GENERAL KORNILOV.
Two days after the Moghilev Conference General Brussilov was relieved
of the Supreme Command. The attempt to give the leadership of the
Russian Armies to a person who had not only given proof of the most
complete loyalty to the Provisional Government, but had evinced
sympathy with its reforms, had failed. A leader had been superseded,
who, on assuming the Supreme Command, gave utterance to the following:
"I am the leader of the Revolutionary Army, appointed to this
responsible post by the people in revolution and the Provisional
Government, in agreement with the Petrograd Soviet of Workmen's and
Soldiers' Delegates. I was the first to go over to the people, serve
the people. I will continue to serve them, will never desert them."[51]
Kerensky, in his evidence before the Commission of Inquiry, explained
Brussilov's dismissal by the catastrophal condition of the Front, by
the possible development of the German offensive, the absence of a firm
hand at the front, and of a definite plan; by Brussilov's inability to
evaluate and forestall the complications of the military situation, and
lastly, by his lack of influence over both officers and men.
Be it as it may, General Brussilov's retirement from the pages of
military history can in no wise be regarded as a simple episode of
an administrative character. _It marks a clear recognition by the
Government of the wreck of its entire military policy._
On July 19th, by an Order of the Provisional Government, Lavr
Georgievich Kornilov, General of Infantry, was appointed to the post of
Supreme Commander-in-Chief.
[Map: The Russian Front in June and July, 1917]
In Chapter VII. I spoke of my meeting with Kornilov, then
Commander-in-Chief of the Petrograd district. The whole meaning of his
occupation of this post lay in the chance of bringing the Petrograd
garrison to a sense of duty and subordination. This Kornilov failed to
accomplish. A fighting General who carried fighting men with him by
his courage, coolness, and contempt of death, had nothing in common
with that mob of idlers and hucksters into which the Petrograd garrison
had been transformed. His sombre figure, his dry speech, only at
times softened by sincere feeling, and above all, its tenour so far
removed from the bewildering slogans of the Revolution, so simple in
its profession of a soldier's faith--could neither fire nor inspire
the Petrograd soldiery. Inexperienced in political chicanery, by
profession alien to those methods of political warfare which had been
developed by the joint efforts of the bureaucracy, party sectarianism,
and the revolutionary underworld, Kornilov, as Commander-in-Chief of
the Petrograd district, could neither influence the Government nor
impress the Soviet, which, without any cause, distrusted him from the
very beginning. Kornilov would have managed to suppress the Petrograd
praetorians, even if he had perished in doing so, but he could not
attract them to himself.
He felt that the Petrograd atmosphere did not suit him, and when on
April 21st, the Executive Committee of the Soviet, after the first
Bolshevist attacks, passed a resolution that no military unit could
leave barracks in arms without the permission of the Committee, it
was totally impossible for Kornilov to remain at a post which gave no
rights and imposed enormous responsibilities.
There was yet another reason: the Commander-in-Chief of the Petrograd
district was subordinated, not to the Stavka, but to the Minister of
War. Gutchkov had left that post on April 30th, and Kornilov did not
wish to remain under Kerensky, the vice-president of the Petrograd
Soviet.
[Map: The Russian Front till August 19th and after]
The position of the Petrograd garrison and command was so incongruous
that this painful problem had to be solved by artificial measures. On
Kornilov's initiative, and with General Alexeiev's full approval, the
Stavka, in conjunction with the Headquarters of the Petrograd District,
drew up a scheme for the organisation of the Petrograd Front, covering
the approaches to the capital through Finland and the Finnish Gulf.
This Front was to include the troops in Finland and Kronstadt, on
the coast, of the Reval fortified region and the Petrograd garrison,
the depôt battalions of which it was proposed to expand into active
regiments and form into brigades; the inclusion of the Baltic Fleet was
likewise probable. Such an organisation--logical from a strategical
point of view, especially in connection with the information received
of the reinforcement of the German Front on the line of advance on
Petrograd--gave the Commander-in-Chief the legal right to alter the
dispositions to relieve the troops at the front and behind, etc. I
do not know whether this would have really made it possible to free
Petrograd from the garrison which had become a veritable scourge to
the Capital, the Provisional Government, and even (in September)
to the non-Bolshevist sections of the Soviet. The Government
most thoughtlessly bound itself by a promise, given in its first
declaration, that "the troops which had taken part in the revolutionary
movement should not be either disarmed or moved from Petrograd."
