ION.
[Side-note: Ion. Persons of the dialogue. Difference of opinion
among modern critics as to its genuineness.]
The dialogue called Ion is carried on between Sokrates and the
Ephesian rhapsode Ion. It is among those disallowed by Ast, first
faintly defended, afterwards disallowed, by Schleiermacher,[1] and
treated contemptuously by both. Subsequent critics, Hermann,[2]
Stallbaum, Steinhart, consider it as genuine, yet as an inferior
production, of little worth, and belonging to Plato's earliest years.
[Footnote 1: Schleiermacher, Einleit. zum Ion, p. 261-266; Ast, Leben
und Schriften des Platon, p. 406.]
[Footnote 2: K. F. Hermann, Gesch. und Syst. der Plat. Phil. pp.
437-438; Steinhart, Einleitung, p. 15.]
[Side-note: Rhapsodes as a class in Greece. They competed for
prizes at the festivals. Ion has been triumphant.]
I hold it to be genuine, and it may be comparatively early; but I see
no ground for the disparaging criticism which has often been applied
to it. The personage whom it introduces to us as subjected to the
cross-examination of Sokrates is a rhapsode of celebrity; one among a
class of artists at that time both useful and esteemed. They recited
or sang,[3] with appropriate accent and gesture, the compositions of
Homer and of other epic poets: thus serving to the Grecian epic, the
same purpose as the actors served to the dramatic, and the
harp-singers ([Greek: kitharô|doi\]) to the lyric. There were various
solemn festivals such as that of Æsculapius at Epidaurus, and (most
especially) the Panathenæa at Athens, where prizes were awarded for
the competition of the rhapsodes. Ion is described as having competed
triumphantly in the festival at Epidaurus, and carried off the first
prize. He appeared there in a splendid costume, crowned with a
golden wreath, amidst a crowd which is described as containing more
than 20,000 persons.[4]
[Footnote 3: The word [Greek: a)/|dein] is in this very dialogue (532
D, 535 A) applied to the rhapsoding of Ion.]
[Footnote 4: Plato, Ion, 535 D.]
[Side-note: Functions of the Rhapsodes. Recitation--Exposition
of the poets. Arbitrary exposition of the poets was then frequent.]
Much of the acquaintance of cultivated Greeks with Homer and the
other epic poets was both acquired and maintained through such
rhapsodes; the best of whom contended at the festivals, while others,
less highly gifted as to vocal power and gesticulation, gave separate
declamations and lectures of their own, and even private lessons to
individuals.[5] Euthydêmus, in one of the Xenophontic conversations
with Sokrates, and Antisthenes in the Xenophontic Symposion, are made
to declare that the rhapsodes as a class were extremely silly. This,
if true at all, can apply only to the expositions and comments with
which they accompanied their recital of Homer and other poets.
Moreover we cannot reasonably set it down (though some modern critics
do so) as so much incontestable truth: we must consider it as an
opinion delivered by one of the speakers in the conversation, but not
necessarily well founded.[6] Unquestionably, the comments made upon
Homer (both in that age and afterwards) were often fanciful and
misleading. Metrodorus, Anaxagoras, and others, resolved the Homeric
narrative into various allegories, physical, ethical, and
theological: and most men who had an opinion to defend, rejoiced to
be able to support or enforce it by some passages of Homer, well or
ill-explained--just as texts of the Bible are quoted in modern times.
In this manner, Homer was pressed into the service of every
disputant; and the Homeric poems were presented as containing, or at
least as implying, doctrines quite foreign to the age in which they
were composed.[7]
[Footnote 5: Xen. Sympos. iii. 6. Nikêratus says that he heard the
rhapsodes nearly every day. He professes to be able to repeat both
the Iliad and the Odyssey from memory.]
[Footnote 6: Xen. Mem. iv. 2, 10; Sympos. iii. 6; Plato, Ion, 530 E.
Steinhart cites this judgment about the rhapsodes as if it had been
pronounced by the Xenophontic Sokrates himself, which is not the fact
(Steinhart, Einleitung p. 3).]
[Footnote 7: Diogenes Laert. ii. 11; Nitzsch, Die Heldensage des
Griechen, pp. 74-78; Lobeck, Agloaphamus, p. 157.
