HIPPARCHUS--MINOS.
In these two dialogues, Plato sets before us two farther specimens of
that error and confusion which beset the enquirer during his search
after "reasoned truth". Sokrates forces upon the attention of a
companion two of the most familiar words of the market-place, to see
whether a clear explanation of their meaning can be obtained.
[Side-note: Hipparchus--Question--What is the definition of
Lover of Gain? He is one who thinks it right to gain from things
worth nothing. Sokrates cross-examines upon this explanation. No man
expects to gain from things which he knows to be worth nothing: in
this sense, no man is a lover of gain.]
In the dialogue called Hipparchus, the debate turns on the definition
of [Greek: to\ philokerde\s] or [Greek: o( philokerdê/s]--the love of
gain or the lover of gain. Sokrates asks his Companion to define the
word. The Companion replies--He is one who thinks it right to gain
from things worth nothing.[1] Does he do this (asks Sokrates) knowing
that the things are worth nothing? or not knowing? If the latter, he
is simply ignorant. He knows it perfectly well (is the reply). He is
cunning and wicked; and it is because he cannot resist the temptation
of gain, that he has the impudence to make profit by such things,
though well aware that they are worth nothing. _Sokr._--Suppose
a husbandman, knowing that the plant which he is tending is
worthless--and yet thinking that he ought to gain by it: does not
that correspond to your description of the lover of gain?
_Comp._--The lover of gain, Sokrates, thinks that he ought to
gain from every thing. _Sokr._--Do not answer in that reckless
manner,[2] as if you had been wronged by any one; but answer with
attention. You agree that the lover of gain knows the value of
that from which he intends to derive profit; and that the husbandman
is the person cognizant of the value of plants. _Comp._--Yes: I
agree. _Sokr._--Do not therefore attempt, you are so young, to
deceive an old man like me, by giving answers not in conformity with
your own admissions; but tell me plainly, Do you believe that the
experienced husbandman, when he knows that he is planting a tree
worth nothing, thinks that he shall gain by it? _Comp._--No,
certainly: I do not believe it.
[Footnote 1: Plato, Hipparch. 225 A. [Greek: oi(\ a)\n kerdai/nein
a)xiô=sin a)po\ tô=n mêdeno\s a)xi/ôn.]]
[Footnote 2: Plato, Hipparch. 225 C.]
Sokrates then proceeds to multiply illustrations to the same general
point. The good horseman does not expect to gain by worthless food
given to his horse: the good pilot, by worthless tackle put into his
ship: the good commander, by worthless arms delivered to his
soldiers: the good fifer, harper, bowman, by employing worthless
instruments of their respective arts, if they know them to be
worthless.
[Side-note: Gain is good. Every man loves good: therefore all
men are lovers of gain.]
None of these persons (concludes Sokrates) correspond to your
description of the lover of gain. Where then can you find a lover of
gain? On your explanation, no man is so.[3] _Comp._--I mean,
Sokrates, that the lovers of gain are those, who, through greediness,
long eagerly for things altogether petty and worthless; and thus
display a love of gain.[4] _Sokr._--Not surely knowing them to
be worthless--for this we have shown to be impossible--but ignorant
that they are worthless, and believing them to be valuable.
_Comp._--It appears so. _Sokr._--Now gain is the opposite
of loss: and loss is evil and hurt to every one: therefore gain (as
the opposite of loss) is good. _Comp._--Yes. _Sokr._--It
appears then that the lovers of good are those whom you call lovers
of gain? _Comp._--Yes: it appears so. _Sokr._--Do not you
yourself love good--all good things? _Comp._--Certainly.
_Sokr._--And I too, and every one else. All men love good
things, and hate evil. Now we agreed that gain was a good: so that by
this reasoning, it appears that all men are lovers of gain while by
the former reasoning, we made out that none were so.[5] Which of the
two shall we adopt, to avoid error. _Comp._--We shall commit
no error, Sokrates, if we rightly conceive the lover of gain. He is
one who busies himself upon, and seeks to gain from, things from
which good men do not venture to gain.
[Footnote 3: Plat. Hipparch. 226 D.]
[Footnote 4: Plat. Hipparch. 226 D. [Greek: A)ll' e)gô\, ô)=
Sô/krates, bou/lomai le/gein tou/tous philokerdei=s ei)=nai, oi(\
e(ka/stote u(po\ a)plêsti/as kai\ panu\ smikra\ kai\ o)li/gou a)/xia
kai\ ou)deno\s gli/chontai u(perphuô=s kai\ philokerdou=sin.]]
[Footnote 5: Plat. Hipparch. 227 C.]
[Side-note: Apparent contradiction. Sokrates accuses the
companion of trying to deceive him. Accusation is retorted upon
Sokrates.]
_Sokr._--But, my friend, we agreed just now, that gain was a
good, and that all men always love good. It follows therefore, that
good men as well as others love all gains, if gains are good things.
_Comp._--Not, certainly, those gains by which they will
afterwards be hurt. _Sokr._--Be hurt: you mean, by which they
will become losers. _Comp._--I mean that and nothing else.
_Sokr._--Do they become losers by gain, or by loss?
_Comp._--By both: by loss, and by evil gain. _Sokr._--Does
it appear to you that any useful and good thing is evil?
_Comp._--No. _Sokr._--Well! we agreed just now that gain
was the opposite of loss, which was evil; and that, being the
opposite of evil, gain was good. _Comp._--That was what we
agreed. _Sokr._--You see how it is: you are trying to deceive
me: you purposely contradict what we just now agreed upon.
_Comp._--Not at all, by Zeus: on the contrary, it is you,
Sokrates, who deceive me, wriggling up and down in your talk, I
cannot tell how.[6] _Sokr._--Be careful what you say: I should
be very culpable, if I disobeyed a good and wise monitor.
_Comp._--Whom do you mean: and what do you mean?
_Sokr._--Hipparchus, son of Peisistratus.
[Footnote 6: Plat. Hipparch. 228 A. _Sokr._--[Greek: O(ra=|s
ou)=n? e)picheirei=s me e)xapata=|n, e)pi/têdes e)nanti/a le/gôn
oi(=s a)/rti ô(mologê/samen.] _Comp._ [Greek: Ou) ma\ Di/', ô)=
Sô/krates; a)lla\ tou)nanti/on su\ e)me\ e)xapata=|s, kai\ ou)k
oi)=da o(pê=| e)n toi=s lo/gois a)/nô kai\ ka/tô stre/pheis.]]
[Side-note: Precept inscribed formerly by Hipparchus the
Peisistratid--"Never deceive a friend". Eulogy of Hipparchus by
Sokrates.]
Sokrates then describes at some length the excellent character of
Hipparchus: his beneficent rule, his wisdom, his anxiety for the
moral improvement of the Athenians: the causes, different from what
was commonly believed, which led to his death; and the wholesome
precepts which he during his life had caused to be inscribed on
various busts of Hermes throughout Attica. One of these busts or
Hermæ bore the words--Do not deceive a friend.[7]
[Footnote 7: Plat. Hipparch. 228 B-229 D.
The picture here given of Hipparchus deserves notice. We are informed
that he was older than his brother Hippias, which was the general
belief at Athens, as Thucydides (i. 20, vi. 58) affirms, though
himself contradicting it, and affirming that Hippias was the elder
brother. Plato however agrees with Thucydides in this point, that the
three years after the assassination of Hipparchus, during which
Hippias ruled alone, were years of oppression and tyranny; and that
the hateful recollection of the Peisistratidæ, which always survived
in the minds of the Athenians, was derived from these three last
years.
The picture which Plato here gives of Hipparchus is such as we might
expect from a philosopher. He dwells upon the pains which Hipparchus
took to have the recitation of the Homeric poems made frequent and
complete: also upon his intimacy with the poets Anakreon and
Simonides. The colouring which Plato gives to the intimacy between
Aristogeiton and Harmodius is also peculiar. The [Greek: e)rastê\s]
is represented by Plato as eager for the education and improvement of
the [Greek: e)rô/menos]; and the jealousy felt towards Hipparchus is
described as arising from the distinguished knowledge and abilities
of Hipparchus, which rendered him so much superior and more effective
as an educator.]
The Companion resumes: Apparently, Sokrates, either you do not
account me your friend, or you do not obey Hipparchus: for you are
certainly deceiving me in some unaccountable way in your talk. You
cannot persuade me to the contrary.
[Side-note: Sokrates allows the companion to retract some of
his answers. The companion affirms that some gain is good, other gain
is evil.]