This plan, however, naturally failed on Kornilov's departure, as
his successors, appointed one after another by Kerensky, were of
such an indefinite political character, and so deficient in military
experience, that it was impossible to place them at the head of so
large a military force.
At the end of April, just before his retirement, Gutchkov wished to
make Kornilov Commander-in-Chief of the Northern Front, a post which
had become vacant after General Ruzsky's dismissal. General Alexeiev
and I were at the Conference with Thomas and the French military
representatives, when I was called up to the telegraph instrument to
talk with the Minister of War. As General Alexeiev remained at the
meeting, and Gutchkov was ill in bed, the negotiations, in which I
acted as an intermediary, were exceedingly difficult to carry on, both
technically and because, in view of the indirect transmission, it was
necessary to speak somewhat guardedly. Gutchkov insisted, Alexeiev
refused. No less than six times did I transmit their replies, which
were at first reserved and then more heated.
Gutchkov spoke of the difficulty of managing the Northern Front, which
was the most unruly, and of the need of a firm hand there. He said
that it was desirable to retain Kornilov in the immediate vicinity of
Petrograd, in view of future political possibilities. Alexeiev refused
flatly. He said nothing about "political possibilities," basing his
refusal on the grounds of Kornilov's inadequate service qualifications
for command, and the awkwardness of passing over Senior Commanders
more experienced and acquainted with the Front, such as General Abram
Dragomirov, for instance. Nevertheless, when the next day an official
telegram arrived from the Ministry in connection with Kornilov's
appointment, Alexeiev replied that he was uncompromisingly against
it, and that if the appointment were made in spite of this, he would
immediately send in his resignation.
Never had the Supreme Commander-in-Chief been so inflexible in his
communications with Petrograd. Some persons, including Kornilov himself
(as he confessed to me afterwards), involuntarily gained the impression
that the question was a somewhat wider basis one than that of the
appointment of the Commander-in-Chief ... that the fear of a future
dictator played a certain part. However, this supposition is flatly
contradicted by placing this episode in conjunction with the fact that
the Petrograd Front was created for Kornilov--a fact that was of no
less importance and fraught with possibilities.
In the beginning of May Kornilov took over the 8th Army on
the South-Western Front. General Dragomirov was appointed
Commander-in-Chief of the Northern Front.
This is the second event which gives the key to the understanding of
the subsequent relations between Alexeiev and Kornilov.
According to Kornilov, the 8th Army was in a state of complete
disintegration when he assumed command. "For two months," says he, "I
had to visit the units nearly every day and personally explain to the
soldiers the necessity for discipline, encourage the officers, and
urge upon the troops the necessity of an advance.... Here I became
convinced that firm language from the Commander and definite action
were necessary in order to arrest the disintegration of our Army. I
understood that such language was expected both by the officers and the
men, the more reasonable of whom were already tired of the complete
anarchy...."
Under what conditions Kornilov made his rounds we have already shown
in Chapter XXIII. I hardly think that he managed to arouse the mass
of soldiers to consciousness. The Kalush of June 28th and the Kalush
of July 8th show the 8th Army equally as heroes and as beasts. The
officers and a small part of the real soldiers, however, were more
than ever under the spell of Kornilov's personality. Its power
increased among the non-Socialistic sections of the Russian public
likewise. When, after the rout of July 6th, General Gutor--who had been
appointed to the highly responsible post of Commander-in-Chief of the
South-Western Front, merely not to resist the democratisation of the
Army--yielded to despair and collapsed, there was no one to replace
him except Kornilov (on the night of July 8th).... The spectre of the
"General on a White Horse" was already looming in sight and disturbing
the spiritual peace of many.