Seneca, Epistol. 88: "modo Stoicum Homerum faciunt--modo Epicureum
. . . modo Peripateticum, tria genera bonorum inducentem: modo
Academicum, incerta omnia dicentem. Apparet nihil horum esse in illo,
cui omnia insunt: ista enim inter se dissident."]
[Side-note: The popularity of the Rhapsodes was chiefly derived
from their recitation. Powerful effect which they produced.]
The Rhapsodes, in so far as they interpreted Homer, were
probably not less disposed than others to discover in him their
own fancies. But the character in which they acquired most
popularity, was, not as expositors, but as reciters, of the poems.
The powerful emotion which, in the process of reciting, they both
felt themselves and communicated to their auditors, is declared in
this dialogue: "When that which I recite is pathetic (says Ion), my
eyes are filled with tears: when it is awful or terrible, my hair
stands on end, and my heart leaps. Moreover I see the spectators also
weeping, sympathising with my emotions, and looking aghast at what
they hear."[8] This assertion of the vehement emotional effect
produced by the words of the poet as declaimed or sung by the
rhapsode, deserves all the more credit--because Plato himself, far
from looking upon it favourably, either derides or disapproves it.
Accepting it as a matter of fact, we see that the influence of
rhapsodes, among auditors generally, must have been derived more from
their efficacy as actors than from their ability as expositors.
[Footnote 8: Plato, Ion, 535 C-E.
The description here given is the more interesting because it is the
only intimation remaining of the strong effect produced by these
rhapsodic representations.]
[Side-note: Ion both reciter and expositor--Homer was
considered more as an instructor than as a poet.]
Ion however is described in this dialogue as combining the two
functions of reciter and expositor: a partnership like that of
Garrick and Johnson, in regard to Shakspeare. It is in the last of
the two functions, that Sokrates here examines him: considering
Homer, not as a poet appealing to the emotions of hearers, but as a
teacher administering lessons and imparting instruction. Such was the
view of Homer entertained by a large proportion of the Hellenic
world. In that capacity, his poems served as a theme for rhapsodes,
as well as for various philosophers and Sophists who were not
rhapsodes, nor accomplished reciters.
[Side-note: Plato disregards and disapproves the poetic or
emotional working.]
The reader must keep in mind, in following the questions put by
Sokrates, that this pædagogic and edifying view of Homer is the only
one present to the men of the Sokratic school--and especially to
Plato. Of the genuine functions of the gifted poet, who touches the
chords of strong and diversified emotion--"qui pectus inaniter
angit, Irritat, mulcet, falsis terroribus implet" (Horat. Epist. II.
1, 212)--Plato takes no account: or rather, he declares open war
against them, either as childish delusions[9], or as mischievous
stimulants, tending to exalt the unruly elements of the mind, and to
overthrow the sovereign authority of reason. We shall find farther
manifestations on this point in the Republic and Leges.
[Footnote 9: The question of Sokrates (Ion, 535 D), about the emotion
produced in the hearers by the recital of Homer's poetry, bears out
what is here asserted.]
[Side-note: Ion devoted himself to Homer exclusively. Questions
of Sokrates to him--How happens it that you cannot talk equally upon
other poets? The poetic art is one.]
Ion professes to have devoted himself to the study of Homer
exclusively, neglecting other poets: so that he can interpret the
thoughts, and furnish reflections upon them, better than any other
expositor.[10] How does it happen (asked Sokrates) that you have so
much to say about Homer, and nothing at all about other poets? Homer
may be the best of all poets: but he is still only one of those who
exercise the poetic art, and he must necessarily talk about the same
subjects as other poets. Now the art of poetry is _One_
altogether--like that of painting, sculpture, playing on the flute,
playing on the harp, rhapsodizing, &c.[11] Whoever is competent
to judge and explain one artist,--what he has done well and what he
has done ill,--is competent also to judge any other artist in the
same profession.
[Footnote 10: Plato, Ion, 536 E.]
[Footnote 11: Plato, Ion, 531 A, 532 C-D. [Greek: poiêtikê\ pou/
e)sti to\ o(/lon. . . Ou)kou=n e)peida\n la/bê| tis kai\ a)/llên
te/chnên ê(ntinou=n o(/lên, o( au)to\s tro/pos tê=s ske/pseô/s e)sti
peri\ a(pasô=n tô=n technô=n?] 533 A.]