_Sokr._--Well then! in order that you may not think yourself
deceived, you may take back any move that you choose, as if we were
playing at draughts. Which of your admissions do you wish to
retract--That all men desire good things? That loss (to be a loser)
is evil? That gain is the opposite of loss: that to gain is the
opposite of to lose? That to gain, as being the opposite of evil
is a good thing? _Comp._--No. I do not retract any one of these.
_Sokr._--You think then, it appears, that some gain is good, other
gain evil? _Comp._--Yes, that is what I do think.[8] _Sokr._--Well, I
give you back that move: let it stand as you say. Some gain is good:
other gain is bad. But surely the good gain is no more _gain_,
than the bad gain: both are _gain_, alike and equally.
_Comp._--How do you mean?
[Footnote 8: Plat. Hipparch. 229 E, 230 A.]
[Side-note: Questions by Sokrates--bad gain is _gain_, as
much as good gain. What is the common property, in virtue of which
both are called Gain? Every acquisition, made with no outlay, or with
a smaller outlay, is gain. Objections--the acquisition may be
evil--embarrassment confessed.]
Sokrates then illustrates his question by two or three analogies. Bad
food is just as much _food_, as good food: bad drink, as much
_drink_ as good drink: a good man is no more _man_ than a
bad man.[9]
[Footnote 9: Plat. Hipparch. 230 C.]
_Sokr._--In like manner, bad gain, and good gain, are (both of
them) _gain_ alike--neither of them more or less than the other.
Such being the case, what is that common quality possessed by both,
which induces you to call them by the same name _Gain_?[10]
Would you call _Gain_ any acquisition which one makes either
with a smaller outlay or with no outlay at all?[11]
_Comp._--Yes. I should call that gain. _Sokr._--For example, if after
being at a banquet, not only without any outlay, but receiving an
excellent dinner, you acquire an illness? _Comp._--Not at all:
that is no gain. _Sokr._--But if from the banquet you acquire
health, would that be gain or loss? _Comp._--It would be gain.
_Sokr._--Not every acquisition therefore is gain, but only such
acquisitions as are good and not evil: if the acquisition be evil, it
is loss. _Comp._--Exactly so. _Sokr._--Well, now, you see,
you are come round again to the very same point: Gain is good. Loss
is evil. _Comp._--I am puzzled what to say.[12]
_Sokr._--You have good reason to be puzzled.
[Footnote 10: Plat. Hipparch. 230 E. [Greek: dia\ ti/ pote
a)mpho/tera au)ta\ ke/rdos kalei=s? ti/ tau)to\n e)n a)mphote/rois
o(rô=n?]]
[Footnote 11: Plat. Hipparch. 231 A.]
[Footnote 12: Plat. Hipparch. 231 C. _Sokr._ [Greek: O(ra=|s
ou)=n, ô(s pa/lin au)= peritre/cheis ei)s to\ au)to\--to\ me\n
ke/rdos a)gatho\n phai/netai, ê( de\ zêmi/a kako/n?] _Comp._
[Greek: A)porô= e)/gôge o(\, ti ei)/pô.] _Sokr._ [Greek: Ou)k
a)di/kôs ge su\ a)porô=n.]]
[Side-note: It is essential to gain, that the acquisition made
shall be greater not merely in quantity, but also in value, than the
outlay. The valuable is the profitable--the profitable is the good.
Conclusion comes back. That Gain is Good.]
But tell me: you say that if a man lays out little and acquires much,
that is gain? _Comp._--Yes: but not if it be evil: it is gain,
if it be good, like gold or silver. _Sokr._--I will ask you
about gold and silver. Suppose a man by laying out one pound of gold
acquires two pounds of silver, is it gain or loss? _Comp._--It
is loss, decidedly, Sokrates: gold is twelve times the value of
silver. _Sokr._--Nevertheless he has acquired more: double is
more than half. _Comp._--Not in value: double silver is not more
than half gold. _Sokr._--It appears then that we must include
value as essential to gain, not merely quantity. The valuable is
gain: the valueless is no gain. The valuable is that which is
valuable to possess: is that the profitable, or the unprofitable?
_Comp._--It is the profitable. _Sokr._--But the profitable
is good? _Comp._--Yes: it is. _Sokr._--Why then, here, the
same conclusion comes back to us as agreed, for the third or fourth
time. The gainful is good. _Comp._--It appears so.[13]
[Footnote 13: Plato, Hipparch. 231 D-E, 232 A.]
[Side-note: Recapitulation. The debate has shown that all gain
is good, and that there is no evil gain--all men are lovers of gain--no
man ought to be reproached for being so. The companion is compelled
to admit this, though he declares that he is not persuaded.]
_Sokr._--Let me remind you of what has passed. You contended
that good men did not wish to acquire all sorts of gain, but
only such as were good, and not such as were evil. But now, the
debate has compelled us to acknowledge that all gains are good,
whether small or great. _Comp._--As for me, Sokrates, the debate
has compelled me rather than persuaded me.[14]
_Sokr._--Presently, perhaps, it may even persuade you. But now,
whether you have been persuaded or not, you at least concur with
me in affirming that all gains, whether small or great, are good.
That all good men wish for all good things. _Comp._--I do concur.
_Sokr._--But you yourself stated that evil men love all gains,
small and great? _Comp._--I said so. _Sokr._--According to your
doctrine then, all men are lovers of gain, the good men as well as
the evil? _Comp._--Apparently so. _Sokr._--It is therefore
wrong to reproach any man as a lover of gain: for the person who
reproaches is himself a lover of gain, just as much.
[Footnote 14: Plat. Hipparch. 232 A-B. _Sokr._ [Greek: Ou)kou=n
nu=n pa/nta ta\ ke/rdê o( lo/gos ê(ma=s ê)na/gkake kai\ smikra\ kai\
mega/la o(mologei=n a)gatha\ ei)=nai?] _Comp._ [Greek:
Ê)na/gkake ga/r, ô)= Sô/krates, ma=llon e)me/ ge ê)\ pe/peiken.]
_Sokr._ [Greek: A)ll' i)/sôs meta\ tou=to kai\ pei/seien
a)\n.]]
[Side-note: Minos. Question put by Sokrates to the companion.
What is Law, or The Law? All law is the same, _quatenus_ law:
what is the common constituent attribute?]
The Minos, like the Hipparchus, is a dialogue carried on between
Sokrates and a companion not named. It relates to Law, or The Law--
_Sokr._--What is Law (asks Sokrates)? _Comp._--Respecting
what sort of Law do you enquire (replies the Companion)?
_Sokr._--What! is there any difference between one law and
another law, as to that identical circumstance, of being Law? Gold
does not differ from gold, so far as the being gold is concerned--nor
stone from stone, so far as being stone is concerned. In like manner,
one law does not differ from another, all are the same, in so far as
each is Law alike:--not, one of them more, and another less. It is
about this as a whole that I ask you--What is Law?
[Side-note: Answer--Law is, 1. The consecrated and binding
customs. 2. The decree of the city. 3. Social or civic opinion.]
_Comp._--What should Law be, Sokrates, other than the various
assemblage of consecrated and binding customs and beliefs?[15]
_Sokr._--Do you think, then, that discourse is, the things
spoken: that sight is, the things seen? that hearing is, the things
heard? Or are they not distinct, in each of the three cases--and is
not Law also one thing, the various customs and beliefs another?
_Comp._--Yes! I now think that they are distinct.[16]
_Sokr._--Law is that whereby these binding customs become
binding. What is it? _Comp._--Law can be nothing else than the
public resolutions and decrees promulgated among us. Law is the
decree of the city.[17] _Sokr._--You mean, that Law is social
opinion. _Comp._--Yes I do.
[Footnote 15: Plato, Minos, 313 B. [Greek: Ti/ ou)=n a)/llo no/mos
ei)/ê a)\n a)ll' ê)\ ta\ nomizo/mena?]]
[Footnote 16: Plato, Minos, 313 B-C.
I pass over here an analogy started by Sokrates in his next question;
as [Greek: o)/psis] to [Greek: ta\ o(rô/mena], so [Greek: no/mos] to
[Greek: ta\ nomizo/mena], &c.]
[Footnote 17: Plato, Minos, 814 A. [Greek: e)peidê\ no/mô| ta\
nomizo/mena nomi/zetai, ti/ni o)/nti tô=| no/mô| nomi/zetai?]]
[Side-note: Cross-examination by Sokrates--just and
lawfully-behaving men are so through law; unjust and lawless men
are so through the absence of law. Law is highly honourable and useful:
lawlessness is ruinous. Accordingly, bad decrees of the city--or bad
social opinion--cannot be law.]
