A MONTH OF CHAOS.
On the 19th July 1875, the twenty years’ labour of Sir Richard Wood in
the Regency of Tunis was crowned with a new and elaborate treaty between
the English and Tunisian Governments. The second and third articles of
this convention ran as follows:—
ARTICLE II.
Every mark of honour and respect shall at all times be paid, and every
privilege and immunity allowed, to Her Majesty’s Agent and Consul-
General accredited to His Highness the Bey which is paid or allowed to
the representative of any other nation whatsoever; and respect and
honour shall be shown to the British Consuls, Vice-Consuls, and Consular
Agents, who shall reside in the Regency of Tunis. Their houses and
families shall be safe and protected. _No one shall interfere with them,
or commit any act of oppression or disrespect towards them, either by
word or deed_; and if any one should do so, the Tunisian authorities
shall take immediate measures for the punishment of the offender. The
British Consuls, Vice-Consuls, and Consular Agents shall, moreover,
continue to enjoy, in the most ample sense, all the privileges and
immunities which are now or may be hereafter accorded to the Consuls,
Vice-Consuls, and Consular Agents of the most favoured nation.
ARTICLE III.
The British Agent and Consul-General shall be at liberty to choose his
own interpreters, brokers, guards, and servants, either from among the
natives or others. His interpreters, brokers, guards, and servants shall
be exempt from the conscription, and from payment of any poll-tax,
forced contribution, or other similar or corresponding charge. In like
manner, the Consuls, Vice-Consuls, and Consular Agents residing at the
Tunisian ports, under the orders of the said Agent and Consul-General,
shall be at liberty to choose, that is to say, the Consuls, each one
interpreter, one broker, two guards, and three servants; the Vice-
Consuls and Consular Agents, each _one interpreter, one broker, and one
guard, and two servants_, not being in the military service, who shall
likewise be exempt from the conscription, from the payment of any poll-
tax, forced contribution, or other similar or corresponding charge.
Four days after the Treaty of Kasr-es-Said, M. Barthélémy Saint-Hilaire
(May 16th, 1881) wrote thus to Lord Lyons:—
You wish first of all to place on record that I stated to you that the
Conventions existing between Tunis and Foreign Powers would be
maintained and respected. _I repeat this assurance to you_ with greater
pleasure because, by a special Article of our Treaty with the Bey, the
French representative guarantees the execution of all the Conventions of
this kind which now exist.
A week later Lord Granville promptly but courteously took note of these
assurances in the following guarded language:—
Her Majesty’s Government do not wish to lay too much stress on
_inconsistencies of language_ in conversation, or on the various reasons
which have been given at Paris and at Tunis for French intervention,
first as a protection against the alleged designs of the Sultan for the
Bey’s deposition, and secondly for the punishment of the turbulent
frontier tribes. But it can hardly be doubted that the Treaty with Tunis
goes far beyond any question of the security of the frontier, and
amounts practically to a Protectorate, which they understood to have
been disclaimed.
Her Majesty’s Government, however, readily acknowledge the assurance
repeated by M. Barthélémy Saint-Hilaire in his note of the 16th instant
that all existing Conventions between Tunis and Foreign Powers will be
maintained and respected, and this all the more readily because by the
4th Article of the Treaty with the Bey the French Republic guarantees
their execution. Commercial and other rights and privileges will
therefore remain undisturbed, in so far as they are guaranteed by
Treaties, unless new Conventions, freely entered into, shall be
substituted for the existing arrangements.
_Her Majesty’s Government take note of this assurance, which they regard
as an international engagement binding upon the French Government in the
future_.
Diplomacy in kid gloves was, however, no match for the diplomacy of
duplicity. The history of the “month of chaos” at Tunis will
sufficiently illustrate the practical results of M. Saint-Hilaire’s
assurances.
Mr. Cacchia has the honour and misfortune to be British Consular Agent
at Hammamet. During Colonel Corréard’s unlucky advance from Hammám el
Lif, and after the French troops had finally evacuated the place by sea
as “hopelessly infected by typhoid,” the Arabs had avenged their
grievances by carrying off all Mr. Cacchia’s flocks and herds, and his
repeated protests were not even answered. His troubles were not destined
to finish here. Towards the end of November another detachment of French
troops was sent to Hammamet. The night of their arrival, a shot was said
to have been fired in the direction of the French encampment, but nobody
was hurt by it. Mr. Cacchia was then at Tunis making useless protests
about his lost camels, sheep, and goats. He had left an Arab guard, who
was also his gardener, in charge of his garden, which is situated about
a mile from the town. On the morning after the shot had been heard, the
French commanding officer imposed a daily fine of 1000 francs on the
inhabitants, until such time as the culprit was detected and given up.
