"Captain Benteen was some six miles from the scene of action when

he received Lieut. Cooke's note; he had no intimation that the

battle had begun, of the force of the Indians, or plan of attack.

Benteen pushed ahead; the packs followed, and not until he reached

the high bluffs over-looking the river valley and near to where the

troops afterwards were besieged did he know of the battle or

immediate presence of the troops to the enemy; he could only hear

occasional shots, not enough to intimate that a battle was going

on. Soon after reaching this point two volleys were heard down the

river where Gen. Custer was, but his force was not in sight. Soon

after this Reno and Benteen joined. By accident Benteen's column

constituted a reserve. It was well it was so. As soon as

dispositions were made on the bluff, Weir's company was sent to

look for Gen. Custer. He went to a high point about three-quarters

of a mile down the river, from which he had a good view of the

country. From it could be seen Custer's battle field, but there was

nothing to indicate the result. The field was covered with Indians.

He was recalled from the place; the packs closed up; ammunition was

issued and the command moved down the river to, if possible, join

Custer. Upon reaching this high point we could see nothing, hear

nothing, to indicate Custer's vicinage. But immediately the Indians

started for us."

The following is the narrative of George Herndon, a scout, published in

the _New York Herald_:--

"At 11 P.M., June 24th, Custer followed the scouts up the

right-hand fork of the Rosebud. About daylight we went into camp,

made coffee, and soon after it was light the scouts brought Custer

word that they had seen the village from the top of a divide that

separates the Rosebud from Little Big Horn River. We moved up the

creek until near its head, and concealed ourselves in a ravine. It

was about three miles from the head of the creek where we then were

to the top of the divide where the Indian scouts said the village

could be seen, and after hiding his command, General Custer with a

few orderlies galloped forward to look at the Indian camp. In about

an hour he returned, and said he could not see the Indian village,

but the scouts and a half-breed guide said they could distinctly

see it some 15 miles off. Custer had 'officers' call' blown, gave

his orders, and the command was put in fighting order. The scouts

were ordered forward, and the regiment moved at a walk. After going

about three miles the scouts reported Indians ahead, and the

command then took the trail.

"Our way lay down a little creek, a branch of the Little Big Horn,

and after going some six miles we discovered an Indian lodge ahead

and Custer bore down on it at a stiff trot. In coming to it we

found ourselves in a freshly-abandoned Indian camp, all the lodges

of which were gone except the one we saw, and on entering it we

found it contained a dead Indian. From this point we could see into

the Little Big Horn valley, and observed heavy clouds of dust

rising about five miles distant. Many thought the Indians were

moving away, and I think Custer believed so, for he sent word to

Reno, who was ahead, to push on the scouts rapidly and head for the

dust. Reno took a steady gallop down the creek bottom three miles

to where it emptied into the Little Big Horn, and found a natural

ford across Little Big Horn River. He started to cross, when the

scouts came back and called out to him to hold on, that the Sioux

were coming in large numbers to meet him. He crossed over, however,

formed his companies on the prairie in line of battle, and moved

forward at a trot, but soon took a gallop.

"The valley was about three-fourths of a mile wide. On the left a

line of low, round hills, and on the right the river bottom,

covered with a growth of cottonwood trees and bushes. After

scattering shots were fired from the hills and a few from the river

bottom, and Reno's skirmishers had returned the shots, he advanced

about a mile from the ford, to a line of timber on the right, and

dismounted his men to fight on foot. The horses were sent into the

timber, and the men formed on the prairies and advanced toward the

Indians. The Indians, mounted on ponies, came across the prairies

and opened a heavy fire on the soldiers. After skirmishing for a

few minutes Reno fell back to his horses in the timber. The Indians

moved to his left and rear, evidently with the intention of cutting

him off from the ford. Reno ordered his men to mount and move

through the timber. Just as the men got into the saddle the Sioux,

who had advanced in the timber, fired at close range and killed one

soldier. Reno then commanded the men to dismount, and they did so;

but he soon ordered them to mount again and moved out on the open

prairie. The command headed for the ford, pressed closely by

Indians in large numbers, and at every moment the rate of speed

was increased, until it became a dead run for the ford. The Sioux,

mounted on their swift ponies, dashed up by the side of the

soldiers and fired at them, killing both men and horses. Little

resistance was offered, and it was a complete route to the ford.

"I did not see the men at the ford, and do not know what took place

further than a good many were killed when the command left the

timber. Just as I got out my horse stumbled and fell, and I was

dismounted--the horse running away after Reno's command. I saw

several soldiers who were dismounted, their horses having been

killed or having run away. There were also some soldiers mounted

who had remained behind. In all there was as many as 13 men, three

of whom were wounded. Seeing no chance to get away, I called on

them to come into the timber and we would stand off the Indians.

They wanted to go out, but I said 'No, we can't get to the ford,

and, besides, we have wounded men and must stand by them.' They

still wanted to go, but I told them I was an old frontiersman,

understood Indians, and, if they would do as I said, I would get

them out of the scrape, which was no worse than scrapes I had been

in before. About half of the men were mounted, and they wanted to

keep their horses with them; but I told them to let them go, and

fight on foot. We stayed in the bush about three hours, and I could

hear heavy firing below in the river, apparently about two miles

distant. I did not know who it was, but knew the Indians were

fighting some of our men, and learned afterward it was Custer's

command. Nearly all the Indians in the upper end of the valley drew

off down the river, and the fight with Custer lasted about one

hour, when the heavy firing ceased.

"When the shooting below began to die away I said to the boys,

'Come, now is the time to get out; the Indians will come back, and

we had better be off at once.' Eleven of the 13 said they would go,

but two staid behind. I deployed the men as skirmishers, and we

moved forward on foot toward the river. When we had got nearly to

the river we met five Indians on ponies, and they fired on us. I

returned the fire and the Indians broke, and we forded the river,

the water being breast-deep. We finally got over, wounded men and

all, and headed for Reno's command, which I could see drawn up on

the bluffs along the river about a mile off. We reached Reno in

safety. We had not been with Reno more than 15 minutes when I saw

the Indians coming up the valley from Custer's fight. Reno was

then moving his whole command down the ridge toward Custer. The

Indians crossed the river below Reno and swarmed up the bluff on

all sides. After skirmishing with them Reno went back to his old

position which was on one of the highest points along the bluffs.

It was now about 5 P.M., and the fight lasted until it was too dark

to see to shoot. As soon as it was dark, Reno took the packs and

saddles off the mules and horses and made breastworks of them. He

also dragged the dead horses and mules on the line and sheltered

the men behind them. Some of the men dug rifle pits with their

butcher knives and all slept on their arms.

"At the peep of day the Indians opened a heavy fire and a desperate

fight ensued, lasting until 10 A.M. The Indians charged our

position three or four times, coming up close enough to hit our men

with stones, which they threw by hand. Captain Benteen saw a large

mass of Indians gathering on his front to charge, and ordered his

men to charge on foot and scatter them. Benteen led the charge, and

was upon the Indians before they knew what they were about and

killed a great many. They were evidently surprised at this

offensive movement. I think in desperate fighting Benteen is one of

the bravest men I ever saw. All the time he was going about through

the bullets, encouraging the soldiers to stand up to their work and

not let the Indians whip them. He never sheltered his own person

once during the battle, and I do not see how he escaped being

killed. The desperate charging and fighting was at about 1 P.M.,

but firing was kept up on both sides until late in the afternoon.

"I think the Indian village must have contained about 6,000 people,

fully 3,000 of whom were warriors. The Indians fought Reno first

and then went to fight Custer, after which they came back to finish

Reno. Hordes of squaws and old, gray-haired Indians were roaming

over the battle-field howling like mad. The squaws had stone

mallets, and mashed in the skulls of the dead and wounded. Our men

did not kill any squaws, but the Ree Indian scouts did. The bodies

of six squaws were found in the little ravine. The Indians must

have lost as many men in killed and wounded as the whites did."

CHAPTER VII.

KILL EAGLE'S NARRATIVE.

A vivid account of Custer's last battle has been given by an Indian

named Kill Eagle, who was in Sitting Bull's village on the day of the

fight as, he claims, a non-combatant. Kill Eagle was head chief of the

Cheyenne River Agency Indians who had become much dissatisfied. Capt.

Poland, formerly commander of the troops at Standing Rock, says that the

Indians there were "abominably starved during the winter and spring of

1875--the authorities having failed to deliver the rations due them; and

in May and June 1876, the Indians received practically nothing except

two issues of beef and ground corn, called meal, but so coarse that one

peck yielded but a quart of meal."

Early in May, Kill Eagle entered the military post with a party of

warriors, gave a dance, demanded rations, and proclaimed "that he owned

the land the post was built on, the timber and stone which had been used

in its construction, and that he would have the Great Father pay for all

these things; that his people were starving and they could get no food

from the agent." The post commander told them he could do nothing for

them. Kill Eagle's party manifested sulliness, and demonstrated their

defiance by firing off pistols in the air as they marched outside of

the garrison. A few days later the post commander was informed that

Kill Eagle had started for the hostile camp with about thirty lodges.

In September, Kill Eagle came near the post and sent word that he

intended to kill all the soldiers unless they crossed the river. The

troops were under arms all night anticipating an attack, but none was

made. Subsequently Kill Eagle surrendered to the authorities, and gave

them an account of his wanderings during the summer. A letter written at

Standing Rock described his story as follows:--

"He commences with the date at which he left this agency, last

spring, with 26 lodges, for the purpose of hunting buffalo and

trading with the hostile Indians. He speaks of having heard reports

that troops were going out to punish the hostiles, but thought he

would have time to do his hunting and trading and get out of the

way before a battle occurred. They were obliged to hunt, as they

were starving at the agency, and were very successful.

"On the seventh day they arrived at Sitting Bull's village, where a

feast and numerous presents of ponies and robes were given them.

Efforts were made to induce Kill Eagle and his band to join in the

contemplated movements and hostilities, but evidently without much

success. They were desirous of getting back again to the protecting

arms of their agency, but were unable to escape from the meshes of

the wily Sitting Bull. They found, too late, that for them there

was no escape; their horses were either shot or stolen, and wounds

and insults were showered upon them from every side. In the

meantime the forces of Crook were approaching, and with his people

Kill Eagle succeeded in escaping temporarily from the hostiles. He

claims to have been distant some forty or fifty miles from the

scene of the Rosebud fight, and relates many of the incidents which

he was able subsequently to gather from the participants. He places

the loss of the Indians in the Rosebud fight at four dead, left on

the field, and twelve that were brought to camp. He places the

wounded at as high as 400, and says they had 180 horses killed,

besides those that were captured.

"He next comes to the fight on the Little Big Horn, and describes

the Indian village, which was six miles long and one wide. He then

speaks of Custer's approach and fight with its tragic details as an

unwilling spectator, rather than a participant, who, during its

progress, remained quietly in his lodge in the centre of the Indian

village. The fight with Reno commenced about noon, the Indians all

rushing to oppose his advance, until the approach of Custer toward

the lower end of the village was announced, when the wildest

confusion prevailed throughout the camp. Lodges were struck and

preparations made for instant flight. Vast numbers of Indians left

Reno's front and hastened to the assistance of their red brethren

engaged with Custer, who was steadily forced back and surrounded

until all were swept from the field by the repeated charges of the

Indians.