_Sokr._--Perhaps you are right: but let us examine. You call
some persons wise:--they are wise through wisdom. You call some
just:--they are just through justice. In like manner, the
lawfully-behaving men are so through law: the lawless men are so
through lawlessness. Now the lawfully-behaving men are just: the
lawless men are unjust. _Comp._--It is so. _Sokr._--Justice and Law,
are highly honourable: injustice and lawlessness, highly
dishonourable: the former preserves cities, the latter ruins them.
_Comp._--Yes--it does. _Sokr._--Well, then! we must
consider law as something honourable; and seek after it, under the
assumption that it is a good thing. You defined law to be the decree
of the city: Are not some decrees good, others evil?
_Comp._--Unquestionably. _Sokr._--But we have already said that law
is not evil. _Comp._--I admit it. _Sokr._--It is incorrect
therefore to answer, as you did broadly, that law is the decree of
the city. An evil decree cannot be law. _Comp._--I see that it
is incorrect.[18]
[Footnote 18: Plato, Minos, 314 B-C-D.]
[Side-note: Suggestion by Sokrates--Law is the _good_
opinion of the city--but good opinion is true opinion, or the finding
out of reality. Law therefore wishes (tends) to be the finding out of
reality, though it does not always succeed in doing so.]
_Sokr._--Still--I think, myself, that law is opinion of some
sort; and since it is not evil opinion, it must be good opinion. Now
good opinion is true opinion: and true opinion is, the finding out of
reality. _Comp._--I admit it. _Sokr._--Law therefore wishes
or tends to be, the finding out of reality.[19] _Comp._--But,
Sokrates, if law is the finding out of reality--if we have
therein already found out realities--how comes it that all
communities of men do not use the same laws respecting the same
matters? _Sokr._--The law does not the less wish or tend to find
out realities; but it is unable to do so. That is, if the fact be
true as you state--that we change our laws, and do not all of us use
the same. _Comp._--Surely, the fact as a fact is obvious
enough.[20]
[Footnote 19: Plato, Minos, 315 A. [Greek: Ou)kou=n ê( a)lêthê\s
do/xa tou= o)/ntos e)stin e)xeu/resis? . . . o( no/mos a)/ra bou/letai
tou= o)/ntos ei)=nai e)xeu/resis?]]
[Footnote 20: Plato, Minos, 315 A-B.]
[Side-note: Objection taken by the Companion--That there is
great discordance of laws in different places--he specifies several
cases of such discordance at some length. Sokrates reproves his
prolixity, and requests him to confine himself to question or
answer.]
(The Companion here enumerates some remarkable local rites,
venerable in one place, abhorrent in another, such as the human
sacrifices at Carthage, &c., thus lengthening his answer much
beyond what it had been before. Sokrates then continues):
_Sokr._--Perhaps you are right, and these matters have escaped
me. But if you and I go on making long speeches each for ourselves,
we shall never come to an agreement. If we are to carry on our
research together, we must do so by question and answer. Question me,
if you prefer:--if not, answer me. _Comp._--I am quite ready,
Sokrates, to answer whatever you ask.
[Side-note: Farther questions by Sokrates--Things heavy and
light, just and unjust, honourable and dishonourable, &c., are
so, and are accounted so everywhere. Real things are always accounted
real. Whoever fails in attaining the real, fails in attaining the
lawful.]
_Sokr._--Well, then! do you think that just things are just and
unjust things are unjust? _Comp._--I think they are.
_Sokr._--Do not all men in all communities, among the Persians
as well as here, now as well as formerly, think so too?
_Comp._--Unquestionably they do. _Sokr._--Are not things which weigh
more, accounted heavier; and things which weigh less, accounted
lighter, here, at Carthage, and everywhere else?[21]
_Comp._--Certainly. _Sokr._--It seems, then, that honourable things
are accounted honourable everywhere, and dishonourable things
dishonourable? not the reverse. _Comp._--Yes, it is so.
_Sokr._--Then, speaking universally, existent things or
realities (not non-existents) are accounted existent and real, among
us as well as among all other men? _Comp._--I think they are.
_Sokr._--Whoever therefore fails in attaining the real fails in
attaining the lawful.[22] _Comp._--As you now put it, Sokrates,
it would seem that the same things are accounted lawful both by us at
all times, and by all the rest of mankind besides. But when I reflect
that we are perpetually changing our laws, I cannot persuade myself
of what you affirm.
[Footnote 21: Plato, Minos, 316 A. [Greek: Po/teron de\ ta\ plei=on
e)/lkonta baru/tera nomi/zetai e)ntha/de, ta\ de\ e)/latton,
koupho/tera, ê)\ tou)nanti/on?]
The verb [Greek: nomi/zetai] deserves attention here, being the same
word as has been employed in regard to law, and derived from [Greek:
no/mos].]
[Footnote 22: Plato, Minos, 316 B. [Greek: ou)kou=n, ô(s kata\
pa/ntôn ei)pei=n, ta\ o)/nta nomi/zetai ei)=nai, ou) ta\ mê\ o)/nta,
kai\ par' ê(mi=n kai\ para\ toi=s a)/llois a(/pasin.]
_Comp._ [Greek: E)/moige dokei=.] _Sokr._ [Greek: O(\s a)\n
a)/ra tou= o)/ntos a(marta/nê|, tou= nomi/mou a(marta/nei.]]
[Side-note: There are laws of health and of cure, composed by
the few physicians wise upon those subjects, and unanimously declared
by them. So also there are laws of farming, gardening, cookery,
declared by the few wise in those respective pursuits. In like
manner, the laws of a city are the judgments declared by the few wise
men who know how to rule.]
_Sokr._--Perhaps you do not reflect that pieces on the draught-board,
when their position is changed, still remain the same. You
know medical treatises: you know that physicians are the really
knowing about matters of health: and that they agree with each other
in writing about them. _Comp._--Yes--I know that. _Sokr._--The
case is the same whether they be Greeks or not Greeks: Those who
know, must of necessity hold the same opinion with each other, on
matters which they know: always and everywhere. _Comp._--Yes--always
and everywhere. _Sokr._--Physicians write respecting
matters of health what they account to be true, and these writings of
theirs are the medical laws? _Comp._--Certainly they are.
_Sokr._--The like is true respecting the laws of farming--the
laws of gardening--the laws of cookery. All these are the writings of
persons, knowing in each of the respective pursuits? _Comp._--Yes.[23]
_Sokr._--In like manner, what are the laws respecting
the government of a city? Are they not the writings of those who know
how to govern--kings, statesmen, and men of superior excellence?
_Comp._--Truly so. _Sokr._--Knowing men like these will not
write differently from each other about the same things, nor change
what they have once written. If, then, we see some doing this,
are we to declare them knowing or ignorant?
_Comp._--Ignorant--undoubtedly.
[Footnote 23: Plato, Minos, 316 D-E.]
[Side-note: That which is right is the regal law, the only
true and real law--that which is not right, is not law, but only
seems to be law in the eyes of the ignorant.]
_Sokr._--Whatever is right, therefore, we may pronounce to be
lawful; in medicine, gardening, or cookery: whatever is not right,
not to be lawful but lawless. And the like in treatises respecting
just and unjust, prescribing how the city is to be administered: That
which is right, is the regal law--that which is not right, is not so,
but only seems to be law in the eyes of the ignorant--being in truth
lawless. _Comp._--Yes. _Sokr._--We were correct therefore
in declaring Law to be the finding out of reality. _Comp._--It
appears so.[24] _Sokr._--It is the skilful husbandman who gives
right laws on the sowing of land: the skilful musician on the
touching of instruments: the skilful trainer, respecting exercise of
the body: the skilful king or governor, respecting the minds of the
citizens. _Comp._--Yes--it is.[25]
[Footnote 24: Plato, Minos, 317 C. [Greek: to\ me\n o)rtho\n no/mos
e)sti\ basiliko/s; to\ de\ mê\ o)rtho/n ou)/, o(\ dokei= no/mos
ei)=nai toi=s ei)do/sin; e)/sti ga\r a)/nomon.]]
[Footnote 25: Plato, Minos, 318 A.]
[Side-note: Minos, King of Krete--his laws were divine and
excellent, and have remained unchanged from time immemorial.]
_Sokr._--Can you tell me which of the ancient kings has the
glory of having been a good lawgiver, so that his laws still remain
in force as divine institutions? _Comp._--I cannot tell.