Up to Sunday the 27th November this contribution was duly paid. On the
evening of that day, the Arab _khalifa_ or vice-governor entered Mr.
Cacchia’s property, and caused his servant to be seized and bound on a
charge of firing at the French camp. The man’s protestations of his
innocence, and those of Mr. Cacchia’s representative, were unavailing:
he was shot at dawn next morning. His head was then cut off and hung up
in the town gate, in sight of the house occupied by Mr. Cacchia’s
family. Of course the man’s master made immediate application for
redress, and invoked the British Convention of 1875 in support of his
demand, but from that day to this four months have passed away and the
Tunisian Government has made no sign. The matter has been under the
consideration of no less a personage than General Elias Musalli,
Commander of the Legion of Honour, Director of the Tunisian Foreign
Office. Notwithstanding that he has as yet come to no conclusion on the
subject, he makes no secret of his opinion that “although Mr. Cacchia
may be right, and the English treaty presents an awkward difficulty, any
kind of redress would be detrimental to the prestige of the
Protectorate.” So Mr. Cacchia’s protest about his innocent servant’s
death must perforce share the same fate as those concerning his camels,
his sheep, and his goats.
· · · · · · · · · ·
While these events were taking place at Hammamet, Colonel Moulin was
conducting a column from Kairwán through the Enfida estate, which had
been almost forgotten in the excitement of the more striking events of
the two expeditions. My readers will remember that in a former chapter
we left Mr. Levy in undisturbed possession of the property under a legal
order of the Sheikh-el-Islam, who had been encouraged by the presence of
the “Thunderer” and “Decoy” to resist the moral pressure gently conveyed
to his judicial mind by the appearance of French ironclads in Tunisian
waters. The time had now come to attain one of the avowed objects of the
war, and place the coveted estate with some show of decency and legal
procedure in the hands of M. Saint-Hilaire’s “honest and laborious
Marseilles company.” Shortly after the signing of the Kasr-es-Said
Treaty, the agents of the French claimants, accompanied by the French
interpreter Sumaripa, paid a visit to the Sheikh-el-Islam, to judge of
his present intentions. As the old man proved to be refractory, the
Société Marseillaise next turned in its dilemma to the now docile Prime
Minister Mustapha. The Meliki school of Moslem jurisprudence ignored, or
regarded with disfavour, the exercise of pre-emption, and if the case
could be transferred to the Meliki judges they would have no difficulty
in conscientiously nonsuiting Mr. Levy. It was true that in the British
Convention of 1863 the religious courts, and not the Bey himself, were
declared to have jurisdiction in disputes relating to real property, and
it was unfortunate that the Meliki Court had already declared itself
incompetent, but still under existing circumstances these were mere
details. Mustapha explained matters to the Bey, who _proprio motu_
issued a decree removing the suit from the Hanafee to the Meliki
tribunal. The rest was now comparatively easy, but meanwhile the Arabs
had cut matters short by driving every European out of the district. The
legal manœuvres at Tunis went on, however, undisturbed by the anarchy
which now reigned all over the Regency. On the 20th July the enlightened
Meliki _cadís_ published, as an evidence of their impartiality, an _ex
parte_ manifesto in the Tunisian Government Gazette, declaring that as
Mr. Levy had no right of pre-emption, the Société Marseillaise must be
regarded as the legal owner.
