THE CONFERENCE AT THE STAVKA OF MINISTERS AND COMMANDERS-IN-CHIEF ON
JULY 16TH.
Upon my return from the Front to Minsk I was summoned to the Stavka
at Moghilev, where a Conference was to be held on July 16th. Kerensky
suggested that Brussilov should invite, of his own accord, the
prominent military chiefs, in order to discuss the actual condition
of the Front, the consequences on the July disaster, and to determine
the course of future military policy. It transpired that General
Gourko, who had been invited by Brussilov, had not been admitted to the
Conference by Kerensky. A telegram was sent to Kornilov from the Stavka
saying that, in view of the difficult position of the South-Western
Front, his attendance was impossible, and that he was requested to
present in writing his views on the questions under discussion. It
should be noted that, at that time, on July 14th and 15th, the 11th
Army was in full retreat from the Sereth to the Zbrucz, and that
everyone was anxious to hear whether the 7th Army had succeeded in
crossing the Lower Sereth and the 8th the line of Zalestchiki, thus
avoiding the blows of the German Armies that were trying to cut their
retreat.
So sad was the plight of the country and the Army that I decided
to disclose to the Conference the full truth on the condition of
the Army in all its hideous nakedness, and in disregard of all
conventionalities. I reported myself to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.
Brussilov surprised me. He said: "I have come to the conclusion
that this is the limit and we must put the question squarely. All
these Commissars, Committees and Democratisations are driving the
Army and Russia to ruin. I have decided categorically to demand that
they should cease to disorganise the Army. I hope that you will back
me?" I answered that this was in full accord with my intentions and
that the object of my visit was to put the question squarely of the
future destinies of the Army. I must confess that Brussilov's words
reconciled me with him and I therefore decided to eliminate from my
speech all the bitter things which I had intended to say against the
Supreme Command.
We waited about an hour and a half for the Conference to meet. We
afterwards learnt that a small incident had occurred. The Prime
Minister had not been met at the station either by Brussilov or by his
Chief-of-Staff (General Lukomsky), who had been detained by urgent
military business. Kerensky waited for some time and grew nervous. He
finally sent his _aide-de-camp_ to Brussilov with the order to come to
the station at once and to report. The incident was not commented upon,
but all those who have been in touch with politics know that the actors
on that stage are mere men, with all their weaknesses, and that the
game is often continued behind the curtain.
The Conference was attended by the Prime Minister Kerensky, the
Foreign Minister Terestchenko, the Supreme C.-in-C. Brussilov, his
Chief-of-Staff General Lukomsky, Generals Alexeiev and Ruzsky, the
C.-in-C. of the Northern Front General Klembovsky, by myself as
C.-in-C. of the Western Front, and by my Chief-of-Staff General Markov,
Admiral Maximov, Generals Velitchko and Romanovsky, the Commissar of
the Western Front Savinkov, and two or three young men of Kerensky's
suite.
General Brussilov addressed the Conference in a short speech, which
struck me as being very vague and commonplace. In fact, he said nothing
at all. I had hoped that Brussilov would keep his word and would sum up
the situation and draw conclusions. I was mistaken. Brussilov did not
speak again. I opened the discussion. I said:
"It is with deep emotion and in full consciousness of a grave
responsibility that I am delivering my report to the Conference. I
beg to be excused if I speak as openly and frankly as I have always
done. I was outspoken with the old Autocracy, and intend to be just as
outspoken with the new--the Revolutionary Autocracy.