_Sokr._--But can you not say which among the Greeks have the
most ancient laws? _Comp._--Perhaps you mean the Lacedæmonians
and Lykurgus? _Sokr._--Why, the Lacedæmonian laws are hardly
more than three hundred years old: besides, whence is it that the
best of them come? _Comp._--From Krete, they say. _Sokr._--Then
it is the Kretans who have the most ancient laws in Greece?
_Comp._--Yes. _Sokr._--Do you know those good kings of
Krete, from whom these laws are derived--Minos and Rhadamanthus, sons
of Zeus and Europa? _Comp._--Rhadamanthus certainly is said to
have been a just man, Sokrates; but Minos quite the reverse--savage,
ill-tempered, unjust. _Sokr._--What you affirm, my friend, is a
fiction of the Attic tragedians. It is not stated either by Homer or
Hesiod, who are far more worthy of credit than all the tragedians put
together. _Comp._--What is it that Homer and Hesiod say
about Minos?[26]
[Footnote 26: Plato, Minos, 318 E.]
[Side-note: Question about the character of Minos--Homer and
Hesiod declare him to have been admirable, the Attic tragedians
defame him as a tyrant, because he was an enemy of Athens.]
Sokrates replies by citing, and commenting upon, the statements of
Homer and Hesiod respecting Minos, as the cherished son, companion,
and pupil, of Zeus; who bestowed upon him an admirable training,
teaching him wisdom and justice, and thus rendering him consummate as
a lawgiver and ruler of men. It was through these laws, divine as
emanating from the teaching of Zeus, that Krete (and Sparta as the
imitator of Krete) had been for so long a period happy and virtuous.
As ruler of Krete, Minos had made war upon Athens, and compelled the
Athenians to pay tribute. Hence he had become odious to the
Athenians, and especially odious to the tragic poets who were the
great teachers and charmers of the crowd. These poets, whom every one
ought to be cautious of offending, had calumniated Minos as the old
enemy of Athens.[27]
[Footnote 27: Plato, Minos, 319-320.]
[Side-note: That Minos was really admirable--and that he has
found out truth and reality respecting the administration of the
city--we may be sure from the fact that his laws have remained so
long unaltered.]
But that these tales are mere calumny (continues Sokrates), and that
Minos was truly a good lawgiver, and a good shepherd ([Greek: nomeu\s
a)gatho/s]) of his people--we have proof through the fact, that his
laws still remain unchanged: which shows that he has really found out
truth and reality respecting the administration of a city.[28]
_Comp._--Your view seems plausible, Sokrates. _Sokr._--If I
am right, then, you think that the Kretans have more ancient laws
than any other Greeks? and that Minos and Rhadamanthus are the best
of all ancient lawgivers, rulers, and shepherds of mankind?
_Comp._--I think they are.
[Footnote 28: Plato, Minos, 321 B. [Greek: tou=to me/giston sêmei=on,
o(/ti a)ki/nêtoi au)tou= oi( no/moi ei)si/n, a)/te tou= o)/ntos peri\
po/leôs oi)kê/seôs e)xeuro/ntos eu)= tê\n a)lê/theian.]]
[Side-note: The question is made more determinate--What is it
that the good lawgiver prescribes and measures out for the health of
the mind, as the physician measures out food and exercise for the
body? Sokrates cannot tell. Close.]
_Sokr._--Now take the case of the good lawgiver and good
shepherd for the body--If we were asked, what it is that he
prescribes for the body, so as to render it better? we should answer,
at once, briefly, and well, by saying--food and labour: the former to
sustain the body, the latter to exercise and consolidate it.
_Comp._--Quite correct. _Sokr._--And if after that we
were asked, What are those things which the good lawgiver prescribes
for the mind to make it better, what should we say, so as to avoid
discrediting ourselves? _Comp._--I really cannot tell.
_Sokr._--But surely it is discreditable enough both for your
mind and mine--to confess, that we do not know upon what it is that
good and evil for our minds depends, while we can define upon what it
is that the good or evil of our bodies depends?[29]
[Footnote 29: Plato, Minos, 321 C-B.]
* * * * *
[Side-note: The Hipparchus and Minos are analogous to each
other, and both of them inferior works of Plato, perhaps unfinished.]
I have put together the two dialogues Hipparchus and Minos, partly
because of the analogy which really exists between them, partly
because that analogy is much insisted on by Boeckh, Schleiermacher,
Stallbaum, and other recent critics; who not only strike them both
out of the list of Platonic works, but speak of them with contempt as
compositions. On the first point, I dissent from them altogether: on
the second, I agree with them thus far--that I consider the two
dialogues inferior works of Plato:--much inferior to his greatest and
best compositions,--certainly displaying both less genius and less
careful elaboration--probably among his early performances--perhaps
even unfinished projects, destined for a farther elaboration, which
they never received, and not published until after his decease. Yet
in Hipparchus as well as in Minos, the subjects debated are important
as regards ethical theory. Several questions are raised and partially
canvassed: no conclusion is finally attained. These characteristics
they have in common with several of the best Platonic dialogues.
[Side-note: Hipparchus--Double meaning of [Greek:
philokerdê\s] and [Greek: ke/rdos].]
In Hipparchus, the question put by Sokrates is, about the definition
of [Greek: o( philokerdê\s] (the lover of gain), and of [Greek:
ke/rdos] itself--gain. The first of these two words (like many in
Greek as well as in English) is used in two senses. In its plain,
etymological sense, it means an attribute belonging to all men: all
men love gain, hate loss. But since this is predicable of all,
there is seldom any necessity for predicating it of any one man or
knot of men in particular. Accordingly, when you employ the epithet
as a predicate of A or B, what you generally mean is, to assert
something more than its strict etymological meaning: to declare that
he has the attribute in unusual measure; or that he has shown
himself, on various occasions, wanting in other attributes, which on
those occasions ought, in your judgment, to have countervailed it.
The epithet thus comes to connote a sentiment of blame or reproach,
in the mind of the speaker.[30]
[Footnote 30: Aristotle adverts to this class of ethical epithets,
connoting both an attribute in the person designated and an
unfavourable sentiment in the speaker (Ethic. Nikom. ii. 6, p. 1107,
a. 9). [Greek: Ou) pa=sa d' e)pide/chetai pra=xis, ou)de\ pa=n
pa/thos, tê\n meso/têta; e)/nia ga\r eu)thu\s ô)no/mastai
suneilêmme/na meta\ tê=s phaulo/têtos, oi)=on], &c.]
[Side-note: State or mind of the agent, as to knowledge,
frequent inquiry in Plato. No tenable definition found.]
The Companion or Collocutor, being called upon by Sokrates to explain
[Greek: to\ philokerde\s], defines it in this last sense, as
conveying or connoting a reproach. He gives three different
explanations of it (always in this sense), each of which Sokrates
shows to be untenable. A variety of parallel cases are compared, and
the question is put (so constantly recurring in Plato's writings),
what is the state of the agent's mind as to knowledge? The
cross-examination makes out, that if the agent be supposed to
know,--then there is no man corresponding to the definition of a
[Greek: philokerdê/s]: if the agent be supposed not to know--then,
on the contrary, every man will come under the definition. The
Companion is persuaded that there is such a thing as "love of
gain" in the blamable sense. Yet he cannot find any tenable
definition, to discriminate it from "love of gain" in the
ordinary or innocent sense.
[Side-note: Admitting that there is bad gain, as well as good
gain, what is the meaning of the word _gain_? None is found.]
The same question comes back in another form, after Sokrates has
given the liberty of retractation. The Collocutor maintains that
there is bad _gain_, as well as good _gain_. But what is
that common, generic, quality, designated well as good by the word
_gain_, apart from these two distinctive epithets? He cannot
find it out or describe it. He gives two definitions, each of which
is torn up by Sokrates. To deserve the name of _gain_, that
which a man acquires must be good; and it must surpass, in value as
well as in quantity, the loss or outlay which he incurs in order
to acquire it. But when thus understood, all gains are good. There is
no meaning in the distinction between good and bad gains: all men are
lovers of gain.
[Side-note: Purpose of Plato in the dialogue--to lay bare the
confusion, and to force the mind of the respondent into efforts for
clearing it up.]
