ERASTÆ OR ANTERASTÆ--RIVALES.
The main subject of this short dialogue is--What is philosophy?
[Greek: ê( philosophi/a--to\ philosophei=n]. How are we to explain or
define it? What is its province and purport?
[Side-note: Erastæ--subject and persons of the
dialogue--dramatic introduction--interesting youths in the palæstra.]
Instead of the simple, naked, self-introducing, conversation, which
we read in the Menon, Hipparchus, Minos, &c. Sokrates recounts a
scene and colloquy, which occurred when he went into the house of
Dionysius the grammatist or school-master,[1] frequented by many
elegant and high-born youths as pupils. Two of these youths were
engaged in animated debate upon some geometrical or astronomical
problem, in the presence of various spectators; and especially of two
young men, rivals for the affection of one of them. Of these rivals,
the one is a person devoted to music, letters, discourse,
philosophy:--the other hates and despises these pursuits, devoting
himself to gymnastic exercise, and bent on acquiring the maximum of
athletic force.[2] It is much the same contrast as that between the
brothers Amphion and Zethus in the Antiopê of Euripides--which is
beautifully employed as an illustration by Plato in the Gorgias.[3]
[Footnote 1: Plato, Erastæ, 132. [Greek: ei)s Dionusi/ou tou=
grammatistou= ei)sê=lthon, kai\ ei)=don au)to/thi tô=n te ne/ôn tou\s
e)pieikesta/tous dokou=ntas ei)=nai tê\n i)de/an kai\ pate/rôn
eu)doki/môn kai\ tou/tôn e)rasta/s.]]
[Footnote 2: Plato, Erast. 132 E.]
[Footnote 3: Plato, Gorgias, 485-486. Compare Cicero De Oratore, ii.
37, 156.]
[Side-note: Two rival Erastæ--one of them literary, devoted to
philosophy--the other gymnastic, hating philosophy.]
As soon as Sokrates begins his interrogatories, the two youths
relinquish[4] their geometrical talk, and turn to him as attentive
listeners. Their approach affects his emotions hardly less than those
of the Erastes. He first enquires from the athletic Erastes,
What is it that these two youths are so intently engaged upon? It
must surely be something very fine, to judge by the eagerness which
they display? How do you mean _fine_ (replies the athlete)? They
are only prosing about astronomical matters--talking
nonsense--philosophising! The literary rival, on the contrary, treats this
athlete as unworthy of attention, speaks with enthusiastic admiration
of philosophy, and declares that all those to whom it is repugnant
are degraded specimens of humanity.
[Footnote 4: The powerful sentiment of admiration ascribed to
Sokrates in the presence of these beautiful youths deserves notice as
a point in his character. Compare the beginning of the Charmidês and
the Lysis.]
[Side-note: Question put by Sokrates--What is philosophy? It is
the perpetual accumulation of knowledge, so as to make the largest
sum total.]
_Sokr._--You think philosophy a fine thing? But you cannot tell
whether it is fine or not, unless you know what it is.[5] Pray
explain to me what philosophy is. _Erast._--I will do so
readily. Philosophy consists in the perpetual growth of a man's
knowledge--in his going on perpetually acquiring something new, both
in youth and in old age, so that he may learn as much as possible
during life. Philosophy is polymathy.[6] _Sokr._--You think
philosophy not only a fine thing, but good? _Erast._--Yes--very
good. _Sokr._--But is the case similar in regard to gymnastic?
Is a man's bodily condition benefited by taking as much exercise, or
as much nourishment, as possible? Is such very great quantity good
for the body?[7]
[Footnote 5: Plat. Erast. 133 A-B.]
[Footnote 6: Plato, Erast. 133 D. [Greek: tê\n
philosophi/an--poluma/theian.]]
[Footnote 7: Plato, Erast. 133 E.]
[Side-note: In the case of the body, it is not the maximum of
exercise which does good, but the proper, measured quantity. For the
mind also, it is not the maximum of knowledge, but the measured
quantity which is good. Who is the judge to determine this measure?]
It appears after some debate (in which the other or athletic Erastes
sides with Sokrates[8]) that in regard to exercise and food it is not
the great quantity or the small quantity, which is good for the body--but
the moderate or measured quantity.[9] For the mind, the case is
admitted to be similar. Not the _much_, nor the _little_,
of learning is good for it but the right or measured amount.