"When I took Command of the Front, I found the Armies in a state of
complete disruption. This seemed the more strange that neither in the
reports received at the Stavka or in those I received upon taking
over the Command had the situation been described in such gloomy
colours. The explanation is obvious: as long as the Army Corps were not
conducting active operations, excesses were comparatively few; but no
sooner was the order given for doing the duty of a soldier, for taking
up positions or for the advance, than the instinct of self-preservation
asserted itself and the picture of disruption was unveiled. Some ten
divisions refused to take up positions. All Commanding Officers of
all grades had to work very hard, to argue, to persuade.... In order
to be able to carry out the slightest measure of any importance, it
became imperative to reduce the numbers of mutinous troops. A whole
month was thus lost, although some divisions obeyed orders. Disruption
was rampant in the 2nd Caucasian Corps and in the 169th Infantry
Division. Several units had lost human appearance, not only morally but
physically. I shall never forget the hour which I spent in the 703rd
Suram Regiment. There were up to ten private stills in each regiment;
drunkenness, cardplaying, rioting, plunder and even murder. I took a
drastic step. I sent the 2nd Caucasian Corps (except the 51st Infantry
Division and the 169th Infantry Division) to the rear and ordered them
to be disbanded. Before the operation had developed, I thus lost about
30,000 bayonets without firing a shot. The 28th and 29th Infantry
Divisions, which were considered the best, were sent to occupy the
sector of the Caucasians. What happened? The 29th Division, after a
forced march to its destination, returned on the next day almost in
its entirety (two and a half regiments). The 28th Division sent one
regiment to the trenches, and that regiment passed a resolution against
advancing. Every possible measure was taken in order to raise the
spirit of the troops. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief visited the Front.
From his conversations with the members of Committee and with the
men elected from two Army Corps he gathered the impression that 'the
soldiers were all right, but the Commanding Officers had lost heart.'
That is not so. The Commanding Officers did all they could in extremely
difficult and painful surroundings, but the Supreme Commander-in-Chief
is unaware of the fact that the meeting of the 1st Siberian Corps,
where his speech was most enthusiastically received, continued after
his departure. New speakers came forward and appealed to the men not
to listen to the 'old Bourgeois' (forgive me, that is so.... Brussilov
interjected: "I do not mind") and they heaped vile abuse upon his head.
These appeals were also enthusiastically greeted. The War Minister, who
visited the troops and by his fiery eloquence incited them to deeds
of valour, was enthusiastically received by the 28th Division. Upon
his return to the train he was met by a regimental deputation which
announced that half an hour after the Minister had gone the regiment,
as well as another one, had decided not to advance. The picture was
particularly moving and evoked great enthusiasm when, in the 29th
Division, the Commanding Officer of the Poti Infantry Regiment knelt to
receive the Red Banner. The men swore--there were three speakers and
passionate cheering--to die for the country. On the first day of the
advance the regiment did not reach our trenches, but turned round in a
disgraceful manner and retreated six miles behind the battlefield.
"The Commissars and the Committee were among the factors which were
meant to give moral support to the troops, but practically contributed
to their demoralisation. Among the Commissars there may have been
favourable exceptions of men who did a certain amount of good without
interfering with other people's business. But the institution itself
cannot fail to contribute to the disruption of the Army because it
implies a dual power, friction and interference uncalled for and
criminal. I am compelled to describe the Commissars of the Western
Front. One of them, for all I know, may be a good and honest man, but
he is an Utopian and not only ignorant of Army life, but of life in
general. He has a great idea of his own importance. In demanding that
the Chief-of-Staff should obey his orders, he declares that he is
entitled to dismiss Commanding Officers, including the General Officer
commanding the Army. In explaining to the troops the extent of his
authority, he thus describes it: 'As the fronts are subordinate to the
War Minister, I am the War Minister for the Western Front.' Another
Commissar, who knows about as much of Army life as the first one, is
a Social Democrat standing somewhere on the verge between Bolshevism
and Menchevism. He is the noted reporter of the Military Section of
the All-Russian Congress of Soviets who has expressed the view that
the Army has not been sufficiently disorganised by the 'Declaration'
and demanded further 'Democratisation.' He claimed the right for the
men to veto appointments of Commanding Officers, insisted upon part
2 of Paragraph 14 of the Declaration which empowered the Commanding
Officers to use arms against cowards and traitors being cancelled, and
upon freedom of speech being granted not only off parade, but on duty.
The 3rd Commissar, who was not a Russian, and who appeared to treat
the Russian soldier with contempt, in addressing the regiment used
such foul language as had never fallen from the Commanding Officers
under the Czar's régime. Curiously enough the conscious and free
Revolutionary warriors accept such treatment as their due and obey him.
That Commissar, according to the Commanding Officers, is undoubtedly
useful.
