LACHES.
The main substance of this dialogue consists of a discussion, carried
on by Sokrates with Nikias and Lachês, respecting Courage. Each of
the two latter proposes an explanation of Courage: Sokratês
criticises both of them, and reduces each to a confessed
contradiction.
[Side-note: Lachês. Subject and persons of the dialogue,
Whether it is useful that two young men should receive lessons from a
master of arms. Nikias and Lachês differ in opinion.]
The discussion is invited, or at least dramatically introduced, by
two elderly men--Lysimachus, son of Aristeides the Just,--and
Melêsias, son of Thucydides the rival of Perikles. Lysimachus and
Melêsias, confessing with shame that they are inferior to their
fathers, because their education has been neglected, wish to guard
against the same misfortune in the case of their own sons: respecting
the education of whom, they ask the advice of Nikias and Lachês. The
question turns especially upon the propriety of causing their sons to
receive lessons from a master of arms just then in vogue. Nikias and
Lachês, both of them not merely distinguished citizens but also
commanders of Athenian armies, are assumed to be well qualified to
give advice. Accordingly they deliver their opinions: Nikias
approving such lessons as beneficial, in exalting the courage of a
young man, and rendering him effective on the field of battle: while
Lachês takes an opposite view, disparages the masters of arms as
being no soldiers, and adds that they are despised by the
Lacedæmonians, to whose authority on military matters general
deference was paid in Greece.[1] Sokratês,--commended greatly by
Nikias for his acuteness and sagacity, by Lachês for his courage
in the battle of Delium,--is invited to take part in the
consultation. Being younger than both, he waits till they have
delivered their opinions, and is then called upon to declare with
which of the two his own judgment will concur.[2]
[Footnote 1: Plato, Lachês, 182-183.]
[Footnote 2: Plato, Lachês, 184 D.
Nikias is made to say that Sokrates has recently recommended to him
Damon, as a teacher of [Greek: mousikê\] to his sons, and that Damon
had proved an admirable teacher as well as companion (180 D). Damon
is mentioned by Plato generally with much eulogy.]
[Side-note: Sokrates is invited to declare his opinion. He
replies that the point cannot be decided without a competent
professional judge.]
_Sokr._--The question must not be determined by a plurality of
votes, but by superiority of knowledge.[3] If we were debating about
the proper gymnastic discipline for these young men, we should
consult a known artist or professional trainer, or at least some one
who had gone through a course of teaching and practice under the
trainer. The first thing to be enquired therefore is, whether, in
reference to the point now under discussion, there be any one of us
professionally or technically competent, who has studied under good
masters, and has proved his own competence as a master by producing
well-trained pupils. The next thing is, to understand clearly what it
is, with reference to which such competence is required.[4]
_Nikias._--Surely the point before us is, whether it be wise to
put these young men under the lessons of the master of arms? That is
what we want to know. _Sokr._--Doubtless it is: but that is only
one particular branch of a wider and more comprehensive enquiry. When
you are considering whether a particular ointment is good for your
eyes, it is your eyes, and their general benefit, which form the
subject of investigation--not the ointment simply. The person to
assist you will be, he who understands professionally the general
treatment of the eyes. So in this case, you are enquiring whether
lessons in arms will be improving for the minds and character of your
sons. Look out therefore for some one who is professionally
competent, from having studied under good masters, in regard to the
general treatment of the mind.[5] _Lachês._--But there are
various persons who, without ever having studied under masters,
possess greater technical competence than others who have so
studied. _Sokr._--There are such persons: but you will never
believe it upon their own assurance, unless they can show you some
good special work actually performed by themselves.
[Footnote 3: Plato, Lachês, 184 E. [Greek: e)pistê/mê| dei=
kri/nesthai a)ll' ou) plê/thei to\ me/llon kalô=s krithê/sesthai.]]
[Footnote 4: Plato, Lachês, 185 C.]
[Footnote 5: Plato, Lachês, 185 E. [Greek: ei)/ tis ê(mô=n techniko\s
peri\ psuchê=s therapei/an, kai\ oi(=o/s te kalô=s tou=to
therapeu=sai, kai\ o(/tô| dida/skaloi a)gathoi\ gego/nasi, tou=to
skepte/on.]]