Brussilov was strongly opposed to this appointment. Kerensky hesitated
for a moment. The position, however, was catastrophical. Kornilov
was bold, courageous, stern, resolute and independent, and would
never hesitate to show initiative or to undertake any responsibility
if circumstances required it. Kerensky was of the opinion[52] that
Kornilov's downright qualities, though dangerous in case of success,
would be only too useful in case of a panic-stricken retreat. And "when
the Moor has done his work, let the Moor go...." So Kerensky insisted
on Kornilov's appointment as Commander-in-Chief of the South-Western
Front.
On the third day after taking over his duties, Kornilov wired to the
Provisional Government: "I declare that if the Government does not
confirm the measures proposed by me, and deprives me of the only means
of saving the Army and of using it for its real purpose of defending
the Motherland and liberty, then I, General Kornilov, will of my own
accord lay down my authority as Commander-in-Chief...."
A series of political telegrams from Kornilov produced a profound
impression on the country, and inspired some with fear, some with hate,
and others with hope. Kerensky hesitated, but what about the support
of the Commissars and Committees? The tranquilisation and reduction
to order of the South-Western Front attained, among other means, by
Kornilov's bold, resolute struggle against the Army Bolsheviks? The
oppressive isolation felt by the Minister of War after the conference
of July 16th? The uselessness of retaining Brussilov as Supreme
Commander-in-Chief and the hopelessness of placing at the head of the
Army Generals of the new type, as shown by the experiment of appointing
Brussilov and Gutor? Savinkov's persistent advice? Such were the
reasons which forced Kerensky--who fully recognised the inevitability
of the coming collision with the man who repudiated his military policy
with every fibre of his soul--to decide on the appointment of Kornilov
to the post of Supreme Commander-in-Chief. There is not the slightest
doubt that Kerensky did this in a fit of despair. Probably it was the
same feeling of fatality that induced him to appoint Savinkov acting
Minister of War.
The collisions occurred sooner than might have been expected. On
receiving the order for his appointment, Kornilov at once sent the
Provisional Government a telegram "reporting" that he could accept
command and "lead the nation to victory and to the prospect of a just
and honourable peace only on the following conditions:
"(1) Responsibility to his own conscience and to the whole nation.
"(2) Complete non-interference with his orders relating to military
operations and, therefore, with the appointment of the Higher
Command.
"(3) The application of the measures recently introduced at the
Front to all places in the rear where drafts for the Army were
quartered.
"(4) Acceptance of his proposals telegraphed to the Conference at
the Stavka on July 16th."
When in due course I read this telegram in the newspapers, I was not
a little surprised at the first condition, which established a highly
original form of suzerainty on the part of the Supreme Command until
the convocation of the Constituent Assembly. I waited impatiently for
the official reply. There was none. As it turned out, on receiving
Kornilov's ultimatum, the Council of the Government hotly debated
the matter, and Kerensky demanded that the prestige of the High
Command should be upheld by the immediate removal of the new Supreme
Commander-in-Chief. The Government did not agree to this, and Kerensky,
ignoring the other points mentioned in the telegram, replied only to
the second, by recognising the right of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief
to select his own direct assistants.
Diverging from the established procedure of appointments, the
Government, simultaneously with Kornilov's appointment and without
his knowledge, issued an order appointing General Cheremissov
Commander-in-Chief of the South-Western Front. Kornilov regarded this
as a complete violation of his rights, and sent another ultimatum,
declaring that he could continue to hold Supreme Command only on
condition of Cheremissov's immediate removal. He declined to go
to Moghilev before this question was settled. Cheremissov, on his
part, was very "nervy," and threatened to "bomb his way" into Front
Headquarters and to establish his rights as Commander-in-Chief.
This complicated matters still further, and Kornilov reported by
wire[53] to Petrograd that, in his opinion, it would be more regular
to dismiss Cheremissov. "For the purpose of strengthening discipline
in the Army, we decided to take severe measures with the soldiers; the
same measures must likewise apply to the higher military commanders."
