MY SERVICE AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE SOUTH-WESTERN FRONT--THE
MOSCOW CONFERENCE--THE FALL OF RIGA.
I was touched by General Alexeiev's letter:
"My thoughts are with you in your new appointment. I consider that
you have been sent to perform a superhuman task. Much has been said,
but apparently little has been done there. Nothing has been done even
after the 16th July by Russia's chief babbler.... The authority of
the Commanders is being steadily curtailed. Should you want my help
in anything I am ready to go to Berdichev, to go to the Front, to one
Command or another.... God preserve you!"
Here was a man, indeed, whom neither an exalted position nor
misfortunes could change. He was full of his modest, disinterested work
for the good of his native land.
A new front, new men. The South-Western Front, shaken by the events
in July, was gradually recovering. Not, however, in the sense of real
convalescence, as the optimists thought, but of a return approximately
to its condition prior to the offensive. There were the same strained
relations between officers and men, the same slip-shod service, the
desertion, and open unwillingness to fight, which was only less
actively expressed owing to the lull in operations; finally there was
the same Bolshevist propaganda, only more active, and not infrequently
disguised under the form of Committee "fractions" and preparations for
the Constituent Assembly. I have a document referring to the 2nd Army
of the Western Front. It is highly characteristic as an indication
of the unparalleled toleration and, indeed, encouragement of the
disintegration of the Army on the part of the representatives of the
Government and Commanders, under the guise of liberty and conscious
voting at the elections. Here is a copy of the telegram sent to all the
senior officers of the 2nd Army:
The Army Commander, in agreement with the Commissar, and at the
request of the Army fraction of the Bolshevist Social-Democrats,
has permitted the organisation, from the 15th to 18th October, of
preparatory courses for instructors of the aforesaid fraction for
the elections to the Constituent Assembly, one representative of
the Bolshevist organisation of each separate unit being sent to the
said courses. No. 1644.
SUVOROV.[55]
The same toleration had been exercised in many cases previously, and
was founded on the exact meaning of the regulations for Army Committees
and of the "Declaration of Soldiers' Rights."
Carried away by the struggle against counter-revolution, the
Revolutionary institutions had paid no attention to such facts as
public meetings with extreme Bolshevist watchwords being held at the
very place where the Front Headquarters were situated, or that the
local paper, _Svobodnaia Mysl_,[56] most undisguisedly threatened the
officers with a St. Bartholomew's Eve.
The front was _holding out_. That is all that could be said of the
situation. At times there would be disturbances ending tragically,
such as the brutal murder of Generals Girshfeld, Hirschfeld, and
Stefanovich, Commissar Linde. The preliminary arrangements and the
concentration of the troops for the coming partial offensive were made,
but there was no possibility of launching the actual attack until the
"Kornilov programme" had been put into practice and the results known.
I waited very impatiently.
The Revolutionary organisations (the Commissariat and Committee) of
the South-Western Front were in a position; they had not yet seized
power, but some of it had already been yielded to them voluntarily by
a series of Commanders-in-Chief--Brussilov, Gutor, Baluev. Therefore,
my coming at once roused their antagonism. The Committee of the Western
Front lost no time in sending a scathing report on me to Berdichev on
the basis of which the next issue of the Committee's organ published an
impressive warning to the "enemies of democracy." As usual, I totally
omitted to invoke the aid of the Commissariat, and sent a message to
the Committee saying that I could have nothing to do with it unless it
kept rigidly within the limits of the law.
The Commissar of the Front was a certain Gobechio. I saw him once only,
on my arrival. In a few days he got transferred to the Caucasus, and
his post was taken by Iordansky.[57] As soon as he arrived he issued
an "order to the troops at the Front." Afterwards he was unable to
understand that two persons could not command the Front at one and the
same time. Iordansky and his assistants, Kostitsin and Grigorier--a
literary man, zoologist, and doctor respectively--were probably rather
prominent men in their own profession, but utterly ignorant of military
life.
