THEAGES.
[Side-note: Theagês--has been declared spurious by some modern
critics--grounds for such opinion not sufficient.]
This is among the dialogues declared by Schleiermacher, Ast,
Stallbaum, and various other modern critics, to be spurious and
unworthy of Plato: the production of one who was not merely an
imitator, but a bad and silly imitator.[1] Socher on the other hand
defends the dialogue against them, reckoning it as a juvenile
production of Plato.[2] The arguments which are adduced to prove its
spuriousness appear to me altogether insufficient. It has some
features of dissimilarity with that which we read in other
dialogues--these the above-mentioned critics call un-Platonic: it has
other features of similarity--these they call bad imitation by a
_falsarius_: lastly, it is inferior, as a performance, to the
best of the Platonic dialogues. But I am prepared to expect (and have
even the authority of Schleiermacher for expecting) that some
dialogues will be inferior to others. I also reckon with certainty,
that between two dialogues, both genuine, there will be points of
similarity as well as points of dissimilarity. Lastly, the critics
find marks of a bad, recent, un-Platonic style: but Dionysius of
Halikarnassus--a judge at least equally competent upon such a
matter--found no such marks. He expressly cites the dialogue as the
work of Plato,[3] and explains the peculiar phraseology assigned to
Demodokus by remarking, that the latter is presented as a person of
rural habits and occupations.
[Footnote 1: Stallbaum, Proleg. pp. 220-225, "ineptus tenebrio,"
&c. Schleiermacher, Einleitung, part ii. v. iii. pp. 247-252.
Ast, Platon's Leben und Schriften, pp. 495-497.
Ast speaks with respect (differing in this respect from the other
two) of the Theagês as a composition, though he does not believe it
to be the work of Plato. Schleiermacher also admits (see the end of
his Einleitung) that the style in general has a good Platonic
colouring, though he considers some particular phrases as
un-Platonic.]
[Footnote 2: Socher, Ueber Platon, pp. 92-102. M. Cobet also speaks
of it as a work of Plato (Novæ Lectiones, &c., p. 624. Lugd. Bat.
1858).]
[Footnote 3: Dionys. Hal. Ars Rhetor. p. 405, Reiske. Compare
Theagês, 121 D. [Greek: ei)s to\ a)/stu katabai/nontes].
In general, in discussions on the genuineness of any of the Platonic
dialogues, I can do nothing but reply to the arguments of those
critics who consider them spurious. But in the case of the Theagês
there is one argument which tends to mark Plato positively as the
author.
In the Theagês, p. 125, the senarius [Greek: sophoi\ tu/rannoi tô=n
sophô=n sunousi/a|] is cited as a verse of _Euripides_. Now it
appears that this is an error of memory, and that the verse really
belongs to _Sophokles_, [Greek: e)n Ai)/anti Lokrô=|]. If the
error had only appeared in this dialogue, Stallbaum would probably
have cited it as one more instance of stupidity on the part of the
_ineptus tenebrio_ whom he supposes to have written the
dialogue. But unfortunately the error does not belong to the Theagês
alone. It is found also in the Republic (viii. 568 B), the most
unquestionable of all the Platonic compositions. Accordingly,
Schleiermacher tells us in his note that the _falsarius_ of the
Theagês has copied this error out of the above-named passage of the
Republic of Plato (notes, p. 500).
This last supposition of Schleiermacher appears to me highly
improbable. Since we know that the mistake is one made by Plato
himself, surely we ought rather to believe that he made it in two
distinct compositions. In other words, the occurrence of the same
exact mistake in the Republic and the Theagês affords strong
presumption that both are by the same author--Plato.]
[Side-note: Persons of the dialogue--Sokrates, with Demodokus
and Theagês, father and son. Theagês (the son), eager to acquire
knowledge, desires to be placed under the teaching of a Sophist.]
Demodokus, an elderly man (of rank and landed property), and his
youthful son Theagês, have come from their Deme to Athens, and enter
into conversation with Sokrates: to whom the father explains, that
Theagês has contracted, from the conversation of youthful companions,
an extraordinary ardour for the acquisition of wisdom. The son has
importuned his father to put him under the tuition of one of the
Sophists, who profess to teach wisdom. The father, though not
unwilling to comply with the request, is deterred by the difficulty
of finding a good teacher and avoiding a bad one. He entreats the
advice of Sokrates, who invites the young man to explain what it is
that he wants, over and above the usual education of an Athenian
youth of good family (letters, the harp, wrestling, &c.), which
he has already gone through.[4]
[Footnote 4: Plato, Theagês, 122.]