"He described the firing at this point as simply terrific, and

illustrated its force by clapping his hands together with great

rapidity and regularity. Then came a lull in the fearful storm of

iron hail and his hands were still again. The storm beat fast and

furious as the thought of some loved one nerved the arm of each

contending trooper. Then the movement of his hands slackened and

gradually grew more feeble. A few scattering shakes, like the rain

upon a window pane, and then the movement ceased as the last of

Custer's band of heroes went down with the setting sun.

"It was dusk as the successful combatants returned to camp littered

with their dead and wounded. 'We have killed them all,' they said,

'put up your lodges where they are.' They had just began to fix

their lodges that evening, when a report came that troops were

coming from toward the mouth of the creek. When this report came,

after dark, the lodges were all taken down and they started up the

creek. 'I told my men,' says Kill Eagle, 'to keep together, and we

would try and get away. Some one told on me, and they said let us

kill him and his band, we have lost many young men to-day, and our

hearts are bad. We travelled all night and next day; after crossing

the Greasy Grass we encamped near the foot of the White Mountains.

That night, when I was asleep, I heard a man calling. I woke up my

people and this man proved to be a Cheyenne Indian, belonging to a

party that had been off on the war-path in the White Mountains.'

"It was not to the Indians a bloodless victory. Fourteen had fallen

in front of Reno, thirty-nine went down with Custer, and fourteen

were dead in camp. Horses and travoises were laden with their

wounded on every hand and in countless numbers. One band alone of

Ogallallas had twenty-seven wounded on travoises, and thirty-eight

thrown across horses. There were no white men in the fight or on

the field. The bugle calls were sounded by an Indian. No prisoners

were taken. The troops were all killed on the east side; none

crossed the river."

Little Buck-Elk, an Uncapapa chief who came into Fort Peck in September,

said that he was present at the fight with Custer, and that eleven

different tribes were engaged in it. "The Indians were as thick as bees

at the fight, and there were so many of them that they could not all

take part in it. The soldiers were all brave men and fought well; some

of them, when they found themselves surrounded and overpowered, broke

through the lines and tried to make their escape, but were pursued and

killed miles from the battle ground. The Indians captured six battle

flags. No soldiers were taken alive, but after the fight the women went

among the dead bodies and robbed and mutilated them. There were plenty

of watches and money taken, which the young warriors are wearing in

their shirts and belts."

CHAPTER VIII.

AN ATTACK IN THE REAR.

Major Reno's conduct on the first day of the fighting on the Little Big

Horn, has been severely criticised by several of Gen. Custer's personal

friends; and one of them, Gen T.L. Rosser, in a letter addressed to Reno

and published in the _Army and Navy Journal_, blames him for taking to

the timber when his "loss was little or nothing." "You had," he says,

"an open field for cavalry operations, and I believe that if you had

remained in the saddle and charged boldly into the village, the shock

upon the Indians would have been so great that they would have been

compelled to withdraw their attacking force from Custer, who, when

relieved, could have pushed his command through to open ground, where he

could have manoeuvred his command, and thus greatly have increased his

chances of success." It would seem as if this and similar criticisms

were sufficiently answered by Reno's report; and by his reply to Rosser,

which is given in part below:--

"After reading all your letter I could no longer look upon it as a

tribute of a generous enemy, since through me you had attacked as

brave officers as ever served a government, and with the same

recklessness and ignorance of circumstances as Custer is charged

with in his attacks upon the hostile Indians. Both charges--the one

made against him and the one made by you against us--are equally

untrue, You say:--'I feel Custer would have succeeded had Reno,

with all the reserve of seven companies, passed through and joined

Custer after the first repulse;' and after confessing that you are

firing at long range say further: 'I think it quite certain that

Custer had agreed with Reno upon a place of junction in case of the

repulse of either or both detachments; and, instead of an effort

being made by Reno for such a junction, as soon as he encountered

heavy resistance he took refuge in the hills and abandoned Custer

and his gallant comrades to their fate.

"As I shall show, both the premises are false, and consequently all

the conclusions of your letter fall to the ground. * * * The only

official orders I had from Custer were about five miles from the

village, when Cooke gave me his orders in these words: 'Custer says

to move at as rapid a gait as you think prudent, and to charge

afterwards, and you will be supported by the whole outfit.'

"No mention of any plan, no thought of junction, only the usual

orders to the advance guard to attack by the charge. When the enemy

was reached I moved to the front at a fast trot, and at the river

halted ten minutes or less to gather the battalion. I sent word to

Custer that I had the enemy in my front very strong, and then

charged, driving the reds before me about three miles or less, to

within a short distance of their village, supposing my command,

consisting of 120 officers and men and about 25 scouts and guards,

followed by the columns under Custer. The stream was very crooked,

like a letter S in its wanderings, and on the side on which the

village was it opened out into a broad bottom, perhaps half or

three-quarters of a mile wide. The stream was fringed, as usual,

with the trees of the plains--a growth of large cottonwood, and on

the opposite side was a range of high bluffs which had been cut

into very deep ravines.

"As I neared the village the Indians came out in great numbers, and

I was soon convinced I had at least ten to one against me, and was

forced on the defensive. This I accomplished by taking possession

of a point of woods where I found shelter for my horses. I fought

there dismounted, and made my way to within 200 yards of the

village, and firmly believe that if, at that moment, the seven

companies had been together the Indians could have been driven from

their village. As we approached near their village they came out in

overwhelming numbers, and soon the small command would have been

surrounded on all sides, to prevent which I mounted and charged

through them to a position I could hold with the few men I had.

"You see by this I was the advance and the first to be engaged and

draw fire, and was consequently the command to be supported, and

not the one from which support could be expected. All I know of

Custer from the time he ordered me to attack till I saw him buried,

is that he did not follow my trail, but kept on his side of the

river and along the crest of the bluffs on the opposite side from

the village and from my command; that he heard and saw my action I

believe, although I could not see him; and it is just here that the

Indians deceived us. All this time I was driving them with ease,

and his trail shows he moved rapidly down the river for three miles

to the ford, at which he attempted to cross into their village, and

with the conviction that he would strike a a retreating enemy.

Trumpeter Martin, of Co. H, who the last time of any living person

heard and saw Gen. Custer, and who brought the last order his

adjutant ever penciled, says he left the General at the summit of

the highest bluff on that side, and which overlooked the village

and my first battle-field, and as he turned, Gen. Custer raised his

hat and gave a yell, saying they were asleep in their tepees and

surprised, and to charge. * * *

"The Indians made him over confident by appearing to be stampeded,

and, undoubtedly, when he arrived at the ford, expecting to go with

ease through their village, he rode into an ambuscade of at least

2,000 reds. My getting the command of the seven companies was not

the result of any order or prearranged plan. Benteen and McDougal

arrived separately, and saw the command on the bluffs and came to

it. They did not go into the bottom at all after the junction. They

attempted to go down the trail of Gen. Custer, but the advance

company soon sent back word they were being surrounded. Crowds of

reds were seen on all sides of us, and Custer's fate had evidently

been determined. I knew the position I had first taken on the bluff

was near and a strong one. I at once moved there, dismounted, and

herded the pack train, and had but just time to do so when they

came upon me by thousands. Had we been twenty minutes later

effecting the junction not a man of that regiment would be living

to-day to tell the tale."

Another writer attacks both Reno and Benteen, accusing one of incapacity

and utter demoralization during the attack of the Indians, and the other

of wilful disobedience. "That he (Benteen) should have, as his own

testimony confesses, deliberately disobeyed the _peremptory order of

Custer_ to 'Come on,' argues either a desire to sacrifice Custer, or an

ignorance of which his past career renders him incapable. Custer told

him to 'Come on,' and he reported to Reno." In order, as he says, to

"vindicate the reputation of a noble man from unjust aspersions," this

writer further declares, that "had Reno fought as Custer fought, and had

Benteen obeyed Custer's orders, the battle of the Little Big Horn might

have proved Custer's last and greatest Indian victory."

Of the writer last quoted, the _Army and Navy Journal_ says:--"With

reckless pen he thrusts right and left, careless of reputations,

regardless of facts, darkening the lives of other men, in the vain hope

that one name may shine more brightly on the page of history * * *

Nothing but the most absolute demonstration, accompanied by the proof,

would justify such statements as he has made, and this he has not given.

The reports of anonymous newspaper correspondents, and an _ex parte_

statement of the conclusions drawn from letters, of which we have not so

much as the names of the writers, is not proof on which to base

criticisms affecting character and reputation."

Capt. Benteen, Brevet Colonel U.S.A., who has been a captain in the 7th

Cavalry since its organization in 1866, at which date Gen. Custer was

appointed its Lieut. Colonel, in a letter to the _Army and Navy Journal_

uses the following language:--

"Col. Reno and I thought during the siege of June 25th and 26th, at the

Little Big Horn, that he, Reno, was the abandoned party, and spoke of it

as another 'Major Elliot[B] affair'; thinking that General Custer had

retreated to the mouth of the river, where the steamboat was supposed to

be, and that Reno's command was left to _its_ fate. I am accused of

disobeying Custer's orders. Nothing is further from the truth in point

of fact; and I do not think the matter of sufficient importance to

attempt to vindicate myself, but can rest contentedly under the ban when

I have the consoling belief that the contrary is so well known by all my

military superiors and comrades."

[B] Major Joel H. Elliot of the 7th Cavalry, and 19 of his command,

were missing after the Battle of the Washita in Nov., 1868. Their

dead bodies were found some weeks later.

Lieut. Gen. Sheridan, in his report for 1876, expresses his views of the

Custer disaster as follows:--

"As much has been said in regard to the misfortune that occurred to

General Custer and the portion of his regiment under his immediate

command in this action, I wish to express the conviction I have

arrived at concerning it. From all the information that has reached

me, I am led to believe that the Indians were not aware of the

proximity of Custer until he had arrived within about eight or nine

miles of their village, and that then their scouts who carried the

intelligence back to the valley were so closely followed up by

Custer, that he arrived on the summit of the divide overlooking the

upper portion of the village, almost as soon as the scouts reached

it. As soon as the news was given, the Indians began to strike

their lodges and get their women and children out of the way--a

movement they always make under such circumstances. Custer, seeing

this, believed the village would escape him if he awaited the

arrival of the four companies of his regiment--still some miles in

his rear. Only about 75 or 100 lodges or tepees could be seen from

the summit or divide, and this, probably, deceived him as to the

extent of the village. He therefore directed Major Reno, with three

companies, to cross the river and charge the village, while he,

with the remaining five companies, would gallop down the east bank

of the river behind the bluff and cut off the retreat of the

Indians. Reno crossed and attacked gallantly with his three

companies--about 110 men--but the warriors, leaving the women to

strike the lodges, fell on Reno's handful of men and drove them

back to and over the river with severe loss.