With this confusion, the dialogue closes. The Sokratic notion of
_good_, as what every one loves--_evil_ as what every one
hates--also of evil-doing, as performed by every evil-doer only
through ignorance or mistake is brought out and applied to test the
ethical phraseology of a common-place respondent. But it only serves
to lay bare a state of confusion and perplexity, without clearing up
any thing. Herein, so far as I can see, lies Plato's purpose in the
dialogue. The respondent is made aware of the confusion, which he did
not know before; and this, in Plato's view, is a progress. The
respondent cannot avoid giving contradictory answers, under an acute
cross-examination: but he does not adopt any new belief. He says to
Sokrates at the close--"The debate has constrained rather than
persuaded me".[31] This is a simple but instructive declaration of
the force put by Sokrates upon his collocutors; and of the
reactionary effort likely to be provoked in their minds, with a view
to extricate themselves from a painful sense of contradiction. If
such effort be provoked, Plato's purpose is attained.
[Footnote 31: Plato, Hipparch. 232 B. [Greek: ê)na/gkake ga\r (o(
lo/gos) ma=llon e)me/ ge ê)\ pe/peiken.]]
One peculiarity there is, analogous to what we have already seen in
the Hippias Major. It is not merely the Collocutor who charges
Sokrates, but also Sokrates who accuses the Collocutor--each charging
the other with attempts to deceive a friend.[32] This seems intended
by Plato to create an occasion for introducing what he had to say
about Hipparchus--_apropos_ of the motto on the Hipparchean
Hermes--[Greek: mê\ phi/lon e)xapa/ta].
[Footnote 32: Plato, Hipparch. 225 E, 228 A.]
[Side-note: Historical narrative and comments given in the
dialogue respecting Hipparchus--afford no ground for declaring the
dialogue to be spurious.]
The modern critics, who proclaim the Hipparchus not to be the work of
Plato, allege as one of the proofs of spuriousness, the occurrence of
this long narrative and comment upon the historical Hipparchus and
his behaviour; which narrative (the critics maintain) Plato would
never have introduced, seeing that it contributes nothing to the
settlement of the question debated. But to this we may reply, first,
That there are other dialogues[33] (not to mention the Minos) in
which Plato introduces recitals of considerable length, historical or
quasi-historical recitals; bearing remotely, or hardly bearing at
all, upon the precise question under discussion; next,--That even if
no such analogies could be cited, and if the case stood single, no
modern critic could fairly pretend to be so thoroughly acquainted
with Plato's views and the surrounding circumstances, as to put a
limit on the means which Plato might choose to take, for rendering
his dialogues acceptable and interesting. Plato's political views
made him disinclined to popular government generally, and to the
democracy of Athens in particular. Conformably with such sentiment,
he is disposed to surround the rule of the Peisistratidæ with an
ethical and philosophical colouring: to depict Hipparchus as a wise
man busied in instructing and elevating the citizens; and to
discredit the renown of Harmodius and Aristogeiton, by affirming them
to have been envious of Hipparchus, as a philosopher who surpassed
themselves by his own mental worth. All this lay perfectly in the
vein of Plato's sentiment; and we may say the same about the
narrative in the Minos, respecting the divine parentage and teaching
of Minos, giving rise to his superhuman efficacy as a lawgiver and
ruler. It is surely very conceivable, that Plato, as a composer of
ethical dialogues or dramas, might think that such recitals lent a
charm or interest to some of them. Moreover, something like variety,
or distinctive features as between one dialogue and another, was a
point of no inconsiderable moment. I am of opinion that Plato did so
conceive these narratives. But at any rate, what I here contend is,
that no modern critics have a right to assume as certain that he did
not.
[Footnote 33: See Alkibiad. ii. pp. 142-149-150; Alkibiad. i. pp.
121-122: Protagoras, 342-344; Politikus, 268 D., [Greek: schedo\n
paidia\n e)gkerasame/nous] and the two or three pages which follow.
F. A. Wolf, and various critics after him, contend that the
genuineness of the Hipparchus was doubted in antiquity, on the
authority of Ælian, V. H. viii. 2. But I maintain that this is not
the meaning of the passage, unless upon the supposition that the word
[Greek: mathêtê\s] is struck out of the text conjecturally. The
passage may be perfectly well construed, leaving [Greek: mathêtê\s]
in the text: we must undoubtedly suppose the author to have made an
assertion historically erroneous: but this is nowise impossible in
the case of Ælian. If you construe the passage as it stands, without
such conjectural alteration, it does not justify Wolf's inference.]
[Side-note: Minos. Question--What is the characteristic
property connoted by the word [Greek: No/mos] or law?]
I now come to the Minos. The subject of this dialogue is, the
explanation or definition of Law. Sokrates says to his Companion or
Collocutor,--Tell me what is the generic constituent of Law: All Laws
are alike _quatenus_ Law. Take no note of the difference between
one law and another, but explain to me what characteristic property
it is, which is common to all Law, and is implied in or connoted by
the name Law.
This question is logically the same as that which Sokrates asks in
the Hipparchus with reference to [Greek: ke/rdos] or gain.
[Side-note: This question was discussed by the historical
Sokrates, Memorabilia of Xenophon.]
That the definition of [Greek: No/mos] or Law was discussed by
Sokrates, we know, not only from the general description of his
debates given in Xenophon, but also from the interesting description
(in that author) of the conversation between the youthful Alkibiades
and Perikles.[34] The interrogations employed by Alkibiades on that
occasion are Sokratic, and must have been derived, directly or
indirectly, from Sokrates. They are partially analogous to the
questions of Sokrates in the dialogue Minos, and they end by driving
Perikles into a confusion, left unexplained, between Law and
Lawlessness.
[Footnote 34: Xen. Mem. i. 1, 16; i. 2, 42-46.]
[Side-note: Definitions of law--suggested and refuted. Law
includes, as a portion of its meaning, justice, goodness, usefulness,
&c. Bad decrees are not laws.]
Definitions of [Greek: No/mos] are here given by the Companion, who
undergoes a cross-examination upon them. First, he says, that [Greek:
No/mos = ta\ nomizo/mena]. But this is rejected by Sokrates, who
intimates that Law is not the aggregate of laws enacted or of customs
held binding: but that which lies behind these laws and customs,
imparting to them their binding force.[35] We are to enquire what
this is. The Companion declares that it is the public decree of the
city: political or social opinion. But this again Sokrates contests:
putting questions to show that Law includes, as a portion of its
meaning, justice, goodness, beauty, and preservation of the city with
its possessions; while lawlessness includes injustice, evil,
ugliness, and destruction. There can be no such thing as bad or
wicked law.[36] But among decrees of the city, some are bad, some
are good. Therefore to define Law as a decree of the city, thus
generally, is incorrect. It is only the good decree, not the bad
decree, which is Law. Now the good decree or opinion, is the true
opinion: that is, it is the finding out of reality. Law therefore
wishes or aims to be the finding out of reality: and if there are
differences between different nations, this is because the power to
find out does not always accompany the wish to find out.
[Footnote 35: Plato, Minos, 314 A. [Greek: e)peidê\ no/mô| ta\
nomizo/mena nomi/zetai, ti/ni o)/nti tô=| no/mô| nomi/zetai?]]
[Footnote 36: Plato, Minos, 314 E. [Greek: kai\ mê\n no/mos ge ou)k
ê)=n ponêro/s.]]
[Side-note: Sokrates affirms that law is everywhere the same--it
is the declared judgment and command of the Wise man upon the
subject to which it refers--it is truth and reality, found out and
certified by him.]
As to the assertion--that Law is one thing here, another thing there,
one thing at one time, another thing at another--Sokrates contests
it. Just things are just (he says) everywhere and at all times;
unjust things are unjust also. Heavy things are heavy, light things
light, at one time, as well as at another. So also honourable things
are everywhere honourable, base things everywhere base. In general
phrase, existent things are everywhere existent,[37] non-existent
things are not existent. Whoever therefore fails to attain the
existent and real, fails to attain the lawful and just. It is only
the man of art and knowledge, in this or that department, who attains
the existent, the real, the right, true, lawful, just. Thus the
authoritative rescripts or laws in matters of medicine, are those
laid down by practitioners who know that subject, all of whom agree
in what they lay down: the laws of cookery, the laws of agriculture
and of gardening--are rescripts delivered by artists who know
respectively each of those subjects. So also about Just and Unjust,
about the political and social arrangements of the city--the
authoritative rescripts or laws are, those laid down by the artists
or men of knowledge in that department, all of whom agree in laying
down the same: that is, all the men of art called kings or lawgivers.
