While Meek was in Washington, he had been dubbed with the title of
Colonel, which title he still bears, though during the Indian war of
1855-56, it was alternated with that of Major. During his marshalship he
was fond of showing off his titles and authority to the discomfiture of
that class of people who had "put on airs" with him in former days, when
he was in his transition stage from a trapper to a United States
Marshal.
While Pratt was Judge of the District Court, a kidnaping case came
before him. The writ of _habeas corpus_ having been disregarded by the
Captain of the _Melvin_, who was implicated in the business, Meek was
sent to arrest him, and also the first mate. Five of the _Melvin's_
sailors were ordered to be summoned as witnesses, at the same time.
Meek went on board with his summons, marched forward, and called out the
names of the men. Every man came up as he was summoned. When they were
together, Meek ordered a boat lowered for their conveyance to Oregon
City. The men started to obey, when the Captain interfered, saying that
the boat should not be taken for such a purpose, as it belonged to him.
"That is of no consequence at all," answered the smiling marshal. "It is
a very good boat, and will suit our purpose very well. Lower away, men!"
The men quickly dropped the boat. As it fell, they were ordered to man
it. When they were at the oars, the mate was then invited to take a seat
in it, which he did, after a moment's hesitation, and glancing at his
superior officer. Meek then turned to the Captain, and extended the same
invitation to him. But he was reluctant to accept the courtesy,
blustering considerably, and declaring his intention to remain where he
was. Meek slowly drew his revolver, all the time cool and smiling.
"I don't like having to urge a gentleman too hard," he said, in a
meaning tone; "but thar is an argument that few men ever resist. Take a
seat, Captain."
The Captain took a seat; the idlers on shore cheered for "Joe
Meek"--which was, after all, his most familiar title; the Captain and
mate went to Oregon City, and were fined respectively $500 and $300; the
men took advantage of being on shore to desert; and altogether, the
master of the _Melvin_ felt himself badly used.
About the same time news was received that a British vessel was
unloading goods for the Hudson's Bay Company, somewhere on Puget Sound.
Under the new order of affairs in Oregon, this was smuggling. Delighted
with an opportunity of doing the United States a service, and the
British traders an ill turn, Marshal Meek immediately summoned a _posse_
of men and started for the Sound. On his way he learned the name of the
vessel and Captain, and recognized them as having been in the Columbia
River some years before. On that occasion the Captain had ordered Meek
ashore, when, led by his curiosity and general love of novelty, he had
paid a visit to this vessel. This information was "nuts" to the marshal,
who believed that "a turn about was fair play."
With great dispatch and secrecy he arrived entirely unexpected at the
point where the vessel was lying, and proceeded to board her without
loss of time. The Captain and officers were taken by surprise and were
all aghast at this unlooked for appearance. But after the first moment
of agitation was over, the Captain recognized Meek, he being a man not
likely to be forgotten, and thinking to turn this circumstance to
advantage, approached him with the blandest of smiles and the most
cordial manner, saying with forced frankness--
"I am sure I have had the pleasure of meeting you before. You must have
been at Vancouver when my vessel was in the river, seven or eight years
ago. I am very happy to have met with you again."
"Thar is some truth in that remark of yours, Captain," replied Meek,
eyeing him with lofty scorn; "you _did_ meet me at Vancouver several
years ago. But I was nothing but 'Joe Meek' at that time, and you
ordered me ashore. Circumstances are changed since then. I am now
Colonel Joseph L. Meek, United States Marshal for Oregon Territory; and
you sir, are only a ---- smuggler! Go ashore, sir!"
The Captain saw the point of that concluding "go ashore, sir!" and
obeyed with quite as bad a grace as 'Joe Meek' had done in the first
instance.
The vessel was confiscated and sold, netting to the Government about
$40,000, above expenses. This money, which fell into bad hands, failed
to be accounted for. Nobody suspected the integrity of the marshal, but
most persons suspected that he placed too much confidence in the
District Attorney, who had charge of his accounts. On some one asking
him, a short time after, what had become of the money from the sale of
the smuggler, he seemed struck with a sudden surprise:
"Why," said he, looking astonished at the question, "thar was barly
enough for the officers of the court!"