[Side-note: Sokrates questions Theagês, inviting him to specify
what he wants.]
_Sokr._--You desire wisdom: but what kind of wisdom? That by
which men manage chariots? or govern horses? or pilot ships?
_Theag._--No: that by which men are governed. _Sokr._--But
what men? those in a state of sickness--or those who are singing in a
chorus--or those who are under gymnastic training? Each of these
classes has its own governor, who bears a special title, and belongs
to a special art by itself--the medical, musical, gymnastic, &c.
_Theag._--No: I mean that wisdom by which we govern, not these
classes alone, but all the other residents in the city along with
them--professional as well as private--men as well as women.[5]
[Footnote 5: Plato, Theagês, 124 A-B. Schleiermacher (Einleit. p.
250) censures the prolixity of the inductive process in this
dialogue, and the multitude of examples here accumulated to prove a
general proposition obvious enough without proof. Let us grant this
to be true; we cannot infer from it that the dialogue is not the work
of Plato. By very similar arguments Socher endeavours to show that
the Sophistês and the Politikus are not works of Plato, because in
both these dialogues logical division and differentiation is
accumulated with tiresome prolixity, and applied to most trivial
subjects. But Plato himself (in Politikus, pp. 285-286) explains why
he does so, and tells us that he wishes to familiarise his readers
with logical subdivision and classification as a process. In like
manner I maintain that prolixity in the [Greek: lo/goi e)paktikoi/]
is not to be held as proof of spurious authorship, any more than
prolixity in the process of logical subdivision and classification.
I noticed the same objection in the case of the First Alkibiadês.]
[Side-note: Theagês desires to acquire that wisdom by which he
can govern freemen with their own consent.]
Sokrates now proves to Theagês, that this function and power which he
is desirous of obtaining, is, the function and power of a despot: and
that no one can aid him in so culpable a project. I might yearn (says
Theagês) for such despotic power over all: so probably would you and
every other man. But it is not _that_ to which I now aspire. I
aspire to govern freemen, with their own consent; as was done by
Themistokles, Perikles, Kimon, and other illustrious statesmen,[6]
who have been accomplished in the political art.
[Footnote 6: Plato, Theagês, 126 A.]
_Sokr._--Well, if you wished to become accomplished in the art
of horsemanship, you would put yourself under able horsemen: if in
the art of darting the javelin, under able darters. By parity of
reasoning, since you seek to learn the art of statesmanship, you must
frequent able statesmen.[7]
[Footnote 7: Plato, Theagês, 126 C.]
[Side-note: Incompetence of the best practical statesmen to
teach any one else. Theagês requests that Sokrates will himself teach
him.]
_Theag._--No, Sokrates. I have heard of the language which you
are in the habit of using to others. You pointed out to them that
these eminent statesmen cannot train their own sons to be at all
better than curriers: of course therefore they cannot do _me_
any good.[8] _Sokr._--But what can your father do for you
better than this, Theagês? What ground have you for complaining of
him? He is prepared to place you under any one of the best and most
excellent men of Athens, whichever of them you prefer.
_Theag._--Why will not you take me yourself, Sokrates? I look
upon you as one of these men, and I desire nothing better.[9]
[Footnote 8: Plato, Theagês, 126 D. Here again Stallbaum (p. 222)
urges, among his reasons for believing the dialogue to be
spurious--How absurd to represent the youthful Theagês as knowing
what arguments Sokrates had addressed to others! But the youthful
Theætêtus is also represented as having heard from others the
cross-examinations made by Sokrates (Theætêt. 148 E). So likewise the
youthful sons of Lysimachus--(Lachês, 181 A); compare also Lysis, 211
A.]
[Footnote 9: Plato, Theagês, 127 A.]