Four days later they cited Mr. Levy to appear before them _to support
his claim_. Although the Société Marseillaise had for months ignored the
authority of the Hanafee Court, Mr. Levy presented himself before the
Meliki _cadís_ on the 28th July, and respectfully stated that as he had
legally constituted himself a defendant in the Hanafee tribunal, he was
unable to acknowledge their jurisdiction. The chief cadi replied that he
would report the matter to the Bey, and Mr. Levy took refuge in a
protest against the treatment to which he was being subjected. Ten days
afterwards the Bey ordered the Meliki _cadís_ to “take no heed of the
Englishman Levy’s objections,” and to proceed with the trial. This at
once elicited a fresh protest from Mr. Levy, but the Tunisian Government
had long since ceased to trouble themselves with the reclamations of the
British subjects. Towards the end of August the Meliki _cadís_, without
calling any further on Mr. Levy, issued a decree annulling the
attachment of rents made originally by the Sheikh-el-Islam in Mr. Levy’s
favour, and ordered the tenants and inhabitants to consider the Société
Marseillaise henceforward in the light of “the sole and lawful
proprietors.” Soon after the taking of Kairwán (October 26th), Mr. Levy
resumed his possession, and proceeded to till the land and sow his crops
as usual. In spite of the complacency of the Meliki judges, the Société
Marseillaise did not even yet feel strong enough to act on the decrees
they had obtained, and eject Mr. Levy _vi et armis_. On the 20th
November, Mr. Levy’s servants were working as usual; the next day
Colonel Moulin’s column came to the Enfida in force on its errand of
pacification. Scrupulous care was taken not to interfere with the
property of Mr. Levy, but the march over the whole domain, the
disarmament of the Arabs, the imposition of a heavy war contribution,
and last, but not least, the shelling of the insurgent Caid Bilawar’s
fort after breakfast on the 26th November, most efficiently prepared the
way for what was to follow. The very next day the agents of the Société
Marseillaise and a posse of workmen arrived at the Enfida, bringing with
them twenty carts filled with building material. In order to have a
reliable witness as to the final steps taken by his “honest and
laborious” opponents, and at the same time to prevent, if possible, any
collision between their employés and his own, Mr. Levy had induced an
English gentleman, Mr. Kane, to remain in his camp at the Enfida. I
cannot better tell the story of the last scene in this _cause célèbre_
than by borrowing Mr. Kane’s narrative, which has the merit of never
having been impugned or contradicted.
“When I went to the Enfida last month (November),” writes Mr. Kane, “Mr.
Levy’s workmen and tenants were in possession of the Enfida, and were
carrying on the usual works of cultivation. At that time no person
appeared to represent the French company. On the 20th of November a
column of the French troops from Kairwán marched over the Enfida, and
the Arabs made their submission as required. The day after they left a
person arrived there, who said he was the agent of the Société
Marseillaise, now called the Société Franco-Africaine. He had several
French and Italian subordinates, and the Tunisian Caid and Khalifa began
to act under his orders.
“On the 4th December, about eight o’clock in the morning, the French
agent sent a servant of the Caid of the Enfida to the ground on which
Mr. Levy’s men were working, and ordered them to cease ploughing. They
complied with the Caid’s orders and sent a messenger to me. I at once
proceeded to the spot and ordered the workmen to continue to plough.
“About ten o’clock the French agent, attended by the Caid’s servant,
rode over to the camp where Elnaser (Mr. Levy’s headman) lived, and gave
in writing an order to an Arab guard he had sent there in the early
morning, to prevent Elnaser and his men from taking any of the straw
from the large stack close to the Arab encampment, and also from giving
any water to their beasts. He then left for Dar-el-Bey, the house in
which he had taken up his abode. Hearing this, I rode over to the
encampment of Elnaser, and told Mr. Levy’s people to use the hay and
straw as before, and to draw water. The Arab guard hearing this at once
left the stacks of hay and straw, and reported what I had done to the
French agent. An hour afterwards, the French agent sent an Italian armed
with a gun to guard the stacks. The French agent also told Elnaser and
his men to leave their camp and _threatened to send for some soldiers
from the company stationed at Dar-el-Bey to burn their tents if they did
not go away_. This was of course said to frighten Mr. Levy’s Arabs into
quitting his service.
“On the 10th December, by order of the French agent, his people
commenced to dig a trench at a distance of six yards from the tent in
which I lived, and all day long, notwithstanding my remonstrances, they
threw earth against the sides of the tents and completely covered up the
pickets for fastening the tent to the ground. The trench was evidently
dug for the purpose of annoying me and blocking up the entrance of my
tent. They continued to dig this trench up to the time when the final
act of open violence took place.