This answer, given as it was, with such apparent simplicity became a
popular joke; and "barly enough" was quoted on all occasions.
The truth was, that there was a serious deficiency in Meek's account
with the Government, resulting entirely from his want of confidence in
his own literary accomplishments, which led him to trust all his
correspondence and his accounts to the hands of a man whose talents were
more eminent than his sense of honor. The result of this misplaced
confidence was a loss to the Government, and to himself, whom the
Government held accountable. Contrary to the general rule of disbursing
officers, the office made him poor instead of rich; and when on the
incoming of the Pierce administration he suffered decapitation along
with the other Territorial officers, he was forced to retire upon his
farm on the Tualatin Plains, and become a rather indifferent tiller of
the earth.
The breaking out of the Indian war of 1855-6, was preceded by a long
period of uneasiness among the Indians generally. The large emigration
which crossed the plains every year for California and Oregon was one
cause of the disturbance; not only by exciting their fears for the
possession of their lands, but by the temptation which was offered them
to take toll of the travelers. Difficulties occurred at first between
the emigrants and Indians concerning stolen property. These quarrels
were followed, probably the subsequent year, by outrages and murder on
the part of the Indians, and retaliation on the part of volunteer
soldiers from Oregon. When once this system of outrage and retaliation
on either side, was begun, there was an end of security, and war
followed as an inevitable consequence. Very horrible indeed were the
acts perpetrated by the Indians upon the emigrants to Oregon, during the
years from 1852 to 1858.
But when at last the call to arms was made in Oregon, it was an
opportunity sought, and not an alternative forced upon them, by the
politicians of that Territory. The occasion was simply this. A party of
lawless wretches from the Sound Country, passing over the Cascade
Mountains into the Yakima Valley, on their way to the Upper Columbia
mines, found some Yakima women digging roots in a lonely place, and
abused them. The women fled to their village and told the chiefs of the
outrage; and a party followed the guilty whites and killed several of
them in a fight.
Mr. Bolin, the Indian sub-agent for Washington went to the Yakima
village, and instead of judging of the case impartially, made use of
threats in the name of the United States Government, saying that an army
should be sent to punish them for killing his people. On his return
home, Mr. Bolin was followed and murdered.
The murder of an Indian agent was an act which could not be overlooked.
Very properly, the case should have been taken notice of in a manner to
convince the Indians that murder must be punished. But, tempted by an
opportunity for gain, and encouraged by the somewhat reasonable fears of
the white population of Washington and Oregon, Governor G.L. Curry, of
the latter, at once proclaimed war, and issued a call for volunteers,
without waiting for the sanction or assistance of the general
Government. The moment this was done, it was too late to retract. It was
as if a torch had been applied to a field of dry grass. So
simultaneously did the Indians from Puget Sound to the Rocky Mountains,
and from the Rocky Mountains to the southern boundary of Oregon send
forth the war-whoop, that there was much justification for the belief
which agitated the people, that a combination among the Indians had been
secretly agreed to, and that the whites were all to be exterminated.
Volunteer companies were already raised and sent into the Indian
country, when Brevet Major G.O. Haller arrived at Vancouver, now a part
of the United States. He had been as far east as Fort Boise to protect
the incoming immigration; and finding on his return that there was an
Indian war on hand, proceeded at once to the Yakima country with his
small force of one hundred men, only fifty of whom were mounted. Much
solicitude was felt for the result of the first engagement, every one
knowing that if the Indians were at first successful, the war would be
long and bloody.
Major Haller was defeated with considerable loss, and notwithstanding
slight reinforcements, from Fort Vancouver, only succeeded in getting
safely out of the country. Major Raines, the commanding officer at
Vancouver, seeing the direction of events, made a requisition upon
Governor Curry for four of his volunteer companies to go into the field.
