THE RUSSIAN ADVANCE IN THE SUMMER OF 1917--THE DÉBÂCLE.
The Russian offensive which had been planned for the month of May was
being delayed. At first a simultaneous advance on all fronts had been
contemplated; later, however, owing to the psychological impossibility
of a forward movement on all fronts, it was decided to advance
gradually. The Western Front was of secondary importance, and the
Northern was intended only for demonstration. They should have moved
first in order to divert the attention and the forces of the enemy from
the main front--the South-Western. The first two of the above-named
fronts were not, however, ready for the advance. The Supreme Command
finally decided to abandon the strategical plan and to give the
commanders of various fronts a free hand in starting operations as
the Armies would be ready, provided these operations were not delayed
too long and the enemy was not given the opportunity of carrying out
re-groupings on a large scale.
Even such a strategy, simplified as it had been owing to the
Revolution, might have yielded great results, considering the
world-wide scope of the War; if the German Armies on the Eastern
Front could not have been utterly defeated, that Front might at least
have been restored to its former importance. The Central Powers might
have been compelled to send to that Front large forces, war material
and munitions, thus severely handicapping Hindenburg's strategy and
causing him constant anxiety. The operations were finally fixed for the
following dates: They were to begin on the South-Western Front on June
16th, on the Western on July 7th, on the Northern on July 8th, and on
the Roumanian on July 6th. The last three dates almost coincide with
the beginning of the collapse (July 6th-7th) of the South-Western Front.
As mentioned above, in June, 1917, the Revolutionary Democracy had
already acquiesced in the idea that an advance was necessary, although
this acquiescence was qualified. The offensive thus had the moral
support of the Provisional Government, the Commanding Staffs, all the
officers, the Liberal Democracy, the Defencist Coalition of the Soviet,
the Commissars, of nearly all Army Committees, and of many Regimental
Committees. Against the offensive the minority of the Revolutionary
Democracy was ranged--the Bolsheviks, the Social-Revolutionaries
of Tchernov's and of Martov's (Zederbaum) group. There was a small
appendix to this minority--the Democratisation of the Army.
At the moment of writing I do not possess a complete list of the
Russian Armies, but I may confidently assert that on all sectors upon
which the advance had been planned we had a numerical and a technical
superiority over the enemy, more especially in guns, of which we had
larger quantities than ever. It fell to the lot of the South-Western
Front to test the fighting capacity of the Revolutionary Army.
The group of armies under General Bohm-Ermolli (the 4th and 2nd
Austrian Armies and the Southern German Armies) stood between the upper
Sereth and the Carpathians (Brody-Nadvorna) on the position north of
the Dniester which we had captured after Brussilov's victorious advance
in the autumn of 1916. South of the Dniester stood the 3rd Austrian
Army of General Kirchbach, which formed the Left Wing of the Archduke
Joseph's Carpathian Front. Our best Army Corps, which were intended as
shock troops, were opposed to the last three Armies mentioned above.
These Austro-German troops had already been dealt many heavy blows by
the Russian Armies in the summer and in the autumn of 1916. Since then,
the Southern German Divisions of General Botmer, which had been hard
hit, had been replaced by fresh troops from the North. Although the
Austrian Armies had been to a certain extent reorganised by the German
High Command and reinforced by German divisions, they did not represent
a formidable force and, according to the German Headquarters, were not
fit for active operations.
Since the Germans had occupied the Cherviche "Place d'armes" on the
Stokhod, Hindenburg's Headquarters had given orders that no operations
should be conducted, as it was hoped that the disruption of the Russian
Army and of the country would follow its natural course, assisted by
German propaganda. The Germans estimated the fighting capacity of our
Army very low. Nevertheless, when Hindenburg realised in the beginning
of June that a Russian advance was a contingency to be reckoned with,
he moved six divisions from the Western-European front and sent them to
reinforce the group of Armies of Bohm-Ermolli. The enemy was perfectly
well aware of the directions in which we intended to advance....
The Russian Armies of the South-Western Front, commanded by General
Gutor, were to strike in the main direction of Kamenetz-Podolsk-Lvov.
The Armies were to move along both banks of the Dniester: General
Erdely's 11th Army in the direction of Zlochev, General Selivatchev's
7th Army towards Brjeczany, and General Kornilov's 8th Army towards
Galitch. In the event of victory we would reach Lvov, break through
between the fronts of Bohm-Ermolli and the Archduke Joseph, and would
drive the latter's left wing to the Carpathians, cutting it off from
all available natural means of communication. The remainder of our
Armies on the South-Western Front were stretched along a broad front
from the river Pripet to Brody for active defence and demonstration.