"About this time Custer reached a point about three and a half or

four miles down the river, but instead of finding a village of 75

or 100 lodges, he found one of perhaps from 1500 to 2000, and

swarming with warriors, who brought him to a halt. This, I think,

was the first intimation the Indians had of Custer's approach to

cut them off, for they at once left Reno and concentrated to meet

the new danger. The point where Custer reached the river, on the

opposite side of which was the village, was broken into choppy

ravines, and the Indians, crossing from Reno, got between the two

commands, and as Custer could not return, he fell back over the

broken ground with his tired men and tired horses (they had ridden

about 70 miles with but few halts) and became, I am afraid, an easy

prey to the enemy. Their wild, savage yells, overwhelming numbers,

and frightening war paraphernalia, made it as much as each trooper

could do to take care of his horse, thus endangering his own safety

and efficiency. If Custer could have reached any position

susceptible of defence, he could have defended himself; but none

offered itself in the choppy and broken ravines over which he had

to pass, and he and his command were lost without leaving any one

to tell the tale.

"As soon as Custer and his gallant officers and men were

exterminated and the scenes of mutilation by the squaws commenced,

the warriors returned to renew the attack upon Reno; but he had

been joined by Captain Benteen and the four companies of the

regiment that were behind when the original attack took place, and

the best use had been made of the respite given by the attack on

Custer, to entrench their position.

"Had the 7th Cavalry been kept together, it is my belief it would

have been able to handle the Indians on the Little Big Horn, and

under any circumstances it could have at least defended itself; but

separated as it was into three distinct detachments, the Indians

had largely the advantage in addition to their overwhelming

numbers. If Custer had not come upon the village so suddenly, the

warriors would have gone to meet him, in order to give time to the

women and children to get out of the way, as they did with Crook

only a few days before, and there would have been, as with Crook,

what might be designated a rearguard fight--a fight to get their

valuables out of the way, or in other words, to cover the escape of

their women, children and lodges."

CHAPTER IX.

THE MIDSUMMER CAMPAIGN.

After regaining his position at the mouth of the Big Horn River, Gen.

Terry called for reinforcements and additional troops were at once put

in motion for his camp; but as they had to be collected from all the

various stations on the frontier--some of them very remote from

railroads--considerable time elapsed before their arrival.

During this period, the bands which had broken off from the main body of

hostiles, and the young men at the agencies, continued their old and

well-known methods of warfare, stealing horses on the frontier and

killing small parties of citizens; while the constant communication by

the hostiles with the Indians at the agencies made it evident that

supplies of food and ammunition were being received. To prevent this,

Gen. Sheridan deemed it necessary that the military should control the

agencies, and at his request, the Secretary of the Interior, July 22d,

authorized the military to assume control of all the agencies in the

Sioux country.

About the same date Medicine Cloud, a chief, who had been sent from Fort

Peck, in May, with a message to Sitting Bull inviting him to visit Fort

Peck with a view to reconciliation, returned to the agency. To the

invitation, Sitting Bull had replied:--

"Tell him I am coming before long to his post to trade. Tell him I did

not commence. I am getting old, and I did not want to fight, but the

whites rush on me, and I am compelled to defend myself. But for the

soldiers stationed on the Rosebud, I with my people would have been

there before that. If I was assured of the protection of the Great

Father, I would go to Fort Peck for the purpose of making peace. I and

others want the Black Hills abandoned, and we will make peace."

While awaiting reinforcements, Generals Terry and Crook were separated

by about 100 miles of rough territory, the hostile Indians were between

them, and for reliable communication with each other it was necessary to

send around by the rear nearly 2000 miles. The carrying of dispatches

direct was a work of the most arduous and perilous nature, and in doing

it, and in reconnoitering, brave and gallant deeds were performed.

On the 6th of July, Gen. Crook sent out Lieut. Sibley of the 2nd Cavalry

with 25 mounted troops and two guides, Gerard and Baptiste, to

reconnoiter the country to the front, and learn if possible the

movements of the enemy and the whereabouts of Terry's division. The

party marched all night, and in the morning were near where the Little

Big Horn debouches from the mountains. Here, from an eminence, they

espied a large body of Indians marching eastward as though meditating an

attack on the camp at Goose Creek. Concealing themselves as well as they

could, they watched the movements of the enemy; but a great shout soon

warned them that their trail had been discovered, and hundreds of

savages immediately set out to follow it, uttering terrific cries.

The fugitives galloped toward the mountains, and seemed to outrun their

pursuers; but about noon, while going through a ravine, a sudden volley

was fired upon them from the surrounding slopes, and many Indians

charged down upon them. They wheeled, and took refuge in the woods, but

three horses were already wounded. Taking the ammunition from the

saddles, and leaving their horses tied to the trees to divert the enemy,

they now moved stealthily and unseen from the ground, and escaped behind

adjacent rocks; then they climbed over steep and slippery places till

exhausted, and while halting for a rest knew by the repeated firing that

their horses were undergoing an attack.

All that night they toiled among the mountains, and on the morning of

the 9th reached Tongue River. As they had left their rations behind,

they suffered much from hunger, and two of the men were so weak they

could not ford the deep stream, and remained behind. When near the camp

one of the guides went ahead for assistance, and a company of cavalry

brought in the exhausted men.

Having urgent occasion to communicate with Gen. Crook, Gen. Terry, by

the promise of a large reward, induced a professional scout to make an

attempt to reach him, but he soon returned unsuccessful. No other scout

would undertake the task, and as a last resort a call for volunteers was

made, in response to which, 12 soldiers promptly offered their services

for the hazardous duty without hope of pecuniary reward. Three of these,

Privates Wm. Evans, Benjamin F. Stewart, and Joseph Bell, of the 17th

Infantry, were selected. They set out on the 9th of July, reached

Crook's camp on the 12th; and returned on the 25th accompanied by three

Crow Indians who had arrived from Terry's camp on the 19th. The three

soldiers were thanked by their commander, in a General Order, "for a

deed reflecting so much credit on the Service."

Partial reinforcements having reached Gen. Crook, on the 16th of July he

broke camp and moved gradually along the hills toward Tongue River. On

the 3d of August, just before sunset, an additional regiment, the 5th

Cavalry, ten companies, under Col. W. Merritt, "marched into camp with

their supply wagons close on their heels, presenting a fine appearance,

despite the fatigue and dust of the march."

Gen. Crook's fighting force now numbered about 2000 men. Among them were

over 200 Shoshone and Ute Indians, sworn enemies to the Sioux, led by

Washakie, a well known Shoshone chief. These Indians were thus spoken of

by a correspondent who saw them at Fort Bridger, drawn up in line before

starting to join Gen. Crook:--

"In advance of the party was a swarthy temporary chief, his face

covered with vertical white streaks. In his right hand, hanging to

the end of a window-blind rod, were the two fingers of a dead

Sioux. Another rod had a white flag nailed to it--a precaution

necessary to preserve them from being fired upon in proceeding to

the seat of war. The faces of the rest had on a plentiful supply of

war paint. Once in line, they struck up a peculiar grunting sound

on a scale of about five notes. One of the braves, afflicted with a

malady peculiar to the Caucasian race, began to brag what he'd do

when he got to the seat of war, winding up in broken English, 'Me

little mad now; bime by me heap mad.' Old Washakie, their chief,

wants to die in battle, and not in bed."

On the 5th of Aug., Gen. Crook cut loose from his wagon trains and

started in pursuit of the Indians who, it was ascertained, had left the

foot of the Big Horn Mountains, July 25th, and moved eastward. His route

was north-easterly, across the Panther Mountains to Rosebud River. On

the 8th of Aug. the troops were ten miles north of the battle-ground of

June 17th, and near the site of a deserted village. The country west of

the Rosebud had been burned over, and a trail recently traveled by large

numbers of Indians led down the valley. Upon this trail the march was

continued.

Meantime, Gen. Terry had been reinforced by six companies of the 5th

Infantry under Col. Nelson A. Miles, six companies of the 22d Infantry

under Lt. Col. Otis, and other detachments, until his command numbered

about the same as Gen. Crook's. On the 25th of July, he started for the

mouth of the Rosebud and there established a base of operations. On the

8th of Aug., with his troops and a train of 225 wagons with supplies for

30 days, he moved down the west bank of the Rosebud; and on the 10th,

when 35 miles from its mouth, made a junction with Crook's command. Col.

Miles with the 5th Infantry was sent back to the mouth of the Rosebud to

patrol the Yellowstone, aided by steamboats, and intercept the Indians

should they attempt to cross the river.

The trail which Gen. Crook had been following now turned from the

Rosebud eastward, and its pursuit was promptly and steadily continued by

the united forces. It led the troops across to Powder River and down its

valley. On the 17th of August they were encamped near the mouth of

Powder River, on both sides of the stream; and here the two commands

separated on the 24th of August.

As the principal Indian trail had turned eastward toward the Little

Missouri, Gen. Crook's column took up the pursuit in that direction. On

the 5th of Sept, when on the headwaters of Heart River, a small party

of Indians were discovered going eastward,--the first hostile Indians

seen since leaving Tongue River.

The trail had now scattered so that it could be followed no longer, and

Crook decided to push for the Black Hills settlements. His troops were

nearly out of food, and suffering from want of clothing, and bad

weather. Cold rains prevailed, and camp life with no tents, few

blankets, and half rations, bore hard on the soldiers. Meat was scarce

and some of the horses were killed to supply food.

On the 7th of Sept., Capt. Anson Mills with 150 men and a pack-train,

was sent ahead with directions to obtain food at the Black Hills

settlements about 100 miles distant, and to return to the hungry column

as soon as possible. Gerard, the scout, accompanied the detachment, and

on the evening of the 8th, he discovered a hostile village of 40 lodges

and several hundred ponies. Capt. Mills retreated a few miles, hid his

men in a ravine, and at daybreak next morning dashed into the village.

The Indians were completely surprised and fled to the surrounding hills,

from which they exchanged shots with their assailants. The lodges were

secured, with their contents consisting of large quantities of dried

meat and other food, robes, and flags and clothing taken from Custer and

his men. 140 ponies were also among the spoils.

A small party of the Indians had taken possession of a narrow ravine or

canyon near the village, and in trying to dislodge them several soldiers

were wounded. By direction of Gen. Crook, who had reached the field with

reinforcements, the Indians in the ravine were informed that if they

would surrender they would not be harmed. An old squaw was the first to

take advantage of the offer, and was followed by 15 women and children,

and, lastly, by three warriors, one of whom, the chief American Horse,

had been mortally wounded.

Later in the day, before the troops had left the village, the Indians

appeared in force and began a vigorous attack. Infantry were at once

thrown out along the slope of the bluffs and, "about sundown it was a

very inspiring sight to see this branch of the command with their long

Springfield breech-loaders drive the enemy for a mile and a half to the

west, and behind the castellated rocks." The captives in camp said the

attacking Indians were reinforcements from the camp of Crazy Horse

further west. This engagement is known as the battle of Slim Buttes. Our

losses during the day were three killed, and 11 wounded including Lieut.

