
(_i.e._ he who possesses cognition of cognition) might know both
what he knows and what he does not know: might know, namely, that he
knows the former and that he does not know the latter. We have
granted this, though it is really an absurdity to say, that what a
man does not know at all, he nevertheless does know after a certain
fashion.[30] Yet after these multiplied concessions against strict
truth, we have still been unable to establish our definition of
temperance: for temperance as we defined it has, after all, turned
out to be thoroughly unprofitable.
[Footnote 30: Plato, Charm. 175 B. [Greek: kai\ ga\r e)pistê/mên
e)pistê/mês ei)=nai xunechôrê/samen, ou)k e)ô=ntos tou= lo/gou ou)de\
pha/skontos ei)=nai; kai\ tau/tê| au)= tê=| e)pistê/mê| kai\ ta\ tô=n
a)/llôn e)pistêmô=n e)/rga gignô/skein xunechôrê/samen, ou)de\ tou=t'
e)ô=ntos tou= lo/gou, i(/na dê\ ê(mi=n ge/noito o( sô/phrôn
e)pistê/môn ô(=n te oi)=den, o(/ti oi)=de, kai\ ô(=n mê\ oi)=den, o(/ti
ou)k oi)=de. tou=to me\n dê\ kai\ panta/pasi megaloprepô=s
xunechôrê/samen, ou)d' e)piskepsa/menoi to\ a)du/naton ei)=nai
a(/ tis mê\ oi)=de mêdamô=s, tau=ta ei)de/nai a(mô=s ge/ pôs; o(/ti
ga\r ou)k oi)=de, phêsi\n au)ta\ ei)de/nai ê( ê(mete/ra o(mologi/a.
kai/toi, ô(s e)gô=mai, ou)deno\s o(/tou ou)chi\ a)logô/teron tou=t'
a)\n phanei/ê.] This would not appear an absurdity to Aristotle.
See Analyt. Priora, ii. p. 67, a. 21; Anal. Post. i. 71, a. 28.]
[Side-note: Temperance is and must be a good thing: but
Charmides cannot tell whether he is temperate or not; since what
temperance is remains unknown.]
It is plain that we have taken the wrong road, and that I (Sokrates)
do not know how to conduct the enquiry. For temperance, whatever it
may consist in, must assuredly be a great benefit: and you,
Charmides, are happy if you possess it. How can I tell (rejoins
Charmides) whether I possess it or not: since even men like you and
Kritias cannot discover what it is?[31]
[Footnote 31: Plato, Charm. 176 A.]
* * * * *
[Side-note: Expressions both from Charmides and Kritias of
praise and devotion to Sokrates, at the close of the dialogue.
Dramatic ornament throughout.]
Here ends the dialogue called Charmidês[32] after the interchange of
a few concluding compliments, forming part of the great dramatic
richness which characterises this dialogue from the beginning. I make
no attempt to reproduce this latter attribute; though it is one of
the peculiar merits of Plato in reference to ethical enquiry,
imparting to the subject a charm which does not naturally belong to
it. I confine myself to the philosophical bearing of the dialogue.
According to the express declaration of Sokrates, it ends in nothing
but disappointment. No positive result is attained. The problem--What
is Temperance?--remains unsolved, after four or five different
solutions have been successively tested and repudiated.
[Footnote 32: See Appendix at end of chapter.]
[Side-note: The Charmides is an excellent specimen of
Dialogues of Search. Abundance of guesses and tentatives, all
ultimately disallowed.]
The Charmidês (like the Lachês) is a good illustrative specimen of
those Dialogues of Search, the general character and purpose of which
I have explained in my eighth** chapter. It proves nothing: it
disproves several hypotheses: but it exhibits (and therein consists
its value) the anticipating, guessing, tentative, and eliminating
process, without which no defensible conclusions can be
obtained--without which, even if such be found, no advocate can be
formed capable of defending them against an acute cross-examiner. In most
cases, this tentative process is forgotten or ignored: even when
recognised as a reality, it is set aside with indifference, often
with ridicule. A writer who believes himself to have solved any
problem, publishes his solution together with the proofs; and
acquires deserved credit for it, if those proofs give satisfaction.