_Sokr._--And who is the competent judge, how much of either
is right measure for the body? _Erast._--The physician and the
gymnastic trainer. _Sokr._--Who is the competent judge, how much
seed is right measure for sowing a field? _Erast._--The farmer.
_Sokr._--Who is the competent judge, in reference to the sowing
and planting of knowledge in the mind, which varieties are good, and
how much of each is right measure?
[Footnote 8: Plat. Erast. 134 B-C. The literary Erastes says to
Sokrates, "To _you_, I have no objection to concede this point,
and to admit that my previous answer must be modified. But if I were
to debate the point only with _him_ (the athletic rival), I
could perfectly well have defended my answer, and even worse answer
still, for _he_ is quite worthless ([Greek: ou)de\n ga/r
e)sti])."
This is a curious passage, illustrating the dialectic habits of the
day, and the pride felt in maintaining an answer once given.]
[Footnote 9: Plato, Erastæ, 134 B-D. [Greek: ta\ me/tria ma/lista
ô)phelei=n, a)lla\ mê\ ta\ polla\ mêde\ ta\ o)li/ga.]]
[Side-note: No answer given. What is the best conjecture?
Answer of the literary Erastes. A man must learn that which will
yield to him the greatest reputation as a philosopher--as much as
will enable him to talk like an intelligent critic, though not to
practise.]
The question is one which none of the persons present can answer.[10]
None of them can tell who is the special referee, about training of
mind; corresponding to the physician or the farmer in the analogous
cases. Sokrates then puts a question somewhat different:
_Sokr._--Since we have agreed, that the man who prosecutes
philosophy ought not to learn many things, still less all
things--what is the best conjecture that we can make, respecting the
matters which he ought to learn? _Erast._--The finest and most suitable
acquirements for him to aim at, are those which will yield to him the
greatest reputation as a philosopher. He ought to appear accomplished
in every variety of science, or at least in all the more important;
and with that view, to learn as much of each as becomes a freeman to
know:--that is, what belongs to the intelligent critic, as
distinguished from the manual operative: to the planning and
superintending architect, as distinguished from the working
carpenter.[11] _Sokr._--But you cannot learn even two different
arts to this extent--much less several considerable arts.
_Erast._--I do not of course mean that the philosopher can be
supposed to know each of them accurately, like the artist himself--but
only as much as may be expected from the free and cultivated
citizen. That is, he shall be able to appreciate, better than other
hearers, the observations made by the artist: and farther to deliver
a reasonable opinion of his own, so as to be accounted, by all the
hearers, more accomplished in the affairs of the art than
themselves.[12]
[Footnote 10: Plato, Erast. 134 E, 135 A.]
[Footnote 11: Plat. Erast. 135 B. [Greek: o(/sa xune/seôs e)/chetai,
mê\ o(/sa cheirourgi/as.]]
[Footnote 12: Plat. Erast. 135 D.]
[Side-note: The philosopher is one who is second-best in
several different arts--a Pentathlus--who talks well upon each.]
_Sokr._--You mean that the philosopher is to be second-best in
several distinct pursuits: like the Pentathlus, who is not
expected to equal either the runner or the wrestler in their own
separate departments, but only to surpass competitors in the five
matches taken together.[13] _Erast._--Yes--I mean what you say.
He is one who does not enslave himself to any one matter, nor works
out any one with such strictness as to neglect all others: he attends
to all of them in reasonable measure.[14]
[Footnote 13: Plat. Erast. 135 E, 136 A. [Greek: kai\ ou(/tôs
gi/gnesthai peri\ pa/nta u(/pakro/n tina a)/ndra to\n
pephilosophêko/ta.] The five matches were leaping, running, throwing
the quoit and the javelin, wrestling.]
[Footnote 14: Plat. Erast. 136 B. [Greek: a)lla\ pa/ntôn metri/ôs
e)phê=phthai.]]
[Side-note: On what occasions can such second-best men be
useful? There are always regular practitioners at hand, and no one
will call in the second-best man when he can have the regular
practitioner.]