“On the evening of the 11th of December I received intelligence that the
Caid of the Enfida had enjoined all the Arabs living near Dar-el-Bey to
place themselves and their camels and oxen at his disposal on the
following morning for the purpose of ploughing up all the grain that had
been sown in the Enfida by Mr. Levy’s employés.
“Early next morning Mr. Levy’s headman Elnaser arrived at my tent with
the news that the Khalifa’s (Hadj Mufta) brother had arrived at his
camp, accompanied by about forty Arabs, and had commenced the work of
destruction, but that he had desisted when opposed by the Maltese in Mr.
Levy’s service.
“Accordingly I rode over to the Arab camp and found everything as
described. I saw that the Khalifa’s brother had ranged about twenty
ploughshares drawn by camels and oxen on the edge of the cultivated
ground in a line ready at any given signal to commence turning up the
ground.
“_In about half-an-hour’s time a courier from the French agent arrived
with orders to plough up Mr. Levy’s land at once, and by force if
necessary_. Upon this the Arab in charge ordered his men to advance, and
notwithstanding that the Maltese resisted by holding the camels’ heads,
the Arabs forced the camels and oxen into the cultivated ground, and Mr.
Levy’s employés, in order to avoid being run over and attacked, were
forced to retire. I then at once ordered the Maltese and Arabs working
for Mr. Levy to abandon the Enfida and return to Tunis, being compelled
to leave Mr. Levy’s oxen, camels, crops, and tents in the hands of our
assailants.”
· · · · · · · · · ·
The statement of Mr. Kane was corroborated by a dozen other declarations
made by his Arab and Maltese servants. He at once presented a formal
protest, but from that day to this, he has, like Mr. Cacchia, been
waiting for a reply. Whatever may be the merits of his case, there can
be no doubt that the manner in which M. Saint-Hilaire’s “honest and
laborious” friends took the administration of justice into their own
hands involved half-a-dozen violations of the treaty-right of Englishmen
in the Regency of Tunis, and still further compromised the consoling
assurances so liberally showered on Lord Granville. Eight months before
to a day, M. Jules Ferry, in the French Chamber, had indignantly
repelled the insinuation of M. Lenglé “that the Enfida affair was at the
bottom of the expedition to Tunis, just as the Jecker affair had been at
the bottom of the expedition to Mexico under the Empire.” “Je répète,”
exclaimed the President of the _Cabinet des Naifs_, with virtuous
indignation, “qu’entre cette opération militaire et l’affaire d’Enfida
_il n’y a aucune relation directe ou indirecte_; que l’affaire de
l’Enfida, comme le rappelait tout à l’heure, M. le Président, a donné
lieu à un débat international, et que ce débat étant ouvert entre la
France et ce grand et loyal pays de l’Angleterre, _il n’y a lieu de
faire intervenir entre ces deux grandes nations que les règles de la
justice et les considérations de l’équité pour arriver à une solution_.”
It was a strange coincidence that while Mr. Levy’s servants were
retreating to Tunis to escape from the ploughs and camels of their
militant adversaries, the authors of the expedition were undergoing a
hardly less disagreeable ordeal before the Tribunal de la Seine.
Retributive justice overtook M. Roustan in the very moment of victory.
The month of December 1881 was signalised by both political and military
chaos. The absence of M. Roustan at Paris necessarily brought all
business to a dead lock. Mustapha returned to Tunis soon after the
Resident’s departure, in order to avoid the awkward contingency of his
being called as a witness by M. Rochefort, and at once set an intrigue
on foot to secure his return to power. Taib Bey and his party were
equally active in the prosecution of their designs to supplant both
Mustapha and his master. Meanwhile torrential rains set in with
unprecedented violence, and greatly helped Ali Ben Hlifa to hold his own
against General Logerot. The hospitals at Susa and Jerba were inundated;
the ambulance sheds at Manouba were destroyed, and several patients died
in consequence; the tents at Carthage shared the same fate; a mud wall
fell on the sleeping soldiers near Oued Zerga and killed five of them;
and several of the smaller columns were knee-deep in slush, and
literally unable to either advance or retreat. Then came the excitement
of the Rochefort case, the practical condemnation of M. Roustan, and an
official announcement of M. Roustan’s departure, to be contradicted a
week later by an equally official announcement of his return.