But he does not care to preserve, nor do the public care to know, the
steps by which such solution has been reached. Nevertheless in most
cases, and in all cases involving much difficulty, there has been a
process, more or less tedious, of tentative and groping--of guesses
at first hailed as promising, then followed out to a certain extent,
lastly discovered to be untenable. The history of science,[33]
astronomical, physical, chemical, physiological, &c.,
wherever it has been at all recorded, attests this constant
antecedence of a period of ignorance, confusion, and dispute, even in
cases where ultimately a solution has been found commanding the
nearly unanimous adhesion of the scientific world. But on subjects
connected with man and society, this period of dispute and confusion
continues to the present moment. No unanimity has ever been
approached, among nations at once active in intellect and enjoying
tolerable liberty of dissent. Moreover--apart from the condition of
different sciences among mature men--we must remember that the
transitive process, above described, represents the successive stages
by which every adult mind has been gradually built up from infancy.
Trial and error--alternate guess and rejection, generation and
destruction of sentiments and beliefs--is among the most widespread
facts of human intelligence.[34] Even those ordinary minds, which in
mature life harden with the most exemplary fidelity into the locally
prevalent type of orthodoxy,--have all in their earlier years gone
through that semi-fluid and indeterminate period, in which the type
to come is yet a matter of doubt--in which the head might have been
permanently lengthened or permanently flattened, according to the
direction in which pressure was applied.
[Footnote 33: It is not often that historians of science take much
pains to preserve and bring together the mistaken guesses and
tentatives which have preceded great physical discoveries. One
instance in which this has been ably and carefully done is in the
'Biography of Cavendish,' the chemist and natural philosopher, by Dr.
Geo. Wilson.
The great chemical discovery of the composition of water,
accomplished during the last quarter of the eighteenth century, has
been claimed as the privilege of three eminent scientific
men--Cavendish, Watt, and Lavoisier. The controversy on the subject,
voluminous and bitter, has been the means of recording each
successive scientific phase and point of view. It will be found
admirably expounded in this biography. Wilson sets forth the
misconceptions, confusion of ideas, approximations to truth seen but
not followed out, &c., which prevailed upon the scientific men of
that day, especially under the misleading influence of the
"phlogiston theory," then universally received.
To Plato such a period of mental confusion would have been in itself
an interesting object for contemplation and description. He might
have dramatised it under the names of various disputants, with the
cross-examining Elenchus, personified in Sokrates, introduced to stir
up the debate, either by first advocating, then refuting, a string of
successive guesses and dreams (Charmidês, 173 A) of his own, or by
exposing similar suggestions emanating from others; especially in
regard to the definition of _phlogiston_, an entity which then
overspread and darkened all chemical speculation, but which every
theorist thought himself obliged to define. The dialogues would have
ended (as the Protagoras, Lysis, Charmidês, &c., now end) by
Sokrates deriding the ill success which had attended them in the
search for an explanation, and by his pointing out that while all the
theorists talked familiarly about _phlogiston_ as a powerful
agent, none of them could agree what it was.
See Dr. Wilson's 'Biography of Cavendish,' pp. 36-198-320-325, and
elsewhere.]
[Footnote 34: It is strikingly described by Plato in one of the most
remarkable passages of the speech of Diotima in the Symposion, pp.
207-208.]
[Side-note: Trial and Error, the natural process of the human
mind. Plato stands alone in bringing to view and dramatising this
part of the mental process. Sokrates accepts for himself the
condition of conscious ignorance.]
We shall follow Plato towards the close of his career (Treatise De
Legibus), into an imperative and stationary orthodoxy of his
own: but in the dialogues which I have already reviewed, as well as
in several others which I shall presently notice, no mention is made
of any given affirmative doctrine as indispensable to arrive at
ultimately. Plato here concentrates his attention upon the
indeterminate period of the mind: looking upon the mind not as an
empty vessel, requiring to be filled by ready-made matter from
without--nor as a blank sheet, awaiting a foreign hand to write
characters upon it--but as an assemblage of latent capacities, which
must be called into action by stimulus and example, but which can
only attain improvement through multiplied trials and multiplied
failures. Whereas in most cases these failures are forgotten, the
peculiarity of Plato consists in his bringing them to view with full
detail, explaining the reasons of each. He illustrates abundantly,
and dramatises with the greatest vivacity, the intellectual process
whereby opinions are broached, at first adopted, then mistrusted,
unmade, and re-made--or perhaps not re-made at all, but exchanged for
a state of conscious ignorance. The great hero and operator in this
process is the Platonic Sokrates, who accepts for himself this
condition of conscious ignorance, and even makes it a matter of
comparative pride, that he stands nearly alone in such
confession.[35] His colloquial influence, working powerfully and
almost preternaturally,[36] not only serves both to spur and to
direct the activity of hearers still youthful and undecided, but also
exposes those who have already made up their minds and confidently
believe themselves to know. Sokrates brings back these latter from
the false persuasion of knowledge to the state of conscious
ignorance, and to the prior indeterminate condition of mind, in which
their opinions have again to be put together by the tentative and
guessing process. This tentative process, prosecuted under the drill
of Sokrates, is in itself full of charm and interest for Plato,
whether it ends by finding a good solution or only by discarding a
bad one.