"The Committees are another disintegrating force. I do not deny that
some of the Committees have done excellent work, and have done their
best to fulfil their duty. In particular some of their members have
been exceedingly useful, and have rendered their country the supreme
service of dying the death of heroes. But I affirm that the good they
have done will not compensate for the tremendous mischief done to the
Army by the introduction of all these new authorities, by friction, by
interference, and by discrediting the commands. I might quote hundreds
of resolutions bearing that stamp, but will confine myself merely to
the most blatant cases. The struggle for seizing power in the Army is
carried on openly and systematically. The Chairman of the Committee
of the Front has published in his paper an article advocating that
governmental powers be granted to the Committee. The Army Committee of
the 3rd Army has passed the resolution, which to my intense surprise
was endorsed by the Commanding Officer, requesting 'that the Army
Committees be invested with the plenary powers of the War Minister and
of the Central Committee of the Soviets which would entitle them to
act in the name of that Committee.' When the famous 'Declaration' was
discussed opinions varied in the Committee of the Front in regard to
Paragraph 14. Some members wanted the second part to be eliminated;
others demanded that a proviso be added empowering the members of the
Committee of the Front to take the same measures including armed force
against the same persons, and even against the Commanding Officers
themselves. Is that not the limit? In the report of the All-Russian
Congress a demand is formulated for the Soldiers' Committees to be
allowed to cancel appointments of Commanding Officers, and to partake
in the administration of the Army. You must not think that this is
merely theory. Far from it. The Committees endeavour to get hold of
everything, to interfere with purely military questions, with the
routine and the administration. And this is being done in an atmosphere
of complete anarchy caused by wholesale insubordination.
"Moral preparations for the advance were proceeding apace. On June 8th
the Committee of the Front passed a resolution against the advance, but
changed its mind on the 18th. The Committee of the 2nd Army decided
against the offensive on June 1st, but cancelled its decision on June
20th. In the Minsk Soviet 123 votes against 79 decided against the
advance. All the Committees of the 169th Infantry Division passed
a vote of censure on the Provisional Government, and described the
offensive as "treason to the Revolution." The campaign against the
authorities manifested itself in a series of dismissals of Senior
Commanders, in which the Committees almost invariably participated.
Shortly before the opening of the operations an Army Corps Commander,
the Chief-of-Staff, and a Divisional Commander of the most important
sector occupied by the shock troops, had to resign, and the same
fate was shared by about 60 Commanding Officers, from Army Corps
Commander to Regimental Commander. It is impossible to estimate the
amount of harm done by the Committee. They have no proper discipline
of their own. If the majority passes a reasonable resolution, that
does not suffice. It is put into practice by individual members of
the Committee. Taking advantage of their position as members of Army
Committees, the Bolsheviks have more than once spread mutiny and
rebellion with impunity. As a result, authority is undermined instead
of being strengthened, because so many different individuals and
institutions are supposed to exercise that authority. And the Commander
in the Field, who is being discredited, dismissed, controlled and
watched from all sides, is nevertheless expected to lead the troops
into action with a strong hand. Such was the moral preparation. The
troops have not yet been deployed. But the South-Western Front required
immediate assistance. The enemy had already removed from my Front to
the South-West three or four divisions. I decided to attack with the
troops which presented at least a semblance of loyalty. In three days
our guns had smashed the enemy trenches and wrought havoc among them,
had inflicted heavy losses among the Germans, and had opened the way
for our infantry. The first line had been almost entirely broken, and
our men had already visited the enemy batteries. That breach of the
Front promised to develop into a great victory, for which we had been
hoping for so long.... I now revert to descriptions of the battle.