On June 16th the guns of the shock troops of the 7th and 11th Army
opened a fire of such intensity as had never been heard before. After
two days of continuous fire, which destroyed the enemy's strong
position, the Russian regiments attacked. The enemy line was broken
between Zvorov and Brjeczany on a front of several miles; we took two
or three fortified lines. On June 19th the attack was renewed on a
front of forty miles, between the Upper Strypa and the Narauvka. In
this heavy and glorious battle the Russian troops took three hundred
officers and eighteen thousand men prisoners in two days, twenty-nine
guns, and other booty. The enemy positions were captured on many
sectors, and we penetrated the enemy lines to an average depth of over
two miles, driving him back to the Strypa in the direction of Zlochev.
The news of our victory spread all over Russia, evoked universal
rejoicings, and raised the hopes for the revival of the former strength
of the Russian Army. Kerensky reported to the Provisional Government as
follows: "This day is the day of a great triumph for the Revolution.
On June 18th the Russian Revolutionary Army, in very high spirits,
began the advance and has proved before Russia and before the world its
ardent devotion to the cause of the Revolution and its love of Country
and Liberty.... The Russian warriors are inaugurating a new discipline
based upon feelings of a citizen's duty.... An end has been made to-day
of all the vicious calumnies and slander about the organisation of
the Russian Army, which has been rebuilt on Democratic lines...." The
man who wrote these words had afterwards the courage to claim that it
was not he who had destroyed the Army, because he had taken over the
organisation as a fatal inheritance!
After three days' respite, a violent battle was resumed on the front
of the 11th Army on both sides of the railway line on the front
Batkuv-Koniuchi. By that time the threatened German regiments were
reinforced, and stubborn fighting ensued. The 11th Army captured
several lines, but suffered heavy losses. The trenches changed hands
several times after a hand-to-hand battle, and great efforts had to
be made in order to break the resistance of the enemy, who had been
reinforced and had recovered. This action practically signified the end
of the advance of the 7th and 11th Armies. The impetus was spent and
the troops began once more to sit in the trenches, the monotony of this
pastime being only broken in places by local skirmishes, Austro-German
counter-attacks, and intermittent gunfire. Meanwhile preparations
for the advance began on June 23rd in Kornilov's Army. On June 25th
his troops broke through General Kirchbach's positions west of
Stanislavov and reached the line of Jesupol-Lyssetz. After a stubborn
and sanguinary battle Kirchbach's troops, utterly defeated, ran and
dragged along in their headlong flight the German division which had
been sent to reinforce them. On the 27th General Cheremissov's right
column captured Galitch, some of his troops crossed the Dniester.
On the 28th the left column overcame the stubborn resistance of the
Austro-Germans and captured Kalush. In the next two or three days, the
8th Army was in action on the river Lomnitza and finally established
itself on the banks of the river and in front of it. In the course of
this brilliant operation Kornilov's Army broke through the 3rd Austrian
Army on a front of over twenty miles and captured 150 officers, 10,000
men, and about 100 guns. The capture of Lomnitza opened to Kornilov the
road to Dolina-Stryi and to the communications of Botmer's Army. German
Headquarters described the position of the Commander-in-Chief of the
Western Front as _critical_.
General Bohm-Ermolli meanwhile was concentrating all his reserves in
the direction of Zlochev, the point to which the German divisions were
likewise sent which had been taken from the Western European Front.
Some of the reserves had to be sent, however, across the Dniester
against the 8th Russian Army. They arrived on July 2nd, reinforced the
shattered ranks of the 3rd Austrian Army, and from that day positional
battles began on the Lomnitza, with varying success, and occasionally
stubborn fighting. The concentration of the German shock troops between
the Upper Sereth and the railway line Tarnopol-Zlochev was completed
on July 5th. On the next day, after strong artillery preparations,
this group attacked our 11th Army, broke our front and moved swiftly
towards Kamenetz-Podolsk, pursuing the Army Corps of the 11th Army
who were fleeing in panic. The Army Headquarters, the Stavka and the
Press, losing all perspective, blamed the 607th Mlynov Regiment as the
chief cause of the catastrophe. The demoralised, worthless regiment had
left the trenches of their own accord and opened the front. It was, of
course, a very sad occurrence, but it would be naïve to describe it
even as an excuse. For as early as on the 9th of July the Committees
and Commissars of the 11th Army were telegraphing to the Provisional
Government: "The truth and nothing but the truth about the events."