Upon this answer Sokrates proceeds to cross-examine: _Sokr._--Do
you think that good men are useful, bad men useless? _Erast._--Yes
I do. _Sokr._--You think that philosophers, as you describe
them, are useful? _Erast._--Certainly: extremely useful.
_Sokr._--But tell me on what occasions such second-best men are
useful: for obviously they are inferior to each separate artist. If
you fall sick will you send for one of _them_, or for a
professional physician? _Erast._--I should send for both.
_Sokr._--That is no answer: I wish to know, which of the two you
will send for first and by preference? _Erast._--No doubt I
shall send for the professional physician. _Sokr._--The like
also, if you are in danger on shipboard, you will entrust your life
to the pilot rather than to the philosopher: and so as to all other
matters, as long as a professional man is to be found, the
philosopher is of no use? _Erast._--So it appears. _Sokr._--Our
philosopher then is one of the useless persons: for we assuredly
have professional men at hand. Now we agreed before, that good men
were useful, bad men useless.[15] _Erast._--Yes; that was
agreed.
[Footnote 15: Plat. Erast. 136 C-D.]
[Side-note: Philosophy cannot consist in multiplication of
learned acquirements.]
_Sokr._--If then you have correctly defined a philosopher to be
one who has a second-rate knowledge on many subjects, he is useless
so long as there exist professional artists on each subject. Your
definition cannot therefore be correct. Philosophy must be something
quite apart from this multifarious and busy meddling with
different professional subjects, or this multiplication of
learned acquirements. Indeed I fancied, that to be absorbed in
professional subjects and in variety of studies, was vulgar and
discreditable rather than otherwise.[16]
[Footnote 16: Plato, Erast. 137 B.]
Let us now, however (continues Sokrates), take up the matter in
another way. In regard to horses and dogs, those who punish rightly
are also those who know how to make them better, and to discriminate
with most exactness the good from the bad? _Erast._--Yes: such
is the fact.
[Side-note: Sokrates changes his course of
examination--questions put to show that there is one special art, regal
and political, of administering and discriminating the bad from the
good.]
_Sokr._--Is not the case similar with men? Is it not the same
art, which punishes men rightly, makes them better, and best
distinguishes the good from the bad? whether applied to one, few, or
many? _Erast._--It is so.[17] _Sokr._--The art or science,
whereby men punish evil-doers rightly, is the judicial or justice:
and it is by the same that they know the good apart from the bad,
either one or many. If any man be a stranger to this art, so as not
to know good men apart from bad, is he not also ignorant of himself,
whether he be a good or a bad man? _Erast._--Yes: he is.
_Sokr._--To be ignorant of yourself, is to be wanting in
sobriety or temperance; to know yourself is to be sober or temperate.
But this is the same art as that by which we punish rightly--or
justice. Therefore justice and temperance are the same: and the
Delphian rescript, _Know thyself_, does in fact enjoin the
practice both of justice and of sobriety.[18] _Erast._--So it
appears. _Sokr._--Now it is by this same art, when practised by
a king, rightly punishing evil-doers, that cities are well governed;
it is by the same art practised by a private citizen or house-master,
that the house is well-governed: so that this art, justice or
sobriety, is at the same time political, regal, economical; and the
just and sober man is at once the true king, statesman,
house-master.[19] _Erast._--I admit it.
[Footnote 17: Plato, Erast. 137 C-D.]
[Footnote 18: Plato, Erast. 138 A.]
[Footnote 19: Plato, Erast. 138 C.]
[Side-note: In this art the philosopher must not only be
second-best, competent to talk--but he must be a fully qualified
practitioner, competent to act.]
_Sokr._--Now let me ask you. You said that it was discreditable
for the philosopher, when in company with a physician or any other
craftsman talking about matters of his own craft, not to be able to
follow what he said and comment upon it. Would it not also be
discreditable to the philosopher, when listening to any king, judge,
or house-master, about professional affairs, not to be able to
understand and comment? _Erast._--Assuredly it would be most
discreditable upon matters of such grave moment. _Sokr._--Shall
we say then, that upon these matters also, as well as all others, the
philosopher ought to be a Pentathlus or second-rate performer,
useless so long as the special craftsman is at hand? or shall we not
rather affirm, that he must not confide his own house to any one
else, nor be the second-best within it, but must himself judge and
punish rightly, if his house is to be well administered?