[Side-note: Those who deliver an opinion must begin by proving
their competence to judge--Sokrates avows his own incompetence.]
_Sokr._--Now then, Lysimachus, since you have invited Lachês and
Nikias, as well as me, to advise you on the means of most effectively
improving the mind of your son, it is for us to show you that we
possess competent professional skill respecting the treatment of the
youthful mind. We must declare to you who are the masters from whom
we have learnt, and we must prove their qualifications. Or if we have
had no masters, we must demonstrate to you our own competence by
citing cases of individuals, whom we have successfully trained, and
who have become incontestably good under our care. If we can fulfil
neither of these two conditions, we ought to confess our incompetence
and decline advising you. We must not begin to try our hands upon so
precious a subject as the son of a friend, at the hazard of doing him
more harm than good.[6]
[Footnote 6: Plato, Lachês, 186 B.]
As to myself, I frankly confess that I have neither had any master to
impart to me such competence, nor have I been able to acquire it by
my own efforts. I am not rich enough to pay the Sophists, who profess
to teach it. But as to Nikias and Lachês, they are both older and
richer than I am: so that they may well have learnt it from others,
or acquired it for themselves. They must be thoroughly satisfied of
their own knowledge on the work of education; otherwise they would
hardly have given such confident opinions, pronouncing what pursuits
are good or bad for youth. For my part, I trust them implicitly: the
only thing which surprises me, is, that they dissent from each
other.[7] It is for you therefore, Lysimachus, to ask Nikias and
Lachês,--Who have been their masters? Who have been their
fellow-pupils? If they have been their own masters, what proof can they
produce of previous success in teaching, and what examples can they
cite of pupils whom they have converted from bad to good?[8]
[Footnote 7: Plato, Lachês, 186 C-D. [Greek: dokou=si dê/ moi
dunatoi\ ei)=nai paideu=sai a)/nthrôpon; ou) ga\r a)\n pote a)deô=s
a)pephai/nonto peri\ e)pitêdeuma/tôn ne/ô| chrêstô=n te kai\
ponêrô=n, ei) mê\ au)toi=s e)pi/steuon i(kanô=s ei)de/nai. ta\ me\n
ou)=n a)/lla, e)/gôge tou/tois pisteu/ô, o(/ti de\ diaphe/resthon
a)llê/loin, e)thau/masa.]]
[Footnote 8: Plato, Lachês, 186-187.]
[Side-note: Nikias and Lachês submit to be cross-examined
by Sokrates.]
_Nikias._--I knew from the beginning that we should both of us
fall under the cross-examination of Sokrates, and be compelled to
give account of our past lives. For my part, I have already gone
through this scrutiny before, and am not averse to undergo it again.
_Lachês._--And I, though I have never experienced it before,
shall willingly submit to learn from Sokrates, whom I know to be a
man thoroughly courageous and honest in his actions. I hate men whose
lives are inconsistent with their talk.[9]--Thus speak both of them.
[Footnote 9: Plato, Lachês, 188.
"Ego odi homines ignavâ operâ et philosophiâ sententiâ," is a line
cited by Cicero out of one of the Latin comic writers.]
* * * * *
[Side-note: Both of them give opinions offhand, according to
their feelings on the special case--Sokrates requires that the
question shall be generalised, and examined as a branch of
education.]
This portion of the dialogue, which forms a sort of preamble to the
main discussion, brings out forcibly some of the Platonic points of
view. We have seen it laid down in the Kriton--That in questions
about right and wrong, good and evil, &c., we ought not to trust
the decision of the Many, but only that of the One Wise Man. Here we
learn something about the criteria by which this One man may be
known. He must be one who has gone through a regular training under
some master approved in ethical or educational teaching: or, if he
cannot produce such a certificate, he must at least cite sufficient
examples of men whom he has taught well himself. This is the Sokratic
comparison, assimilating the general art of living well to the
requirements of a special profession, which a man must learn through
express teaching, from a master who has proved his ability, and
through conscious application of his own. Nikias and Lachês give
their opinions offhand and confidently, upon the question whether
lessons from the master of arms be profitable to youth or not. Plato,
on the contrary, speaking through Sokrates, points out that this is
only one branch of the more comprehensive question as to education
generally--"What are the qualities and habits proper to be imparted
to youth by training? What is the proper treatment of the mind? No
one is competent to decide the special question, except he who
has professionally studied the treatment of the mind." To deal with
the special question, without such preliminary general preparation,
involves rash and unverified assumptions, which render any opinion so
given dangerous to act upon. Such is the judgment of the Platonic
Sokrates, insisting on the necessity of taking up ethical questions
in their most comprehensive aspect.