The Committee of the Front was no better and no worse than others.[58]
It took the "Defencist" point of view, and even supported the
repressive measures taken by Kornilov in July, but at that time
the Committee was not in the least degree a _military_ institution
organically connected--for good or evil--with the true Army life. It
was merely a mixed party organ. Divided into "fractions" of all the
Socialist parties, the Committee positively revelled in politics,
and introduced them at the Front likewise. The Committee carried on
propaganda on a large scale, convened congresses of representatives in
order to have them converted by Socialist fractions, including such
as were openly antagonistic to the policy of the Government. I made
an attempt to stop this work in view of the impending strategical
operations and the difficult period of transition, but met with
determined opposition on the part of Commissar Iordansky. At the same
time, the Committee was perpetually interfering in all questions of
military authority, spreading sedition and distrust to the commanders.
* * * * *
Meanwhile, both in Petrograd and Moghilev, events were taking their
course, and we could grasp their meaning only in so far as they were
reflected by newspaper reports, rumours and gossip.
There was still no "programme." The Moscow State Conference[59] raised
great hopes, but it met without making any changes in either State
or military policy. On the contrary, it even outwardly emphasises
the irreconcilable enmity between the Revolutionary Democracy and
the Liberal Bourgeoisie, between the Commanders and the soldiers'
representatives.
If the Moscow Conference yielded no positive results, nevertheless, it
fully exposed the mood of the opponents, the leaders and the rulers.
All unanimously recognised that the country was in deadly peril.
Everyone understood that the social relations had suffered an upheaval,
that all branches of the nation's economy had been uprooted. Each
party reproached the other with supporting the selfish interests of
their class. This, however, was not the most important matter, for,
strange as it may seem, the primary causes of social class war, even
the agrarian and labour questions, merely led to disagreement, without
rousing any irreconcilable dissentions. Even when Plekhanov, the
old leader of the Social-Democrats, amid universal approval, turned to
the Right demanding sacrifice, and to the Left demanding moderation, it
seemed as if the chasm between the two opposing social camps was not so
very great.
All the attention of the Conference was taken up by other questions,
those of _authority and of the Army_.
Miliukov enumerated all the sins of the Government, vanquished by the
Soviets, its "capitulation" to the ideology of the Socialist parties
and Zimmerwaldists, capitulation in the Army, in foreign policy, to
the Utopian demands of the working classes, to the extreme demands of
nationalities.
"The usurpation of the authority of the State by Central and Local
Committees and Soviets," said General Kaledin distinctly, "must be
stopped at once and decisively."
Maklakov smoothed the way for his attack: "I demand nothing, but
I cannot help drawing attention to the alarm felt by the social
conscience when it sees that the 'Defeatists' of yesterday have been
invited to join the Government." Shulgin (Right) is agitated. He says:
"I want your (the Provisional Government's) authority to be really
strong, really unlimited. I want this, though I know that a strong
Government easily turns to despotism, which is more likely to crush me
than you, the friends of that Government."
On the Left, Jehkheidze sings the praises of the Soviets: "It is only
owing to the Revolutionary organisations that the creative spirit of
the Revolution has been preserved, for the salvation of the country
from the disintegration of authority and from anarchy...." "There
is no power higher than that of the Provisional Governments," says
Tzeretelli, "because the source of this power the sovereign people
has, through all the organs at its disposal, directly delegated this
power to the Provisional Government." Of course, in so far as that
Government submits to the will of the Soviets?... And over all one
hears the dominating voice of the President of the Congress, who is
seeking for "heavenly words" in order to "express his shuddering
horror" at coming events, "and at the same time brandishing a wooden
sword and threatening his hidden enemies thus: 'Be it known to everyone
who has once tried to offer armed resistance to the authority of the
people that the attempt will be smothered in blood and iron. Let those
beware who think that the time has come for them to overthrow the
Revolutionary Government with the help of bayonets.'"