Then followed applications to Major Raines for horses and arms to equip
the volunteers; but the horses at the Fort being unfit for service, and
the Major unauthorized to equip volunteer troops, there resulted only
misunderstandings and delays. When General Wool, at the head of the
Department in San Francisco, was consulted, he also was without
authority to employ or receive the volunteers; and when the volunteers,
who at length armed and equipped themselves, came to go into the field
with the regulars, they could not agree as to the mode of fighting
Indians; so that with one thing and another, the war became an exciting
topic for more reasons than because the whites were afraid of the
Indians. As for General Wool, he was in great disfavor both in Oregon
and Washington because he did not believe there ever had existed the
necessity for a war; and that therefore he bestowed what assistance was
at his command very grudgingly. General Wool, it was said, was jealous
of the volunteers; and the volunteers certainly cared little for the
opinion of General Wool.
However all that may be, Col. Meek gives it as his opinion that the old
General was right. "It makes me think," said he, "of a bear-fight I once
saw in the Rocky Mountains, where a huge old grizzly was surrounded by a
pack of ten or twelve dogs, all snapping at and worrying him. It made
him powerful mad, and every now and then he would make a claw at one of
them that silenced him at once."
The Indian war in Oregon gave practice to a number of officers, since
become famous, most prominent among whom is Sheridan, who served in
Oregon as a Lieutenant. Grant himself, was at one time a Captain on that
frontier. Col. Wright, afterwards Gen. Wright, succeeded Major Raines at
Vancouver, and conducted the war through its most active period. During
a period of three years there were troops constantly occupied in trying
to subdue the Indians in one quarter or another.
As for the volunteers they fared badly. On the first call to arms the
people responded liberally. The proposition which the Governor made for
their equipment was accepted, and they turned in their property at a
certain valuation. When the war was over and the property sold, the men
who had turned it in could not purchase it without paying more for it in
gold and silver than it was valued at when it was placed in the hands of
the Quartermaster. It was sold, however, and the money enjoyed by the
shrewd political speculators, who thought an Indian war a very good
investment.
Meek was one of the first to volunteer, and went as a private in Company
A. On arriving at the Dalles he was detailed for special service by Col.
J.W. Nesmith, and sent out as pilot or messenger, whenever any such
duty was required. He was finally placed on Nesmith's staff, and given
the title of Major. In this capacity, as in every other, he was still
the same alert and willing individual that we have always seen him, and
not a whit less inclined to be merry when an opportunity offered.
While the army was in the Yakima country, it being an enemy's country,
and provisions scarce, the troops sometimes were in want of rations. But
Meek had not forgotten his mountain craft, and always had something to
eat, if anybody did. One evening he had killed a fat cow which he had
discovered astray, and was proceeding to roast a twenty-pound piece
before his camp-fire, when a number of the officers called on him. The
sight and savory smell of the beef was very grateful to them.
"Major Meek," said they in a breath, "we will sup with you to-night."
"I am very sorry, gentlemen, to decline the honor," returned Meek with a
repetition of the innocent surprise for which he had so often been
laughed at, "but I am very hungry, and thar is barly enough beef for one
man!"
On hearing this sober assertion, those who had heard the story laughed,
but the rest looked rather aggrieved. However, the Major continued his
cooking, and when the beef was done to a turn, he invited his visitors
to the feast, and the evening passed merrily with jests and camp
stories.
After the army went into winter-quarters, Nesmith having resigned, T.R.
Cornelius was elected Colonel. One of his orders prohibited firing in
camp, an order which as a good mountaineer the Major should have
remembered. But having been instructed to proceed to Salem without
delay, as bearer of dispatches, the Major committed the error of firing
his gun to see if it was in good condition for a trip through the
enemy's country. Shortly after he received a message from his Colonel
requesting him to repair to his tent. The Colonel received him politely,
and invited him to breakfast with him. The aroma of coffee made this
invitation peculiarly acceptable--for luxuries were scarce in camp--and
the breakfast proceeded for some time very agreeably. When Meek had
breakfasted, Colonel Cornelius took occasion to inquire if the Major had
not heard his order against firing in camp. "Yes," said Meek. "Then,"
said the Colonel, "I shall be obliged to make an example of you."