Affairs showed no signs of mending in the south. A war contribution of
£250,000 was decreed against the inhabitants of Sfax, to their own ruin
and that of their already half-beggared European creditors. No sooner
had General Logerot’s column commenced its march northward, than the
“pacified” Beni Zid tribe once more rose in revolt, and an eight days’
reconnaissance in force became necessary to bring them to reason. The
Matmata mountain, the stronghold of the Beni Zid, was surrounded, and
greatly to the surprise of the French, the courageous but infatuated
Arabs were the first to begin the attack. For six hours they maintained
a hopeless resistance, and only submitted after losing twenty-seven men,
besides having a much greater number _hors de combat_. The Beni Zid now
ceased their hostilities, but the Ouerdna and Ouerghama tribes prepared
to resist any invasion of their territory. After the engagement at
Matmata, another fight took place near the village of Zeraon, which was
subsequently bombarded. General Logerot then passed, amidst a continued
fall of rain, through the defile of Djebel Ben Aïssa, but the Ouerghama
named Ali Ben Hlifa Pasha Bey, and placed 5000 horsemen at his disposal.
The fruitlessness of the great concentric movement on Kairwán was
becoming more and more apparent: a successful _razzia_ of cattle was
executed within sight of Kairwán itself (December 20th), the tribes near
Gabes were threatened with attack, and it was even considered necessary
to hold the chief of the Beni Zid as a hostage for their good behaviour.
General Logerot now prepared to attack the Ouerghama, but unexpectedly
their _sheikhs_ made a pretence of submission, and the troops gladly
enough returned to Gabes (December 23d). On Christmas day General
Logerot set out for Sfax, leaving only half a battalion of soldiers on
the shore at Gabes, and a small garrison at Ras-el-Oued. The reality of
this peacemaking was doubted at the time, and has since turned out to be
entirely deceptive.
On the last day of 1881 M. Roustan returned to Tunis. A crowd of
Algerian protegés hastened to Goletta to meet the conqueror, but all
honest Frenchmen, and notably the military authorities, held aloof from
so curious a demonstration. In this manner, the first year of the
Protectorate closed with a very melancholy prospect for the future of
this once peaceful country. The Bey’s power over his subjects was now
reduced to the merest shadow; his administration had fallen into a state
of hopeless confusion, while his available army was reduced to a corps
of titular generals and colonels, who did nothing but wear magnificent
uniforms, and draw their pay when they could get it. The collection of
taxes had proved inadequate for the payment of the interest due on the
national debt, and the wholesale desertion of their usual camping-
grounds by the Bedouin Arabs was an ominous portent of coming famine and
the pestilence which usually follows in its wake. The notables of Sfax
were still offering in vain an interest of twelve per cent. for a loan
to pay their share of the war indemnity, the indiscriminate levy of
which elsewhere had hopelessly ruined a large proportion of the Tunisian
tribesmen. Suspicions were afloat that the peace in the south would be
of short duration, and the heavy rains had augmented the natural
difficulties which met the French troops at every turn, and increased
the mortality in the military hospitals. While all unity of feeling
amongst the European residents was at an end, the French colony, split
up into Taibists and Roustanites, presented notoriously the spectacle of
a house divided against itself. To add to those troubles, the
inopportune return of M. Roustan, in defiance of public opinion, now
placed any attempt at a new departure beyond the range of possibilities.
The very streets of the town seemed to share in the general chaos; they
had become an impassable quagmire. Genuine trade was now at a
standstill, and had been superseded by a brisk traffic in absinthe and
vermouth. The _Café du Cercle_, frequented by generals and staff-
officers, and the _Café du Kroumír_, the rendezvous of the honest
_troupiers_, were doing a roaring business, but Ali Ben Saleh and
Muhamed Ben Abdallah no longer came into Tunis to purchase their
Manchester cloth and Nottingham calico. They had exchanged their cattle
for guns and gunpowder, and were waiting on the frontier with Ali Ben
Hlifa, for the long-expected advance of the Sultan and Caliph. This was
the state of Tunisia when 1881 dropped into the years of history.
While these pages have been passing through the press the Enfida case
has ended. The Société Marseillaise has at last purchased Mr. Levy’s
adjacent property, and at the same time his contingent right to the
Enfida estate. Ten days later (June 11th) Mr. Levy died.