I cannot explain to you how it happens (replies Ion): I only know the
fact incontestably--that when I talk about Homer, my thoughts flow
abundantly, and every one tells me that my discourse is excellent.
Quite the reverse, when I talk of any other poet.[12]
[Footnote 12: Plato, Ion, 533 C.]
[Side-note: Explanation given by Sokrates. Both the Rhapsode
and the Poet work, not by art and system, but by divine inspiration.
Fine poets are bereft of their reason, and possessed by inspiration
from some God.]
_I_ can explain it (says Sokrates). Your talent in expounding
Homer is not an art, acquired by system and method--otherwise it
would have been applicable to other poets besides. It is a special
gift, imparted to you by divine power and inspiration. The like is
true of the poet whom you expound. His genius does not spring from
art, system, or method: it is a special gift emanating from the
inspiration of the Muses.[13] A poet is a light, airy, holy, person,
who cannot compose verses at all so long as his reason remains within
him.[14] The Muses take away his reason, substituting in place of it
their own divine inspiration and special impulse, either towards
epic, dithyramb, encomiastic hymns, hyporchemata, &c., one or
other of these. Each poet receives one of these special gifts, but is
incompetent for any of the others: whereas, if their ability had been
methodical or artistic, it would have displayed itself in all of them
alike. Like prophets, and deliverers of oracles, these poets have
their reason taken away, and become servants of the Gods.[15] It is
not _they_ who, bereft of their reason, speak in such sublime
strains: it is the God who speaks to us, and speaks through them. You
may see this by Tynnichus of Chalkis; who composed his Pæan, the
finest of all Pæans, which is in every one's mouth, telling us
himself, that it was the invention of the Muses--but who never
composed anything else worth hearing. It is through this worthless
poet that the God has sung the most sublime hymn:[16] for the express
purpose of showing us that these fine compositions are not human
performances at all, but divine: and that the poet is only an
interpreter of the Gods, possessed by one or other of them, as the
case may be.
[Footnote 13: Plato, Ion, 533 E--534 A. [Greek: pa/ntes ga\r oi(/ te
tô=n e)pô=n poiêtai\ oi( a)gathoi\ ou)k e)k te/chnês a)ll' e)/ntheoi
o)/ntes kai\ katecho/menoi pa/nta tau=ta ta\ kala\ le/gousi
poiê/mata, kai\ oi( melopoioi\ oi( a)gathoi\ ô(sau/tôs; ô(/sper oi(
korubantintiô=tes ou)k e)/mphrones o)/ntes o)rchou=ntai, ou(/tô kai\
oi(] melopoioi\ ou)k e)/mphrones o)/ntes ta\ kala\ me/lê tau=ta
poiou=sin], &c.]]
[Footnote 14: Plato, Ion, 534 B. [Greek: kou=phon ga\r chrê=ma
poiêtê/s e)sti kai\ ptêno\n kai\ i(ero/n, kai\ ou) pro/teron oi(=o/s
te poiei=n pri\n a)\n e)/ntheo/s te ge/nêtai kai\ e)/kphrôn kai\ o(
nou=s mêke/ti e)n au)tô=| e)nê=|; e(/ôs d' a)\n touti\ e)/chê| to\
ktê=ma, a)du/natos pa=s poiei=n e)stin a)/nthrôpos kai\
chrêsmô|dei=n.]]
[Footnote 15: Plato. Ion, 534 C-D. [Greek: dia\ tau=ta de\ o( theo\s
e)xairou/menos tou/tôn to\n nou=n tou/tois chrê=tai u(pêre/tais kai\
toi=s chrêsmô|doi=s kai\ toi=s ma/ntesi toi=s thei/ois, i(/na ê(mei=s
oi( a)kou/ontes ei)dô=men, o(/ti ou)ch ou(=toi/ ei)sin oi( tau=ta
le/gontes ou(/tô pollou= a)/xia, a)ll' o( theo\s au)to/s e)stin o(
le/gôn, dia\ tou/tôn de\ phthe/ggetai pro\s ê(ma=s.]]
[Footnote 16: Plato, Ion. 534 E. [Greek: tau=ta e)ndeiknu/menos o(
theo\s e)xepi/têdes dia\ tou= phaulota/tou poiêtou= to\ ka/lliston
me/los ê)=|sen.]]