[Side-note: Appeal of Sokrates to the judgment of the One Wise
Man--this man is never seen or identified.]
Consequent upon this preamble, we should expect that Lachês and
Nikias would be made to cite the names of those who had been their
masters; or to produce some examples of persons effectively taught by
themselves. This would bring us a step nearer to that One Wise
Man--often darkly indicated, but nowhere named or brought into
daylight--from whom alone we can receive a trustworthy judgment. But
here, as in the Kriton and so many other Platonic dialogues, we get
only a Pisgah view of our promised adviser--nothing more. The discussion
takes a different turn.
* * * * *
[Side-note: We must know what virtue is, before we give an
opinion on education. Virtue, as a whole, is too large a question. We
will enquire about one branch of virtue--courage.]
_Sokr._--"We will pursue a line of enquiry which conducts to the
same result; and which starts even more decidedly from the
beginning.[10] We are called upon to advise by what means virtue can
be imparted to these youths, so as to make them better men. Of
course, this implies that we know what virtue is: otherwise how can
we give advice as to the means of acquiring it? _Lachês._--We
could give no advice at all. _Sokr._--We affirm ourselves
therefore to know what virtue is? _Lachês._--We do.
_Sokr._--Since therefore we know, we can farther declare what it
is.[11] _Lachês._--Of course we can. _Sokr._--Still, we
will not at once enquire as to the whole of virtue, which might be an
arduous task, but as to a part of it--Courage: that part to which the
lessons of the master of arms are supposed to tend. We will
first enquire what courage is: after that has been determined,
we will then consider how it can best be imparted to these youths."
[Footnote 10: Plato, Lachês, 189 E. [Greek: kai\ ê( toia/de ske/psis
ei)s tau)to\n phe/rei, schedo\n de/ ti kai\ ma=llon e)x a)rchê=s
ei)/ê a)\n.]]
[Footnote 11: Plato, Lachês, 190 C. [Greek: phame\n a)/ra, ô)=
La/chês, ei)de/nai au)to\ (tê\n a)retê\n) o(/, ti e)/sti. Phame\n
me/ntoi. Ou)kou=n o(/ ge i)/smen, ka)\n ei)/poimen dê/pou, ti/
e)/sti. Pô=s ga\r ou)/?]]
"Try then if you can tell me, Lachês, what courage is.
_Lachês._--There is no difficulty in telling you that. Whoever
keeps his place in the rank, repels the enemy, and does not run away,
is a courageous man."[12]
[Footnote 12: Plato, Lachês, 190 D-E.]
[Side-note: Question--what is courage? Lachês answers by citing
one particularly manifest case of courage. Mistake of not giving a
general explanation.]
Here is the same error in replying, as was committed by Euthyphron
when asked, What is the Holy? and by Hippias, about the Beautiful.
One particular case of courageous behaviour, among many, is
indicated, as if it were an explanation of the whole: but the general
feature common to all acts of courage is not declared. Sokrates
points out that men are courageous, not merely among hoplites who
keep their rank and fight, but also among the Scythian horsemen who
fight while running away; others also are courageous against disease,
poverty, political adversity, pain and fear of every sort; others
moreover, against desires and pleasures. What is the common attribute
which in all these cases constitutes Courage? If you asked me what is
_quickness_--common to all those cases when a man runs, speaks,
plays, learns, &c., quickly--I should tell you that it was that
which accomplished much in a little time. Tell me in like manner,
what is the common fact or attribute pervading all cases of courage?