Demodokus joins his entreaties with those of Theagês to prevail upon
Sokrates to undertake this function. But Sokrates in reply says that
he is less fit for it than Demodokus himself, who has exercised high
political duties, with the esteem of every one; and that if practical
statesmen are considered unfit, there are the professional Sophists,
Prodikus, Gorgias, Polus, who teach many pupils, and earn not merely
good pay, but also the admiration and gratitude of every one--of the
pupils as well as their senior relatives.[10]
[Footnote 10: Plato, Theagês, 127 D-E, 128 A.]
[Side-note: Sokrates declares that he is not competent to
teach--that he knows nothing except about matters of love. Theagês
maintains that many of his young friends have profited largely by the
conversation of Sokrates.]
_Sokr._--I know nothing of the fine things which these Sophists
teach: I wish I did know. I declare everywhere, that I know nothing
whatever except one small matter--what belongs to love. In that, I
surpass every one else, past as well as present.[11]
_Theag._--Sokrates is only mocking us. I know youths (of my own age and
somewhat older), who were altogether worthless and inferior to every
one, before they went to him; but who, after they had frequented his
society, became in a short time superior to all their former rivals.
The like will happen with me, if he will only consent to receive
me.[12]
[Footnote 11: Plato, Theagês, 128 B. [Greek: a)lla\ kai\ le/gô dê/pou
a)ei/, o(/ti e)gô\ tugcha/nô, ô(s e)/pos ei)pei=n, ou)de\n
e)pista/menos plê/n ge smikrou= tino\s mathê/matos, tô=n e)rôtikô=n,
tou=to me/ntoi to\ ma/thêma par' o(ntinou=n poiou=mai deino\s
ei)=nai, kai\ tô=n progegono/tôn a)nthrô/pôn kai\ tô=n nu=n.]]
[Footnote 12: Plato, Theagês, 128 C.]
[Side-note: Sokrates explains how this has sometimes happened--he
recites his experience of the divine sign or Dæmon.]
_Sokr._--You do not know how this happens; I will explain it to
you. From my childhood, I have had a peculiar superhuman something
attached to me by divine appointment: a voice, which, whenever it
occurs, warns me to abstain from that which I am about to do,
but never impels me.[13] Moreover, when any one of my friends
mentions to me what he is about to do, if the voice shall then occur
to me it is a warning for him to abstain. The examples of Charmides
and Timarchus (here detailed by Sokrates) prove what I say: and many
persons will tell you how truly I forewarned them of the ruin of the
Athenian armament at Syracuse.[14] My young friend Sannion is now
absent, serving on the expedition under Thrasyllus to Ionia: on his
departure, the divine sign manifested itself to me, and I am
persuaded that some grave calamity will befall him.
[Footnote 13: Plato, Theagês, 128 D. [Greek: e)sti ga/r ti thei/a|
moi/ra| parepo/menon e)moi\ e)k paido\s a)rxa/menon daimo/nion;
e)/sti de\ tou=to phônê/, ê)\ o(/tan ge/nêtai, a)ei/ moi sêmai/nei,
o(\ a)\n me/llô pra/ttein, tou/tou a)potropê/n, protre/pei de\
ou)de/pote.]]
[Footnote 14: Plato, Theag. 129.]
[Side-note: The Dæmon is favourable to some persons, adverse to
others. Upon this circumstance it depends how far any companion
profits by the society of Sokrates. Aristeides has not learnt
anything from Sokrates, yet has improved much by being near to him.]
These facts I mention to you (Sokrates continues) because it is that
same divine power which exercises paramount influence over my
intercourse with companions.[15] Towards many, it is positively
adverse; so that I cannot even enter into companionship with them.
Towards others, it does not forbid, yet neither does it co-operate:
so that they derive no benefit from me. There are others again in
whose case it co-operates; these are the persons to whom you allude,
who make rapid progress.[16] With some, such improvement is lasting:
others, though they improve wonderfully while in my society, yet
relapse into commonplace men when they leave me. Aristeides, for
example (grandson of Aristeides the Just), was one of those who made
rapid progress while he was with me. But he was forced to absent
himself on military service; and on returning, he found as my
companion Thucydides (son of Melesias), who however had quarrelled
with me for some debate of the day before. I understand (said
Aristeides to me) that Thucydides has taken offence and gives himself
airs; he forgets what a poor creature he was, before he came to
you.[17] I myself, too, have fallen into a despicable condition.