[Side-note: Analogy of the Magnet, which holds up by attraction
successive stages of iron rings. The Gods first inspire Homer, then
act through him and through Ion upon the auditors.]
Homer is thus (continues Sokrates) not a man of art or reason, but
the interpreter of the Gods; deprived of his reason, but possessed,
inspired, by them. You, Ion, are the interpreter of Homer: and the
divine inspiration, carrying away your reason, is exercised over you
through him. It is in this way that the influence of the Magnet
is shown, attracting and holding up successive stages of iron
rings.[17] The first ring is in contact with the Magnet itself: the
second is suspended to the first, the third to the second, and so on.
The attractive influence of the Magnet is thus transmitted through a
succession of different rings, so as to keep suspended several which
are a good way removed from itself. So the influence of the Gods is
exerted directly and immediately upon Homer: through him, it passes
by a second stage to you: through him and you, it passes by a third
stage to those auditors whom you so powerfully affect and delight,
becoming however comparatively enfeebled at each stage of transition.
[Footnote 17: Plato, Ion, 533 D-E.]
[Side-note: This comparison forms the central point of the
dialogue. It is an expansion of a judgment delivered by Sokrates in
the Apology.]
The passage and comparison here given by Sokrates--remarkable as an
early description of the working of the Magnet--forms the central
point or kernel of the dialogue called Ion. It is an expansion of a
judgment delivered by Sokrates himself in his Apology to the Dikasts,
and it is repeated in more than one place by Plato.[18] Sokrates
declares in his Apology that he had applied his testing
cross-examination to several excellent poets; and that finding them
unable to give any rational account of their own compositions, he
concluded that they composed without any wisdom of their own, under
the same inspiration as prophets and declarers of oracles. In the
dialogue before us, this thought is strikingly illustrated and
amplified.
[Footnote 18: Plato, Apol. Sokr. p. 22 D; Plato, Menon, p. 99 D.]
[Side-note: Platonic Antithesis: systematic procedure
distinguished from unsystematic: which latter was either blind
routine, or madness inspired by the Gods. Varieties of madness, good
and bad.]
The contrast between systematic, professional, procedure,
deliberately taught and consciously acquired, capable of being
defended at every step by appeal to intelligible rules founded upon
scientific theory, and enabling the person so qualified to impart his
qualification to others--and a different procedure purely impulsive
and unthinking, whereby the agent, having in his mind a conception of
the end aimed at, proceeds from one intermediate step to another,
without knowing why he does so or how he has come to do so, and
without being able to explain his practice if questioned or to
impart it to others--this contrast is a favourite one with Plato. The
last-mentioned procedure--the unphilosophical or irrational--he
conceives under different aspects: sometimes as a blind routine or
insensibly acquired habit,[19] sometimes as a stimulus applied from
without by some God, superseding the reason of the individual. Such a
condition Plato calls _madness_, and he considers those under it
as persons out of their senses. But he recognises different varieties
of madness, according to the God from whom it came: the bad madness
was a disastrous visitation and distemper--the good madness was a
privilege and blessing, an inspiration superior to human reason.
Among these privileged madmen he reckoned prophets and poets; another
variety under the same genus, is, that mental love, between a
well-trained adult, and a beautiful, intelligent, youth, which he
regards as the most exalted of all human emotions.[20] In the Ion,
this idea of a privileged madness--inspiration from the Gods superseding
reason--is applied not only to the poet, but also to the rhapsode who
recites the poem, and even to the auditors whom he addresses. The
poet receives the inspiration directly from the Gods: he inoculates
the rhapsode with it, who again inoculates the auditors--the fervour
is, at each successive communication, diminished. The auditor
represents the last of the rings; held in suspension, through the
intermediate agency of other rings, by the inherent force of the
magnet.[21]
[Footnote 19: Plato, Phædon, 82 A; Gorgias, 463 A, 486 A.]
[Footnote 20: This doctrine is set forth at length by Sokrates in the
Platonic Phædrus, in the second discourse of Sokrates about Eros, pp.
244-245-249 D.]
[Footnote 21: Plato, Ion, 535 E. [Greek: ou(=to/s e)stin o( theatê\s
tô=n daktuli/ôn o( e)/schatos . . . . o( de\ me/sos su\ o( r(apsô|do\s
kai\ u(pokritê\s, o( de\ prô=tos, au)to\s o( poiêtê/s.]]