Von Leuttroitz.

During the march of Sept. 10th a number of Indians came down on the

rear, but were repulsed with a loss of several killed and wounded. Three

soldiers were wounded in this skirmish.

The remainder of this long and difficult march was successfully

accomplished. On the 16th, Gen. Crook reached Deadwood, a Black Hills

settlement, and was cordially received by the inhabitants. In a speech

made by the General on this occasion, he said:--

"Citizens: while you welcome me and my personal staff as the

representatives of the soldiers who are here encamped upon the

Whitewood, let me ask you, when the rank and file pass through

here, to show that you appreciate their admirable fortitude in

bearing the sufferings of a terrible march almost without a murmur,

and to show them that they are not fighting for $13 per month, but

for the cause--the proper development of our gold and other mineral

resources, and of humanity. This exhibition of your gratitude need

not be expensive. Let the private soldier feel that he is

remembered by our people as the real defender of his country."

After parting with Gen. Crook, Aug. 24th, Gen. Terry crossed the

Yellowstone and marched down its left bank, his object being to

intercept the Indians Crook was following if they attempted to cross the

river. On the 27th he left the river, and moved northerly into the

buffalo range where hunting parties were detailed who secured

considerable game. The country was parched, the small streams dry, and

water scarce. A scouting party made a detour to the north and west, but

no Indians could be found. On the 5th of Sept. the whole command was at

the mouth of Glendive Creek, where a military post had been established.

Gen. Terry now decided to close the campaign and distribute his troops

to their winter quarters. The Montana column under Col. Gibbon started

on the return march to Fort Ellis, 400 miles distant; Lieut. Col. Otis

of the 22d Infantry, with his command, remained at Glendive Creek, to

build a stockade and co-operate with Col. Miles, who was establishing a

winter post at the mouth of Tongue River; and Gen. Terry with the

balance of the troops started for Fort Buford at the mouth of the

Yellowstone.

Hearing that Sitting Bull with a large band had recently crossed to the

north side of the Missouri River near Fort Peck, Terry sent Reno with

troops--then en route to Fort Buford--in pursuit. Reno marched to Fort

Peck, and thence to Fort Buford, but encountered no Indians. A

reconnoitering party under Long Dog had been near Fort Peck, and that

chief passed one night at the agency. They did not want rations or

annuities, but desired plenty of ammunition, for which they were ready

to exchange 7th Cavalry horses, arms and equipments.

CHAPTER X.

AUTUMN ON THE YELLOWSTONE.

On the 10th of October, as a train escorted by two companies of the 6th

Infantry was carrying supplies from Glendive Creek to the cantonment at

the mouth of Tongue River, it was attacked by Indians, and was obliged

to return to Glendive with a loss of sixty mules.

Lieut. Col. Otis was in command at Glendive, and on the 14th he again

started out the train and personally accompanied it. The train consisted

of 86 wagons, 41 of which were driven by soldiers, who had taken the

places of as many citizen teamsters too demoralized by the recent attack

to continue in the service. The military escort numbered with officers

196 men. The following interesting narrative of subsequent events is

from the report of Col. Otis:--

"We proceeded on the first day 12 miles, and encamped on the broad

bottom of the Yellowstone River, without discovering a sign of the

presence of Indians. During the night a small thieving party was

fired upon by the pickets, but the party escaped, leaving behind a

single pony, with its trappings, which was killed. At dawn of day,

upon the 15th, the train pulled out in two strings, and proceeded

quietly to Spring Creek, distant from camp about three miles, when

I directed two mounted men to station themselves upon a hill beyond

the creek, and watch the surrounding country until the train should

pass through the defile. The men advanced at swift pace in proper

direction, and when within 50 yards of the designated spot, they

received a volley from a number of concealed Indians, when

suddenly men and Indians came leaping down the bluff. The men

escaped without injury to person, although their clothing was

riddled with bullets. I quickly advanced on the skirmish line,

which drove out 40 or 50 Indians, and making a similar movement on

the opposite flank, passed through the gorge and gained the high

table land. Here, three or four scouts, sent out by Colonel Miles,

from Tongue River, joined us. They had been driven into the Tongue

upon the previous evening, there corraled, had lost their horses

and one of their number, and escaped to the bluffs under cover of

the darkness. The dead scout was found and buried.

"The train proceeded along the level prairie, surrounded by the

skirmish line, and the Indians were coming thick and fast from the

direction of Cabin Creek. But few shots were exchanged, and both

parties were preparing for the struggle which it was evident would

take place at the deep and broken ravine at Clear Creek, through

which the train must pass. We cautiously entered the ravine, and

from 150 to 200 Indians had gained the surrounding bluffs to our

left; signal fires were lighted for miles around, and extended far

away on the opposite side of the Yellowstone. The prairies to our

front were fired, and sent up vast clouds of smoke. We had no

artillery, and nothing remained to us except to charge the bluffs.

Company C, of the 17th Infantry, and Company H, of the 22d

Infantry, were thrown forward upon the run, and gallantly scaled

the bluffs, answering the Indian yell with one equally as

barbarous, and driving back the enemy to another ridge of hills. We

then watered all the stock at the creek, took on water for the men,

and the train slowly ascended the bluffs.

"The country now surrounding us was broken. The Indians continued

to increase in numbers, surrounded the train, and the entire escort

became engaged. The train was drawn up in four strings, and the

entire escort enveloped it by a thin skirmish line. In that

formation we advanced, the Indians pressing every point, especially

the rear, Company C, 17th, which was only able to follow by

charging the enemy, and then retreating rapidly toward the train,

taking advantage of all the knolls and ridges in its course. The

flanks, Companies G, 17th, and K and G, 22d, were advanced about

1000 yards, and the road was opened in the front, by Company H,

22d, by repeated charges.

"In this manner we advanced several miles, and then halted for the

night upon a depression of the high prairie, the escort holding the

surrounding ridge. The Indians now had attempted every artifice.

They had pressed every point of the line, had run their fires

through the train, which we were compelled to cross with great

rapidity, had endeavored to approach under cover of smoke, when

they found themselves overmatched by the officers and men, who,

taking advantage of the cover, moved forward and took them at close

range. They had met with considerable loss, a good many of their

saddles were emptied, and several ponies wounded. Their firing was

wild in the extreme, and I should consider them the poorest of

marksmen. For several hours they kept up a brisk fire and wounded

but three of our men.

"Upon the morning of the 16th, the train pulled out in four

strings, and we took up the advance, formed as on the previous day.

Many Indians occupied the surrounding hills, and soon a number

approached, and left a communication upon a distant hill. It was

brought in by Scout Jackson, and read as follows:--

"YELLOWSTONE."

"I want to know what you are doing traveling on this road? you

scare all the buffalo away. I want to hunt on the place. I want you

to turn back from here: if you don't I will fight you again. I want

you to leave what you have got here, and turn back from here.

"I am your friend, SITTING BULL.

"I mean all the rations you have got and some powder; I wish you

would write as soon as you can."

"I directed the Scout Jackson to inform the Indians that I had nothing

to say in reply, except that we intended to take the train through to

Tongue River, and that we should be pleased to accommodate them at any

time with a fight. The train continued to proceed, and about eight

o'clock the Indians began to gather for battle.

"We passed through the long, narrow gorge, near Bad Route Creek, when we

again watered the stock, and took in wood and water, consuming in this

labor about an hour's time. When we had pulled up the gentle ascent, the

Indians had again surrounded us, but the lesson of the previous day

taught them to keep at long range, and there was but little firing by

either party. I counted 150 Indians in our rear, and from their

movements and position I judged their numbers to be between 300 and

500. After proceeding a short distance, a flag of truce appeared on the

left flank, borne by two Indians, whom I directed to be allowed to enter

the lines. They proved to be Indian scouts from Standing Rock Agency,

bearing dispatches from Lieut. Col. Carlin, of the 17th Infantry,

stating that they had been sent out to find Sitting Bull, and to

endeavor to influence him to proceed to some military post and treat for

peace.

"These scouts informed me that they had that morning reached the camp of

Sitting Bull and Man-afraid-of-his-horse, near the mouth of Cabin Creek,

and that they had talked with Sitting Bull, who wished to see me outside

the lines. I declined the invitation, but professed a willingness to see

Sitting Bull within my own lines. The scouts left me, and soon returned

with three of the principal soldiers of Sitting Bull--the last named

individual being unwilling to trust his person within our reach. The

chiefs said that their people were angry because our train was driving

away the buffalo from their hunting grounds, that they were hungry and

without ammunition, and that they especially wished to obtain the

latter; that they were tired of war, and desired to conclude a peace.

"I informed them that I could not give them ammunition, that had they

saved the amount already wasted upon the train it would have supplied

them for hunting purposes for a long time, that I had no authority to

treat with them upon any terms whatever, but they were at liberty to

visit Tongue River, and there make known conditions. They wished to know

what assurance I could give them of their safety should they visit that

place, and I replied that I could give them nothing but the word of an

officer. They then wished rations for their people, promising to proceed

to Fort Rock immediately, and from thence to Tongue River. I declined to

give them rations, but finally offered them as a present 150lb. of hard

bread and two sides of bacon, which they gladly accepted. The train

moved on, and the Indians fell to the rear. Upon the following day I saw

a number of them from Cedar Creek, far away to the right, and after that

time they disappeared entirely.

"Upon the evening of the 18th I met Col. Miles encamped with his entire

regiment on Custer Creek. Alarmed for the safety of the train, he had

set out from Tongue River upon the previous day."

While Col. Otis was thus gallantly advancing with his train, Col. Miles,

of the 5th Infantry, fearing for its safety, had crossed the Yellowstone

before daybreak on the 17th and started toward Glendive. He met Col.

Otis, as above stated, on the evening of the 18th; and on being informed

of the attack on the train, started in pursuit of the enemy. On the

21st, when about eight miles beyond Cedar Creek, a large number of

Indians appeared in front of the column, and two of them, bearing a

white flag, rode up to the line. They proved to be the Standing Rock

ambassadors who had met Col. Otis; and brought word that Sitting Bull

wished a conference with Col. Miles. Lieut. H.R. Bailey accompanied the

two friendly Indians to the hostile camp, and there arranged with

Sitting Bull's white interpreter for a meeting to take place between the

lines.

The troops rested on their arms in line of battle while Col. Miles with

a few officers rode forward and halted about half way between the two

forces. Sitting Bull with a dozen unarmed warriors presently emerged

from the hostile lines and walked slowly forward in single file. Col.

Miles' party dismounted and advanced to meet them, and the council

began. The scene was picturesque and exciting; and the occasion one of

much anxiety to the troops who remembered the assassination of Gen.

Canby--especially so when dozens of armed warriors rode forward and

surrounded the little group.

The "talk" was long and earnest; the Indians wanted an "old-fashioned

peace," with privileges of trade--especially in ammunition, and demanded

the discontinuing of supply trains and the abandonment of Fort Buford.