When I left you, I was competent to discuss with any one and make a
good figure, so that I courted debate with the most accomplished men.
Now, on the contrary, I avoid them altogether--so thoroughly am I
ashamed of my own incapacity. Did the capacity (I, _Sokrates_,
asked Aristeides) forsake you all at once, or little by little?
Little by little, he replied. And when you possessed it (I asked),
did you get it by learning from me? or in what other way? I will tell
you, Sokrates (he answered), what seems incredible, yet is
nevertheless true.[18] I never learnt from you any thing at all. You
yourself well know this. But I always made progress, whenever I was
along with you, even if I were only in the same house without being
in the same room; but I made greater progress, if I was in the same
room--greater still, if I looked in your face, instead of turning my
eyes elsewhere--and the greatest of all, by far, if I sat close and
touching you. But now (continued Aristeides) all that I then acquired
has dribbled out of me.[19]
[Footnote 15: Plato, Theagês, 129 E. [Greek: tau=ta dê\ pa/nta
ei)/rêka/ soi, o(/ti ê( du/namis au(/tê tou= daimoni/ou tou/tou kai\
ei)s ta\s sunousi/as tô=n met' e)mou= sundiatribo/ntôn to\ a(/pan
du/natai. polloi=s me\n ga\r e)nantiou=tai, kai\ ou)k e)/sti tou/tois
ô)phelêthênai met' e)mou= diatri/bousin.]]
[Footnote 16: Plato, Theag. 129 E. [Greek: oi(=s d' a)\n sulla/bêtai
tê=s sunousi/as ê( tou= daimo/niou du/namis, ou(=toi ei)sin ô(=n kai\
su\ ê)/|sthêsai; tachu\ ga\r parachrê=ma e)pidido/asin.]]
[Footnote 17: Plato, Theag. 130 A-B. [Greek: Ti/ dai/? ou)k oi)=den,
e)/phê, pri\n soi\ suggene/sthai, oi(=on ê)=n to\ a)ndra/podon?]]
[Footnote 18: Plato, Theag. 130 D. [Greek: Ê(ni/ka de/ soi
parege/neto (ê( du/namis), po/teron matho/nti par' e)mou= ti
parege/neto, ê)/ tini a)/llô| tro/pô|? E)gô/ soi, e)/phê, e)rô=, ô)=
Sô/krates, a)/piston me\n nê\ tou\s theou/s, a)lêthe\s de/. e)gô\
ga\r e)/mathon me\n para\ sou= ou)de\n pô/pote, ô(s au)to\s oi)=stha;
e)pedi/doun de\ o(pote soi sunei/ên, ka)\n ei) e)n tê=| au)tê=|
mo/non oi)ki/a| ei)/ên, mê\ e)n tô=| au)tô=| de\ oi)kê/mati],
&c.]
[Footnote 19: Plato, Theag. 130 E. [Greek: polu\ de\ ma/lista kai\
plei=ston e)pedi/doun, o(po/te par' au)to/n se kathoi/mên
e)cho/meno/s sou kai\ a(pto/menos. nu=n de/, ê)= d' o(/s, pa=sa
e)kei/nê ê(\ e(/xis e)xer)r(u/êken.]]
[Side-note: Theagês expresses his anxiety to be received as the
companion of Sokrates.]
_Sokr._--I have now explained to you, Theagês, what it is to
become my companion. If it be the pleasure of the God, you will make
great and rapid progress: if not, not. Consider, therefore, whether
it is not safer for you to seek instruction from some of those who
are themselves masters of the benefits which they impart, rather than
to take your chance of the result with me.[20] _Theag._--I shall
be glad, Sokrates, to become your companion, and to make trial of
this divine coadjutor. If he shows himself propitious, that will be
the best of all: if not, we can then take counsel, whether I shall
try to propitiate him by prayer, sacrifice, or any other means which
the prophets may recommend or whether I shall go to some other
teacher.[21]
[Footnote 20: Plato, Theag. 130 E. [Greek: o(/ra ou)=n mê/ soi
a)sphale/steron ê)=| par' e)kei/nôn tini\ paideu/esthai, oi(\
e)gkratei=s au)toi/ ei)si tê=s ô)phelei/as, ê)\n ô)phelou=si tou\s
a)nthrô/pous, ma=llon ê)\ par' e)mou= o(/, ti a)\n tu/chê|, tou=to
pra=xai.]]