[Side-note: Special inspiration from the Gods was a familiar
fact in Grecian life. Privileged communications from the Gods to
Sokrates--his firm belief in them.]
We must remember, that privileged communications from the Gods to
men, and special persons recipient thereof, were acknowledged and
witnessed everywhere as a constant phenomenon of Grecian life. There
were not only numerous oracular temples, which every one could visit
to ask questions in matters of doubt--but also favoured persons who
had received from the Gods the gift of predicting the future, of
interpreting omens, of determining the good or bad indications
furnished by animals sacrificed.[22] In every town or village--or
wherever any body of men were assembled--there were always persons
who prophesied or delivered oracles, and to whom special revelations
were believed to be vouchsafed, during periods of anxiety. No one was
more familiar with this fact than the Sokratic disciples: for
Sokrates himself had perhaps a greater number of special
communications from the Gods than any man of his age: his divine sign
having begun when he was a child, and continuing to move him
frequently, even upon small matters, until his death: though the
revelations were for the most part negative, not affirmative--telling
him often what was not to be done--seldom what was to be
done--resembling in this respect his own dialogues with other persons.
Moreover Sokrates inculcated upon his friends emphatically, that they
ought to have constant recourse to prophecy: that none but impious
men neglected to do so: that the benevolence of the Gods was nowhere
more conspicuous than in their furnishing such special revelations
and warnings, to persons whom they favoured: that the Gods
administered the affairs of the world partly upon principles of
regular sequence, so that men by diligent study might learn what they
were to expect,--but partly also, and by design, in a manner
irregular and undecypherable, such that it could not be fathomed by
any human study, and could not be understood except through direct
and special revelation from themselves.[23]
[Footnote 22: Not only the [Greek: chrêsmolo/goi, ma/nteis] oracular
temples, &c., are often mentioned in Herodotus, Thucydides,
Xenophon, &c., but Aristotle also recognises [Greek: oi(
numpho/lêptoi kai\ theo/lêptoi tô=n a)nthrô/pôn, e)pipnoi/a|
daimoni/ou tino\s ô(/sper e)nthousia/zontes], as a real and known
class of persons. See Ethic. Eudem. i. p. 1214, a. 23; Ethic. Magna,
ii. p. 1207, b. 8.
The [Greek: ma/ntis] is a recognised profession, the gift of Apollo,
not merely according to Homer, but according to Solon (Frag. xi. 52,
Schn.):
[Greek: A)/llon ma/ntin e)/thêken a)/nax e(ka/ergos A)po/llôn,
e)/gnô d' a)ndri\ kako\n têlo/then e)rcho/menon], &c.]
[Footnote 23: These views of Sokrates are declared in the Memorabilia
of Xenophon, i. 1, 6-10; i. 4, 2-18; iv. 3, 12.
It is plain from Xenophon (Mem. i. 1, 3) that many persons were
offended with Sokrates because they believed,--or at least because he
affirmed--that he received more numerous and special revelations from
the Gods than any one else.]
[Side-note: Condition of the inspired person--his reason is
for the time withdrawn.]
Here, as well as elsewhere, Plato places inspiration, both of the
prophet and the poet, in marked contrast with reason and
intelligence. Reason is supposed to be for the time withdrawn or
abolished, and inspiration is introduced by the Gods into its
place. "When Monarch Reason sleeps, this mimic wakes." The person
inspired (prophet or poet) becomes for the time the organ of an
extraneous agency, speaking what he neither originates nor
understands. The genuine gift of prophecy[24] (Plato says) attaches
only to a disabled, enfeebled, distempered, condition of the
intelligence; the gift of poetry is conferred by the Gods upon the
most inferior men, as we see by the case of Tynnichus--whose sublime
pæan shows us, that it is the Gods alone who utter fine poetry
through the organs of a person himself thoroughly incompetent.
[Footnote 24: Plato, Timæus, 71 E. [Greek: i(kano\n de\ sêmei=on ô(s
mantikê\n a)phrosu/nê| theo\s a)nthrôpi/nê| de/dôken; ou)dei\s ga\r
e)/nnous e)pha/ptetai mantikê=s e)nthe/ou kai\ a)lêthou=s, a)ll' ê)\
kath' u(/pnon tê\n tê=s phronê/seôs pedêthei\s du/namin, ê)\ dia\
no/son ê)/ tina e)nthousiasmo\n paralla/xas.]