It is only the right, the true, the real--that which these artists
attain--which is properly a law and is entitled to be so called. That
which is not right is not a law,--ought not to be so called--and is
only supposed to be a law by the error of ignorant men.[38]
[Footnote 37: M. Boeckh remarks justly in his note on this
passage--"neque enim illud demonstratum est, eadem omnibus legitima
esse--sed tantum, _notionem_" (rather the sentiment or emotion)
"_legitimi_ omnibus eandem esse. Sed omnia scriptor hic
confundit."]
[Footnote 38: Plato, Minos, 317 C.]
[Side-note: Reasoning of Sokrates in the Minos is unsound,
but Platonic. The Good, True, and Real, coalesce in the mind of
Plato--he acknowledges nothing to be Law, except what he thinks ought
to _be_ Law.]
That the reasoning of Sokrates in this dialogue is confused and
unsound (as M. Boeckh and other critics have remarked), I perfectly
agree. But it is not the less completely Platonic; resting upon views
and doctrines much cherished and often reproduced by Plato. The
dialogue Minos presents, in a rude and awkward manner, without
explanation or amplification, that worship of the Abstract and the
Ideal, which Plato, in other and longer dialogues, seeks to diversify
as well as to elaborate. The definitions of Law here combated and
given by Sokrates, illustrate this. The good, the true, the right,
the beautiful, the real--all coalesce in the mind of Plato. There is
nothing (in his view) real, except _The_ Good, _The_ Just, &c.
([Greek: to\ au)to-a)gatho\n]; [Greek: au)to-di/kaion]--Absolute
Goodness and Justice): particular good and just things have
no reality, they are no more good and just than bad and unjust--they
are one or the other, according to circumstances--they are ever
variable, floating midway between the real and unreal.[39] The real
alone is knowable, correlating with knowledge or with the knowing
Intelligence [Greek: Nou=s]. As Sokrates distinguishes elsewhere
[Greek: to\ di/kaion] or [Greek: au)to-di/kaion] from [Greek: ta\
di/kaia]--so here he distinguishes ([Greek: no/mos] from [Greek: ta\
nomizo/mena]) _Law_, from the assemblage of actual commands or
customs received as _laws_ among mankind. These latter are
variable according to time and place; but Law is always one and the
same. Plato will acknowledge nothing to _be_ Law, except that
which (he thinks) _ought to be_ Law: that which emanates from a
lawgiver of consummate knowledge, who aims at the accomplishment of
the good and the real, and knows how to discover and realise that
end. So far as "the decree of the city" coincides with what would
have been enacted by this lawgiver (_i. e._ so far as it is good
and right), Sokrates admits it as a valid explanation of Law; but no
farther. He considers the phrase _bad law_ to express a logical
impossibility, involving a contradiction _in adjecto_.[40] What
others call a bad law, he regards as being no real law, but only
a fallacious image, mistaken for such by the ignorant. He does not
consider such ignorant persons as qualified to judge: he recognises
only the judgment of the knowing one or few, among whom he affirms
that there can be no difference of opinion. Every one admits just
things to be just,--unjust things to be unjust,--heavy things to be
heavy,--the existent and the real, to be the existent and the real.
If then the lawgiver in any of his laws fails to attain this reality,
he fails in the very purpose essential to the conception of law:[41]
_i. e._ his pretended law is no law at all.
[Footnote 39: See the remarkable passage in the fifth book of the
Republic, pp. 479-480; compare vii. 538 E.]
[Footnote 40: Plato, Minos, 314 D.
The same argument is brought to bear by the Platonic Sokrates against
Hippias in the Hippias Major, 284-285. If the laws are not really
profitable, which is the only real purpose for which they were
established, they are no laws at all. The Spartans are [Greek:
para/nomoi]. Some of the answers assigned to Hippias (284 D) are
pertinent enough; but he is overborne.]
[Footnote 41: Plato, Minos, 316 B. [Greek: O(\s a)\n a)/ra tou=
o)/ntos a(marta/nê, tou= nomi/mou a(marta/nei.]]
[Side-note: Plato worships the Ideal of his own mind--the work
of systematic constructive theory by the Wise Man.]
By _Law_ then, Plato means--not the assemblage of actual
positive rules, nor any general property common to and characteristic
of them, nor the free determination of an assembled Demos as
distinguished from the mandates of a despot--but the Type of Law as
it ought to be, and as it would be, if prescribed by a perfectly wise
ruler, aiming at good and knowing how to realise it. This, which is
the ideal of his own mind, Plato worships and reasons upon as if it
were the only reality; as Law by nature, or natural Law,
distinguished from actual positive laws: which last have either been
set by some ill-qualified historical ruler, or have grown up
insensibly. Knowledge, art, philosophy, systematic and constructive,
applied by some one or few exalted individuals, is (in his view) the
only cause capable of producing that typical result which is true,
good, real, permanent, and worthy of the generic name.
[Side-note: Different applications of this general Platonic
view, in the Minos, Politikus, Kratylus, &c. _Natural_
Rectitude of Law, Government, Names, &c.]
In the Minos, this general Platonic view is applied to Law: in the
Politikus, to government and social administration: in the Kratylus,
to naming or language. In the Politikus, we find the received
classification of governments (monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy)
discarded as improper; and the assertion advanced, That there is only
one government right, true, genuine, really existing--government by
the uncontrolled authority and superintendence of the man of exalted
intelligence: he who is master in the art of governing, whether
such man do in fact hold power anywhere or not. All other governments
are degenerate substitutes for this type, some receding from it less,
some more.[42] Again, in the Kratylus, where names and name-giving
are discussed, Sokrates[43] maintains that things can only be named
according to their true and real nature--that there is, belonging to
each thing, one special and appropriate Name-Form, discernible only
by the sagacity of the intelligent Lawgiver: who alone is competent
to bestow upon each thing its right, true, genuine, real name,
possessing rectitude by nature ([Greek: o)rtho/tês phu/sei]).[44]
This Name-Form (according to Sokrates) is the same in all languages
in so far as they are constructed by different intelligent Lawgivers,
although the letters and syllables in which they may clothe the Form
are very different.[45] If names be not thus apportioned by the
systematic purpose of an intelligent Lawgiver, but raised up by
insensible and unsystematic growth--they will be unworthy substitutes
for the genuine type, though they are the best which actual societies
possess; according to the opinion announced by Kratylus in that same
dialogue, they will not be names at all.[46]
[Footnote 42: Plato, Politikus, 293 C-E. [Greek: tau/tên o)rthê\n
diaphero/ntôs ei)=nai kai\ mo/nên politei/an, e)n ê(=| tis a)\n
eu(/riskoi tou\s a)/rchontas a)lêthô=s e)pistê/monas kai\ ou)
dokou=ntas mo/non . . . to/te kai\ kata\ tou\s toiou/tous o(/rous
ê(mi=n mo/nên o)rthê\n politei/an ei)=nai r(ête/on. o(/sas de\
a)/llas le/gomen, _ou) gnêsi/as ou)d' o)/ntôs ou)/sas lekte/on_,
a)lla\ memimême/nas tau/tên, a(/s me\n eu)no/mous le/gomen, e)pi\ ta\
kalli/ô, ta\s de\ a)/llas e)pi\ ta\ ai)schi/ona memimê=sthai.]
The historical (Xenophontic) Sokrates asserts this same position in
Xenophon's Memorabilia (iii. 9, 10). "Sokrates said that Kings and
Rulers were those who knew how to command, not those who held the
sceptre or were chosen by election or lot, or had acquired power by
force or fraud," &c.
The Kings of Sparta and Macedonia, the [Greek: Boulê\] and [Greek:
Dê=mos] of Athens, the Despot of Syracuse or Pheræ are here declared
to be not real rulers at all.]
[Footnote 43: Plato, Kratylus, 387 D.]
[Footnote 44: Plato, Kratyl. 388 A-E.]
[Footnote 45: Plato, Kratyl. 389 E, 390 A, 432 E. [Greek: Ou)kou=n
ou)/tôs a)xiô/seis kai\ to\n nomothe/tên to/n te e)ntha/de kai\ to\n
e)n toi=s barba/rois, e(/ôs a)\n to\ tou= o)no/matos ei)=dos
a)podidô=| to\ prosê=kon e(ka/stô| e)n o(poiaisou=n sullabai=s,
ou)de\n chei/rô nomothe/tên ei)=nai to\n e)ntha/de ê)\ to\n o(pouou=n
a)/llothi?] Compare this with the Minos, 315 E, 316 D, where Sokrates
evades, by an hypothesis very similar, the objection made by the
collocutor, that the laws in one country are very different from
those in another--[Greek: i)/sôs ga\r ou)k e)nnoei=s tau=ta
metapetteuo/mena o(/ti tau)ta/ e)stin.]]