The contradiction was still more striking in military matters. In a dry
but powerful speech, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief drew a picture of
the destruction of the Army, involving the whole country in its ruin,
and with great reserve explained the gist of his programme. General
Alexeiev related, with genuine bitterness, the sad story of the sins,
sufferings and gallantry of the former Army.
"Weak in technical resources and morally strong in spirit and
discipline," he related how the Army had lived to see the bright
days of the Revolution, and how later on, "when it was thought to be
a danger to the conquests of the Revolution, it was inoculated with
deadly poison." Kaledin, the Don Cossack Attaman, representing thirteen
Cossack Armies and unhampered by any official position, spoke sharply
and distinctly: "The Army must keep out of politics. There must be no
political meetings with their party struggles and disputes. All the
(Army) Soviets and Committees must be abolished. The Declaration of
Soldiers' Rights must be revised. Discipline must be raised both at the
Front and in the rear. The disciplinary authority of the Commanders
must be restored. All power to the leaders of the Army!"
Kuchin, the representative of the Army and Front Committees, rose
to reply to these trite military axioms. "The Committees were a
manifestation of the instinct of self-defence.... They had to be formed
as organs for the protection of the privates, as hitherto there had
been nothing but oppression ... the Committees had brought light and
knowledge to the soldiers.... Then came the second period--one of decay
and disorganisation ... 'rearguard consciousness' made its appearance,
but failed to digest all the mass of questions which the Revolutions
had raised in the minds of the soldiery...." Now the speaker did
not deny the necessity for repressive measures, but they "must be
compatible with the definite work of Army organisations...." How this
was to be done had been shown by the united front of Revolutionary
Democracy, namely, the Army must be animated, not by the desire of
victory over the enemy, but by "a repudiation of Imperialistic aims,
and a desire for the speedy attainment of universal peace on Democratic
principles.... The commanders should possess complete independence
in the conduct of military operations, and have a decisive voice in
questions of discipline and service training." The object of the
organisations, on the other hand, was to introduce their policy
wholesale among troops, and "the Commissars must be the introducers
of (this) single Revolutionary policy of the Provisional Government,
the Army Committees must direct the social and political life of
the soldiers. The restoration of the disciplinary authority of the
commanders is not to be thought of," etc.
What is the Government going to do? Will it find enough strength
and boldness to burst the fetters placed on it by the Bolshevistic
Soviet?[60]
Kornilov said firmly, repeating his words twice: "I do not doubt for a
moment that the (my) measures will be carried out without delay."
And if not--was it to be War?
He also said: "It is impossible to admit that the determination to
carry out these measures should in every case be aroused merely by the
pressure of defeats and loss of territory. If the rout at Tarnopol and
the loss of Galicia and Bukovina did indeed result in restoration of
discipline at the Front, it cannot be admitted that order in the rear
should be restored at the cost of the loss of Riga, and that order
on the railways should be restored by the cession of Moldavia and
Bessarabia to the enemy."
On the 20th Riga fell.
Both strategically and tactically the Front of the lower Dvina was in
complete preparedness. Taking into consideration the strength of the
defensive positions, the forces were also sufficient. The officers in
command were General Parsky, Army Commander, and General Boldyrev,
Corps Commander; both experienced Generals, and certainly not inclined
to counter-Revolution in the opinion of the Democrats.[61]
Finally, from deserters' reports, our Headquarters knew not only the
direction but even the day and the hour of the contemplated attack.
Nevertheless, on the 19th August the Germans (Von Hutier's 8th Army),
after heavy artillery preparation, occupied the Uxküll bridgehead in
the face of feeble opposition on our part, and crossed the Dvina. On
20th August the Germans assumed the offensive also along the Mitau
road; towards evening of the same day the enemy's Uxküll group,
having pierced our lines on the Egel, began deploying in a northerly
direction, threatening the retreat of the Russian troops towards
Wenden. The 12th Army, abandoning Riga, retired some 60-70 versts,
losing touch with the enemy, and on the 25th occupied the so-called
Wenden position. The Army lost in prisoners alone some 9,000 men,
besides 81 guns, 200 machine-guns, etc. A further advance did not enter
into the German plans, and they commenced to establish themselves on
the extensive terrain of the right bank of the Dvina, immediately
sending off two divisions to the Western Front.