_Erast._--That too I admit.[20] _Sokr._--Farther, if his
friends shall entrust to him the arbitration of their disputes,--if
the city shall command him to act as Dikast or to settle any
difficulty,--in those cases also it will be disgraceful for him to
stand second or third, and not to be first-rate? _Erast._--I
think it will be. _Sokr._--You see then, my friend, philosophy
is something very different from much learning and acquaintance with
multifarious arts or sciences.[21]
[Footnote 20: Plato, Erast. 138 E. [Greek: Po/teron ou)=n kai\ peri\
tau=ta le/gômen, pe/ntathlon au)to\n dei=n ei)=nai kai\ u(/pakron,
ta\ deuterei=a e)/chonta pa/ntôn, to\n philo/sophon, kai\ a)chrei=on
ei)=nai, e(/ôs a)\n tou/tôn tis ê)=|? ê)\ prô=ton me\n tê\n au(tou=
oi)ki/an ou)k a)llô| e)pitrepte/on ou)de ta\ deuterei=a e)n tou/tô|
e(kte/on, a)ll' au)to\n kolaste/on dika/zonta o)rthô=s, ei) me/llei
eu)= oi)kei=sthai au)tou= ê( oi)ki/a?]]
[Footnote 21: Plato, Erast. 139 A. [Greek: Pollou= a)/ra dei= ê(mi=n,
ô)= be/ltiste, to\ philosophei=n poluma/theia/ te ei)=nai kai\ ê(
peri\ ta\s te/chnas pragmatei/a.]]
[Side-note: Close of the dialogue--humiliation of the literary
Erastes.]
Upon my saying this (so Sokrates concludes his recital of the
conversation) the literary one of the two rivals was ashamed and held
his peace; while the gymnastic rival declared that I was in the
right, and the other hearers also commended what I had said.
* * * * *
[Side-note: Remarks--animated manner of the dialogue.]
The antithesis between the philo-gymnast, hater of philosophy,--and
the enthusiastic admirer of philosophy, who nevertheless cannot
explain what it is--gives much point and vivacity to this short
dialogue. This last person is exhibited as somewhat presumptuous and
confident; thus affording a sort of excuse for the humiliating
cross-examination put upon him by Sokrates to the satisfaction
of his stupid rival. Moreover, the dramatic introduction is full of
animation, like that of the Charmidês and Lysis.
Besides the animated style of the dialogue, the points raised for
discussion in it are of much interest. The word philosophy has at all
times been vague and ambiguous. Certainly no one before
Sokrates--probably no one before Plato--ever sought a definition of it.
In no other Platonic dialogue than this, is the definition of it made a
special topic of research.
[Side-note: Definition of philosophy--here sought for the
first time--Platonic conception of measure--referee not discovered.]
It is here handled in Plato's negative, elenchtic, tentative, manner.
By some of his contemporaries, philosophy was really considered as
equivalent to polymathy, or to much and varied knowledge: so at least
Plato represents it as being considered by Hippias the Sophist,
contrary to the opinion of Protagoras.[22] The exception taken by
Sokrates to a definition founded on simple quantity, without any
standard point of sufficiency by which much or little is to be
measured, introduces that governing idea of [Greek: to\ me/trion]
(the moderate, that which conforms to a standard measure) upon which
Plato insists so much in other more elaborate dialogues. The
conception of a measure, of a standard of measurement--and of
conformity thereunto, as the main constituent of what is good and
desirable--stands prominent in his mind,[23] though it is not always
handled in the same way. We have seen it, in the Second Alkibiadês,
indicated under another name as knowledge of Good or of the Best:
without which, knowledge on special matters was declared to be
hurtful rather than useful.[24] Plato considers that this Measure is
neither discernible nor applicable except by a specially trained
intelligence. In the Erastæ as elsewhere, such an intelligence is
called for in general terms: but when it is asked, Where is the
person possessing such intelligence, available in the case of mental
training--neither Sokrates nor any one else can point him out. To
suggest a question, and direct attention to it, yet still to
leave it unanswered--is a practice familiar with Plato. In this
respect the Erastæ is like other dialogues. The answer, if any,
intended to be understood or divined, is, that such an intelligence
is the philosopher himself.