"The German offensive on the front of the 11th Army, which began on
July 6th, is growing into an immeasurable calamity which threatens
perhaps the very existence of Revolutionary Russia. The spirit of
the troops, that were prompted to advance by the heroic efforts of
the minority, has undergone a decisive and fatal change. The impetus
of the advance was soon spent. Most of the units are in a condition
of increasing disruption. There is not a shadow of discipline or
obedience; persuasion is likewise powerless and is answered by threats
and sometimes by shootings. Cases have occurred when orders to advance
immediately to reinforce the line were debated for hours at meetings,
and reinforcements were twenty-four hours late. Some units arbitrarily
leave the trenches without even waiting for the enemy to advance....
For hundreds of miles strings of deserters--healthy, strong men who
thoroughly realise their impunity--are to be seen moving along with
rifles or without.... The country should know the whole truth. It will
shudder and will find the strength to fall with all its might upon
all those whose cowardice is ruining and bartering Russia and the
Revolution."
The Stavka wrote: "In spite of its enormous numerical and technical
superiority, the 11th Army was retreating uninterruptedly. On the
8th of July it had already reached the Serenth, never halting at the
very strong fortified position to the West of the river, which had
been our starting point in the glorious advance of 1916. Bohm-Ermolli
had detached some of his forces for the pursuit of the Russian
troops in the direction of Tarnapol and had moved his main forces
southwards between the Serenth and the Strypa, threatening to cut off
the communication of the 7th Army, to throw them into the Dniester
and, perhaps, cut off the retreat of the 8th Army. On July 9th the
Austro-Germans had already reached Mikulinze, a distance of one march
south of Tarnapol.... The Armies of General Selivatchev and Cheremissov
(who had succeeded General Kornilov upon the latter's appointment on
July 7th to the High Command of the South-Western Front) were in great
difficulty. They could not hope to resist the enemy by manoeuvring,
and all that was left to them was to escape the enemy's blows by
forced marches. The 7th Army was in particularly dire straits, as it
was retreating under the double pressure of the Army Corps of General
Botmer, who was conducting a frontal attack, and of the troops of
Bohm-Ermolli, striking from the north against the denuded right flank.
The 8th Army had to march over one hundred miles under pressure from
the enemy.
On July 10th the Austro-Germans advanced to the line
Mikulinze-Podgaitze-Stanilavov. On the 11th the Germans occupied
Tarnapol, abandoned without fighting by the 1st Guards Army Corps. On
the next day they broke through our position on the rivers Gniezno
and Sereth, South of Trembovlia, and developed their advance in the
Eastern and South-Eastern directions. On the same day, pursuing the
7th and 8th Armies, the enemy occupied the line from the Sereth to
Monsaterjisko-Tlumatch.
On the 12th July, seeing that the position was desperate, the
Commander-in-Chief issued orders for a retreat from the Sereth, and by
the 21st the Armies of the South-Western Front, having cleared Galicia
and Bukovina, reached the Russian frontier. Their retreat was marked
by fires, violence, murders and plunder. A few units, however, fought
the enemy stubbornly and covered the retreat of the maddened mob of
deserters by sacrificing their lives. Among them were Russian officers,
whose bodies covered the battlefields. The Armies were retreating in
disorder; the same Armies that, only a year ago, had captured Lutsk,
Brody-Stanislavov, Chernovetz in their triumphal progress ... were
retreating before the same Austro-German troops that only a year ago
had been completely defeated and had strewn with fugitives the plains
of Volynia, Galicia and Bukovina, leaving hundreds of thousands of
prisoners in our hands. We shall never forget that in Brussilov's
advance of 1916, the 7th, 8th, 9th and 11th Armies took 420,000
prisoners, 600 guns, 2,500,000 machine guns, etc. Our Allies are not
likely to forget this either; they know full well that the loud echo of
the Galician battle sounded on the Somme and at Goritza.
The Commissars Savinkov and Filonenko telegraphed to the Provisional
Government: "There is no choice; the traitors must be executed....
Capital punishment must be meted out to all those who refuse to
sacrifice their lives for their country...."