We lost the rich industrial town of Riga, with all its military
structures and supplies; more important still, we lost a safe defensive
line, the abandonment of which placed both the Dvina Front and the way
to Petrograd under a constant threat.
The fall of Riga made a great impression in the country. Quite
unexpectedly, however, it called forth from the Revolutionary
Democracy, not repentance, not patriotic fervour, but, instead, a still
greater bitterness towards the leaders and officers. The Stavka in one
_communiqué_[62] inserted the following sentence: "The disorganised
masses of the soldiery are flocking in uncontrollable masses along
the Pskov high road and the road to Bieder-Limburg." This statement,
undoubtedly true, and neither mentioning nor relating to the causes
of the above, raised a storm amongst the Revolutionary Democracy.
The Commissars and Committees of the Northern Front sent a series of
telegrams refuting the "provocative attacks of the Stavka" and assuring
that "there was no shame in this reverse"; that "the troops honestly
obey all demands of their leaders ... there have been no cases of
flight or treachery on the part of the troops."
The Commissar for the Front, Stankevitch, while demurring against there
being no shame in such a causeless and inglorious retreat, pointed
out, amongst other things, a series of errors and delinquencies on
the part of the Commanders. It is extremely possible that there were
errors, both personal and of leadership, as well as purely objective
deficiencies, caused by mutual mistrust, slackening of obedience,
and the _débâcle_ of the technical services. At the same time, it
is undoubtedly a fact that the troops of the Northern Front, and
especially the 12th Army, were the most disorganised of all, and,
logically, could not offer the necessary resistance. Even the apologist
of the 12th Army, Commissar Voitinsky, who always considerably
exaggerated the fighting value of these troops, telegraphed on the
22nd to the Petrograd Soviet: "The troops show want of confidence in
their powers, absence of training for battle, and, consequently,
insufficient steadiness in open warfare.... Many units fight bravely,
as in the early days; others show signs of weariness and panic."
Actually, the debauched Northern Front had lost all power of
resistance. The troops rolled back to the limit of pursuit by the
German advanced detachments, and only moved forward subsequently
on losing touch with Hutier's main body, which had no intention of
passing, beyond a definite line.
Meanwhile, all the papers of the Left commenced a fierce campaign
against the Stavka and the Commands. The word "treachery" was heard....
Tchernov's _Delo Naroda_, a Defeatist paper, complained: "A torturing
fear creeps into the mind: are not the mistakes of the commanders,
the deficiencies in artillery, and the incapacity of the leaders
being unloaded on to the soldiers--courageous, heroic, perishing
in thousands." The _Izvestia_ announced also the motives for the
"provocation": "The Stavka, by putting forth the bogy of menacing
events, is trying to terrorise the Provisional Government and make
it adopt a series of measures, directly and indirectly aimed at the
Revolutionary Democracy and their organisations...."
In conjunction with all these events, the feeling against the Supreme
Commander-in-Chief, General Kornilov, was increasing in the Soviets,
and rumours of his approaching dismissal appeared in the Press. In
answer to these, a series of angry resolutions addressed to the
Government, and supporting Kornilov, made their appearance.[63] The
resolution of the Council of the Union of Cossack Troops contained even
the following passage: "The supersession of Kornilov will inevitably
imbue the Cossacks with the fatal impression of the futility of further
Cossack sacrifices"; and, further, that the Council "declines all
responsibility for the Cossack troops at and behind the Front should
Kornilov be removed."
Such was, then, the situation. Instead of pacification, passions burned
fiercer, contradictions increased, the atmosphere of mutual mistrust
and morbid suspicion was thickened.