[Footnote 22: Plato, Protag. 318 E. Compare too, the Platonic
dialogues, Hippias Major and Minor.]
[Footnote 23: See about [Greek: ê( tou= metri/ou phu/sis] as [Greek:
ou)si/a]--as [Greek: o)/ntôs gigno/menon].--Plato, Politikus,
283-284. Compare also the Philêbus, p. 64 D, and the Protagoras, pp.
356-357, where [Greek: ê( metrêtikê\ te/chnê] is declared to be the
principal saviour of life and happiness.]
[Footnote 24: Plato, Alkib. ii. 145-146; supra, ch. xii. p. 16.]
[Side-note: View taken of the second-best critical talking
man, as compared with the special proficient and practitioner.]
The second explanation of philosophy here given--that the philosopher
is one who is second-best in many departments, and a good talker upon
all, but inferior to the special master in each--was supposed by
Thrasyllus in ancient times to be pointed at Demokritus. By many
Platonic critics, it is referred to those persons whom they single
out to be called Sophists. I conceive it to be applicable (whether
intended or not) to the literary men generally of that age, the
persons called Sophists included. That which Perikles expressed by
the word, when he claimed the love of wisdom and the love of beauty
as characteristic features of the Athenian citizen--referred chiefly
to the free and abundant discussion, the necessity felt by every one
for talking over every thing before it was done, yet accompanied with
full energy in action as soon as the resolution was taken to act.[25]
Speech, ready and pertinent, free conflict of opinion on many
different topics--was the manifestation and the measure of knowledge
acquired. Sokrates passed his life in talking, with every one
indiscriminately, and upon each man's particular subject; often
perplexing the artist himself. Xenophon recounts conversations with
various professional men--a painter, a sculptor, an armourer--and
informs us that it was instructive to all of them, though Sokrates
was no practitioner in any craft.[26] It was not merely Demokritus,
but Plato and Aristotle also, who talked or wrote upon almost every
subject included in contemporary observation. The voluminous works of
Aristotle,--the Timæus, Republic, and Leges, of Plato,--embrace a
large variety of subjects, on each of which, severally taken, these
two great men were second-best or inferior to some special
proficient. Yet both of them had judgments to give, which it was
important to hear, upon all subjects:[27] and both of them could
probably talk better upon each than the special proficient himself.
Aristotle, for example, would write better upon rhetoric than
Demosthenes--upon tragedy, than Sophokles. Undoubtedly, if an oration
or a tragedy were to be composed--if resolution or action were
required on any real state of particular circumstances--the special
proficient would be called upon to act: but it would be a mistake to
infer from hence, as the Platonic Sokrates intimates in the Erastæ,
that the second-best, or theorizing reasoner, was a useless man. The
theoretical and critical point of view, with the command of language
apt for explaining and defending it, has a value of its own; distinct
from, yet ultimately modifying and improving, the practical. And such
comprehensive survey and comparison of numerous objects, without
having the attention exclusively fastened or enslaved to any one of
them, deserves to rank high as a variety of intelligence whether it
be adopted as the definition of a philosopher, or not.
[Footnote 25: Thucyd. ii. 39 fin.--40. [Greek: kai\ e)/n te tou/tois
tê\n po/lin a)xi/an ei)=nai thauma/zesthai, kai\ e)/ti e)n a)/llois.
philokalou=men ga\r met' eu)telei/as kai\ philosophou=men a)/neu
malaki/as], &c., and the remarkable sequel of the same chapter
about the intimate conjunction of abundant speech with energetic
action in the Athenian character.]
[Footnote 26: Xen. Mem. iii. 10; iii. 11; iii. 12.]
[Footnote 27: The [Greek: pe/ntathlos] or [Greek: u(/pakros] whom
Plato criticises in this dialogue, coincides with what Aristotle
calls "the man of universal education or culture".--Ethic. Nikom. I.
i. 1095, a. 1. [Greek: e(/kastos de\ kri/nei kalô=s a(\ gignô/skei,
kai\ tou/tôn e)sti\n a)gatho\s kritê/s; kath' e(/kaston a)/ra, o(
pepaideume/nos; a(plô=s de/, o( peri\ pa=n pepaideume/nos.]]