In the beginning of July, after the Russian advance had ostensibly
failed, it was decided at Hindenburg's Headquarters to undertake a
new extensive operation against the Roumanian front by a simultaneous
advance of the 3rd and 7th Austrian Armies across Bukovina into
Moldavia and of the Right group of General Mackensen on the Lower
Sereth. The objective was to seize Moldavia and Bessarabia. But on
July 11th the Russian Army of General Ragosa and the Roumanian Army
of General Averesco took the offensive between the rivers Susitsa
and Putna against the 9th Austrian Army. The attack was successful,
the enemy positions were captured, the Armies moved forward several
miles, took 2,000 prisoners and over 60 guns, but the operation was not
developed. Owing to the natural conditions of the theatre of war and
to the direction in which the operation was undertaken, it was more
akin to a demonstration in order to relieve the South-Western Front.
Also the troops of the 4th Russian Army soon lost all impetus for the
advance. In July and until August 4th, the troops of the Archduke
Joseph and of Mackensen attacked in several directions and gained
local successes, but without any appreciable result. Although the
Russian divisions repeatedly disobeyed orders and occasionally left the
trenches during the battle, yet the condition of the Roumanian Front
was somewhat better than that of the other Front, owing to its distance
from Petrograd, to the presence of disciplined Roumanian troops and
to the natural conditions of the country. For these reasons we were
able to keep that Front somewhat longer. This circumstance, together
with the apparent weakness of the Austrian Armies, especially the 3rd
and the 7th, and the complete dislocation of the communications of
Bohm-Ermolli's group and of the Archduke Joseph's left wing--caused
Hindenburg's Headquarters indefinitely to postpone the operation, and
a period of calm ensued along the entire South-Western Front. On the
Roumanian Front local actions were fought until the end of August.
At the same time, German divisions began to move from the Sbrucz
northwards in the direction of Riga. Hindenburg's plan was to deal
the Russian Army local blows, without straining his own resources or
spending large reserves, so urgently needed, on the Western-European
Front. By these tactics he intended to contribute to the natural course
of the collapse of the Russian front, for it was upon this collapse
that the Central Powers based all their calculations in regard to
operations and even in regard to the possibility of continuing the
campaign in 1918.
Our efforts at advancing on other Fronts also ended in complete
failure. On the 7th of July operations began on the Western Front,
which I commanded. The details will be given in the next chapter. Of
this operation Ludendorf wrote: "Of all the attacks directed against
the former Eastern front of General Eichhorn, the attacks of July 9th,
South of Smorgom, and at Krevo were particularly fierce.... For several
days the position was extremely difficult until our reserves and our
gunfire restored the front. The Russians left our trenches; they were
no longer the Russians of the old days."
On the Northern Front, in the 5th Army, everything was over in one
day. The Stavka wrote: "South-West of the Dvinsk our troops, after
strong artillery preparation, captured the German position across the
railway Dvinsk-Vilna. Subsequently, entire divisions, without pressure
from the enemy, deliberately retreated to their own trenches." The
Stavka noted the heroic behaviour of several units, the prowess of
the officers and the tremendous losses which the latter had suffered.
This fact, however unimportant from the strategical point of view,
deserves to be specially noted. As a matter of fact, the 5th Army was
commanded by General Danilov (afterwards a member of the Bolshevik
Delegation at Brest-Litovsk. He served in 1920 in the Russian Army in
the Crimea). He enjoyed exceptional prestige with the Revolutionary
Democracy. According to Stankevitch, the Commissar of the Northern
Front, Danilov "was the only General who had remained, in spite of the
Revolution, full master in the Army and had succeeded in so dealing
with the new institutions--the Commissars and the Committees--that
they strengthened his authority instead of weakening it.... He knew
how to make use of these elements, and he overcame all obstacles in a
spirit of complete self-control and firmness. In the 5th Army everyone
was working, learning and being educated.... As the best and the most
cultured elements of the Army were working to that end." This is a
striking proof of the fact that even when the Commanding Officer
becomes thoroughly familiar with Revolutionary institutions, this does
not serve as a guarantee of the fighting capacity of his troops.
* * * * *
On July 11th Kornilov, upon his appointment to the Chief Command
of the South-Western Front, sent to the Provisional Government his
well-known telegram, of which he forwarded a copy to the Supreme
Commander-in-Chief. In that telegram, already quoted above, Kornilov
demanded the reintroduction of capital punishment, and wrote: "...