* * * * *
I still postponed my tour of the troops, not abandoning hope of a
satisfactory issue to the struggle and of the publication of the
"Kornilov programme."[64]
What could I bring the men? A deep, painful feeling, words appealing to
"common-sense and conscience," concealing my helplessness, and like the
voice of one crying in the wilderness? All had been and gone, leaving
bitter memories behind. It will always be so: thoughts, ideas, words,
moral persuasion will never cease to rouse men to deeds of merit; but
what if overgrown, virgin soil must be torn up with an iron plough?...
What should I say to the officers, sorrowfully and patiently awaiting
the end of the regular and merciless lingering death of the Army? For I
could only say to them: If the Government does not radically alter its
policy the end of the Army has come.
On the 7th August orders were received to move the Caucasian Native
("Wild") Division from under my command northwards; on the 12th the
same order was received for the 3rd Cavalry Corps, then in Reserve, and
later for the Kornilov "shock" Regiment. As always, their destination
was not indicated. The direction prescribed, on the other hand, equally
pointed to the Northern Front, at that time greatly threatened, and
to ... Petrograd. I recommended General Krymov, commanding the 3rd
Cavalry Corps, for the command of the 11th Army. The Stavka agreed, but
demanded his immediate departure for Moghilev on a special mission. On
his way there Krymov reported to me. Apparently he had not yet received
definite instructions--at any rate, he spoke of none; however, neither
he nor I doubted that the mission was in connection with the expected
change in military policy. Krymov was at this time cheerful and
confident, and had faith in the future; as formerly, he considered that
only a crushing blow to the Soviets could save the situation.
Following on this, official information was received of the formation
of the Detached Petrograd Army, and the appointment of an officer of
the General Staff to be Quartermaster-General of this Army was desired.
Finally, about the 20th, the situation became somewhat clearer. An
officer reported to me at Berdichev, and handed me a personal letter
from Kornilov, wherein the latter suggested I should hear this
officer's verbal report. He stated as follows:
"According to reliable information, a rising of the Bolsheviks
will take place at the end of August. By this time the 3rd Cavalry
Corps,[65] commanded by Krymov, would reach Petrograd, would crush
the rising, and simultaneously put an end to the Soviets."[66]
Simultaneously, Petrograd would be proclaimed in a state of war, and
the laws resulting from the "Kornilov programme" would be published.
The Supreme Commander-in-Chief requested me to despatch to the
Stavka a score or more of reliable officers--officially "for trench
mortar instruction"; actually they would be sent to Petrograd, and
incorporated in the Officers' Detachment.
In the course of the conversation he communicated the news from the
Stavka, painting all in glowing colours. He told me, among other
things, of rumours concerning new appointments to the Kiev, Odessa and
Moscow commands, and of the proposed new Government, mentioning some
existing ministers, and some names entirely unknown to me. The part
played in this matter by the Provisional Government, in particular by
Kerensky, was not clear. Had he decided on an abrupt change of military
policy, would he resign, or would he be swept away by developments
impossible of prediction by pure logic, or the most prophetic common
sense?
_In this volume I described the entire course of events during August
in that sequence and in that light, in which these tragic days were
experienced on the South-Western Front, not giving them the perspective
of the stage and the actors acquired subsequently._
The seconding of the officers--with all precautions to prevent
either them or their superiors being placed in a false position--was
commenced, but it is hardly likely that it could have been accomplished
by the 27th. Not one Army Commander was supplied by me with the
information I had received; in fact, not one of the senior officers at
the front knew anything of the events brewing.
It was clear that the history of the Russian Revolution had entered
on a new phase. What would the future bring? General Markov and I
spent many hours discussing this subject. He--nervous, hot-headed and
impetuous--constantly wavered between the extremes of hope and fear.
I also felt much the same; and both of us quite clearly saw and felt
the _fatal inevitability_ of a crisis. The Soviets--Bolshevists or
semi-Bolshevists, no matter which--would unfailingly bring Russia to
her doom. A conflict was unavoidable. But _over there_, was there an
actual chance, or was everything being done in heroic desperation?
[Illustration: General Kornilov's welcome in Moscow.]