While Meek stood aghast at the idea of punishment, a guard appeared at
the door of the tent, and he heard what his punishment was to be, "Mark
time for twenty minutes in the presence of the whole regiment."
"When the command "forward!" was given," says Meek, "you might have seen
somebody step off lively, the officer counting it off, 'left, left.' But
some of the regiment grumbled more about it than I did. I just got my
horse and my dispatches and left for the lower country, and when I
returned I asked for my discharge, and got it."
And here ends the career of our hero as a public man. The history of the
young State, of which he is so old a pioneer furnishes ample material
for an interesting volume, and will sometime be written by an abler than
our sketchy pen.
PART II.
OUR
CENTENNIAL INDIAN WAR
AND THE
LIFE OF GENERAL CUSTER.
INTRODUCTION.
The reader of the foregoing pages can hardly have failed to observe,
that the region east of the Big Horn Mountains, including the valleys of
the Yellowstone, Big Horn, Powder, and Rosebud Rivers, was the favorite
haunt of the Rocky Mountain hunters and trappers--the field of many of
their stirring adventures and hardy exploits. Here was the "hunters'
paradise," where they came to secure game for food and to feed their
animals on the nutritious bark of the cottonwoods; here they assembled
at the Summer rendezvous, to exchange their peltries for supplies; and
here, ofttimes, was established their winter camp, with its rough cheer,
athletic sports, and wild carousals.
Here, also, between the plains and the mountains, was the dark and
sanguinary ground where terrific and deadly combats were fought between
the Delawares, Iroquois, Crows, and Blackfeet, and between the trappers
and Indians; and here, fifty years later, were enacted scenes of warfare
and massacre which cast a gloom over the festivities of our Centennial
anniversary.
The recent campaign against the hostile Sioux was over the identical
ground where the fur-traders roamed intent on beaver-skins and
adventure; and it is believed that some account thereof, and a sketch of
the renowned Indian fighter who perished on the Little Big Horn, may
appropriately supplement the story of the Mountain-men.
CONTENTS.
CHAPTER I.
Our Centennial War with the Sioux--Scene of the Campaign--General
Aspect of the Country--The hostile Indians and their
Grievances--The People of the Frontier--The Treaty of 1868--The
Invasion of the Black Hills--Sitting Bull--Immediate Causes of the
War--The Indians Warned and Threatened--The Warning Disregarded--An
Appeal to Arms--Bishop Whipple on the Roaming Indians, 7
CHAPTER II.
General Crook's First Expedition--The March Northward--Reynolds
Follows a Trail--Camp of Crazy Horse Discovered and Attacked--The
Battle of Powder River--Return to Fort Fetterman--Crook's Second
Expedition--On the Head Waters of Tongue River--Friendly
Crows--Battle of the Rosebud--Retreat to Goose Creek Camp, 20
CHAPTER III.
Gen. Terry's Expedition--March from Fort Lincoln--Rendezvous on the
Yellowstone--The Montana Column--Reno's Scouting Party Discovers a
Trail--The Seventh Cavalry Start up the Rosebud--Custer Discovers
an Indian Village and Advances to Attack, 26
CHAPTER IV.
Gibbon's Troops Cross the Yellowstone--March up the Big Horn--A
Smoke Cloud--An Omen of Victory--Crow Scouts--Indians in Front--A
Night's Bivouac on the Little Big Horn--Site of a deserted
Village--Evidences of Conflict--A breathless Scout--Intrenched
Cavalry--Reno Relieved--"Where is Custer?" 30
CHAPTER V.
Custer's last Battle--Revelations of the Battle-field--Theories as
to the Engagement--Custer and His Officers--Capt. Tom
Custer--Boston Custer--Armstrong Reed--Burial of the Slain--Retreat
to the Yellowstone--Story of Custer's Scout "Curley"--Death of
Custer, 35
CHAPTER VI.