'The units of the 28th Infantry Division took up their positions only
four hours before the attack; of the 109th Regiment only two and a
half companies, with four machine-guns and 30 officers, reached the
appointed line; only one-half of the 110th came up. Two battalions of
the 111th Regiment, who had occupied the defiles, refused to advance;
men of the 112th Regiment retired to the rear in batches. Units of
the 28th Division were met by a strong artillery fire, machine-gun
and rifle fire, and remained behind their barbed wire, as they were
incapable of advancing. Only a few shock troops and volunteers of the
Volga Regiment, with a company of officers, succeeded in capturing the
first line, but the fire was so strong that they failed to keep the
position, and towards the afternoon units of the 29th Division returned
to their original lines after suffering heavy losses, especially
in officers. On the sector of the 51st Division the attack began
at five minutes past seven. The 202nd Gori Regiment and the 204th
Ardagan-Michailovsky Regiment, as well as two companies of the Sukhum
Regiment, with a shock company of the Poti Regiment, made a dash across
two lines of trenches, bayoneted the enemy, and began to storm the
third line at half-past seven. The break was so rapid and so unexpected
that the enemy failed to establish a barrage. The 201st Poti Regiment,
which was following the advance troops, approached our first line of
trenches, but refused to go any further, so that our troops who had
broken through were not reinforced in time. The units of the 134th
Division, which followed, could not carry out their orders because the
men of the Poti Regiment had crowded in the trenches, while the enemy
had opened a very strong gun fire. These units, therefore, partly
dispersed and partly lay in our trenches. Seeing that no reinforcements
were forthcoming from the rear and from the flanks, the men of the Gori
and Ardagan Regiments lost heart, and some of the companies, in which
all the officers had been killed, began to retire. They were followed
by the remainder of the troops without, however, any pressure from the
Germans, who did not put their batteries and machine-guns into action
until the retreat had begun.... The units of the 29th Division were
late in going into position, because the men advanced reluctantly,
as their mood had changed. A quarter of an hour before the appointed
time the 114th Regiment on the right flank refused to advance, and
the Erivan Regiment had to be drawn up from the Army Corps Reserves.
For some unknown reason the 113th and 116th Regiments also failed
to move.... After this failure desertion began to grow, and at dawn
became general. The men were tired, nervous; they had lost the habit of
fighting, and were unaccustomed to the roar of the guns owing to long
months of inactivity, of fraternisation, and of meetings. They left the
trenches _en masse_, they abandoned the machine-guns and retired to the
rear.... _The Headquarters of the 20th Army Corps sent the following
report of the battle: 'The cowardice and lack of discipline in certain
units reached such a pitch that the Commanding Officers were compelled
to ask our artillery to cease firing, because the fire of our own guns
caused a panic among our soldiers.'_
"I will quote another description of the battle made by an Army Corps
Commander who took command on the eve of battle, and whose impressions
are therefore totally unbiassed: '... Everything was ready for the
advance: the plan had been worked out in detail; we had a powerful and
efficient artillery; the weather was favourable because it did not
allow the Germans to take advantage of their superiority in aircraft;
we had superior numbers, our Reserves were drawn up in time, we had
plenty of ammunition, and the sector was well chosen for the advance,
because we were in a position to conceal strong artillery forces in
the close neighbourhood of our trenches. The undulations of ground
also afforded many hidden approaches to the Front; the distance
between ourselves and the enemy was small, and there were no natural
obstacles between us which would have had to have been forced under
fire. Finally, the troops had been prepared by the Committees, the
Commanding Officers and the War Minister, Kerensky, and their efforts
induced the troops to take the first, the most arduous steps. We
attained considerable success without suffering appreciable losses.
Three fortified lines had been broken through and occupied, and there
remained only separate defensive positions. The fighting might soon
have reached the phase of bayonet fighting; the enemy artillery was
silenced, over 1,400 Germans, many machine-guns and other booty had
been captured. Also, our guns had inflicted heavy casualties in killed
and wounded upon the enemy, and it may be confidently stated that
the forces that were opposing our Corps had been temporarily knocked
out. Along the entire front of our Corps only three or four enemy
batteries and occasionally three or four machine-guns were firing, and
there were isolated rifle shots. But--night came. Immediately I began
to receive anxious reports from officers commanding sectors at the
Front to the effect that the men were abandoning the unattacked Front
Line _en masse_, entire companies deserting. It was stated in some of
the reports that the firing line in places was only occupied by the
Commanding Officer, his staff, and a few men. The operations ended in
an irretrievable and hopeless failure. In one day we had lived through
the joy of victory, which had been won in spite of the low spirits
of the men, as well as the horror of seeing the fruits of victory
deliberately cast away by the soldiery. And yet the country needed that
victory for its very life. I realised that we, the Commanding Officers,
are powerless to alter the elemental psychology of the men, and I wept
long and bitterly.'
"This inglorious operation, however, resulted in serious losses, which
it is now difficult to estimate, as crowds of fugitives returned daily.