The Revolution had upset all mutual relations and the very essence
of discipline. As a soldier, I was bound to see in all this the
undermining of the authority of the Provisional Government (if such
existed), and I could not but recognise that it was both the right and
the duty of the Government to make everyone respect its authority.
As a chronicler, however, I must add that the military leaders had no
other means of stopping this disintegration of the Army, proceeding
from above. And had the Government actually possessed the power, and
in full panoply of right and might had been able to assert itself,
there would have been no ultimatums either from the Soviet or from the
military leaders. Furthermore, there would have been no need for the
events of the 27th of August, and those of the 25th of October would
have been impossible.
The matter finally resolved itself into the arrival of Commissar
Filonenko at Front Headquarters. He informed Kornilov that all his
recommendations had been accepted by the Government, in principle,
while Cheremissov was placed at the disposal of the Provisional
Government. General Balnev was hastily, at random, selected to command
the South-Western Front, and Kornilov assumed the Supreme Command on
the 27th of July.
The spectre of the "General on the White Horse" became more and more
clearly visible. And the eyes of many, suffering at the sight of the
madness and the shame now engulfing Russia, were again and again
turned to this spectre. Honest and dishonest, sincere and insincere,
politicians, soldiers and adventurers, all turned to it. And all with
one voice cried out, "Save Us!"
He, the stern and straightforward soldier, deeply patriotic, untried in
politics, knowing little of men, hypnotised both by truth and flattery,
and by the general longing expectation of someone's coming, moved by
a fervent desire for deeds of sacrifice--he truly believed in the
predestined nature of his appointment. He lived and fought with this
belief, and died for it on the banks of the Kuban.
Kornilov became a sign and rallying point. To some, of
counter-Revolution; to others, of the salvation of their native land.
Around this point a struggle for influence and power was commenced by
people who, unaided, without him could not have attained to such power.
A characteristic episode had already taken place on the 8th of July,
at Kamenetz-Podolsk. Here, in Kornilov's entourage, there occurred the
first conflict between Savinkov and Zavoiko, the former being the most
prominent Russian Revolutionary, leader of the Terrorist fighting group
of the Social-Revolutionary Party, organiser of the most notorious
political assassinations--those of Plehve, Minister of the Interior,
of the Grand Duke Serge, etc. Strong-willed and cruel by nature,
completely lacking in the controlling influences of "conventional
morality," despising both the Provisional Government and Kerensky,
supporting the Provisional Government from motives of expediency, as
he understood it, ready at any moment to sweep them aside--he saw in
Kornilov merely a weapon in the fight for Revolutionary power, in
which _he_ must have a dominant interest. Zavoiko was one of those
peculiar personages who afterwards clustered closely round Kornilov and
played such a prominent part in the August days. He was not very well
known even to Kornilov. The latter stated, in his evidence before the
Supreme Commission of Inquiry, that he became acquainted with Zavoiko
in April, 1917; that Zavoiko had been "marechal de noblesse" of the
Haisin district of Podolia, had been employed on the Nobel oilfields in
Baku, and, by his own statements, had been employed in prospecting for
minerals in Turkestan and Western Siberia. He arrived in Czernowitz,
enrolled as a volunteer in the Daghestan Mounted Regiment, and was
retained at Army Headquarters as personal aide to Kornilov. That is all
that is known of Zavoiko's past.
Kornilov's first telegram to the Provisional Government was edited by
Zavoiko, who "gave it the form of an ultimatum with a concealed threat,
in case of non-compliance with the demands presented to the Provisional
Government, to proclaim a military dictatorship on the South-Western
Front."[54]
I discovered all this subsequently. During all these events I continued
working at Minsk, completely engrossed now, not by the offensive,
but by the organisation of any sort of skeleton defence of the
half-collapsed Front. There was no information, no rumours even, of
what was going on at the head of affairs. Only an increased tension was
noticeable in all official relations.