Col. Miles explained that he could only accept surrender on the terms

of absolute submission to the U.S. Government. At evening the conference

was adjourned to the next day, and the parties separated as quietly as

they had assembled.

In the morning Col. Miles moved his command north, so as to intercept

retreat in that direction. At about 11 A.M., Sitting Bull, Pretty Bear,

Bull Eagle, John, Standing Bear, Gall, White Bull and others, came

forward, marching abreast, and met Col. Miles and several officers on a

knoll half way between the opposing lines. The Indians asked to be let

alone, and professed a wish for peace, but such a peace as Col. Miles

could not concede. "After much talk by the various chiefs, Sitting Bull

was informed once and for all that he must accept the liberal conditions

offered by the Government or prepare for immediate hostilities; and the

council dispersed--Sitting Bull disappearing like a shadow in the crowd

of warriors behind him."

"The scene," wrote a correspondent of the _Army and Navy Journal_,

"was now most animated. Col. Miles sent for his company commanders,

and they came charging over the field to receive his final

instructions. On the other side, the Sioux leaders rode hither and

thither at full speed in front of their line, marshaling their men

and haranguing them, calling on them to be brave. Sitting Bull's

interpreter, Bruey, rode back to ask why the troops were following

him? He was answered by Col. Miles, that the non-acceptance of the

liberal terms offered was considered an act of hostility, and he

would open fire at once. The whole line then advanced in skirmish

order. One company occupied a knoll on the left with the 3-inch

gun, the first shell from which was greeted with a hearty cheer

from the advancing line. The Indians tried their old tactics and

attempted rear and flank attacks from the ravines, but they found

those vital points well protected by companies disposed _en

potence_, which poured in a torrent of lead wherever an Indian

showed himself. The firing then became general along the whole

line. Some of the sharpest shooting was done by the Sioux, and many

officers only escaped "close calls" by the ends of their hair. Two

enlisted men were wounded. Finally, Sitting Bull, finding his old

plan of battle frustrated by that solid infantry skirmish line

advancing upon him with the relentless sternness of fate, began a

general and precipitate retreat."

The pursuit was resolutely kept up. The Indians fled down Bad Route

Creek and across the Yellowstone, a distance of 42 miles, abandoning

tons of dried meat, lodge-poles, camp equipments, ponies, etc. The

troops on foot followed rapidly, not stopping to count the dead or

gather the plunder; and the result was, that on the 27th of October five

principal chiefs surrendered themselves to Col. Miles, on the

Yellowstone, opposite the mouth of Cabin Creek, as hostages for the

surrender of their whole people, represented as between 400 and 500

lodges, equal to about 2,000 souls. The hostages were sent under escort

to Gen. Terry, at St. Paul, and the Indians were allowed five days in

their then camp to gather food, and thirty days to reach the Cheyenne

Agency on the Missouri River, where they were to surrender their arms

and ponies, and remain either as prisoners of war or subject to

treatment such as is usually accorded to friendly Indians.

Sitting Bull was not among the chiefs who surrendered; during the

retreat, they said, he had slipped out, with thirty lodges of his own

special followers, and gone northerly.

CHAPTER XI.

TERRY AND CROOK AT THE SIOUX AGENCIES.

The disarming and dismounting of the Sioux Agency Indians being deemed

necessary as a precautionary measure, to prevent the hostile Indians

from receiving constant supplies of arms, ammunition, and ponies from

their friends at the agencies, General Sheridan directed Generals Crook

and Terry to act simultaneously in accomplishing that object. The

friendly and unfriendly Indians at the agencies were so intermixed, that

it seemed impossible to discriminate between them.

After refitting at the Black Hills, Gen. Crook proceeded to the Red

Cloud Agency, and found the Indians there in a dissatisfied mood and

probably about to start to join the hostile bands. They had moved out

some 25 miles from the agency, and refused to return although informed

that no more rations would be given them till they did so.

At daylight, Oct. 22d, Col. Mackenzie, the post commander, with eight

companies of the 4th and 5th Cavalry, surrounded the Indian camp

containing 300 lodges, and captured Red Cloud and his whole band, men,

squaws and ponies without firing a shot, and marched them into the

agency dismounted and disarmed. The Indians at Spotted Tail Agency were

also disarmed and dismounted.

Gen. Crook had an interview with Spotted Tail, and being satisfied that

he was the only important Sioux leader who had remained friendly, he

deposed Red Cloud, and declared Spotted Tail, his rival, the "Sachem of

the whole Sioux Nation, by the grace of the Great Father the President.

As the representative of the latter, Gen. Crook invested him with the

powers of a grand chief, and in token thereof presented him his

commission as such, written upon a parchment scroll tied with richly

colored ribbons. Spotted Tail's heart was very glad."

"The line of the hostile and the peaceably disposed," wrote Gen. Crook

at this time, "is now plainly drawn, and we shall have our enemies only

in the front in the future. I feel that this is the first gleam of

daylight we have had in this business."

Meantime Gen. Terry, with the 7th Cavalry and local garrisons, was

disarming and dismounting the Indians at the Standing Rock and Cheyenne

River Agencies. The following is a copy of his report to Gen. Sheridan,

written at Standing Rock, Oct. 25th:--

"Colonel Sturgis left Lincoln on the 20th, Major Reno on the 21st,

and each arrived here on the afternoon of the 22d. Sturgis

immediately commenced dismounting and disarming the Indians at Two

Bears' camp, on the left bank of the river, and Lieut. Col. Carlin,

with his own and Reno's forces, dismounted and disarmed them at

both camps on this side. Owing partially to the fact that before I

arrived at Lincoln news was sent the Indians here, it is said, by

Mrs. Galpin, that we were coming, and our purpose stated; but

principally, I believe, that some time since, owing to the failure

of the grass here, the animals were sent to distant grazing places

many miles away, comparatively only a few horses were found. I,

therefore, the next morning, called the chiefs together, and

demanded the surrender of their horses and arms, telling them that

unless they complied their rations would be stopped, and also

telling them that whatever might be realized from the sale of the

property taken would be invested in stock for them. They have

quietly submitted, and have sent out to bring in their animals.

Some have already arrived, and we have now in our possession 700.

More are arriving rapidly, and I expect to double that number. I

have kept the whole force here until now for the effect its

presence produces.

"I shall start Sturgis to-morrow morning for Cheyenne, leaving Reno

until Carlin completes the work here. Only a few arms have yet been

found or surrendered, but I think our results are satisfactory. Not

a shot was fired on either side of the river. Of course no surprise

can now be expected at Cheyenne. The desired effect will be

attained there by the same means as those employed here."

The late Sioux Commissioners, who made a treaty for the Black Hills in

Sept. 1876, gave their pledge that all _friendly_ Indians would be

protected in their persons and property. Bishop Whipple comments on the

dismounting of the Indians as follows:--

"In violation of these pledges 2,000 ponies were taken from

Cheyenne and Standing Rock Agencies. No inventory was kept of

individual property. Of 1,100 ponies taken at Standing Rock, only

874 left Bismark for Saint Paul. No provision was made to feed them

on the way. The grass had burned on the prairie and there was

several inches of snow on the ground. The small streams were

frozen, and no water was to be had until they reached the James

River. There was no grass, and no hay could be purchased until they

reached the Cheyenne River, more than ten days' travel, and then

nothing until they reached Fort Abercrombie. No wonder that there

were only 1,200 ponies out of 2,000 that left Abercrombie, and that

of these only 500 reached St. Paul. The wretched, dying brutes were

made the subject of jest as the war horses of the Dakota. Many died

on the way, many were stolen, and the remnant were sold in St.

Paul. It was worse than the ordinary seizure of property without

color of law. It was not merely robbery of our friends. It was

cruel. The Indians are compelled to camp from 10 to 40 miles away

from the agency to find fuel. They have to cross this distance in

the coldest weather to obtain their rations, and without ponies

they must cross on foot, and some of them may perish."

Gen. Crook issued at Red Cloud Agency his General Orders, No. 8--in part

as follows:--

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE PLATTE, IN THE FIELD,}

CAMP ROBINSON, NEB., Oct. 24th, 1876.}

"The time having arrived when the troops composing the Big Horn and

Yellowstone Expedition are about to separate, the Brigadier-General

commanding addresses himself to the officers and men of the

command, to say:--

"In the campaign now closed he has been obliged to call upon you

for much hard service and many sacrifices of personal comfort. At

times you have been out of reach of your base of supplies; in most

inclement weather you have marched without food and slept without

shelter. In your engagements you have evinced a high order of

discipline and courage, in your marches wonderful powers of

endurance, and in your deprivations and hardships, patience and

fortitude.

"Indian warfare is, of all warfare, the most trying, the most

dangerous, and the most thankless; not recognized by the high

authority of the United States Congress as war, it still possesses

for you the disadvantages of civilized warfare with all the

horrible accompaniments that barbarians can invent and savages can

execute. In it, you are required to serve without the incentive to

promotion or recognition; in truth, without favor or hope of

reward.

"The people of our sparsely settled frontier, in whose defence this

war is waged, have but little influence with the powerful

communities in the East; their representatives have little voice in

our national councils, while your savage foes are not only the

wards of the nation, supported in idleness, but objects of sympathy

with a large number of people otherwise well informed and

discerning. You may, therefore, congratulate yourselves that in the

performance of your military duty you have been on the side of the

weak against the strong, and that the few people there are on the

frontier will remember your efforts with gratitude."

Gen. Crook's losses during the campaign extending from May 27th to Oct.

24th, were 12 killed, 32 wounded (most of whom subsequently returned to

duty), one death by accident and one by disease.

CHAPTER XII.

THE WINTER OF 1876-7.

After leaving Red Cloud, Gen. Crook marched to Fort Fetterman and

organized a new column for a winter expedition against the enemy.

Subsequently, with a force of ten companies of cavalry under Col.

Mackenzie, eleven companies of infantry and four of artillery under

Lieut. Col. R.I. Dodge, and about 200 Indian allies, some of whom were

friendly Sioux enlisted at Red Cloud Agency, Gen. Crook advanced to old

Fort Reno, head of Powder River, where a cantonment had been built.

Hearing that a band of Cheyenne Indians were encamped among the Big Horn

Mountains to the southwest, Gen. Crook, Nov. 23d, sent Col. Mackenzie

with his cavalry and the Indian allies to hunt them up. At noon, Nov.

24th, after marching some 30 miles along the base of the mountains

toward the Sioux Pass, Mackenzie met five of seven Indian scouts who had

been sent ahead the evening previously. These scouts reported that they

had discovered the camp of the Cheyennes at a point in the mountains

about 20 miles distant, and that the other two scouts had remained to

watch the camp.

A night's march was decided upon and, at sunset, after a halt of three

hours, the command moved forward toward the village; but owing to the

roughness of the country, it was daylight when they reached the mouth

of a canyon leading to and near the village. Through this canyon the

column advanced, crossing several deep ravines, and when within a mile

of the camp the order to charge was given. The Indian allies, who were

in front, rushed forward howling and blowing on instruments, and some of

them subsequently ascended the side of the canyon and occupied a high

bluff opposite to and overlooking the village.