[Footnote 21: Plato, Theag. 131 A.]
* * * * *
[Side-note: Remarks on the Theagês--analogy with the
Lachês.]
The Theagês figured in the list of Thrasyllus as first in the fifth
Tetralogy: the other three members of the same Tetralogy being
Charmidês, Lachês, Lysis. Some persons considered it suitable to read
as first dialogue of all.[22] There are several points of analogy
between the Theagês and the Lachês, though with a different turn
given to them. Aristeides and Thucydides are mentioned in both of
them: Sokrates also is solicited to undertake the duty of teacher.
The ardour of the young Theagês to acquire wisdom reminds us of
Hippokrates at the beginning of the Protagoras. The string of
questions put by Sokrates to Theagês, requiring that what is called
wisdom shall be clearly defined and specialised, has its parallel in
many of the Platonic dialogues. Moreover the declaration of Sokrates,
that he knows nothing except about matters of love, but that in them
he is a consummate master--is the same as what he explicitly declares
both in the Symposion and other dialogues.[23]
[Footnote 22: Diog. L. iii. 59-61.]
[Footnote 23: Symposion, 177 E. [Greek: ou)/te ga\r a)/n pou e)gô\
a)pophê/saimi, o(\s ou)de/n phêmi a)/llo e)pi/stasthai ê)\ ta\
e)rôtika/.] Compare the same dialogue, p. 212 B, 216 C. Phædrus, 227
E, 257 A; Lysis, 204 B. Compare also Xenoph. Memor. ii. 6, 28;
Xenoph. Sympos. iv. 27.
It is not reasonable to treat this declaration of Sokrates, in the
Theagês, as an evidence that the dialogue is the work of a
_falsarius_, when a declaration quite similar is ascribed to
Sokrates in other Platonic dialogues.]
[Side-note: Chief peculiarity of the Theagês--stress laid upon
the divine sign or Dæmon.]
But the chief peculiarity of the Theagês consists in the stress which
is laid upon the Dæmon, the divine voice, the inspiration of
Sokrates. This divine auxiliary is here described, not only as giving
a timely check or warning to Sokrates, when either he or his friends
contemplated any inauspicious project--but also as intervening, in
the case of those youthful companions with whom he conversed, to
promote the improvement of one, to obstruct that of others; so that
whether Sokrates will produce any effect or not in improving any one,
depends neither upon his own efforts nor upon those of the recipient,
but upon the unpredictable concurrence of a divine agency.[24]
[Footnote 24: See some remarks on this point in Appendix.]
[Side-note: Plato employs this divine sign here to render some
explanation of the singularity and eccentricity of Sokrates, and of
his unequal influence upon different companions.]
Plato employs the Sokratic Dæmon, in the Theagês, for a philosophical
purpose, which, I think, admits of reasonable explanation. During the
eight (perhaps ten) years of his personal communion with Sokrates,
he had had large experience of the variable and unaccountable
effect produced by the Sokratic conversation upon different hearers:
a fact which is also attested by the Xenophontic Memorabilia. This
difference of effect was in no way commensurate to the unequal
intelligence of the hearers. Chærephon, Apollodôrus, Kriton, seem to
have been ordinary men:--[25] while Kritias and Alkibiades, who
brought so much discredit both upon Sokrates and his teaching,
profited little by him, though they were among the ablest pupils that
he ever addressed: moreover Antisthenes, and Aristippus, probably did
not appear to Plato (since he greatly dissented from their
philosophical views) to have profited much by the common
companionship with Sokrates. Other companions there must have been
also personally known to Plato, though not to us: for we must
remember that Sokrates passed his whole day in talking with all
listeners. Now when Plato in after life came to cast the ministry of
Sokrates into dramatic scenes, and to make each scene subservient to
the illustration of some philosophical point of view, at least a
negative--he was naturally led to advert to the Dæmon or divine
inspiration, which formed so marked a feature in the character of his
master. The concurrence or prohibition of this divine auxiliary
served to explain why it was that the seed, sown broadcast by
Sokrates, sometimes fructified, and sometimes did not fructify, or
speedily perished afterwards--when no sufficient explanatory
peculiarity could be pointed out in the ground on which it fell. It
gave an apparent reason for the perfect singularity of the course
pursued by Sokrates: for his preternatural acuteness in one
direction, and his avowed incapacity in another: for his mastery of
the Elenchus, convicting men of ignorance, and his inability to
supply them with knowledge: for his refusal to undertake the duties
of a teacher. All these are mysterious features of the Sokratic
character. The intervention of the Dæmon appears to afford an
explanation, by converting them into religious mysteries: which,
though it be no explanation at all, yet is equally efficacious by
stopping the mouth of the questioner, and by making him believe that
it is guilt and impiety to ask for explanation--as Sokrates
himself declared in regard to astronomical phenomena, and as
Herodotus feels, when his narrative is crossed by strange religious
legends.[26]
[Footnote 25: Xenophon, Apol. Sokr. 28.