Reno's Battles--His Charge down the Valley, and Retreat to the
Bluffs--Benteen's Battalion--A terrific Assault--Holding the
Fort--Volunteer Water Carriers--Removal of Indian Village--Approach
of Terry--Statements of Benteen and Godfrey--A Scout's Narrative,
40
CHAPTER VII.
Kill Eagle at Sitting Bull's Camp--His Account of the Battles with
Custer and Reno--"We have Killed them all"--What Buck Elk Saw,
52
CHAPTER VIII.
Criticisms on the Conduct of Reno and Benteen--Reno's Defence--What
Benteen Says--Gen. Sheridan on the Custer Disaster, 56
CHAPTER IX.
The Midsummer Campaign--Adventures of a Scouting Party--Running the
Gauntlet--Indian Allies--Hazardous Service--Junction of Terry and
Crook--Following the Trail--At the Mouth of Powder River--Crook
Starts for the Black Hills--Short Rations--Battle of Slim
Buttes--The Chief American Horse--Deadwood--Terry at Glendive
Creek--A Chase after Sitting Bull--Close of the Campaign--Long
Dog's Reconnoitering Party, 62
CHAPTER X.
Autumn on the Yellowstone--Gallant Defence of a Wagon Train--A
Letter from Sitting Bull--A Flag of Truce--Col. Miles and Sitting
Bull Have a "Talk" between the Lines--An Exciting Scene--The
Council Disperses--The Troops Advance--A Battle and its
Results--Escape of Sitting Bull--Surrender of Chiefs as Hostages,
70
CHAPTER XI.
Terry and Crook at the Sioux Agencies--The Agency Indians Disarmed
and Dismounted--A Gleam of Daylight--What became of the Ponies--Red
Cloud Deposed--Spotted Tail Declared Chief Sachem--Gen. Crook's
Address to His Troops, 77
CHAPTER XII.
Winter Operations--Crook's Expedition--Col. McKenzie on the
Trail--A Night's March--A Charge down a Canyon--Destruction of a
Cheyenne Village--Life at the Tongue River Cantonment--Miles'
Excursion Northward--Capture of Sitting Bull's Camp--An Unfortunate
Affair--Massacre of Five Chiefs--Treacherous Crows--Winter March
Southward--Desperate Battle in the Wolf Mountains--Defeat of Crazy
Horse--Red Horse Surrenders--His Story of the Big Horn
Battles--Spotted Tail's Mission--Surrender of Roman Nose, Standing
Elk and Crazy Horse, 81
CHAPTER XIII.
George A. Custer--Early Youth--Cadet Life--From West Point to Bull
Run--On Kearny's Staff--Wades the Chickahominy--On McClellan's
Staff--Antietam--On Pleasonton's Staff--Aldie--A General at
Gettysburg--Pursues Lee--Falling Waters--Wounded--Cavalry
Engagement at Brandy Station--Marriage, 90
CHAPTER XIV.
A Raid toward Richmond--With Sheridan in the Shenandoah
Valley--Opequan Creek--Fisher's Hill--Commander of the Third
Division--Fight with Rosser--Sheridan's Army Surprised--Defeat and
Victory--The Cavalry at Cedar Creek--The last great Raid, 98
CHAPTER XV.
The last Struggle for Richmond--Custer at Dinwiddie and Fire
Forks--Petersburg Evacuated--The Pursuit of
Lee--Jetersville--Sailor's Creek--Appomattox--A Flag of
Truce--Custer's Address to His Soldiers--The Great Parade--A Major
General--Texas--Negotiation with Romero, 106
CHAPTER XVI.
The Seventh Cavalry--Hancock's Expedition--Tricky Indians--A Scout
on the Plains--Camp Attacked by Indians--A Fight for the Wagon
Train--The Kidder Massacre--Court Martialed--Sully's
Expedition--Battle of the Washita--Death of Black Kettle--Fate of
Major Elliot--Night Retreat--March to Fort Cobb--Lone Wolf and
Satanta--After the Cheyennes--Captive Women Recovered, 113
CHAPTER XVII.