Lachês at first does not understand the question:[13] and Sokrates
elucidates it by giving the parallel explanation of quickness. Here,
as elsewhere, Plato takes great pains to impress the conception in
its full generality, and he seems to have found difficulty in making
others follow him.
[Footnote 13: Plato, Lachês, 191-192.
[Greek: pa/lin ou)=n peirô= ei)pei=n a)ndrei/an prô=ton, ti/ o)\n e)n
pa=si tou/tois tau)to/n e)stin. ê)\ ou)/pô katamantha/neis o(\
le/gô?] _Lachês._ [Greek: Ou) pa/nu ti. . . .] _Sokr._
[Greek: peirô= dê\ tê\n a)ndrei/an ou(/tôs ei)pein, ti/s ou)=sa
du/namis ê( au)tê\ e)n ê(donê=| kai\ e)n lu/pê| kai\ e)n a(/pasin
oi(=s nu=n dê\ e)le/gomen au)tê\n ei)=nai, e)/peit' a)ndrei/a
ke/klêtai.]]
[Side-note: Second answer. Courage is a sort of endurance of
the mind. Sokrates points out that the answer is vague and incorrect.
Endurance is not always courage: even intelligent endurance is not
always courage.]
Lachês then gives a general definition of courage. It is a sort of
endurance of the mind.[14]
[Footnote 14: Plato, Lachês, 192 B. [Greek: karteri/a tis tê=s
psuchê=s.]]
Surely not _all_ endurance (rejoins Sokrates)? You admit that
courage is a fine and honourable thing. But endurance without
intelligence is hurtful and dishonourable: it cannot therefore be
courage. Only intelligent endurance, therefore, can be courage. And
then what is meant by _intelligent_? Intelligent--of what--or to
what end? A man, who endures the loss of money, understanding well
that he will thereby gain a larger sum, is he courageous? No. He who
endures fighting, knowing that he has superior skill, numbers,
and all other advantages on his side, manifests more of
intelligent endurance, than his adversary who knows that he has all
these advantages against him, yet who nevertheless endures fighting.
Nevertheless this latter is the most courageous of the two.[15]
Unintelligent endurance is in this case courage: but unintelligent
endurance was acknowledged to be bad and hurtful, and courage to be a
fine thing. We have entangled ourselves in a contradiction. We must
at least show our own courage, by enduring until we can get right.
For my part (replies Lachês) I am quite prepared for such endurance.
I am piqued and angry that I cannot express what I conceive. I seem
to have in my mind clearly what courage is: but it escapes me somehow
or other, when I try to put it in words.[16]
[Footnote 15: Plato, Lachês, 192 D-E. [Greek: ê( phro/nimos karteri/a
. . . i)/dômen dê/, _ê( ei)s ti/_ phro/nimos; ê)\ ê( ei)s a(/panta
kai\ ta\ mega/la kai\ ta\ smikra/?]]
[Footnote 16: Plato, Lachês, 193 C, 194 B.]
Sokrates now asks aid from Nikias. _Nikias._--My explanation of
courage is, that it is a sort of knowledge or intelligence.
_Sokr._--But what sort of intelligence? Not certainly
intelligence of piping or playing the harp. Intelligence of what?
[Side-note: Confusion. New answer given by Nikias. Courage is
a sort of intelligence--the intelligence of things terrible and not
terrible. Objections of Lachês.]
_Nikias._--Courage is intelligence of things terrible, and
things not terrible, both in war and in all other conjunctures.
_Lachês._--What nonsense! Courage is a thing totally apart from
knowledge or intelligence.[17] The intelligent physician knows best
what is terrible, and what is not terrible, in reference to disease:
the husbandman, in reference to agriculture. But they are not for
that reason courageous. _Nikias._--They are not; but neither do
they know what is terrible, or what is not terrible. Physicians can
predict the result of a patient's case: they can tell what may
cure him, or what will kill him. But whether it be better for him to
die or to recover--_that_ they do not know, and cannot tell him.