Compare Plato, Menon, pp. 99-100. [Greek: oi( chrêsmô|doi/ te kai\
oi( theoma/nteis . . . . le/gousi me\n a)lêthê= kai\ polla\ i)/sasi de\
ou)de\n ô(=n le/gousi.] Compare Plato, Legg. iv. 719.]
[Side-note: Ion does not admit himself to be inspired and out
of his mind.]
It is thus that Plato, setting before himself a process of
systematised reason,--originating in a superior intellect, laying
down universal principles and deducing consequences from
them--capable of being consistently applied, designedly taught, and
defended against objections--enumerates the various mental conditions
opposed to it, and ranks inspiration as one of them. In this
dialogue, Sokrates seeks to prove that the success of Ion as a
rhapsode depends upon his being out of his mind or inspired. But Ion
does not accept the compliment: _Ion._--You speak well,
Sokrates; but I should be surprised if you spoke well enough to
create in me the new conviction, that I am possessed and mad when I
eulogize Homer. I do not think that you would even yourself say so,
if you heard me discourse on the subject.[25]
[Footnote 25: Plato, Ion, 536 E.]
[Side-note: Homer talks upon all subjects--Is Ion competent to
explain what Homer says upon all of them? Rhapsodic art. What is its
province?]
_Sokr._--But Homer talks upon all subjects. Upon which of them
can you discourse? _Ion._--Upon all. _Sokr._--Not surely on
such as belong to special arts, professions. Each portion of the
matter of knowledge is included under some special art, and is known
through that art by those who possess it. Thus, you and I, both of
us, know the number of our fingers; we know it through the same art,
which both of us possess--the arithmetical. But Homer talks of
matters belonging to many different arts or occupations, that of
the physician, the charioteer, the fisherman, &c. You cannot know
these; since you do not belong to any of these professions, but are a
rhapsode. Describe to me what are the matters included in the
rhapsodic art. The rhapsodic art is one art by itself, distinct from
the medical and others: it cannot know every thing; tell me what
matters come under its special province.[26] _Ion._--The
rhapsodic art does not know what belongs to any one of the other
special arts: but that of which it takes cognizance, and that which I
know, is, what is becoming and suitable to each variety of character
described by Homer: to a man or woman--to a freeman or slave--to the
commander who gives orders or to the subordinate who obeys them,
&c. This is what belongs to the peculiar province of the rhapsode
to appreciate and understand.[27] _Sokr._--Will the rhapsode
know what is suitable for the commander of a ship to say to his
seamen, during a dangerous storm, better than the pilot? Will the
rhapsode know what is suitable for one who gives directions about the
treatment of a sick man, better than the physician? Will the rhapsode
know what is suitable to be said by the herdsman when the cattle are
savage and distracted, or to the female slaves when busy in spinning?
_Ion._--No: the rhapsode will not know these things so well as
the pilot, the physician, the grazier, the mistress, &c.[28]
_Sokr._--Will the rhapsode know what is suitable for the
military commander to say, when he is exhorting his soldiers?
_Ion._--Yes: the rhapsode will know this well: at least I know
it well.
[Footnote 26: Plato, Ion, 538-539.]
[Footnote 27: Plato, Ion, 540 A. [Greek: a)\ tô=| r(apsô|dô=|
prosê/kei kai\ skopei=sthai kai\ diakri/nein para\ tou\s a)/llous
a)nthrô/pous], 539 E.]
[Footnote 28: Plato, Ion, 540 B-C.]
[Side-note: The Rhapsode does not know special matters, such
as the craft of the pilot, physician, farmer, &c., but he knows
the business of the general, and is competent to command soldiers,
having learnt it from Homer.]
_Sokr._--Perhaps, Ion, you are not merely a rhapsode, but
possess also the competence for being a general. If you know matters
belonging to military command, do you know them in your capacity of
general, or in your capacity of rhapsode? _Ion._--I think there
is no difference. _Sokr._--How say you? Do you affirm that the
rhapsodic art, and the strategic art, are one? _Ion._--I think
they are one. _Sokr._--Then whosoever is a good rhapsode, is
also a good general? _Ion._--Unquestionably. _Sokr._--And
of course, whoever is a good general, is also a good rhapsode?