[Footnote 35: Plato, Apolog. Sokr. pp. 21-22-23.]
[Footnote 36: Plato, Symposion, 213 E, 215-216; Menon, 80 A-B.]
[Side-note: Familiar words--constantly used, with much earnest
feeling, but never understood nor defined--ordinary phenomenon in
human society.]
The Charmidês is one of the many Platonic dialogues wherein such
intellectual experimentation appears depicted without any positive
result: except as it adds fresh matter to illustrate that wide-spread
mental fact,--(which has already come before the reader, in
Euthyphron, Alkibiadês, Hippias, Erastæ, Lachês, &c., as to
holiness, beauty, philosophy, courage, &c., and is now brought to
view in the case of _temperance_ also; all of them words in
every one's mouth, and tacitly assumed by every one as known
quantities) the perpetual and confident judgments which mankind are
in the habit of delivering--their apportionment of praise and blame,
as well as of reward and punishment consequent on praise and
blame--without any better basis than that of strong emotion imbibed
they know not how, and without being able to render any rational
explanation even of the familiar words round which such emotions are
grouped. No philosopher has done so much as Plato to depict in detail
this important fact--the habitual condition of human society, modern
as well as ancient, and for that very reason generally unnoticed.[37]
The emotional or subjective value of temperance is all that Sokrates
determines, and which indeed he makes his point of departure.
Temperance is essentially among the fine, beautiful, honourable,
things:[38] but its rational or objective value (_i.e._, what is
the common object characterising all temperate acts or persons), he
cannot determine. Here indeed Plato is not always consistent with
himself: for we shall come to other dialogues wherein he professes
himself incompetent to say whether a thing be beautiful or not, until
it be determined what the thing is:[39] and we have already found
Sokrates declaring (in the Hippias Major), that we cannot
determine whether any particular object is beautiful or not, until we
have first determined, What is Beauty in the Absolute, or the
Self-Beautiful? a problem nowhere solved by Plato.
[Footnote 37: "Whoever has reflected on the generation of ideas in
his own mind, or has investigated the causes of misunderstandings
among mankind, will be obliged to proclaim as a fact deeply seated in
human nature--That most of the misunderstandings and contradictions
among men, most of the controversies and errors both in science and
in society, arise usually from our assuming (consciously or
unconsciously) fundamental maxims and fundamental facts as if they
were self-evident, and as if they must be assumed by every one else
besides. Accordingly we never think of closely examining them, until
at length experience has taught us that these _self-evident_
matters are exactly what stand most in need of proof, and what form
the special root of divergent opinions."--(L. O. Bröcker--Untersuchungen
über die Glaubwürdigkeit der alt-Römischen Geschichte, p. 490.)]
[Footnote 38: Plato, Charm. 159 B, 160 D. [Greek: ê( sôphrosu/nê--tô=n
kalô=n ti--e)n tô=| lo/gô=| tô=n kalô=n ti]. So also Sokrates
in the Lachês (192 C), assumes that courage is [Greek: tô=n pa/nu kalô=n
pragma/tôn], though he professes not to know nor to be able to discover
what courage is.]
[Footnote 39: See Gorgias, 462 B, 448 E; Menon, 70 B.]
[Side-note: Different ethical points of view in different
Platonic dialogues.]
Among the various unsuccessful definitions of temperance propounded,
there is more than one which affords farther example to show how
differently Plato deals with the same subject in different dialogues.
Here we have the phrase--"to do one's own business"--treated as an
unmeaning puzzle, and exhibited as if it were analogous to various
other phrases, with which the analogy is more verbal than real. But
in the Republic, Plato admits this phrase as well understood, and
sets it forth as the constituent element of justice; in the Gorgias,
as the leading mark of philosophical life.[40]
[Footnote 40: Plato, Republ. iv. 433, vi. 496 C, viii. 550 A;
Gorgias, 526 C. Compare also Timæus, 72 A, Xen, Mem. ii. 9, 1.]
[Side-note: Self-knowledge is here declared to be impossible.]
Again, another definition given by Kritias is, That temperance
consists in knowing yourself, or in self-knowledge. In commenting
upon this definition, Sokrates makes out--first, that self-knowledge
is impossible: next, that if possible, it would be useless. You
cannot know yourself, he argues: you cannot know what you know, and
what you do not know: to say that you know what you know, is either
tautological or untrue--to say that you know what you do not know, is
a contradiction. All cognition must be cognition of something
distinct from yourself: it is a relative term which must have some
correlate, and cannot be its own correlate: you cannot have cognition
of cognition, still less cognition of non-cognition.