To some persons, death is a less evil than life:--defeat, than
victory:--loss of wealth, than gain. None except the person who can
discriminate these cases, knows what is really terrible and what is
not so. He alone is really courageous.[18] _Lachês._--Where is
there any such man? It can be only some God. Nikias feels himself in
a puzzle, and instead of confessing it frankly as I have done, he is
trying to help himself out by evasions more fit for a pleader before
the Dikastery.[19]
[Footnote 17: Plato, Lachês, 195 A. [Greek: tê\n tô=n deinôn kai\
thar)r(ale/ôn e)pistê/mên kai\ e)n pole/mô| kai\ e)n toi=s a)/llois
a(/pasin.] _Lachês._--[Greek: Ô(s a)/topa le/gei!--chôri\s dê/
pou sophi/a e)sti\n a)ndrei/as.]
It appears from two other passages (195 E, and 198 B) that [Greek:
thar)r(a/leos] here is simply the negation of [Greek: deino\s] and
cannot be translated by any affirmative word.]
[Footnote 18: Plato, Lachês, 195-196.]
[Footnote 19: Plato, Lachês, 196 B.]
[Side-note: Questions of Sokrates to Nikias. It is only future
events, not past or present, which are terrible; but intelligence of
future events cannot be had without intelligence of past or present.]
_Sokr._--You do not admit, then, Nikias, that lions, tigers,
boars, &c., and such animals, are courageous? _Nikias._--No:
they are without fear--simply from not knowing the danger--like
children: but they are not courageous, though most people call them
so. I may call them bold, but I reserve the epithet courageous for
the intelligent. _Lachês._--See how Nikias strips those, whom
every one admits to be courageous, of this honourable appellation!
_Nikias._--Not altogether, Lachês: I admit you, and Lamachus,
and many other Athenians, to be courageous, and of course therefore
intelligent. _Lachês._--I feel the compliment: but such subtle
distinctions befit a Sophist rather than a general in high
command.[20] _Sokr._--The highest measure of intelligence befits
one in the highest command. What you have said, Nikias, deserves
careful examination. You remember that in taking up the investigation
of courage, we reckoned it only as a portion of virtue: you are aware
that there are other portions of virtue, such as justice, temperance,
and the like. Now you define courage to be, intelligence of what is
terrible or not terrible: of that which causes fear, or does not
cause fear. But nothing causes fear, except future or apprehended
evils: present or past evils cause no fear. Hence courage, as you
define it, is intelligence respecting future evils, and future events
not evil. But how can there be intelligence respecting the future,
except in conjunction with intelligence respecting the present and
the past? In every special department, such as medicine, military
proceedings, agriculture, &c., does not the same man, who knows
the phenomena of the future, know also the phenomena of present and
past? Are they not all inseparable acquirements of one and the same
intelligent mind?[21]
[Footnote 20: Plato, Lachês, 197. [Greek: Kai\ ga\r pre/pei, ô)=
Sô/krates, sophistê=| ta\ toiau=ta ma=llon kompseu/esthai ê)\ a)ndri\
o(\n ê( po/lis a)xioi= au(tê=s proi+sta/nai.]
Assuredly the distinctions which here Plato puts into the mouth of
Nikias are nowise more subtle than those which he is perpetually
putting into the mouth of Sokrates. He cannot here mean to
distinguish the Sophists from Sokrates, but to distinguish the
dialectic talkers, including both one and the other, from the active
political leaders.]
[Footnote 21: Plato, Lachês, 198 D. [Greek: peri\ o(/sôn e)sti\n
e)pistê/mê, ou)k a)/llê me\n ei)=nai peri\ gegono/tos, ei)de/nai
o(/pê| ge/gonen, a)/llê de\ peri\ gignome/nôn, o(/pê| gi/gnetai,
a)/llê de\ o(/pê| a)\n ka/llista ge/noito kai\ genê/setai to\ mê/pô
gegono/s--a)ll' ê( au)tê/. oi(=on peri\ to\ u(gieino\n ei)s a(/pantas
tou\s chro/nous ou)k a)/llê tis ê)\ ê( i)atrikê/, mi/a ou)=sa,
e)phora=| kai\ gigno/mena kai\ gegono/ta kai\ genêso/mena, o(/pê|
genê/setai.]