_Ion._--No: I do not think that. _Sokr._--But you do
maintain, that whosoever is a good rhapsode, is also a good general?
_Ion._--Decidedly. _Sokr._--You are yourself the best
rhapsode in Greece? _Ion._--By far. _Sokr._--Are you then
also the best general in Greece? _Ion._--Certainly I am,
Sokrates: and that too, by having learnt it from Homer.[29]
[Footnote 29: Plato, Ion, 540 D--541 B.]
After putting a question or two, not very forcible, to ask how it
happens that Ion, being an excellent general, does not obtain a
military appointment from Athens, Sparta, or some other city,
Sokrates winds up the dialogue as follows:--
[Side-note: Conclusion. Ion expounds Homer, not with any
knowledge of what he says, but by divine inspiration.]
Well, Ion, if it be really true that you possess a rational and
intelligent competence to illustrate the beauties of Homer, you wrong
and deceive me, because after promising to deliver to me a fine
discourse about Homer, you will not even comply with my preliminary
entreaty--that you will first tell me what those matters are, on
which your superiority bears. You twist every way like Proteus, until
at last you slip through my fingers and appear as a general. If your
powers of expounding Homer depend on art and intelligence, you are a
wrong-doer and deceiver, for not fulfilling** your promise to me. But
you are not chargeable with wrong, if the fact be as I say; that is,
if you know nothing about Homer, but are only able to discourse upon
him finely and abundantly, through a divine inspiration with which
you are possessed by him. Choose whether you wish me to regard you as
a promise-breaker, or as a divine man. _Ion._--I choose the
last: it is much better to be regarded as a divine man.[30]
[Footnote 30: Plato, Ion, 541 E--542 A. [Greek: ei) me\n a)lêthê/
le/geis, ô(s te/chnê| kai\ e)pistê/mê| oi(=o/s te ei)= O(/mêrou
e)painei=n, a)dikei=s . . . ei) de\ mê\ techniko\s ei)=, a)lla\
thei/a| moi/ra| katecho/menos e)x O(mê/rou mêde\n ei)dô\s polla\ kai\
kala\ le/geis peri\ tou= poiêtou=, ô(/sper e)gô\ ei)=pon peri\ sou=,
ou)de\n a)dikei=s; e(lou= ou)=n, po/tera bou/lei nomi/zesthai u(ph'
ê(mô=n a)/dikos a)nê\r ei)=nai ê)\ thei=os.]]
* * * * *
[Side-note: The generals in Greece usually possessed no
professional experience--Homer and the poets were talked of as the
great teachers--Plato's view of the poet, as pretending to know
everything, but really knowing nothing.]
It seems strange to read such language put into Ion's mouth (we are
not warranted in regarding it as what any rhapsode ever did say), as
the affirmation--that every good rhapsode was also a good general,
and that he had become the best of generals simply through
complete acquaintance with Homer. But this is only a caricature of a
sentiment largely prevalent at Athens, according to which the works
of the poets, especially the Homeric poems, were supposed to be a
mine of varied instruction, and were taught as such to youth.[31] In
Greece, the general was not often required (except at Sparta, and not
always even there) to possess professional experience.[32] Sokrates,
in one of the Xenophontic conversations, tries to persuade
Nikomachides, a practised soldier (who had failed in getting himself
elected general, because a successful Chorêgus had been preferred to
him), how much the qualities of an effective Chorêgus coincided with
those of an effective general.[33] The poet Sophokles was named by
the Athenians one of the generals of the very important armament for
reconquering Samos: though Perikles, one of his colleagues, as well
as his contemporary declared that he was an excellent poet, but knew
nothing of generalship.[34] Plato frequently seeks to make it evident
how little the qualities required for governing numbers, either civil
or military, were made matter of professional study or special
teaching. The picture of Homer conveyed in the tenth book of the
Platonic Republic is, that of a man who pretends to know
everything, but really knows nothing: an imitative artist,
removed by two stages from truth and reality,--who gives the shadows
of shadows, resembling only enough to satisfy an ignorant crowd. This
is the picture there presented of poets generally, and of Homer as
the best among them. The rhapsode Ion is here brought under the same
category as the poet Homer, whom he has by heart and recites. The
whole field of knowledge is assumed to be distributed among various
specialties, not one of which either of the two can claim.