* * * * *
Quite unexpectedly, in the end of July the Stavka offered me the post
of Commander-in-Chief of the South-Western Front. I communicated
by wire with General Lukomsky, the Chief-of-Staff of the Supreme
Commander-in-Chief, and told him that I should obey orders and go
wherever I was sent, but would like to know the reason for this
exchange. If the reasons were political I should ask to be left at my
old post. Lukomsky assured me that what Kornilov had in view was only
the military importance of the South-Western Front and the proposed
strategical operations in that quarter. I accepted the post.
I parted from my assistants with regret, and, having transferred my
friend, General Markov, to the new front, left for my new place of
service together with him. On my way I stopped at Moghilev. The Stavka
was in a very optimistic mood; everyone was animated and hopeful, but
there were no signs of any "underground" conspiratory working. It
should be mentioned that in this respect the military were so naïvely
inexperienced, that when they really began to "conspire" their work
took such _obvious_ forms that the deaf could not help hearing, nor the
blind seeing, what was going on.
On the day of our arrival Kornilov held a Council of the Chiefs of
Departments of the Stavka, at which the so-called "Kornilov programme"
for the restoration of the Army was discussed. I was invited to attend.
I shall not repeat all the fundamental propositions, which have already
been mentioned both by me and in Kornilov's telegrams--such demands,
for instance, as the introduction of Revolutionary courts-martial
and capital punishment in the rear, the restoration of disciplinary
authority to Commanders and raising their prestige, the limitation
of the activity of the Committees and their responsibility, etc. I
remember that side by side with clear and irrefutable propositions--the
draft memorandum drawn up by the Departments of the Stavka--there
were bureaucratic lucubrations hardly applicable in actual life.
For instance, with the object of making disciplinary authority more
palatable to Revolutionary Democracy, the authors of the memorandum had
drawn up a curiously detailed list of disciplinary misdemeanour with a
corresponding scale of penalties. And this was meant for the seething
whirlpool of life, where all relations were trampled underfoot, all
standards violated, where every fresh day brought forward an endless
variety of departures from the regulations!
At any rate, the Supreme Command was finding the proper path, and
apparently Kornilov's personality was a guarantee that the Government
would be obliged to follow that path. Undoubtedly a long struggle with
the Soviets, Committees, and soldiery was still to be waged, but,
at least, the definiteness of the policy gave moral support and a
tangible basis for this heavy task in the future. On the other hand,
the support given to Kornilov's measures by Savinkov's War Ministry
gave reason to hope that Kerensky's vacillations and indecision would
finally be overcome. The attitude to this question of the Provisional
Government as a whole was of no practical importance, and could not
even be officially expressed. At that time it seemed as if Kerensky
had, in some degree, freed himself from the yoke of the Soviet, but,
just as formerly all the most important questions of State had been
settled by him apart from the Government, in conjunction with the
leading Soviet circles, now, in August, the direction of State affairs
passed into the hands of a triumvirate composed of Kerensky, Nekrassov,
and Tereschenko, leaving both the Socialist and Liberal groups of the
Government out of the running.
After the meeting was over Kornilov asked me to stay, and, when all had
left, said to me, almost in a whisper: "It is necessary to struggle,
otherwise the country will perish. N. came to see me at the Front. He
is nursing his scheme of a _coup d'état_ and of placing the Grand-Duke
Dmitri on the throne. He is organising something or other, and has
suggested collaboration. I told him flatly that I would take no part
in any Romanov adventures. The Government itself understands that it
can do nothing. They have offered my joining in the Government.... No,
thank you! These gentlemen are far too much entangled with the Soviets,
and cannot decide on anything. I have told them that if authority is
given me I shall carry on a decisive struggle. We must lead Russia to
a Constituent Assembly, and then let them do what they like. I shall
stand aside and not interfere in any way. Now, General, may I rely on
your support?"
"To the fullest extent."
This was my second meeting and my second conversation with Kornilov.
We embraced heartily and parted ... only to meet again in the Bykhov
Prison.