199 B. [Greek: ê( de/ g' au)tê\ e)pistê/mê tô=n au)tô=n kai\
mello/ntôn kai\ pa/ntôs e)cho/ntôn ei)=nai [ô(molo/gêtai].]
[Side-note: Courage therefore must be intelligence of good and
evil generally. But this definition would include the whole of
virtue, and we declared that courage was only a part thereof. It will
not hold therefore as a definition of courage.]
Since therefore courage, according to your definition, is the
knowledge of futurities evil and not evil, or future evil and good--and
since such knowledge cannot exist without the knowledge of good
and evil generally--it follows that courage is the knowledge of good
and evil generally.[22] But a man who knows thus much, cannot be
destitute of any part of virtue. He must possess temperance and
justice as well as courage. Courage, therefore, according to your
definition, is not only a part of virtue, it is the whole. Now we
began the enquiry by stating that it was only a part of virtue, and
that there were other parts of virtue which it did not comprise. It
is plain therefore that your definition of courage is not precise,
and cannot be sustained. We have not yet discovered what courage
is.[23]
[Footnote 22: Plato, Lachês, 199 C. [Greek: kata\ to\n so\n lo/gon
ou) mo/non deinô=n te kai\ thar)r(ale/ôn ê( e)pistê/mê a)ndrei/a
e)sti/n, a)lla\ schedo/n ti ê( peri\ pa/ntôn a)gathô=n te kai\ kakô=n
kai\ pa/ntôs e)cho/ntôn], &c.]
[Footnote 23: Plato, Lachês, 199 E. [Greek: Ou)k a)/ra eu)rê/kamen,
a)ndrei/a o(/, ti e)/stin.]]
* * * * *
[Side-note: Remarks. Warfare of Sokrates against the false
persuasion of knowledge. Brave generals deliver opinions confidently
about courage without knowing what it is.]
Here ends the dialogue called Lachês, without any positive result.
Nothing is proved except the ignorance of two brave and eminent
generals respecting the moral attribute known by the name
_Courage_: which nevertheless they are known to possess,
and have the full sentiment and persuasion of knowing perfectly; so
that they give confident advice as to the means of imparting it. "I
am unaccustomed to debates like these" (says Lachês): "but I am
piqued and mortified--because I feel that I know well what Courage
is, yet somehow or other I cannot state my own thoughts in words."
Here is a description[24] of the intellectual deficiency which
Sokrates seeks to render conspicuous to the consciousness, instead of
suffering it to remain latent and unknown, as it is in the ordinary
mind. Here, as elsewhere, he impugns the false persuasion of
knowledge, and the unconscious presumption of estimable men in
delivering opinions upon ethical and social subjects, which have
become familiar and interwoven with deeply rooted associations, but
have never been studied under a master, nor carefully analysed and
discussed, nor looked at in their full generality. This is a mental
defect which he pronounces to be universal: belonging not less to men
of action like Nikias and Lachês, than to Sophists and Rhetors like
Protagoras and Gorgias.
[Footnote 24: Plato, Lachês, 194. [Greek: Kai/toi a)ê/thês g' ei)mi\]
(Lachês) [Greek: tô=n toiou/tôn lo/gôn; a)lla/ ti/s me kai\
philoneiki/a ei)/lêphe pro\s ta\ ei)rême/na, kai\ ô(s a)lêthô=s
a)ganaktô=, ei) ou(tôsi\ a)\ noô= mê\ oi(=o/s t' ei)mi\ ei)pei=n;
noei=n me\n ga\r e)/moige dokô= peri\ a)ndrei/as o(/, ti e)/stin,
ou)k oi)=da d' o(/pê| me a)/rti die/phugen, ô(/ste mê\ xullabei=n
tô=| lo/gô| au)tê\n kai\ ei)pei=n o(/, ti e)/stin.]
Compare the Charmidês p. 159 A, 160 D, where Sokrates professes to
tell Charmides, If temperance is really in you, you can of course
inform us what it is.]
[Side-note: No solution given by Plato. Apparent tendency of
his mind, in looking for a solution. Intelligence--cannot be
understood without reference to some object or end.]