The surprise was nearly complete; but some of the Cheyennes, whom the

scouts had reported as being engaged in a war dance, sounded the alarm

on a drum, and began firing on the advancing column. The inhabitants

immediately deserted their lodges, taking nothing but their weapons with

them, and took refuge in a net-work of very difficult ravines beyond the

upper end of the village. A brisk fight for about an hour ensued, after

which skirmishing was kept up until night. The village of 173 lodges and

their entire contents were destroyed, about 500 ponies were captured,

and the bodies of 25 Indians killed in the engagement were found. Col.

Mackenzie's loss was Lieut. J.A. McKinney and six men killed, and

twenty-two men wounded.

On the 4th of Dec., Gen. Crook left Fort Reno with his whole force, and

moved down Little Powder River, intending to form at its junction with

Powder River a supply camp from which to operate against the Indians.

Subsequently, however, he crossed over to the Belle Fourche River, and,

Dec. 22d, started for Fort Fetterman where he arrived Dec. 29th. The

weather during this homeward march was at times intensely cold, and the

men and horses suffered considerably thereby.

While Gen. Crook was thus looking for and harassing the Indians in the

Powder River country, the isolated garrison of the Tongue River

cantonment, further north, were not idle. An excursion northward in

search of Sitting Bull was led by Col. Miles, the post-commander, and as

reports as to the location of the Indians were conflicting and their

trails obscured by snow, he divided his force, and sent Lieut. Frank D.

Baldwin with three companies of the 5th Infantry to the north of the

Missouri, while he examined the the Mussel Shell and Dry Forks country.

On the 7th of Dec., Lieut. Baldwin discovered Sitting Bull's band, and

followed the Indians to the Missouri River, where they crossed and for a

short time resisted the crossing of the troops. The Indians then

retreated south, but were overtaken in the Redwood country and attacked,

Dec. 18th. Their camp of 122 lodges was captured and burned with its

contents, and 60 mules and horses were taken. The Indians escaped, but

carried off little property except what they had on their backs. Lieut.

Baldwin's command marched on this expedition over 500 miles--walking on

one occasion 73 miles in 48 hours--and endured the cold of a Montana

winter with great fortitude.

A very unfortunate affair occurred at the Tongue River cantonment,

within a few hundred yards of the parade-ground, Dec. 16th. The

following is from Col. Miles' report thereof:--

"As five Minneconjou chiefs were coming in, bearing two white

flags, followed by twenty or thirty other Indians, and were passing

by the Crow Indian camp, the five in advance were surrounded by

twelve Crows and instantly killed. The act was an unprovoked,

cowardly murder. The Crows approached them in a friendly manner,

said "How," shook hands with them, and when they were within their

power and partly behind a large wood pile, killed them in a most

brutal manner. Upon hearing the first shot, both officers and men

rushed out and tried to save the Minneconjous, but could not reach

them in time. The Crows were aware of the enormity of their crime,

as they saw that the Minneconjous had a flag of truce, and they

were told to come back. They were warned the day before against

committing any act of violence against messengers or other parties

coming in for friendly purposes. They tried to hide the flag of

truce and, taking advantage of the momentary excitement, while

efforts were being made to open communication and bring back the

others, who were following, and who became alarmed and fled to the

bluffs, the guilty Crow Indians jumped upon their ponies and fled

to their agency in Montana. The only thing that can be said in

defence of the Crows is, that a false report was made by one of the

Crow women that the Sioux had fired upon her, and that within the

last few months some of their number had lost relatives killed by

the Sioux in the vicinity of the Rosebud. These Indians have

claimed to be friends of the white man for years, have been

frequently in the Government employ, and were brought down to fight

such outlaws as Sitting Bull and Crazy Horse.

"Those killed were believed to be Bull Eagle, Tall Bull, Red ----,

Red Cloth, and one other prominent chief of the Sioux nation. I am

unable to state the object of Bull Eagle's coming, but am satisfied

he came with the best of motives. I can only judge from the

following:--When he surrendered on the Yellowstone, after the

engagement on Cedar Creek, he was the first to respond to my

demands, and, I believe, was largely instrumental in bringing his

people to accept the terms of the Government. When I had received

five of the principal chiefs as hostages, and was about parting

with him, I told him, if he had any trouble in going in, or his

people hesitated or doubted that the Government would deal fairly

and justly with them, to come back to me, and I would tell him what

to do; that if he would come back to my command, I would be glad to

see him and, so long as he complied with the orders of the

Government, he could be assured of the friendship of its officers.

I could not but regard him with respect, as he appeared in every

sense a chief, and seemed to be doing everything in his power for

the good of his people, and endeavoring to bring them to a more

peaceful condition. He appeared to have great confidence in what I

told him; I gave him five days to obtain meat; during that time he

lost three favorite ponies, which were brought to this place.

During my absence he came in, bringing five horses that had strayed

or been stolen from some citizens in the vicinity, and requested

his own. He also inquired if he could send up to the Big Horn

country for the remainder of his people, and take them in on the

pass I had given him. He was informed by the commanding officer,

Gen. Whistler (whom he had known for years before), that he could,

and was told to send for them. Whether he had met with some trouble

in taking his people in to their agency, and had returned, as I had

told him, for directions, or had gathered up his people, and in

passing had come in to apprise me of the fact, I know not; but

there is every reason to believe that the above mentioned

circumstances gave rise to his motives and prompted his actions.

"The Crows were immediately disarmed, twelve of their ponies taken

from them, and other considerations, together with a letter

explaining the whole affair, were sent to the people and friends of

those killed, as an assurance that no white man had any part in the

affair, and that we had no heart for such brutal and cowardly acts.

"It illustrates clearly the ferocious, savage instincts of even the

best of these wild tribes, and the impossibility of their

controlling their desire for revenge when it is aroused by the

sight of their worst enemies, who have whipped them for years and

driven them out of this country. Such acts are expected and

considered justifiable among these two tribes of Indians, and it is

to be hoped that the Sioux will understand that they fell into a

camp of their ancient enemies, and did not reach the encampment of

this command."

In January, 1877, Col. Miles with 350 of his troops marched southerly

sixty miles up the Tongue River, and on the evening of the 7th

discovered a large Indian village. Skirmishing ensued, and on the next

day 1000 well-armed warriors appeared in front, and a battle was fought.

The battle-ground was very rough and broken, and a heavy snow storm came

on during the fight. The Indians fought with desperation; but our

troops had been so admirably arranged that they succeeded in gaining a

decisive victory. The following is Col. Miles' report of the affair:--

"I have the honor to report that this command fought the hostile

tribes of Cheyenne and Ogallala Sioux, under Crazy Horse, in

skirmishes on the 1st, 3d, and 7th of January, and in a five hours'

engagement on the 8th inst. Their camp, consisting of some 500

lodges, extended three miles along the valley of Tongue River,

below Hanging Woman's Creek. They were driven through the canyons

of the Wolf or Panther Mountains, in the direction of Big Horn

Mountains. Their fighting strength outnumbered mine by two or three

to one, but by taking advantage of the ground we had them at a

disadvantage, and their loss is known to be heavy. Our loss is

three killed and eight wounded. They fought entirely dismounted,

and charged on foot to within fifty yards of Captain Casey's line,

but were taken in front and flank by Captain Butler's and

Lieutenant McDonald's companies. They were whipped at every point

and driven from the field, and pursued so far as my limited

supplies and worn down animals would carry my command."

The following additional particulars are derived from a letter to the

_Army and Navy Journal_:--

"On the 5th January, Indian signs grew thicker and thicker. Miles

of hastily abandoned war lodges were passed. The country became

very rough. The valley of the Tongue grew narrower, the stream more

tortuous, and the hills on both sides loftier and more precipitous,

until the valley shrank into a prolonged and winding canyon. At

short distances, jutting bluffs made narrow passes which offered

points of vantage to the savage enemy. The gorges of the Wolf

Mountains had been reached.

"On the 6th, the march was through a large war camp, recently and

hurriedly abandoned. Unusual heat was followed by snow. In the

evening there was snow and hail driven by a cruel wind, and by 5

P.M. it was pitch dark. On the evening of the 7th, the scouts

captured four Cheyenne squaws, a youth, and three young children.

Two hundred Indians made a dash at the scouts, shot two of their

horses and made a desperate effort to take them. Casey opened a

musketry fire on the Indians, and darkness supervening, they

withdrew.

"Next morning the fight was renewed shortly after daylight. The

Indians charged down the valley in large force, close up to the

skirmish line, but failed to make any impression. They then turned

their attention to the flanks, and began to swarm on the bluffs to

the right. The action then became general. The Indians were in

strong force, and tried every point of the line. The hills and

woods resounded with their cries and the high-pitched voices of the

chiefs giving their orders.

"It is the opinion of some who have had years of experience in

Indian fighting, that there has rarely, if ever, been a fight

before in which the Sioux and Cheyenne showed such determination

and persistency, where they were finally defeated. They had chosen

their ground; and it has since been learned that they expected to

make another Custer slaughter. The Cheyenne captives, in the hands

of the troops, sang songs of triumph during the entire fight, in

anticipation of a speedy rescue and the savage orgies of a

massacre."

In a complimentary order to his troops, dated Jan. 31st, Col. Miles

says:--

"Here in the home of the hostile Sioux, this command, during the

past three months, has marched 1200 miles and fought three

engagements--besides affairs of less importance. * * * Fortunate

indeed is the officer who commands men who will improvise boats of

wagon beds, fearlessly dash out into the cold and turbid waters,

and amid the treacherous current and floating ice, cross and

recross the great Missouri; who will defy the elements on these

bleak plains in a Montana winter; and who have in every field

defeated superior numbers."

The dismounting and disarming policy was kept up at the Agencies through

the winter. Several bands came in and surrendered--among them that of

Red Horse, who had been actively hostile. This chief thus describes the

engagement on the Little Big Horn. The "brave officer" referred to is

said to be Capt. T.H. French, of Reno's battalion.

"On the morning of the attack, myself and several women were out

about a mile from camp gathering wild turnips. Suddenly one of the

women called my attention to a cloud of dust rising in the

neighborhood of the camp. I soon discovered that troops were making

an attack. We ran for the camp, and when I got there I was sent for

at once to come to the council-lodge. I found many of the council

men already there when I arrived. We gave directions immediately

for every Indian to get his horse and arms; for the women and

children to mount the horses and get out of the way, and for the

young men to go and meet the troops.

"Among the troops was an officer who rode a horse with four white

feet. The Indians have fought a great many tribes of people, and

very brave ones, too, but they all say that this man was the

bravest man they had ever met. I don't know whether this man was

General Custer or not. This officer wore a large-brimmed hat and

buckskin coat. He alone saved his command a number of times by

turning on his horse in the retreat. In speaking of him, the

Indians call him the 'man who rode the horse with four white feet.'