I declare that the country is on the verge of collapse and that,
although I have not been consulted, I _demand_ that the offensive be
stopped on all Fronts in order that the Army may be saved, preserved
and re-organised on the basis of strict discipline, and in order that
the lives may not be sacrificed of a few heroes who are entitled to
see better days." In spite of the peculiar wording of this appeal, the
idea of stopping the advance was immediately accepted by the Supreme
Command, the more so that the operations had practically come to a
standstill irrespective of orders as a result of the reluctance of the
Russian Army to fight and to advance, as well as of the schemes of the
German Headquarters.
Capital punishment and Revolutionary courts-martial were introduced
at the front. Kornilov gave an order to shoot deserters and robbers
and to expose their bodies with corresponding notices on the roads
and in other prominent places. Special shock battalions were formed
of cadets and volunteers to fight against desertion, plunder and
violence. Kornilov forbade meetings at the Front and gave an order to
stop them by the force of arms. These measures--which were introduced
by Kornilov at his own risk and peril, his manly, straightforward
utterances, and the firm tone in which, disregarding discipline, he
began to address the Provisional Government, and last, but not least,
his resolute action--considerably enhanced his authority with the
wide circles of Liberal Democracy and with the officers. Even the
Revolutionary Democracy within the Army, stunned and depressed as it
was by the tragic turn of events, saw in Kornilov, for some time after
the _débâcle_, the last resource and the only possible remedy in the
desperate position. It may be stated that the date of July 8th, on
which Kornilov took command of the South-Western Front and addressed
his first demand to the Provisional Government, sealed his fate: in
the eyes of many people he became a national hero and great hopes were
centred upon him--he was expected to save the country.
During my stay at Minsk I was not very well informed of the unofficial
tidings prevailing in military circles, yet I felt that the centre
of moral influence had moved to Berditchev (Headquarters of the
South-Western Front). Kerensky and Brussilov had somehow suddenly
receded to the background. A new method of administration was put
into practice: we received from Kornilov's Headquarters copies of
his "demands" or notices of some strong and striking decision he had
adopted, and in a few days these were repeated from Petrograd or from
the Stavka, but in the shape of an order or of a regulation.
The tragedy of July undoubtedly had a sobering effect upon the men. In
the first place, they were ashamed because things had happened that
were so shameful and so disgraceful that even the dormant conscience
and the deadened spirit of the men could not find excuses for these
happenings. Several months later, in November, after fleeing from
the captivity of Bykhov, I spent several days under an assumed name
and in civilian clothes among the soldiers who had flooded all the
railways. They were discussing the past. I never heard a single man
confessing openly or cynically his participation in the treachery of
July. They all tried to explain away the matter and chiefly attributed
it to somebody's treason, especially, of course, the treason of the
officers. None spoke of his own treachery. In the second place, the men
were frightened. They felt that a kind of power, a kind of authority
had arisen, and they were quietly waiting for developments. Lastly,
operations had ended and nervous tension had been relieved--which
caused a certain reaction, apathy and indifference. _This was the
second occasion (the first took place in March) on which, had the
moment been immediately and properly taken advantage of--it might have
been the turning point in the history of the Russian Revolution._
As the sounds were dying out of the last shots fired at the Front, the
men who had been stunned by the disaster began to recover their senses.
Kerensky was the first to return to sanity. The horror had passed away,
the nerve-wrecking, maddening fear which had prompted the issue of
the first stringent order. Kerensky's will-power was dominated by his
fear of the Soviet, of the danger of definitely losing all prestige
with the Revolutionary Democracy by resentment against Kornilov for
the resolute tone of the latter's messages and by the shadow of the
potential dictator. The drafts of military regulations by which it
was intended to restore the power of the Commanding Officers and of
the Army were drowned in red tape and in the turmoil of personal
conflicts, suspicions and hatreds. The Revolutionary Democracy once
again sternly opposed the new course, as it interpreted this course
as an infringement upon the liberties and as a menace to its own
existence. The same attitude was adopted by the Army Committees, whose
powers were to be curtailed as a first step in the proposed changes. In
these circles the new course was described as counter-revolutionary.
The masses of the soldiery, on the other hand, soon appraised the
new situation. They saw that stern words were mere words, that
capital punishment was only a bogy, because there was no real force
capable of mastering their arbitrariness. So fear vanished again. The
hurricane did not clear the close and tense atmosphere. New clouds were
overhanging and peals of a new deafening thunder were to be heard in
the distance.
[Illustration: General Kornilov's arrival at Petrograd.]
[Illustration: General Kornilov in the trenches.]