Here, as elsewhere, Plato (or the Platonic Sokrates) exposes the
faulty solutions of others, but proposes no better solution of his
own, and even disclaims all ability to do so. We may nevertheless
trace, in the refutation which he gives of the two unsatisfactory
explanations, hints guiding the mind into that direction in which
Plato looks to supply the deficiency. Thus when Lachês, after having
given as his first answer (to the question, What is Courage?) a
definition not even formally sufficient, is put by Sokrates upon
giving his second answer,--That Courage is intelligent endurance:
Sokrates asks him[25]--"Yes, _intelligent_: but intelligent to
_what end_? Do you mean, to all things alike, great as well
as little?" We are here reminded that _intelligence_, simply
taken, is altogether undefined; that intelligence must relate to
_something_--and when human conduct is in question, must relate
to some end; and that the Something, and the End, to which it
relates, must be set forth, before the proposition can be clearly
understood.
[Footnote 25: Plato, Lachês, 192 D.
[Greek: ê( phro/nimos karteri/a . . . i)/dômen dê/, ê( ei)s ti
phro/nimos; ê)\ ê( ei)s a(/panta kai\ ta\ mega/la kai\ ta\
smikra/?]]
[Side-note: Object--is supplied in the answer of Nikias.
Intelligence--of things terrible and not terrible. Such intelligence
is not possessed by professional artists.]
Coming to the answer given by Nikias, we perceive that this
deficiency is in a certain manner supplied. Courage is said to
consist in knowledge: in knowledge of things terrible, and things not
terrible. When Lachês applies his cross-examination to the answer,
the manner in which Nikias defends it puts us upon a distinction
often brought to view, though not always adhered to, in the Platonic
writings. There can be no doubt that death, distemper, loss of
wealth, defeat, &c. are terrible things (_i.e._ the prospect
of them inspires fear) in the estimation of mankind generally.
Correct foresight of such contingencies, and of the antecedents
tending to produce or avert them, is possessed by the physician and
other professional persons: who would therefore, it should seem,
possess the knowledge of things terrible and not terrible. But Nikias
denies this. He does not admit that the contingencies here enumerated
are, always or necessarily, proper objects of fear. In some cases, he
contends, they are the least of two evils. Before you can be said to
possess the knowledge of things terrible and not terrible, you must
be able to take correct measure not only of the intervening
antecedents or means, but also of the end itself as compared with
other alternative ends: whether, in each particular case, it be the
end most to be feared, or the real evil under the given
circumstances. The professional man can do the former, but he cannot
do the latter. He advises as to means, and executes: but he assumes
his own one end as an indisputable datum. The physician seeks to cure
his patient, without ever enquiring whether it may not be a less evil
for such patient to die than to survive.
[Side-note: Postulate of a Science of Ends, or Teleology,
dimly indicated by Plato. The Unknown Wise Man--correlates with the
undiscovered Science of Ends.]
The ulterior, yet not less important, estimate of the comparative
worth of different ends, is reserved for that unknown master whom
Nikias himself does not farther specify, and whom Lachês sets
aside as nowhere to be found, under the peculiar phrase of "some
God". Subjectively considered, this is an appeal to the judgment of
that One Wise Man, often alluded to by Plato as an absent Expert who
might be called into court--yet never to be found at the exact
moment, nor produced in visible presence: Objectively considered, it
is a postulate or divination of some yet undiscovered Teleology or
Science of Ends: that Science of the Good, which (as we have already
noticed in Alkibiadês II.) Plato pronounces to be the crowning and
capital science of all--and without which he there declared, that
knowledge on all other topics was useless and even worse than
useless.[26] The One Wise Man--the _Science of Good_--are the
Subject and Object corresponding to each other, and postulated by
Plato. None but the One Wise Man can measure things terrible and not
terrible: none else can estimate the good or evil, or the comparative
value of two alternative evils, in each individual case. The items
here directed to be taken into the calculation, correspond with what
is laid down by Sokrates in the Protagoras, not with that laid down
in the Gorgias: we find here none of that marked antithesis between
pleasure and good--between pain and evil--upon which Sokrates
expatiates in the Gorgias.