[Side-note: Plato's view--that the philosopher has a province
special to himself, distinct from other specialties--dimly
indicated--regal or political art.]
Plato undoubtedly did not conceive the definition of the philosopher
in the same way as Sokrates. The close of the Erastæ is employed in
opening a distant and dim view of the Platonic conception. We are
given to understand, that the philosopher has a province of his own,
wherein he is not second-best, but a first-rate actor and adviser. To
indicate, in many different ways, that there is or must be such a
peculiar, appertaining to philosophy--distinct from, though analogous
to, the peculiar of each several art--is one leading purpose in many
Platonic dialogues. But what is the peculiar of the philosopher?
Here, as elsewhere, it is marked out in a sort of misty outline, not
as by one who already knows and is familiar with it, but as one who
is trying to find it without being sure that he has succeeded. Here,
we have it described as the art of discriminating good from evil,
governing, and applying penal sanctions rightly. This is the supreme
art or science, of which the philosopher is the professor; and
in which, far from requiring advice from others, he is the only
person competent both to advise and to act: the art which exercises
control over all other special arts, directing how far, and on what
occasions, each of them comes into appliance. It is philosophy,
looked at in one of its two aspects: not as a body of speculative
truth, to be debated, proved, and discriminated from what cannot be
proved or can be disproved--but as a critical judgment bearing on
actual life, prescribing rules or giving directions in particular
cases, with a view to the attainment of foreknown ends, recognised as
_expetenda_.[28] This is what Plato understands by the measuring
or calculating art, the regal or political art, according as we use
the language of the Protagoras, Politikus, Euthydêmus, Republic. Both
justice and sobriety are branches of this art; and the distinction
between the two loses its importance when the art is considered as a
whole--as we find both in the Erastæ and in the Republic.[29]
[Footnote 28: The difference between the second explanation of
philosophy and the third explanation, suggested in the Erastæ, will
be found to coincide pretty nearly with the distinction which
Aristotle takes much pains to draw between [Greek: sophi/a] and
[Greek: phro/nêsis].--Ethic. Nikomach. vi. 5, pp. 1140-1141; also
Ethic. Magn. i. pp. 1197-1198.]
[Footnote 29: See Republic, iv. 433 A; Gorgias, 526 C; Charmidês 164
B; and Heindorf's note on the passage in the Charmidês.]
[Side-note: Philosopher--the supreme artist controlling other
artists.]
Here, in the Erastæ, this conception of the philosopher as the
supreme artist controlling all other artists, is darkly indicated and
crudely sketched. We shall find the same conception more elaborately
illustrated in other dialogues; yet never passing out of that state.
* * * * *
APPENDIX.
This is one of the dialogues declared to be spurious by
Schleiermacher, Ast, Socher, and Stallbaum, all of them critics of
the present century. In my judgment, their grounds for such
declaration are altogether inconclusive. They think the dialogue an
inferior composition, unworthy of Plato; and they accordingly find
reasons, more or less ingenious, for relieving Plato from the
discredit of it. I do not think so meanly of the dialogue as they do;
but even if I did, I should not pronounce it to be spurious, without
some evidence bearing upon that special question. No such evidence,
of any value, is produced.
It is indeed contended, on the authority of a passage in Diogenes
(ix. 37), that Thrasyllus himself doubted of the authenticity of the
Erastæ. The passage is as follows, in his life of Demokritus--[Greek:
ei)/per oi( A)nterastai\ Pla/tôno/s ei)si, phêsi\ Thra/sullos,
ou(=tos a)\n ei)/ê o( parageno/menos a)nô/numos, tô=n peri\
Oi)nopi/dên kai\ A)naxago/ran e(/teros, e)n tê=| pro\s Sôkra/tên
o(mili/a| dialego/menos peri\ philosophi/as; ô(=|, phêsi/n, ô(s
penta/thlô| e)/oiken o( philo/sophos; kai\ ê)=n ô(s a)lêthô=s e)n
philosophi/a| pe/ntathlos] (Demokritus).
Now in the first place, Schleiermacher and Stallbaum both declare
that Thrasyllus can never have said that which Diogenes here makes
him say (Schleierm. p. 510; Stallbaum, Prolegg. ad. Erast. p. 266,
and not. p. 273).