"After driving this party back, the Indians corraled them on top of

a high hill, and held them there until they saw that the women and

children were in danger of being made prisoners by another party of

troops which just then made its appearance below. The word passed

among the Indians like a whirlwind, and they all started to attack

the new party, leaving the troops on the hill. When we attacked the

other party, we swarmed down on them and drove them in confusion.

No prisoners were taken. All were killed. None were left alive even

for a few minutes. These troopers used very few of their

cartridges. I took a gun and a couple of belts off two dead men.

Out of one belt two cartridges were gone; out of the other five.

"It was with captured ammunition and arms that we fought the other

body of troops. If they had all remained together they would have

hurt us very badly. The party we killed made five different starts.

Once we charged right in until we scattered the whole of them,

fighting among them hand to hand. One band of soldiers was right in

the rear of us when they charged. We fell back, and stood for one

moment facing each other. Then the Indians got courage and started

for them in a solid body. We went but a little distance when we

spread out and encircled them. All the time I could see their

officers riding in front, and hear them shouting to their men. We

finished up the party right there in the ravine.

"The troops up the river made their first attack, skirmishing a

little while after the fight commenced with the other troops below

the village. While the latter fight was going on we posted some

Indians to prevent the other command from forming a junction. As

soon as we had finished the fight we all went back to massacre the

troops on the hill. After skirmishing around awhile we saw the

walking soldiers coming. These new troops making their appearance

was the saving of the others. An Indian started to go to Red Cloud

Agency that day, and when a few miles from camp discovered dust

rising. He turned back and reported that a large herd of buffalo

was approaching the camp, and a short time after he reported this

the camp was attacked by troops."

In February, Spotted Tail, with a body-guard of 200 warriors, started

out to visit his roaming brethren as a peacemaker; and through his

influence, or for other reasons, all the hostile bands, it is believed,

except Sitting Bull's, have accepted the terms offered by the Government

and surrendered their arms and ponies. One band of about 1000 encircled

the Indian camp at Spotted Tail Agency, April 16th, and after

discharging their guns in the air by way of salutation, surrendered to

Gen. Crook. Roman Nose, whose village was destroyed at Slim Buttes,

indicated his desire for peace in a short speech and by laying his rifle

at the feet of the General. Five days later, 500 Cheyennes, with 600

ponies, came into Red Cloud Agency. Their village near Sioux Pass had

been destroyed in November, and they were in a destitute and pitiable

condition.

Crazy Horse and his band of 900 Indians surrendered at Red Cloud, May

5th. They appeared to be in a comfortable condition and had 2000 ponies.

At the latest date, Sitting Bull and his band were reported moving

toward Canada. If they return south, Col. Miles will be prepared to give

them a suitable reception.

CHAPTER XIII.

A BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF MAJOR-GENERAL CUSTER.

George Armstrong Custer, son of Emmanuel H. Custer, a hard-working,

enterprising farmer, was born at New Rumley, Harrison County, Ohio,

December 5th, 1839. He grew up into an active, athletic, and amiable

youth, acquired a fair English education, and at the age of sixteen

years engaged in teaching school near his native town.

Having determined to go to West Point if possible, young Custer

addressed a letter on the subject to Hon. John A. Bingham, Member of

Congress from his district, to whom he was personally unknown, and

subsequently called on him. The result was that he entered West Point

Academy as a cadet in 1857. The official notification of his appointment

was signed by Jefferson Davis, President Buchanan's secretary of war.

As a cadet, Custer did not achieve a brilliant record either for

scholarship or good behavior. This was not owing to any want of

intelligence or quickness of comprehension, but rather to a love of

mischief and hatred of restraint. During the four years of his academic

term he spent 66 Saturdays in doing extra guard duty as penance for

various offences; and he graduated in 1861, at the foot of a class of

34.

[Illustration: GENERAL GEORGE A. CUSTER.]

His stay terminated with a characteristic incident. He chanced one

day when officer of the guard to come upon two angry cadets, who from

words had come to blows, and were just ready to settle their difficulty

with their fists. Custer pushed through the crowd of spectators who

surrounded the combatants, but instead of arresting them, as was his

duty, he restrained those who were endeavoring to restrain them, and

called out:--

"Stand back, boys; let's have a fair fight."

His appeal was heard by Lieuts. Hazen and Merritt, and he was placed

under arrest and kept back to be court-martialed, while the rest of his

class, (excepting such as had already resigned to join the Southern

army) departed for active service. The court-martial was however cut

short, through the exertions of his fellow cadets at Washington, by a

telegraphic order summoning him there.

Custer reported to the Adjutant-General of the Army at Washington, July

20th, and was by him introduced to Gen. Scott. The company (G, 2nd

Cavalry) to which he had been assigned, with the rank of 2nd lieutenant,

was at this time near Centerville, and as he was to join it, Gen. Scott

entrusted to him some dispatches for Gen. McDowell who commanded the

troops in the field. A night's ride on horseback took him to the army,

the dispatches were delivered, and then he joined his company before

daybreak just as they were preparing to participate in the battle of

Bull Run. In this battle, however, the cavalry took but little part; in

the frantic retreat that followed, Custer's company was among the last

to retire, and did so in good order, taking with them Gen. Heintzelman

who was wounded.

After Gen. McClellan took command of the army, Custer's company was

attached to Gen. Phil Kearny's brigade, and that general detailed Custer

as his aid-de-camp, and afterwards as assistant adjutant-general, which

position he held till deprived of it by a general order prohibiting

officers of the regular army from serving on the staffs of volunteer

officers.

About this time he obtained leave of absence on account of ill health,

and visited his sister, Mrs. Reed, at her home in Monroe, Michigan; and

it is said that through her entreaties and influence he then gave up the

habit of using strong drinks, which, in common with many of his fellow

officers, he had acquired during his brief army life near Washington.

Thenceforth, through the remainder of his life, he drank no intoxicating

liquor.

Returning to the army in Feb. 1862, he was assigned to the 5th Cavalry,

and when the enemy evacuated Manassas he participated in the advance on

that place, and led the company which drove the hostile pickets across

Cedar Run.

When the Army of the Potomac was transferred to the Peninsula, Custer's

company was among the first to reach Fortress Monroe, and it then

marched to Warwick. Here he was detailed as assistant to the chief

engineer, on Gen. W.F. Smith's staff; he served in that capacity during

the siege of Yorktown, and planned the earthwork nearest the enemy's

lines. At the battle of Williamsburg, where he acted as aid-de-camp to

Gen. Hancock, he effected the capture of a battle-flag--the first taken

by the Army of the Potomac.

When the army was encamped near the Chickahominy River, late in May,

Custer accompanied Gen. Barnard, the chief engineer of the army, on a

reconnoisance outside the picket line to the bank of the river; and at

the request of his superior, he dismounted, jumped into the river, and

waded across the stream--the object being to ascertain the depth of the

water, which in some places came nearly up to his shoulders. On reaching

the opposite bank he examined the ground for some distance, and

discovered, unseen by them, the position of the enemy's pickets. Barnard

reported to McClellan that the river was fordable, and how he had

ascertained that it was so. McClellan sent for Custer, and was so

pleased with his appearance and courageous act that he transferred him

to his own staff; and in June, Custer received from the Secretary of War

his appointment as additional aid-de-camp, with the rank of captain

during the pleasure of the President. Previously to this he had crossed

the Chickahominy at daybreak with a company of infantry, attacked the

enemy's picket post, and captured prisoners and arms.

Custer served on McClellan's staff through all of the Peninsular

campaign; and after the battles of Gaines' Mills, Fair Oaks, Malvern

Hill, etc., retreated with him to the protection of the gunboats at

Harrison's Landing on the James River. Subsequently, after the

withdrawal of the army from the Peninsula and the defeat of Banks and

Pope in Virginia, he was McClellan's aid-de-camp in the Maryland

campaign which closed with the battle of Antietam. When McClellan was

superseded by Burnside, Nov. 10th, 1862, Custer accompanied his chief to

Washington, and subsequently visited his friends in Ohio and Michigan.

His staff position as captain ceased with the retirement of McClellan,

and he was now a first lieutenant, commissioned July 17th, 1862.

In April, 1863, Custer rejoined his company which was with Gen. Hooker's

army near Fredericksburg, and took part in the battle of

Chancellorsville. In June he was on the staff of Gen. Pleasonton, then

chief of the cavalry corps, and was conspicuous at Beverly Ford and

other places across the Rappahannock where Stuart's cavalry were met and

roughly handled.

At the battle of Aldie, Virginia, Custer distinguished himself in the

charge made by Kilpatrick's cavalry. The onset was irresistible; the

Confederate forces were driven back in confusion, and Custer's

impetuosity carried him far within their lines, from which he was

allowed to escape in consequence, he believed, of the similarity of his

hat to those worn by the Confederates. For his gallantry in this action,

Custer was promoted at one bound from a first lieutenant to a

brigadier-general.

Gen. Custer was now assigned to the command of a Michigan brigade in

Kilpatrick's division, the 1st, 5th, 6th and 7th Cavalry, and joined his

command at Hanover, Md., June 29th. The next day he was engaged in a

skirmish with Stuart's cavalry, and attracted the attention of all by

the peculiarity of his dress. He wore a broad-brimmed, low-crowned felt

hat; loose jacket and trowsers of velveteen, the former profusely

trimmed with gold-braid and the latter tucked into high boots; a blue

shirt, with turnover collar on either corner of which was an embroidered

star; and a flaming neck-tie.

The battle of Gettysburg was now in progress, and on the 2nd of July

Custer distinguished himself, and won the respect of his officers, by

charging the enemy at the head of a company of his troops, having his

horse shot under him. The next day his brigade was actively engaged,

and the charge of the 1st Michigan Cavalry, supported by a battery, is

designated by Custer as one of the most brilliant and successful

recorded in the annals of warfare.

After the battle Gen. Lee retreated rapidly toward the Potomac, and the

cavalry moving by different routes harassed him continually, capturing

trains and prisoners. The following paragraph is copied from Headley's

"History of the Civil War."

"Kilpatrick clung to the rebel army with a tenacity that did not

allow it a moment's rest. At midnight, in a furious thunder storm,

he charged down the mountain through the darkness with unparalleled

boldness, and captured the entire train of Elwell's division, eight

miles long. At Emmettsburg, Haggerstown, and other places, he smote

the enemy, with blow after blow. Buford, Gregg, Custer, and others,

performed deeds which, but for the greater movements that occupied

public attention, would have filled the land with shouts of

admiration. In fact, the incessant protracted labors of the cavalry

during this campaign, rendered it useless for some time."

Custer's brigade came upon the enemy's rear guard at Falling Waters, and

the 6th Michigan made a gallant charge which was repulsed with

considerable loss; but after a two hours' fight the enemy was driven to

the river; Gen. Pettegrew and 125 of his men were killed, and 1500 were

taken prisoners; cannon and battle-flags were also captured.