[Greek: A)pollo/dôros--e)pithumê/tês me\n i)schurô=s au)tou=,
a)/llôs d' eu)ê/thês.]--Plat. Phædon, 117 D.]
[Footnote 26: Xen. Mem. iv. 7, 5-6; Herodot. ii. 3, 45-46.]
[Side-note: Sokrates, while continually finding fault with
other teachers, refused to teach himself--difficulty of finding an
excuse for his refusal. The Theagês furnishes an excuse.]
In this manner, the Theagês is made by Plato to exhibit one way of
parrying the difficulty frequently addressed to Sokrates by various
hearers: "You tell us that the leading citizens cannot even teach
their own sons, and that the Sophists teach nothing worth having: you
perpetually call upon us to seek for better teachers, without telling
us where such are to be found. We entreat you to teach us yourself,
conformably to your own views."
If a leader of political opposition, after years employed in
denouncing successive administrators as ignorant and iniquitous,
refuses, when invited, to take upon himself the business of
administration--an intelligent admirer must find some decent pretence
to colour the refusal. Such a pretence is found for Sokrates in the
Theagês: "I am not my own master on this point. I am the instrument
of a divine ally, without whose active working I can accomplish
nothing: who forbids altogether my teaching of one man--tolerates,
without assisting, my unavailing lessons to another--assists
efficaciously in my teaching of a third, in which case alone the
pupil receives any real benefit. The assistance of this divine ally
is given or withheld according to motives of his own, which I cannot
even foretell, much less influence. I should deceive you therefore if
I undertook to teach, when I cannot tell whether I shall do good or
harm."
The reply of Theagês meets this scruple. He asks permission to make
the experiment, and promises to propitiate the divine auxiliary by
prayer and sacrifice; under which reserve Sokrates gives consent.
[Side-note: Plato does not always, nor in other dialogues,
allude to the divine sign in the same way. Its character and working
essentially impenetrable. Sokrates a privileged person.]
It is in this way that the Dæmon or divine auxiliary serves the
purpose of reconciling what would otherwise be an inconsistency in
the proceedings of Sokrates. I mean, that such is the purpose served
in _this_ dialogue: I know perfectly that Plato deals with the
case differently elsewhere: but I am not bound (as I have said
more than once) to force upon all the dialogues one and the same
point of view. That the agency of the Gods was often and in the most
important cases, essentially undiscoverable and unpredictable, and
that in such cases they might sometimes be prevailed on to give
special warnings to favoured persons--were doctrines which the
historical Sokrates in Xenophon asserts with emphasis.[27] The Dæmon
of Sokrates was believed, both by himself and his friends, to be a
special privilege and an extreme case of divine favour and
communication to him.[28] It was perfectly applicable to the scope of
the Theagês, though Plato might not choose always to make the same
employment of it. It is used in the same general way in the
Theætêtus;[29] doubtless with less expansion, and blended with
another analogy (that of the mid-wife) which introduces a
considerable difference.[30]
[Footnote 27: Xenoph. Memor. i. 1, 8-9-19.
Euripid. Hecub. 944.
[Greek: phu/rousi d' au)ta\ theoi\ pa/lin te kai\ pro/sô,
taragmo\n e)ntithe/ntes, ô(s a)gnôsi/a|
se/bômen au)tou/s.]]
[Footnote 28: Xenoph. Mem. iv. 3, 12.]
[Footnote 29: Plato, Theætêt. 150 D-E.]