Next, it is certain that Thrasyllus did consider it the undoubted
work of Plato, for he enrolled it in his classification, as the third
dialogue in the fourth tetralogy (Diog. L. iii. 59).
Yxem, who defends the genuineness of the Erastæ (Ueber Platon's
Kleitophon, pp. 6-7, Berlin, 1846), insists very properly on this
point; not merely as an important fact in itself, but as determining
the sense of the words [Greek: ei)/per oi( A)nterastai\ Pla/tôno/s
ei)si], and as showing that the words rather affirm, than deny, the
authenticity of the dialogue. "If the Anterastæ are the work of
Plato, _as they are universally admitted to be_." You must
supply the parenthesis in this way, in order to make Thrasyllus
consistent with himself. Yxem cites a passage from Galen, in
which [Greek: ei)/per] is used, and in which the parenthesis must be
supplied in the way indicated: no doubt at all being meant to be
hinted. And I will produce another passage out of Diogenes himself,
where [Greek: ei)/per] is used in the same way; not as intended to
convey the smallest doubt, but merely introducing the premiss for a
conclusion immediately following. Diogenes says, respecting the
Platonic Ideas, [Greek: ei)/per e)sti\ mnê/mê, ta\s i)de/as e)n toi=s
ou)=sin u(pa/rchein] (iii. 15). He does not intend to suggest any
doubt whether there be such a fact as memory. [Greek: Ei)/per] is
sometimes the equivalent of [Greek: e)peidê/per]: as we learn from
Hermann ad Viger. VIII. 6, p. 512.
There is therefore no fair ground for supposing that Thrasyllus
doubted the genuineness of the Erastæ. And when I read what modern
critics say in support of their verdict of condemnation, I feel the
more authorised in dissenting from it. I will cite a passage or two
from Stallbaum.
Stallbaum begins his Prolegomena as follows, pp. 205-206: "Quanquam
hic libellus genus dicendi habet purum, castum, elegans, nihil ut
inveniri queat quod à Platonis aut Xenophontis elegantiâ,
abhorreat--tamen quin à Boeckhio, Schleiermachero, Astio, Sochero,
Knebelio, aliis jure meritoque pro suppositicio habitus sit, haudquaquam
dubitamus. Est enim materia operis adeo non ad Platonis mentem
rationemque elaborata, ut potius cuivis alii Socraticorum quam huic
rectè adscribi posse videatur."
After stating that the Erastæ may be divided into two principal
sections, Stallbaum proceeds:--"Neutra harum partium ita tractata
est, ut nihil desideretur, quod ad justam argumenti explicationem
merito requiras--nihil inculcatum reperiatur, quod vel alio modo
illustratum vel omnino omissum esse cupias".
I call attention to this sentence as a fair specimen of the grounds
upon which the Platonic critics proceed when they strike dialogues
out of the Platonic Canon. If there be anything wanting in it which
is required for what they consider a proper setting forth of the
argument--if there be anything which they would desire to see omitted
or otherwise illustrated--this is with them a reason for deciding
that it is not Plato's work. That is, if there be any defects in it
of any kind, it cannot be admitted as Plato's work;--_his genuine
works have no defects_. I protest altogether against this _ratio
decidendi_. If I acknowledged it and applied it consistently I
should strike out every dialogue in the Canon. Certainly, the
presumption in favour of the Catalogue of Thrasyllus must be counted
as _nil_, if it will not outweigh such feeble counter-arguments
as these.
One reason given by Stallbaum for considering the Erastæ as
spurious is, that the Sophists are not derided in it. "Quis est
igitur, qui Platonem sibi persuadeat illos non fuisse castigaturum,
et omnino non significaturum, quinam illi essent, adversus quos hanc
disputationem instituisset?" It is strange to be called on by learned
men to strike out all dialogues from the Canon in which there is no
derision of the Sophists. Such derision exists already in excess: we
hear until we are tired how mean it is to receive money for
lecturing. Again, Stallbaum says that the persons whose opinions are
here attacked are not specified by name. But who are the [Greek:
ei)dô=n phi/loi], attacked in the Sophistês? They are not specified
by name, and critics differ as to the persons intended.