[Footnote 46: Plato, Kratyl. 430 A, 432 A, 433 D, 435 C.
Kratylus says that a name badly given is no name at all; just as
Sokrates says in the Minos that a bad law is no law at all.]
[Side-note: Eulogy on Minos, as having established laws on
this divine type or natural rectitude.]
The Kretan Minos (we here find it affirmed), son, companion, and
pupil of Zeus, has learnt to establish laws of this divine type or
natural rectitude: the proof of which is, that the ancient Kretan
laws have for immemorial ages remained, and still do remain,[47]
unchanged. But when Sokrates tries to determine, Wherein consists
this Law-Type? What is it that the wise Lawgiver prescribes for the
minds of the citizens--as the wise gymnastic trainer prescribes
proper measure of nourishment and exercise for their bodies?--the
question is left unanswered. Sokrates confesses with shame that he
cannot answer it: and the dialogue ends in a blank. The
reader--according to Plato's manner--is to be piqued and shamed
into the effort of meditating the question for himself.
[Footnote 47: Plato, Minos, 319 B, 321 A.]
[Side-note: The Minos was arranged by Aristophanes at first in
a Trilogy along with the Leges.]
An attempt to answer this question will be found in Plato's Treatise
De Legibus--in the projected Kretan colony, of which he there
sketches the fundamental laws. Aristophanes of Byzantium very
naturally placed this treatise as sequel to the Minos; second in the
Trilogy of which the Minos was first.[48]
[Footnote 48: I reserve for an Appendix some further remarks upon the
genuineness of Hipparchus and Minos.]
[Side-note: Explanations of the word Law--confusion in its
meaning.]
Whoever has followed the abstract of the Minos, which I have just
given, will remark the different explanations of the word Law--both
those which are disallowed, and that which is preferred, though left
incomplete, by Sokrates. On this same subject, there are in many
writers, modern as well an ancient, two distinct modes of confusion
traceable--pointed out by eminent recent jurists, such as Mr.
Bentham, Mr. Austin, and Mr. Maine. 1. Between Law as it is, and Law
as it ought to be. 2. Between Laws Imperative, set by intelligent
rulers, and enforced by penal sanction--and Laws signifying
uniformities of fact expressed in general terms, such as the Law of
Gravitation, Crystallisation, &c.--We can hardly say that in the
dialogue Minos, Plato falls into the first of these two modes of
confusion: for he expressly says that he only recognises the Ideal of
Law, or Law as it ought to be (actual Laws everywhere being
disallowed, except in so far as they conform thereunto). But he does
fall into the second, when he identifies the Lawful with the Real or
Existent. His Ideal stands in place of generalisations of fact.
There is also much confusion, if we compare the Minos with other
dialogues; wherein Plato frequently talks of Laws as the laws and
customs actually existing or imperative in any given state--Athens,
Sparta, or elsewhere ([Greek: No/mos = ta\ nomizo/mena], according to
the first words in the Minos). For example, in the harangue which he
supposes to be addressed to Sokrates in the Kriton, and which he
invests with so impressive a character--the Laws of Athens are
introduced as speakers: but according to the principles laid down in
the Minos, three-fourths of the Laws of Athens could not be regarded
as laws at all. If therefore we take Plato's writings throughout, we
shall not find that he is constant to one uniform sense of the word
Law, or that he escapes the frequent confusion between Law as it
actually exists and Law as it ought to be.[49]
[Footnote 49: The first explanation of [Greek: No/mos] advanced by
the Companion in reply to Sokrates (viz. [Greek: No/mos = ta\
nomizo/mena], coincides substantially with the meaning of [Greek:
No/mos basileu\s] in Pindar and Herodotus (see above, chap. viii.),
who is an imaginary ruler, occupying a given region, and enforcing
[Greek: ta\ nomizo/mena]. It coincides also with the precept [Greek:
No/mô| po/leôs], as prescribed by the Pythian priestess to applicants
who asked advice about the proper forms of religious worship (Xen.
Mem. i. 3, 1); though this precept, when Cicero comes to report it
(Legg. ii. 16, 40), appears divested of its simplicity, and
over-clouded with the very confusion touched upon in my text. Aristotle
does not keep clear of the confusion (compare Ethic. Nikom. i. 1,
1094, b. 16, and v. 5, 1130, b. 24). I shall revert again to the
distinction between [Greek: no/mos] and [Greek: phu/sis], in touching
on other Platonic dialogues. Cicero expressly declares (Legg. ii. 5,
11), conformably to what is said by the Platonic Sokrates in the
Minos, that a bad law, however passed in regular form, is no law at
all; and this might be well if he adhered consistently to the same
phraseology, but he perpetually uses, in other places, the words
_Lex_ and _Leges_ to signify laws actually in force at
Rome, good or bad.
Mr. Bentham gives an explanation of Law or The Law, which coincides
with [Greek: No/mos = ta\ nomizo/mena]. He says (Principles of Morals
and Legislation, vol. ii. ch. 17, p. 257, ed. 1823), "Now Law, or The
Law, taken indefinitely, is an abstract and collective term, which,
when it means anything, can mean neither more nor less than the sum
total of a number of individual laws taken together".
Mr. Austin in his Lectures, 'The Province of Jurisprudence
Determined', has explained more clearly and copiously than any
antecedent author, the confused meanings of the word Law adverted to
in my text. See especially his first lecture and his fifth, pp. 88
seq. and 171 seq., 4th ed.]
* * * * *
APPENDIX.
In continuing to recognise Hipparchus and Minos as Platonic works,
contrary to the opinion of many modern critics, I have to remind the
reader, not only that both are included in the Canon of Thrasyllus,
but that the Minos was expressly acknowledged by Aristophanes of
Byzantium, and included by him among the Trilogies: showing that it
existed then (220 B.C.) in the Alexandrine Museum as a
Platonic work. The similarity between the Hipparchus and Minos is
recognised by all the Platonic critics, most of whom declare that
both of them are spurious. Schleiermacher affirms and vindicates this
opinion in his Einleitung and notes: but it will be convenient to
take the arguments advanced to prove the spuriousness, as they are
set forth by M. Boeckh, in his "Comment. in Platonis qui vulgo fertur
Minoem": in which treatise, though among his early works, the case is
argued with all that copious learning and critical ability, which
usually adorn his many admirable contributions to the improvement of
philology.
M. Boeckh not only rejects the pretensions of Hipparchus and Minos to
be considered as works of Plato, but advances an affirmative
hypothesis to show what they are. He considers these two dialogues,
together with those De Justo, and De Virtute (two short dialogues in
the pseudo-Platonic list, not recognised by Thrasyllus) as among the
dialogues published by Simon; an Athenian citizen and a shoemaker by
trade, in whose shop Sokrates is said to have held many of his
conversations. Simon is reported to have made many notes of these
conversations, and to have composed and published, from them, a
volume of thirty-three dialogues (Diog. L. ii. 122), among the titles
of which there are two--[Greek: Peri\ Philkerdou=s] and [Greek: Peri\
No/mou]. Simon was, of course, contemporary with Plato; but somewhat
older in years. With this part of M. Boeckh's treatise, respecting
the supposed authorship of Simon, I have nothing to do. I only notice
the arguments by which he proposes to show that Hipparchus and Minos
are not works of Plato.
In the first place, I notice that M. Boeckh explicitly recognises
them as works of an author contemporary with Plato, not later
than 380 B.C. (p. 46). Hereby many of the tests, whereby we
usually detect spurious works, become inapplicable.
In the second place, he admits that the dialogues are composed in
good Attic Greek, suitable to the Platonic age both in character and
manners--"At veteris esse et Attici scriptoris, probus sermo, antiqui
mores, totus denique character, spondeat," p. 32.
The reasons urged by M. Boeckh to prove the spuriousness of the
Minos, are first, that it is unlike Plato--next, that it is too much
like Plato. "Dupliciter dialogus a Platonis ingenio discrepat: partim
quod parum, partim quod nimium, similis ceteris ejusdem scriptis sit.
Parum similis est in rebus permultis. Nam cum Plato adhuc vivos ac
videntes aut nuper defunctos notosque homines, ut scenicus poeta
actores, moribus ingeniisque accurate descriptis, nominatim producat
in medium--in isto opusculo cum Socrate colloquens persona plané
incerta est ac nomine carens: quippe cum imperitus scriptor esset
artis illius colloquiis suis _dulcissimas veneres_ illas
inferendi, quæ ex peculiaribus personarum moribus pingendis
redundant, atque à Platone ut flores per amplos dialogorum hortos
sunt disseminatæ" (pp. 7-8): again, p. 9, it is complained that there
is an "infinitus secundarius collocutor" in the Hipparchus.