Over 20,000 wounded men have already passed through sorting stations
in the rear. I will refrain at present from drawing any conclusion,
but the percentage of various kinds of wounds is symptomatic: 10 per
cent. heavily wounded, 30 per cent. finger and wrist wounds, 40 per
cent. light wounds from which bandages were not removed at the dressing
stations (many wounds were probably simulated), and 20 per cent.
bruised and sick. Such was the end of the operation. I have never yet
gone into battle with such superiority in numbers and technical means.
Never had the conditions been more full of such brilliant promise.
On a front of about 14 miles I had 184 battalions against 29 enemy
battalions; 900 guns against 300 German: 138 of my battalions came
into action against 17 German battalions of the 1st line. All that was
wasted. Reports from various Commanders indicate that the temper of
the troops immediately after the operation was just as indefinite as
before. Three days ago I summoned the Army Commanders and addressed to
them the question: 'Could their Armies resist a strong enemy attack,
provided reserves were forthcoming?' The answer was in the negative.
'Could the Armies resist an organised German offensive in their present
condition, numerical and technical?' Two of the Army Commanders gave
indefinite replies, and the Commanding Officer of the 10th Army
answered in the affirmative. They all said: 'We have no infantry.' I
will go further, and I will say:
"_We have no Army. It is necessary immediately, and at all costs to
create that Army._ The new Government regulations, which are supposed
to raise the spirit of the Army, have not yet penetrated into its
depths, and the impression they have produced cannot yet be defined.
One thing is certain--that repression alone cannot drag the Army out of
the morass into which it has fallen. It is repeated every day that the
Bolsheviks have caused the disruption of the Army, but I disagree. It
is not so. The Army has been disrupted by others, and the Bolsheviks
are like worms which have bred in the wounds of the Army. The Army has
been disrupted by the regulations of the last four months, and it is
the bitter irony of fate that this has been done by men who, however
honest and idealistic, are unaware of the historical laws governing
the existence of the Army, of its life and routine. At first this was
done under pressure from the Soviet, which was primarily an Anarchist
institution. Later it developed into a fatal, mistaken policy. Soon
after the War Minister had taken up his duties he said to me: 'The
process of revolutionising the country and the Army has been completed.
Now we must proceed with creative work....' I ventured to reply: 'The
process is completed, but it is too late.'"
General Brussilov here interrupted me, and asked me to curtail my
Report, as the Conference would otherwise be too protracted. I realised
that the length of the Report was not what mattered, but it was its
risky substance, and I replied: "I consider that this question is of
paramount importance, and request that I be allowed to complete my
statement, otherwise I shall have to cease speaking." A silence ensued,
which I interpreted as a permission to continue.
I then proceeded: "The Declaration of the Soldiers' Rights has been
issued. Every one of the Commanding Officers has stated that it would
bring about the ruin of the Army. The late Supreme C.-in-C., General
Alexeiev, telegraphed that the Declaration was the last nail which was
being driven into the coffin prepared for the Russian Army. The present
Supreme C.-in-C., when in command of the South-Western Front, declared
here, at Moghilev, at the Conference of Commanders-in-Chief, that
the Army may yet be saved and may advance, but on one condition--if
the Declaration is not issued. Our advice, however, was unheeded.
Paragraph 3 of the Declaration authorises free and open expressions
of political, religious, social, and other views. The Army was thus
flooded by politics. When the men of the 2nd Caucasian Grenadier
Division were disbanded they were quite sincerely puzzled. 'What is
the reason? We were allowed to speak whenever and whatever we wished,
and now we are being disbanded....' You must not think that such a
broad interpretation of the 'Liberties' is confined to the illiterate
masses. When the 169th Infantry Division was morally disrupted, and
all the Committees of that Division passed a vote of censure upon
the Provisional Government and categorically refused to advance, I
disbanded the Division. But there arose an unexpected complication: the
Commissars came to the conclusion that no crime had been committed,
because the spoken and the written word were unrestricted. The only
thing that could be incriminated was direct disobedience of Army
orders.... Paragraph 6 stipulates that all literature should be
delivered to the addressees, and the Army was flooded with criminal
Bolshevik and Defeatist literature. The stuff upon which our Army was
fed--and apparently at the expense of Government funds and of the
people's treasure--can be gauged from the report of the Moscow Military
Bureau, which alone supplied to the Front the following publications:
From March 24th to May 1st--
7,972 copies of the _Pravda_
2,000 " " _Soldiers' Pravda_
30,375 " " _Social Democrat_
From May 1st to June 11th--
61,522 copies of the _Soldiers' Pravda_
32,711 " " _Social Democrat_
6,999 " " _Pravda_
and so on. The same kind of literature was sent to the villages by the
soldiers.