Accordingly, both of them under the mask of universal knowledge,
conceal the reality of universal ignorance.
[Footnote 31: Aristophan. Ranæ, 1032.
[Greek: O)rpheu\s me\n ga\r teleta/s th' ê(mi=n kate/deixe pho/nôn
t' a)pe/chesthai
Mousai=os d' e)xake/seis te no/sôn kai\ chrêsmou/s, Ê(si/odos de\
Gê=s e)rgasi/as, karpô=n ô(/ras, a)ro/tous; o( de\ thei=os O(/mêros
A)po\ tou= timê\n kai\ kle/os e)/schein, plê\n tou=d', o(/ti chrê/st'
e)di/daxe.
Ta/xeis, a)reta/s, o(pli/seis a)ndrô=n? . . . .
A)ll' a)/llous toi pollou\s a)gathou\s (e)di/daxen), ô(=n ê)=n kai\
La/machos ê(/rôs.]
See these views combated by Plato, Republ. x. 599-600-606 E.
The exaggerated pretension here ascribed to Ion makes him look
contemptible--like the sentiment ascribed to him, 535 E, "If I make
the auditors weep, I myself shall laugh and pocket money," &c.]
[Footnote 32: Xenoph. Memor. iii. 5, 21, in the conversation between
the younger Perikles and Sokrates--[Greek: tô=n de\ stratêgô=n oi(
plei=stoi au)toschedia/zousin.] Also iii. 5, 24.
Compare, respecting the generals, the striking lines of Euripides,
Androm. 698, and the encomium of Cicero (Academ. Prior. 2, 1)
respecting the quickness and facility with which Lucullus made
himself an excellent general.]
[Footnote 33: Xen. Mem. iii. 4, especially iii. 4, 6, where
Nikomachides asks with surprise, [Greek: le/geis su/, ô)= Sô/krates,
ô(s tou= au)tou= a)ndro/s e)sti chorêgei=n te kalô=s kai\
stratêgei=n?]]
[Footnote 34: See the very curious extract from the contemporary Ion
of Chios, in Athenæus, xiii. 604. Aristophanes of Byzantium says that
the appointment of Sophokles to this military function arose from the
extra-ordinary popularity of his tragedy Antigonê, exhibited a little
time before. See Boeckh's valuable 'Dissertation on the Antigonê,'
appended to his edition thereof, pp. 121-124.]
[Side-note: Knowledge, opposed to divine inspiration without
knowledge.]
Ion is willing enough (as he promises) to exhibit before Sokrates one
of his eloquent discourses upon Homer. But Sokrates never permits him
to arrive at it: arresting him always by preliminary questions, and
requiring him to furnish an intelligible description of the matter
which his discourse is intended to embrace, and thus to distinguish
it from other matters left untouched. A man who cannot comply with
this requisition,--who cannot (to repeat what I said in a previous
chapter) stand a Sokratic cross-examination on the subject--possesses
no rational intelligence of his own proceedings: no art, science,
knowledge, system, or method. If as a practitioner he executes well
what he promises (which is often the case), and attains success--he
does so either by blind imitation of some master, or else under the
stimulus and guidance of some agency foreign to himself--of the Gods
or Fortune.
This is the Platonic point of view; developed in several different
ways and different dialogues, but hardly anywhere more conspicuously
than in the Ion.
[Side-note: Illustration of Plato's opinion respecting the
uselessness of written geometrical treatises.]
I have observed that in this dialogue, Ion is anxious to embark on
his eloquent expository discourse, but Sokrates will not allow him to
begin: requiring as a preliminary stage that certain preliminary
difficulties shall first be cleared up. Here we have an illustration
of Plato's doctrine, to which I adverted in a former chapter,[35]--that
no written geometrical treatise could impart a knowledge of
geometry to one ignorant thereof. The geometrical writer begins by
laying down a string of definitions and axioms; and then strikes out
boldly in demonstrating his theorems. But Plato would refuse him the
liberty of striking out, until he should have cleared up the
preliminary difficulties about the definitions and axioms themselves.
This the geometrical treatise does not even attempt.[36]
[Footnote 35: Chap. viii. p. 353.]
[Footnote 36: Compare Plato, Republic, vi. 510 C; vii. 538 C-D.]