[Footnote 26: Plato, Alkib. ii. 146-147. See above, ch. xii. p. 16.]
[Side-note: Perfect condition of the intelligence--is the one
sufficient condition of virtue.]
This appears still farther when the cross-examination is taken up by
Sokrates instead of by Lachês. We are then made to perceive, that the
knowledge of things terrible and not terrible is a part, but an
inseparable part, of the knowledge of good and evil generally: the
lesser cannot be had without the greater--and the greater carries
with it not merely courage, but all the other virtues besides. None
can know good or evil generally except the perfectly Wise Man. The
perfect condition of the Intelligence, is the sole and all-sufficient
condition of virtue. None can possess one mode of virtue separately.
This is the doctrine to which the conclusion of the Lachês points,
though the question debated is confessedly left without solution. It
is a doctrine which seems to have been really maintained by the
historical Sokrates, and is often implied in the reasonings of the
Platonic Sokrates, but not always nor consistently.
[Side-note: Dramatic contrast between Lachês and Sokrates, as
cross-examiners.]
In reference to this dialogue, the dramatic contrast is very
forcible, between the cross-examination carried on by Lachês, and
that carried on by Sokrates. The former is pettish and impatient,
bringing out no result, and accusing the respondent of cavil and
disingenuousness: the latter takes up the same answer patiently,
expands it into the full generality wrapped up in it, and renders
palpable its inconsistency with previous admissions.
APPENDIX.
Ast is the only critic who declares the Lachês not to be Plato's work
(Platon's Leben und Schr. pp. 451-456). He indeed even finds it
difficult to imagine how Schleiermacher can accept it as genuine (p.
454). He justifies this opinion by numerous reasons--pointing out
what he thinks glaring defects, absurdity, and bad taste, both in the
ratiocination and in the dramatic handling, also _dicta_ alleged
to be _un-Platonic_. Compare Schleiermacher's Einleitung zum
Lachês, p. 324 seq.
I do not concur with Ast in the estimation of those passages which
serve as premisses to his conclusion. But even if I admitted his
premisses, I still should not admit his conclusion. I should conclude
that the dialogue was an inferior work of Plato, but I should
conclude nothing beyond. Stallbaum (Prolegg. ad Lachet. p. 29-30, 2nd
ed.) and Socher discover "adolescentiæ vestigia" in it, which are not
apparent to me.
Socher, Stallbaum, and K. F. Hermann pass lightly over the objections
of Ast; and Steinhart (Einleit. p. 355) declares them to be unworthy
of a serious answer. For my part, I draw from these dissensions among
the Platonic critics a conviction of the uncertain evidence upon
which all of them proceed. Each has his own belief as to what Plato
_must_ say, _ought to_ say, and _could not_ have said;
and each adjudicates thereupon with a degree of confidence which
surprises me. The grounds upon which Ast rejects Lachês, Charmidês,
and Lysis, though inconclusive, appear to me not more inconclusive
than those on which he and other critics reject the Erastæ, Theagês.
Hippias Major, Alkibiadês II., &c.
The dates which Stallbaum, Schleiermacher, Socher, and Steinhart
assign to the Lachês (about 406-404 B.C.) are in my judgment
erroneous. I have already shown my reasons for believing that not one
of the Platonic dialogues was composed until after the death of
Sokrates. The hypotheses also of Steinhart (p. 357) as to the special
purposes of Plato in composing the dialogue are unsupported by any
evidence; and are all imagined so as to fit his supposition as
to the date. So also Schleiermacher tells us that a portion of the
Lachês is intended by Plato as a defence of himself against
accusations which had been brought against him, a young man, for
impertinence in having attacked Lysias in the Phædrus, and Protagoras
in the Protagoras, both of them much older than Plato. But Steinhart
justly remarks that this explanation can only be valid if we admit
Schleiermacher's theory that the Phædrus and the Protagoras are
earlier compositions than the Lachês, which theory Steinhart and most
of the others deny. Steinhart himself adapts his hypotheses to his
own idea of the date of the Lachês: and he is open to the same remark
as he himself makes upon Schleiermacher.