"Paragraph 14 stipulates that no soldier can be punished without
a trial. Of course, this liberty applied only to the men, because
the officers continued to suffer the heaviest penalty of dismissal.
What was the result? The Central Military Justice Administration,
without reference to the Stavka and in view of the impending
Democratisation of the Courts, suggested that the latter should
suspend their activities, except for cases of special importance,
such, for example, as treason. The Commanding Officers were deprived
of disciplinary powers. Disciplinary Courts were partly inactive,
partly were boycotted. Justice completely disappeared from the Army.
This boycott of Disciplinary Court and reports on the reluctance of
certain units to elect juries are symptomatic. The legislator may come
across the same phenomenon in respect of the new Revolutionary Military
Courts, in which juries may also have to be replaced by appointed
judges. As a result of a series of legislative measures, authority
and discipline have been eliminated, the officers are dishonoured,
distrusted, and openly scorned. Generals in High Command, not excluding
Commanders-in-Chief, are being dismissed like domestic servants. In one
of his speeches at the Northern Front the War Minister inadvertently
uttered the following significant words: 'It lies within my power
to dismiss the entire personnel of the High Command in twenty-four
hours, and the Army would not object.' In the speeches addressed to
the Western Front it was said that 'in the Czarist Army we were driven
into battle with whips and machine-guns ... that Czarist Commanders
led us to slaughter, but now every drop of our blood is precious....'
I, the Commander-in-Chief, stood by the platform erected for the War
Minister, and I was heart-broken. My conscience whispered to me:
'That is a lie. My "Iron" Rifles, only eight battalions and then
twelve, took over 60,000 prisoners and 43 guns.... I have never driven
them into battle with machine-guns. I have never led my troops to
slaughter at Mezolaborch, Lutovisko, Lutsk, Chartoriisk.' To the late
Commander-in-Chief of the South-Western Front these names are indeed
familiar....
"Everything may be forgiven and we can stand a great deal if it is
necessary for victory, if the troops can regain their spirit and can
be induced to advance.... I will venture to draw a comparison. Sokolov
and other Petrograd delegates came to our front, to the 703rd Suram
Regiment. He came with the noble object of combating dark ignorance and
moral decrepitude, which were particularly apparent in that regiment.
He was mercilessly flogged. We were, of course, revolted against that
crowd of savage scoundrels, and everyone was perturbed. All kinds of
committees passed votes of censure. The War Minister condemned the
behaviour of the Suram Regiment in fiery speeches and Army orders, and
sent a telegram of sympathy to Sokolov.
"And here is another story. I well remember January, 1915, near
Lutovisko. There was a heavy frost. Colonel Noskov, the gallant
one-armed hero, up to the waist in snow, was leading his regiment to
the attack under a heavy fire against the steep and impregnable slopes
of Height 804.... Death spared him then. And now two companies came,
asked for General Noskov, surrounded him, killed him and went away.
I ask the War Minister, did he condemn these foul murderers with the
whole might of his fiery eloquence, of his wrath and of his power, and
did he send a telegram of sympathy to the hapless family of the fallen
hero?
"When we were deprived of power and authority, when the term
'Commanding Officer' was sterilised, we have once again been insulted
by a telegram from the Stavka to the effect that: 'Commanding Officers
who will now hesitate to apply armed force will be dismissed and
tried.' No, gentlemen, you will not intimidate those who are ready to
lose their lives in the service of their country.
"The senior Commanding Officers may now be divided into three
categories: some of them disregarding the hardships of life and service
with a broken heart, are doing their duty devotedly to the end; others
have lost heart and are following the tide; the third are curiously
brandishing the Red Flag, and mindful of the traditions of the Tartar
captivity, are crawling before new gods of the Revolution as they
crawled before the Czars. It causes me infinite pain to mention the
question of the Officers.... It is a nightmare, and I will be brief.