[Side-note: In other dialogues, Sokrates declares
self-knowledge to be essential and inestimable. Necessity for
the student to have presented to him dissentient points of view.]
This is an important point of view, which I shall discuss more at
length when I come to the Platonic Theætetus. I bring it to view here
only as contrasting with different language held by the Platonic
Sokrates in other dialogues; where he insists on the great value and
indispensable necessity of self-knowledge, as a preliminary to all
other knowledge--upon the duty of eradicating from men's minds that
false persuasion of their own knowledge which they universally
cherished--and upon the importance of forcing them to know their
own ignorance as well as their own knowledge. In the face of this
last purpose, so frequently avowed by the Platonic Sokrates
(indirectly even in this very dialogue),[41] we remark a material
discrepancy, when he here proclaims self-knowledge to be impossible.
We must judge every dialogue by itself, illustrating it when
practicable by comparison with others, but not assuming consistence
between them as a postulate _à priori_. It is a part of Plato's
dramatic and tentative mode of philosophising to work out different
ethical points of view, and to have present to his mind one or other
of them, with peculiar force in each different dialogue. The subject
is thus brought before us on all its sides, and the reader is
familiarised with what a dialectician might say, whether capable of
being refuted or not. Inconsistency between one dialogue and another
is not a fault in the Platonic dialogues of Search; but is, on the
contrary, a part of the training process, for any student who is
destined to acquire that full mastery of question and answer which
Plato regards as the characteristic test of knowledge. It is a puzzle
and provocative to the internal meditation of the student.
[Footnote 41: Plato, Charm. 166 D.]
[Side-note: Courage and Temperance are shown to have no
distinct meaning, except as founded on the general cognizance of good
and evil.]
In analyzing the Lachês, we observed that the definition of courage
given by Nikias was shown by Sokrates to have no meaning, except in
so far as it coincided with the general knowledge or cognition of
good and evil. Here, too, in the Charmidês, we are brought in the
last result to the same terminus--the general cognition of good and
evil. But Temperance, as previously good and defined, is not
comprehended under that cognition, and is therefore pronounced to be
unprofitable.
[Side-note: Distinction made between the special sciences and
the science of Good and Evil. Without this last, the special sciences
are of no use.]
This cognition of good and evil--the science of the profitable--is
here (in the Charmidês) proclaimed by Sokrates to have a place of its
own among the other sciences; and even to be first among them,
essentially necessary to supervise and direct them, as it had been
declared in Alkibiadês II. Now the same supervising place and
directorship had been claimed by Kritias for Temperance as he
defines it--that is, self-knowledge, or the cognition of our
cognitions and non-cognitions. But Sokrates doubts even the reality
of such self-knowledge: and granting for argument's sake that it
exists, he still does not see how it can be profitable. For the
utmost which its supervision can ensure would be, that each
description of work shall be scientifically done, by the skilful man,
and not by the unskilful. But it is not true, absolutely speaking (he
argues), that acting scientifically or with knowledge is sufficient
for well doing or for happiness: for the question must next be
asked--Knowledge--of what? Not knowledge of leather-cutting, carpenter's
or brazier's work, arithmetic, or even medicine: these, and many others,
a man may possess, and may act according to them; but still he will
not attain the end of being happy. All cognitions contribute in
greater or less proportion towards that end: but what contributes
most, and most essentially, is the cognition of good and evil,
without which all the rest are insufficient. Of this last-mentioned
cognition or science, it is the special object to ensure profit or
benefit:[42] to take care that everything done by the other sciences
shall be done well or in a manner conducing towards the end
Happiness. After this, there is no province left for
temperance--_i.e._, self-knowledge, or the knowledge of cognitions and
non-cognitions: no assignable way in which it can yield any benefit.[43]
[Footnote 42: Plato, Charm. 174 D. [Greek: Ou)ch au(/tê| de/ ge, ô(s
e)/oiken, e)sti\n ê( sôphrosu/nê, a)ll' ê(=s e)/rgon e)sti\ to\
ô)phelei=n ê(ma=s. Ou) ga\r e)pistêmô=n ge kai\ a)nepistêmosunô=n
ê( e)pistê/mê e)sti/n, a)lla\ a)gathou= te kai\ kakou=.]]
[Footnote 43: Plato, Charm. 174 E. [Greek: Ou)k a)/ra u(giei/as e)/stai
dêmiourgo/s? Ou) dê=ta. A)/llês ga\r ê)=n te/chnês u(gi/eia? ê)\ ou)/?