[Footnote 30: Plato, Apolog. Sokr. 33 C. [Greek: e)moi\ de\ tou=to,
ô(s e)gô/ phêmi, proste/taktai u(po\ toou= theou= pra/ttein kai\ e)k
manteiô=n kai\ e)x e)nupni/ôn kai\ panti\ tro/pô|, ô(=|pe/r ti/s pote
kai\ a)/llê thei/a moio/ra a)nthrô/pô| kai\ o(tiou=n prose/taxe
pra/ttein.] 40 A. [Greek: ê( ga\r ei)ôthui=a/ moi mantikê\ ê( tou=
daimoni/ou e)n me\n tô=| pro/sthen _chro/nô| panti\ pa/nu puknê\
a)ei\ ê)=n kai\ pa/nu e)pi\ smikroi=s e)nantioume/nê_, ei)/ ti
me/lloimi mê\ o)rthô=s pra/xein.] Compare Xenophon, Memor. iv. 8, 5;
Apol. Sokr. c. 13.]
APPENDIX.
[Greek: To\ daimo/nion sêmei=on.]
Here is one of the points most insisted on by Schleiermacher and
Stallbaum, as proving that the Theagês is not the work of Plato.
These critics affirm (to use the language of Stallbaum, Proleg. p.
220) "Quam Plato alias de Socratis dæmonio prodidit sententiam, ea
longissimè recedit ab illâ ratione, quæ in hoc sermone exposita est".
He says that the representation of the Dæmon of Sokrates, given in
the Theagês, has been copied from a passage in the Theætêtus, by an
imitator who has not understood the passage, p. 150, D, E. But Socher
(p. 97) appears to me to have shown satisfactorily, that there is no
such material difference as these critics affirm between this passage
of the Theætêtus and the Theagês. In the Theætêtus, Sokrates
declares, that none of his companions learnt any thing from him, but
that all of them [Greek: oi(=sper a)\n o( theo\s parei/kê|] (the very
same term is used at the close of the Theagês--131 A, [Greek: e)a\n
me\n parei/kê| ê(mi=n--to\ daimo/nion]) made astonishing progress and
improvement in his company. Stallbaum says, "Itaque [Greek: o(
theo\s], qui ibi memoratur, non est Socratis dæmonium, sed potius
deus _i.e._ sors divina. Quod non perspiciens _noster
tenebrio_ protenus illud dæmonium, quod Socrates sibi semper
adesse dictitabat, ad eum dignitatis et potentiæ gradum evexit, ut,
&c." I agree with Socher in thinking that the phrase [Greek: o(
theo\s] in the Theætêtus has substantially the same meaning as
[Greek: to\ daimo/nion] in the Theagês. Both Schleiermacher (Notes on
the Apology, p. 432) and Ast (p. 482), have notes on the phrase
[Greek: to\ daimo/nion]--and I think the note of Ast is the more
instructive of the two. In Plato and Xenophon, the words [Greek: to\
daimo/nion], [Greek: to\ thei=on], are in many cases
undistinguishable in meaning from [Greek: o( dai/môn], [Greek: o(
theo/s]. Compare the Phædrus, 242 E, about [Greek: theo\s] and
[Greek: thei=o/n ti]. Sokrates, in his argument against Meletus in
the Apology (p. 27) emphatically argues that no man could believe in
any thing [Greek: daimo/nion], without also believing in [Greek:
daimo/nes]. The special [Greek: thei=o/n ti kai\ daimo/nion
(Apol. p. 31 C), which presented itself in regard to him and his
proceedings, was only one of the many modes in which (as he believed)
[Greek: o( theo/s] commanded and stimulated him to work upon the
minds of the Athenians:--[Greek: e)moi\ de\ tou=to, ô(s e)gô/ phêmi,
proste/taktai u(po\ tou= theou= pra/ttein kai\ e)k manteiô=n kai\ e)x
e)nupni/ôn kai\ panti\ tro/pô|, ô(=|pe/r ti/s pote kai\ a)/llê thei/a
moi=ra a)nthrô/pô| kai\ o(tiou=n prose/taxe pra/ttein] (Apol. p. 33
C). So again in Apol. p. 40 A, B, [Greek: ê( ei)ôthui=a/ moi mantikê\
ê( tou= daimoni/ou]--and four lines afterwards we read the very same
fact intimated in the words, [Greek: to\ tou= theou= sêmei=on], where
Sokratis dæmonium--and Deus--are identified: thus refuting the
argument above cited from Stallbaum. There is therefore no such
discrepancy, in reference to [Greek: to\ daimo/nion], as Stallbaum
and Schleiermacher contend for. We perceive indeed this difference
between them--that in the Theætêtus, the simile of the obstetric art
is largely employed, while it is not noticed in the Theagês. But we
should impose an unwarrantable restriction upon Plato's fancy, if we
hindered him from working out his variety and exuberance of
metaphors, and from accommodating each dialogue to the metaphor
predominant with him at the time.