When Sokolov became familiar with the Army, he said: 'I could not
imagine that your officers could be such martyrs. I take off my hat to
them.' Yes, in the darkest days of Czarist autocracy, the police and
the gendarmerie never subjected the would-be criminal to such moral
torture and derision as the officers have to endure at present from
the illiterate masses, led by the scum of the Revolution. Officers
who are giving their lives for the country. They are insulted at
every turn. They are beaten. Yes, beaten. But they will not come and
complain to you. They are ashamed, dreadfully ashamed. Alone, in their
dug-outs, many of them are silently weeping over their dismal fate. No
wonder many officers consider that the best solution is to be killed
in action. Listen to the subdued and placid tragedy of the following
words which occur in a Field Report: 'In vain did the officers marching
in front try to lead the men into action. At that a moment a white
flag was raised on Redoubt No. 3. Fifteen officers and a small batch
of soldiers then went forward. Their fate is unknown--they did not
return.' (38th Corps). May these heroes rest in peace and their blood
be upon the heads of their conscious and unconscious executioners.
"The Army is falling to pieces. Heroic measures are needed for its
salvation: (1) The Provisional Government should recognise its mistakes
and its guilt, as it has not understood and estimated the noble and
sincere impulse of the officers who had greeted the news of the
Revolution with joy, and had sacrificed innumerable lives for their
country. (2) Petrograd, entirely detached from the Army, and ignorant
of its life and of the historical foundations of its existence, should
cease to enact military regulations. Full power must be given to the
Supreme Commander-in-Chief, who should be responsible only to the
Provisional Government. (3) Politics must disappear from the Army. (4)
The 'Declaration' must be rescinded in its fundamentals. Commissars
and Committees must be abolished, and the functions of the latter must
gradually be altered. (5) Commanding Officers must be restored to
power. Discipline and the outward form of order and good conduct must
likewise be restored. (6) Appointments to prominent posts must be made
not only according to the standard of youth and strength, but also of
experience in the field and in administration. (7) Special law-abiding
units of all arms must be placed at the disposal of Commanding Officers
as a bulwark against mutiny, and against the horrors of possible
demobilisation. (8) Military Revolutionary Courts must be established
and capital punishment introduced in the rear for the troops and for
civilians guilty of the same crimes.
"If you ask me whether these measures are likely to produce good
results, I will answer frankly: Yes, but not at once. It is easy to
destroy the Army, but time is needed for its reconstruction. The
measures I suggest would at least lay the foundations for the creation
of a strong Army. In spite of the disruption of the Army, we must
continue the struggle, however arduous it may be, and we must even be
prepared to retreat into the depths of the country. Our Allies should
not count upon immediate relief through our advance. Even in retreating
and remaining on the defensive, we are drawing upon us enormous enemy
forces, which, were they relieved, would be sent to the Western Front
and would crush the Allies and then turn against us. Upon this new
Calvary the Russian people and the Russian Army may yet shed rivers
of blood and endure privations and misfortunes. But at the end of the
Calvary a bright future is in store.
"There is another way. The way of treason. It would give a respite
to our martyred country.... But the curse of treachery cannot give
us happiness. At the end of that path there is political, moral and
economic slavery. The destinies of the country are in the hands of the
Army. I now appeal to the Provisional Government represented here by
two Ministers:
"You must lead Russia towards truth and enlightenment under the banner
of Liberty, but you must give us a real chance of leading the troops in
the name of that same Liberty under our old banners. You need have no
fear. The name of the autocrat has been removed from these banners as
well as from our hearts. It is no longer there. But there is a Mother
Country; there is a sea of blood; and there is the glory of our former
victories. You have trampled that banner into the dust. The time has
now come. Raise the banners and bow to them if your conscience is still
within you."
* * * * *
I had finished. Kerensky rose, shook hands with me, and said: "Thank
you, General, for your outspoken and sincere speech."