When the cavalry crossed the Rappahannock in September, pushing back

Stuart's cavalry to Brandy Station, Culpepper C.H., and across the

Rapidan, Custer, as usual, was with the advance, and in one engagement

was slightly wounded by a piece of a shell--the first and only time he

was wounded during the war. After a short vacation in consequence of his

wound, he rejoined his command in season to accompany the advance of

cavalry to and across the Rapidan in October; and when Mead's army was

forced back across the Rappahannock, he assisted in covering the

retreat. The following description of the engagement at Brandy Station

is also copied from Headley:--

"Pleasonton, with the cavalry, remained behind to watch the enemy,

and then slowly retired toward the retreating army. Buford had been

forced back more rapidly than Kilpatrick, whose command--with Davis

over the right brigade, and Custer over the left--fell back more

slowly. When the latter reached Brandy Station, he found the

former, ignorant of his movements, was far in advance, leaving his

right entirely exposed. To make matters worse Stuart had passed

around his left, so that Kilpatrick, with whom was Pleasonton

himself, was suddenly cut off. The gallant leader saw at a glance

the peril of his position, and, riding to a slight eminence took a

hasty survey of the ground before him. He then gave his orders, and

three thousand swords leaped from their scabbards, and a long, loud

shout rolled over the field.

"With a heavy line of skirmishers thrown out, to protect his flanks

and rear, he moved in three columns straight on the rebel host that

watched his coming. At first, the well-closed columns advanced on a

walk, while the batteries of Pennington and Elder played with

fearful precision upon the hostile ranks. He thus kept on, till

within a few hundred yards of the rebel lines, when the band struck

up "Yankee Doodle." The next instant, a hundred bugles pealed the

charge, and away, with gleaming sabres and a wild hurrah, went the

clattering squadrons. As they came thundering on, the hostile lines

parted, and let them pass proudly through. Buford was soon

overtaken, and a line of battle formed; for the rebels, outraged to

think they had let Kilpatrick off so easy, reorganized, and now

advanced to the attack.

"A fierce cavalry battle followed, lasting till after dark.

Pleasonton, Buford, Kilpatrick, Custer and Davis again and again

led charges in person. It seemed as if the leaders on both sides

were determined to test, on the plains of Brandy Station, the

question of superiority between the cavalry; for the charges on

both sides were of the most gallant and desperate character. The

dark masses would drive on each other, through the deepening gloom,

with defiant yells, while the flashing sabres struck fire as they

clashed and rung in the fierce conflict. At length the rebels gave

it up, and our cavalry, gathering up its dead and wounded, crossed

the Rappahannock."

In the spirited encounter near Buckland's Mills, Oct. 19th, in which

Stuart, aided by a flank attack from Fitz Hugh Lee, worsted Kilpatrick

by force of numbers, Custer's brigade bore the brunt of the attack, and

did most of the fighting on our side. This fight terminated the active

campaign of 1863 for Custer's brigade, which subsequently guarded the

upper fords of the Rapidan.

On the 9th of February, 1864, Gen. Custer was married at Monroe,

Michigan, to Miss Elizabeth Bacon, only daughter of Judge Daniel S.

Bacon of Monroe. When he rejoined his command at Stevensburg a few days

later, his wife accompanied him, and she remained in camp till the

opening of the spring campaign of 1864. The marriage was, as far as

Custer was concerned, the consequence of love at first sight, and ever

proved to be for both parties a happy one.

Late in February, 1864, Gen. Custer crossed the Rapidan with 1500

cavalry in light marching order, flanking Lee's army on the west, and

pushed rapidly ahead to within four miles of Charlottesville, where he

found his progress arrested by a far superior force. He then turned

northward toward Stannardsville where he again encountered the enemy,

and after skirmishing, returned to his camp followed by some hundreds of

refugees from slavery. This raid was designed to draw attention from a

more formidable one led by Kilpatrick at the same time.

CHAPTER XIV.

A BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF MAJOR-GENERAL CUSTER.

(CONTINUED.)

In the spring of 1864, Gen. Grant was placed at the head of all the

Union armies; Gen. Sheridan was called to command the cavalry corps in

place of Gen. Pleasonton; and Custer with his brigade was transferred to

the First division under Torbert.

In May, the Army of the Potomac once more advanced to the Rapidan and

crossed it. In the battle of the Wilderness, owing to the character of

the field, the cavalry were compelled to remain almost idle spectators,

but subsequently, at Spottsylvania C.H., Torbert's division was

seriously engaged.

On the 9th of May, Gen. Sheridan started out on his first great cavalry

raid toward Richmond. At Beaverdam Station he inflicted great damage on

the railroads, destroyed much property, and liberated 400 Union

prisoners on their way to Richmond. Continuing his march, he found, at

Yellow Tavern a few miles north of Richmond, Stuart's cavalry drawn up

to oppose his passage. A spirited fight ensued, resulting in the death

of Stuart and the dispersion of his troops. Our cavalry pressed on down

the road to Richmond, and Custer's brigade attacked and carried the

outer line of defenses, and took 100 prisoners. The second line of

works was too strong to be taken by cavalry, and Sheridan was obliged to

retreat. Beating off assailants both in front and rear he crossed the

Chickahominy, pushed southward to Haxall's Landing on the James River,

and then leisurely returned by way of White House and Hanover C.H. to

Grant's army, arriving in time to be present at the sanguinary battle of

Cool Arbor.

On the 9th of June, Custer accompanied Sheridan on a raid around Lee's

army. They struck the railroad at Trevilian's, drove off a large force

of the enemy and broke up a long section of the road. Retracing their

steps to Trevilian's, they had there a spirited contest with Fitz Hugh

Lee, and then drew off and rejoined Gen. Grant. During this raid

Sheridan lost over 700 men, and captured 400 prisoners.

In the autumn of 1864, two divisions of cavalry under Torbert were with

Sheridan's army operating in the Shenandoah Valley. Custer's brigade was

in the First division, commanded by Merritt. Averill commanded the

Second division.

Having received from Gen. Grant the order, "Go in"--the only

instructions which Grant deemed it necessary to give--Sheridan, Sept.

19th, attacked the Confederate forces at Opequan Creek. The artillery

opened along the whole line, the columns moved steadily forward, and

Gen. Early soon discovered that Sheridan was in earnest. Early's

position was a strong one, and he stubbornly held it until the cavalry

bugles were heard on his right, as the firm-set squadrons bore fiercely

down. Rolled up before the impetuous charge, the rebel line at length

crumbled into fragments, and the whole army broke in utter confusion and

was sent "whirling through Winchester," followed until dark by the

pursuing cavalry. 3000 prisoners were taken.

Three days later Sheridan attacked Early at Fisher's Hill--a strong

position to which he had retired--and again forced him to retreat with a

loss of 1100 men taken prisoners. The cavalry pursued so sharply and

persistently, that Early left the valley and took refuge in the

mountains where cavalry could not operate.

On the 26th of Sept., Custer was transferred from the command of the

Michigan brigade in the First division to the head of the Second

division; but before he was able to reach his new command, he was placed

at the head of the Third division, with which he had formerly been

connected under Kilpatrick.

When Sheridan moved back through the valley from Port Republic to

Strasburg, sparing the houses, but burning all the barns, mills and

hay-stacks, and driving off all the cattle, his rear was much harassed

by the rebel cavalry under Gen. Rosser--a class-mate of Custer's at West

Point; and on the night of Oct. 8th, Sheridan ordered Torbert to "start

out at daylight, and whip the rebel cavalry or get whipped himself."

Accordingly on the next morning the cavalry, led on by Merritt and

Custer and supported by batteries, swept boldly out to attack a larger

force drawn up in battle array. At the first charge upon them Rosser's

men broke and fled, but subsequently rallied, and were again pushed back

and utterly routed. Rosser lost all his artillery but one piece, and

everything else which was carried on wheels, and was pursued to Mt.

Jackson, 26 miles distant. Of this affair, Gen. Torbert reported:--

"The First Division captured five pieces of artillery, their

ordnance, ambulance, and wagon trains, and 60 prisoners. The Third

Division captured six pieces of artillery, all of their headquarter

wagons, ordnance, ambulance, and wagon trains. There could hardly

have been a more complete victory and rout. The cavalry totally

covered themselves with glory, and added to their long list of

victories the most brilliant one of them all, and the most decisive

the country has ever witnessed."

On the 15th of Oct., Sheridan started on a flying visit to Washington,

leaving his army encamped on three ridges or hills. The crest nearest

the enemy was held by the Army of West Virginia under Crook; half a mile

to the rear of this was the second one, held by the 19th Corps under

Emory; and still further to the rear, on the third crest, was the 6th

Corps under Gen. Wright, who commanded the whole army during Sheridan's

absence. The cavalry under Torbert lay to the right of the 6th Corps.

Gen. Early, having resolved to surprise and attack the Union army,

started out his troops on a dark and foggy night, and advanced

unperceived and unchallenged in two columns along either flank of the

6th Corps. The march was noiseless; and trusty guides led the steady

columns through the gloom, now pushing through the dripping trees and

now fording a stream, till at length, an hour before day-break, Oct.

18th, Early's troops, shivering with cold, stood within 600 yards of

Crook's camp. Two of Crook's pickets had come in at 2 A.M. and reported

a heavy, muffled tramp heard at the front; but though some extra

precautions were taken, no one dreamed that an attack would be made.

Crook's troops, slumbering on unconscious of danger, were awakened at

daybreak by a deafening yell and the crack of musketry on either flank;

following which, charging lines regardless of the pickets came

immediately on over the breastworks. The surprise was complete, and

after a brief struggle the Army of West Virginia was flying in confusion

toward the second hill occupied by the 19th Corps. Emory attempted to

stop the progress of the enemy, but they got in his rear, and his

command soon broke and fled with the rest toward the hill where the 6th

Corps lay.

Gen. Wright formed a new line of battle, and repulsed a tremendous

charge of the enemy, thus obtaining time to cover the immense crowd of

fugitives that darkened the rear. A general retreat was then begun and

continued in good order till 10 A.M. when, the enemy having ceased to

advance, Wright halted and commenced reorganizing the scattered troops.

The cavalry, being at the rear and extreme right, had not suffered in

the first assault on the Union army, but they were subsequently

transferred to the left flank, and did brave service in covering the

retreat of the infantry.

Meanwhile Sheridan, returning from Washington, had slept at Winchester

20 miles distant, and in the morning rode leisurely toward his army. The

vibrations of artillery at first surprised him, and he soon became aware

that a heavy battle was raging and that his army was retreating. Dashing

his spurs into his horse he pushed madly along the road, and soon left

his escort far behind. Further on he met fugitives from the army, who

declared that all was lost. As the cloud of fugitives thickened he

shouted, as he drove on and swung his cap, "Face the other way, boys; we

are going back to our camp; we are going to lick them out of their

boots." The frightened stragglers paused, and then turned back.

On arriving at the front, where the work of reorganization was already

well advanced, Sheridan inspired his men with new courage by his

appearance and words. For two hours he rode back and forth in front of

the line, encouraging the troops; and when the order was given, "The

entire line will advance, etc.," the infantry went steadily forward upon

the enemy. Early's front was soon carried, while his left was partly

turned back; and after much desperate fighting, his astonished troops

turned and fled in utter confusion over the field.