Now the sentence, just transcribed from M. Boeckh, shows that he had
in his mind as standard of comparison, a certain number of the
Platonic works, but that he did not take account of all of them. The
Platonic Protagoras begins with a dialogue between Sokrates and an
unknown, nameless person; to whom Sokrates, after a page of
conversation with him, recounts what has just passed between himself,
Protagoras, and others. Next, if we turn to the Sophistês and
Politikus, we find that in both of them, not simply the secundarius
collocutor, but even the principal speaker, is an unknown and
nameless person, described only as a Stranger from Elea, and never
before seen by Sokrates. Again, in the Leges, the principal speaker
is only an [Greek: A)thênai=os xe/nos], without a name. In the face
of such analogies, it is unsafe to lay down a peremptory rule, that
no dialogue can be the work of Plato, which acknowledges as
_collocutor_ an unnamed person.
Then again--when M. Boeckh complains that the Hipparchus and Minos
are destitute of those "_flores et dulcissimæ Veneres_" which
Plato is accustomed to spread through his dialogues--I ask, Where are
the "dulcissimæ Veneres" in the Parmenidês, Sophistês, Politikus,
Leges, Timæus, Kritias? I find none. The presence of "dulcissimæ
Veneres" is not a condition _sine quâ non_, in every
composition which pretends to Plato as its author: nor can the
absence of them be admitted as a reason for disallowing Hipparchus
and Minos.
The analogy of the Sophistês and Politikus (besides Symposium,
Republic, and Leges) farther shows, that there is nothing wonderful
in finding the titles of Hipparchus and Minos derived from the
subjects ([Greek: Peri\ Philkerdou=s] and [Greek: Peri\ No/mou]), not
from the name of one of the collocutors:--whether we suppose the
titles to have been bestowed by Plato himself, or by some subsequent
editor (Boeckh, p. 10).
To illustrate his first ground of objection--Dissimilarity between
the Minos and the true Platonic writings--M. Boeckh enumerates (pp.
12-23) several passages of the dialogue which he considers
unplatonic. Moreover, he includes among them (p. 12) examples of
confused and illogical reasoning. I confess that to me this evidence
is noway sufficient to prove that Plato is not the author. That
certain passages may be picked out which are obscure, confused,
inelegant--is certainly no sufficient evidence. If I thought so, I
should go along with Ast in rejecting the Euthydêmus, Menon, Lachês,
Charmidês, Lysis, &c., against all which Ast argues as spurious,
upon evidence of the same kind. It is not too much to say, that
against almost every one of the dialogues, taken severally, a case of
the same kind, more or less plausible, might be made out. You might
in each of them find passages peculiar, careless, awkwardly
expressed. The expression [Greek: tê\n a)nthrôpei/an a)ge/lên tou=
sô/matos], which M. Boeckh insists upon so much as improper, would
probably have been considered as a mere case of faulty text, if it
had occurred in any other dialogue: and so it may fairly be
considered in the Minos.
Moreover as to faults of logic and consistency in the reasoning, most
certainly these cannot be held as proving the Minos not to be Plato's
work. I would engage to produce, from most of his dialogues, defects
of reasoning quite as grave as any which the Minos exhibits. On the
principle assumed by M. Boeckh, every one who agreed with Panætius in
considering the elaborate proof given in the Phædon, of the
immortality of the soul, as illogical and delusive--would also agree
with Panætius in declaring that the Phædon was not the work of Plato.
It is one question, whether the reasoning in any dialogue be good or
bad: it is another question, whether the dialogue be written by Plato
or not. Unfortunately, the Platonic critics often treat the first
question as if it determined the second.
M. Boeckh himself considers that the evidence arising from
dissimilarity (upon which I have just dwelt) is not the strongest
part of his case. He relies more upon the evidence arising from
_too much similarity_, as proving still more clearly the
spuriousness of the Minos. "Jam pergamus ad alteram partem nostræ
argumentationis, _eamque etiam firmiorem_, de _nimia
similitudine_ Platonicorum aliquot locorum, quæ imitationem doceat
subesse. Nam de hoc quidem conveniet inter omnes doctos et indoctos,
Platonem se ipsum haud posse imitari: nisi si quis dubitet de sanâ
ejus mente" (p. 23). Again, p. 26, "Jam vero in nostro colloquio
Symposium, Politicum, Euthyphronem, Protagoram, Gorgiam, Cratylum,
Philêbum, dialogos expressos ac tantum non compilatos reperies". And
M. Boeckh goes on to specify various passages of the Minos, which he
considers to have been imitated, and badly imitated, from one or
other of these dialogues.
I cannot agree with M. Boeckh in regarding this _nimia
similitudo_ as the strongest part of his case. On the contrary, I
consider it as the weakest: because his own premisses (in my
judgment) not only do not prove his conclusion, but go far to prove
the opposite. When we find him insisting, in such strong language,
upon the great analogy which subsists between the Minos and seven of
the incontestable Platonic dialogues, this is surely a fair proof
that its author is the same as their author. To me it appears as
conclusive as internal evidence ever can be; unless there be some
disproof _aliunde_ to overthrow it. But M. Boeckh produces no
such disproof. He converts these analogies into testimony in his own
favour, simply by bestowing upon them the name _imitatio,--stulta
imitatio_ (p. 27). This word involves an hypothesis, whereby the
point to be proved is assumed--viz.: difference of authorship. "Plato
cannot have imitated himself" (M. Boeckh observes). I cannot admit
such impossibility, even if you describe the fact in that phrase: but
if you say "Plato in one dialogue thought and wrote like Plato in
another"--you describe the same fact in a different phrase, and it
then appears not merely possible but natural and probable. Those very
real analogies, to which M. Boeckh points in the word
_imitatio_, are in my judgment cases of the Platonic thought in
one dialogue being like the Platonic thought in another. The
_similitudo_, between Minos and these other dialogues, can
hardly be called _nimia_, for M. Boeckh himself points out that
it is accompanied with much difference. It is a similitude, such as
we should expect between one Platonic dialogue and another: with this
difference, that whereas, in the Minos, Plato gives the same general
views in a manner more brief, crude, abrupt--in the other dialogues
he works them out with greater fulness of explanation and
illustration, and some degree of change not unimportant. That there
should be this amount of difference between one dialogue of Plato and
another appears to me perfectly natural. On the other hand--that
there should have been a contemporary _falsarius_ (scriptor
miser, insulsus, vilissimus, to use phrases of M. Boeckh), who
studied and pillaged the best dialogues of Plato, for the purpose of
putting together a short and perverted abbreviation of them--and who
contrived to get his miserable abbreviation recognised by the
Byzantine Aristophanes among the genuine dialogues notwithstanding
the existence of the Platonic school--this, I think highly
improbable.
I cannot therefore agree with M. Boeckh in thinking, that "ubique se
prodens Platonis imitatio" (p. 31) is an irresistible proof of
spuriousness: nor can I think that his hypothesis shows itself to
advantage, when he says, p. 10--"Ipse autem dialogus (Minos) quum
post Politicum compositus sit, quod quædam in eo dicta rebus ibi
expositis manifesté nitantur, ut paullo post ostendemus--quis est qui
artificiosissimum philosophum, postquam ibi (in Politico) accuratius
de naturâ legis egisset, de eâ iterum putet negligenter egisse?"--I
do not think it so impossible as it appears to M. Boeckh, that a
philosopher, after having _written_ upon a given subject
_accuratius_, should subsequently write upon it
_negligenter_. But if I granted this ever so fully, I should
still contend that there remains another alternative. The negligent
workmanship may have preceded the accurate: an alternative which I
think is probably the truth, and which has nothing to exclude it
except M. Boeckh's pure hypothesis, that the Minos must have been
copied from the Politikus.
While I admit then that the Hipparchus and Minos are among the
inferior and earlier compositions of Plato, I still contend that
there is no ground for excluding them from the list of his works.
Though the Platonic critics of this century are for the most part of
an adverse opinion, I have with me the general authority of the
critics anterior to this century--from Aristophanes of Byzantium down
to Bentley and Ruhnken--see Boeckh, pp. 7-32.
Yxem defends the genuineness of the Hipparchus--(Ueber Platon's
Kleitophon, p. 8. Berlin, 1846).