In the evidence which Kerensky subsequently gave to the High
Commission for the investigation of Kornilov's movement, the Prime
Minister explained this gesture by the fact that he approved, not of
the contents of my speech, but of my courage, and that he wished to
emphasise his respect for every independent opinion, albeit entirely
divergent from the views of the Provisional Government. In substance,
according to Kerensky, "General Deniken had for the first time drawn
a plan for the Revanche--that music of the future military reaction."
There is in these words a deep misinterpretation. We had not forgotten
the Galician retreat of 1915 or its causes, but, at the same time,
we could not forgive Kalush and Tarnopol in 1917. It was our duty,
our right, and our moral obligation not to wish for either of these
contingencies. I was followed by General Klembovsky. I had left the
Assembly, and only heard the end of his speech. He described the
condition of his Front in terms almost identical to mine, with great
restraint, and came to a conclusion that could only have been prompted
by deep despair: he suggested that power should be vested at the Front
in a kind of peculiar triumvirate consisting of the Commander-in-Chief,
a Commissar, and an elected soldier....
General Alexeiev was unwell, spoke briefly, described the condition
of the rear, of the reserves and garrison troops, and endorsed the
suggestions I had made.
General Ruzsky, who had been undergoing a protracted cure in the
Caucasus, and was therefore out of touch with the Army, analysed the
situation such as it appeared to him from the speeches that had been
made. He quoted a series of historical comparisons between the old
Army and the new Revolutionary one with such emphasis and bluntness
that Kerensky, in replying, accused Ruzsky of advocating the return to
Czarist autocracy. The new men were unable to understand the passionate
grief of an old soldier for the Army. Kerensky was probably unaware of
the fact that Ruzsky had been repudiated, and also passionately accused
by the Reactionary circles of the opposite crime, for the part which he
had played in the Emperor's abdication.
A telegram was read from General Kornilov, urging that capital
punishment should be introduced in the rear, chiefly in order to cope
with the licentious bands of Reservists; that disciplinary powers
should be vested in the Commanding Officers; that the competence of
the Army Committees should be restricted and their responsibilities
fixed; that meetings should be prohibited as well as anti-national
propaganda, and visits to the Front prohibited to various delegations
and agitators. All this was practically implied in my programme, but
under another shape, and was described as "military reaction." But
Kornilov had other suggestions. He advocated that Commissars should
be introduced into the Army Corps and given the right to confirm the
verdicts of the Military Revolutionary Tribunals, as well as to effect
a "cleansing" of the commanding staffs. This last proposal impressed
Kerensky by its "breadth and depth of vision"--greater than those which
emanated from the "old wiseacres," whom he considered intoxicated "with
the wine of hate...." There was an obvious misunderstanding, because
Kornilov's "cleansing" was not intended against the men of solid
military traditions (mistakenly identified with Monarchist Reaction),
but against the hirelings of the Revolution--unprincipled men, deprived
of will-power and of the capacity of taking the responsibility upon
their own shoulders.
Savinkov, the Commissar of the South-Western Front, also spoke,
expressing his own views only. He agreed with the general description
of the Front which we had given, and pointed out that it is not the
fault of the Revolutionary Democracy that the soldiery of the old
régime is still distrustful of their Commanding Officers; that all is
not well with the latter from the military and political points of
view, and that the main object of the new Revolutionary institutions
was to restore normal relations between these two elements of the Army.
Kerensky made the closing speech of the Conference. He tried to
justify himself--spoke of the elemental character of the inevitable
"Democratisation" of the Army. He blamed us for seeing in the
Revolution, and in its influence upon the Russian soldier, the only
cause of the _débâcle_ of July, and he severely condemned the old
régime. Finally, he gave us no definite directions for future work.
The members of the Conference dispersed with a heavy feeling of mutual
misunderstanding. I was also discouraged, but at the bottom of my heart
I was pleased to think--alas! I was mistaken--that our voices had been
heeded. My hopes were confirmed by a letter from Kornilov which I
received soon after his appointment to the Supreme Command:
"I have read the Report you made at the Stavka on July 16th with deep
and sincere satisfaction. I would sign such a Report with both hands;
I take off my hat to you, and I am lost in admiration before your
firmness and courage. I firmly believe that, with the help of the
Almighty, we will succeed in accomplishing the task of reconstructing
our beloved Army and of restoring its fighting power."
Fate has, indeed, cruelly derided our hopes!