Moreover, in respect to what is called the Dæmon of Sokrates, we
ought hardly to expect that either Plato or Xenophon would always be
consistent even with themselves. It is unsafe for a modern critic to
determine beforehand, by reason or feelings of his own, in what
manner either of them would speak upon this mysterious subject. The
belief and feeling of a divine intervention was very real on the part
of both, but their manner of conceiving it might naturally fluctuate:
and there was, throughout all the proceedings of Sokrates, a mixture
of the serious and the playful, of the sublime and the eccentric, of
ratiocinative acuteness with impulsive superstition--which it is
difficult to bring into harmonious interpretation. Such heterogeneous
mixture is forcibly described in the Platonic Symposium, pp. 215-222.
When we consider how undefined, and undefinable, the idea of this
[Greek: daimo/nion] was, we cannot wonder if Plato ascribes to it
different workings and manifestations at different times. Stallbaum
affirms that it is made ridiculous in the Theagês: and Kühner
declares that Plutarch makes it ridiculous, in his treatise De Genio
Sokratia (Comm. ad. Xenoph. Memor. p. 23). But this is because its
agency is described more in detail. You can easily present it in a
ridiculous aspect, by introducing it as intervening on petty and
insignificant matters. Now it is remarkable, that in the Apology, we
are expressly told that it actually did intervene on the most
trifling occasions--[Greek: pa/nu e)pi\ smikroi=s
e)nantioume/nê]. The business of an historian of philosophy is, to
describe it as it was really felt and believed by Sokrates and
Plato--whether a modern critic may consider the description
ridiculous or not.
When Schleiermacher says (Einleitung, p. 248), respecting the
_falsarius_ whom he supposes to have written the Theagês--"Damit
ist ihm begegnet, auf eine höchst verkehrte Art wunderbar
zusammenzurühren diese göttliche Schickung, und jenes persönliche
Vorgefühl welches dem Sokrates zur göttlichen Stimme ward".--I
contend that the mistake is chargeable to Schleiermacher himself, for
bisecting into two phenomena that which appears in the Apology as the
same phenomenon under two different names--[Greek: to\
daimo/nion]--[Greek: to\ tou= theou= sêmei=on]. Besides, to treat the
Dæmon as a mere "personal presentiment" of Sokrates, may be a true
view:--but it is the view of one who does not inhale the same religious
atmosphere as Sokrates, Plato, and Xenophon. It cannot therefore be
properly applied in explaining their sayings or doings. Kühner, who treats
the Theagês as not composed by Plato, grounds this belief partly on the
assertion, that the [Greek: daimo/nion] of Sokrates is described
therein as something peculiar to Sokrates; which, according to
Kühner, was the fiction of a subsequent time. By Sokrates and his
contemporaries (Kühner says) it was considered "non sibi soli tanquam
proprium quoddam beneficium a Diis tributum, sed commune sibi esse
cum cæteris hominibus" (pp. 20-21). I dissent entirely from this
view, which is contradicted by most of the passages noticed even by
Kühner himself. It is at variance with the Platonic Apology, as well
as with the Theætêtus (150 D), and Republic (vi. 496 C). Xenophon
does indeed try, in the first Chapter of the Memorabilia, as the
defender of Sokrates, to soften the _invidia_ against Sokrates,
by intimating that other persons had communications from the Gods as
well as he. But we see plainly, even from other passages of the
Memorabilia, that this was not the persuasion of Sokrates himself,
nor of his friends, nor of his enemies. They all considered it (as it
is depicted in the Theagês also) to be a special privilege and
revelation.