A)/llês; Ou)d' a)/ra ô)phelei/as, ô)= e(tai=re; a)/llê| ga\r au)=
a)pe/domen tou=to to\ e)/rgon te/chnê| nu=n dê/; ê)= ga\r? Pa/nu ge.
Pô=s ou)=n ô)phe/limos e)/stai ê(sôphrosu/nê, ou)demia=s ô)phelei/as
ou)=sa dêmiourgo/s? Ou)damô=s, ô)= Sô/krates, e)/oike/ ge.]]
[Side-note: Knowledge, always relative to some object known.
Postulate or divination of a Science of Teleology.]
Two points are here to be noted, as contained and debated in the
handling of this dialogue. 1. Knowledge absolutely, is a word without
meaning: all knowledge is relative, and has a definite object or
_cognitum_: there can be no _scientia scientiarum_. 2.
Among the various objects of knowledge (_cognita_ or
_cognoscenda_), one is, _good and evil_. There is a science
of good and evil, the function of which is, to watch over and compare
the results of the other sciences, in order to promote results of
happiness, and to prevent results of misery: without the supervision
of this latter science, the other sciences might be all exactly
followed out, but no rational comparison could be had between
them.[44] In other words, there is a science of Ends, estimating the
comparative worth of each End in relation to other Ends (Teleology):
distinct from those other more special sciences, which study the
means each towards a separate End of its own. Here we fall into the
same track as we have already indicated in Lachês and Alkibiadês II.
[Footnote 44: Compare what has been said upon the same subject in my
remarks on Alkib. i. and ii. p. 31.**]
[Side-note: Courage and Temperance, handled both by Plato and
by Aristotle. Comparison between the two.]
These matters I shall revert to in other dialogues, where we shall
find them turned over and canvassed in many different ways. One
farther observation remains to be made on the Lachês and Charmidês,
discussing as they do Courage (which is also again discussed in the
Protagoras) and Temperance. An interesting comparison may be made
between them and the third book of the Nikomachean Ethics of
Aristotle,[45] where the same two subjects are handled in the
Aristotelian manner. The direct, didactic, systematising, brevity of
Aristotle contrasts remarkably with the indirect and circuitous
prolixity, the multiplied suggestive comparisons, the shifting points
of view, which we find in Plato. Each has its advantages: and both
together will be found not more than sufficient, for any one who is
seriously bent on acquiring what Plato calls knowledge, with the
cross-examining power included in it. Aristotle is greatly superior
to Plato in one important attribute of a philosopher: in the care
which he takes to discriminate the different significations of the
same word: the univocal and the equivocal, the generically identical
from the remotely analogical, the proper from the improper, the
literal from the metaphorical. Of such precautions we discover little
or no trace in Plato, who sometimes seems not merely to neglect, but
even to deride them. Yet Aristotle, assisted as he was by all Plato's
speculations before us, is not to be understood as having superseded
the necessity for that negative Elenchus which animates the Platonic
dialogues of Search: nor would his affirmative doctrines have held
their grounds before a cross-examining Sokrates.
[Footnote 45: Aristot. Ethic. Nikom. iii. p. 1115, 1119; also Ethic.
Eudem. iii. 1229-1231.
The comments of Aristotle upon the doctrine of Sokrates respecting
Courage seem to relate rather to the Protagoras than to the Lachês of
Plato. See Eth. Nik. 1116, 6, 4; Eth. Eud. 1229, a. 15.]
APPENDIX.
The dialogue Charmidês is declared to be spurious, not only by Ast,
but also by Socher (Ast, Platon's Leb. pp. 419-428; Socher, Ueber
Platon, pp. 130-137). Steinhart maintains the genuineness of the
dialogue against them; declaring (as in regard to the Lachês) that he
can hardly conceive how critics can mistake the truly Platonic
character of it, though here too, as in the Lachês, he detects
"adolescentiæ vestigia" (Steinhart, Einleit. zum Charmidês,
pp. 290-293).
Schleiermacher considers Charmidês as well as Lachês to be appendixes
to the Protagoras, which opinion both Stallbaum (Proleg. ad Charm, p.
121; Proleg. ad Lachet. p. 30, 2nd ed.) and Steinhart controvert.
The views of Stallbaum respecting the Charmidês are declared by
Steinhart (p. 290) to be "recht äusserlich und oberflächlich". To me
they appear much nearer the truth than the profound and recondite
meanings, the far-sighted indirect hints, which Steinhart himself
perceives or supposes in the words of Plato.
These critics consider the dialogue as composed during the government
of the Thirty at Athens, in which opinion I do not concur.