The Yellowstone Expedition--Road-hunters--A Siesta--Dashing
Indians--A Trap--Fearful Odds--Rapid Volleys--Attack
Renewed--Reinforcements--The Foe Repulsed--A Tragedy--The Revenge
of Rain in the Face--Another Fight--Assigned to Fort Lincoln--Mrs.
Custer, 121
CHAPTER XVIII.
The Campaign of 1876--The Dakota Column--The Babcock
Investigation--The Congressional Committee--Grant's
Displeasure--Appeal to the President--Custer's last Campaign,
126
CHAPTER XIX.
Reminiscences of General Custer--Personal Characteristics, 132
CHAPTER XX.
The Indian Commission of 1876--Purchase of the Black Hills--Indian
Orators--Speeches of Red Cloud, Spotted Tail, Blue Teeth, Running
Antelope, Two Bears, Red Feather, Swan, White Ghost, etc., 138
[Illustration: MAP OF THE SIOUX COUNTRY.]
THE INDIAN WAR.
CHAPTER I.
THE SIOUX TRIBES--CAUSES OF THE WAR.
The scene of the campaign against the hostile Indians in 1876, was the
rugged, desolate, and partially unexplored region lying between the Big
Horn and Powder Rivers, and extending from the Big Horn Mountains
northerly to and beyond the Yellowstone River. This region is the most
isolated and inaccessible of any lying east of the Rocky Mountains, and
is admirably adapted for Indian warfare and defense. Several rivers,
tributaries of the Yellowstone, flow through it, and it abounds in
creeks, ravines, and canyons. It is the hereditary country of the Crows,
who for generations defended it against marauding tribes of Blackfeet.
A vivid description of the general aspect of the country and of the
hardships and perils of our soldiers, has been given by Col. Nelson A.
Miles, of the Fifth Infantry, in a letter written from the mouth of the
Powder River. "No service," he says, "is more thankless or dangerous
than contending against these treacherous savages, and if you will come
out and learn the real sentiment of the army, you will find the officers
of the army the strongest advocates of any peace policy that shall be
just and honorable. You will find us out here, five hundred miles from
railroad communication, in as barren, desolate and worthless a country
as the sun shines upon--volcanic, broken, and almost impassable--so
rugged as to make our granite hills of Vermont and New Hampshire appear
in comparison as pleasant parks. Jagged and precipitous cliffs; narrow
and deep arroyos filled with massive boulders; alkali water, or for
miles and miles none at all; and vegetation of cactus and sage-bushes,
will represent to you, feebly indeed, the scene of the present campaign,
in which we are contending against the most powerful, warlike, and
best-armed body of savages on the American Continent, armed and mounted
partly at the expense of the Government, and fully supplied with the
most improved magazine guns and tons of metallic ammunition."
"The brave mariner," wrote a newspaper correspondent, "on the trackless
ocean without compass, is no more at the mercy of wind and wave than
Terry's army, out upon this vast trackless waste, is at the mercy of his
guides and scouts. The sun rises in the east, shines all day upon a vast
expanse of sage-brush and grass, and, as it sets in the west, casts its
dull rays into a thousand ravines that neither man nor beast can cross.
The magnet always points north; but whether one can go either north or
south can be decided only by personal effort. An insignificant turn to
the wrong side of a little knoll or buffalo-wallow ofttimes
imperceptibly leads the voyager into ravine after ravine, over bluff
after bluff, until at last he stands on the edge of a yawning canyon,
hundreds of feet in depth and with perpendicular walls. Nothing is left
for him to do but to retrace his steps and find an accessible route."
The hostile Indians with whom our soldiers have had to contend are no
despicable foe; on the contrary they are quite able, in frontier
warfare, to cope with disciplined troops. They fight in bodies, under
skilled leaders, and have regular rules which they observe in battle, on
their marches, and in their camps. "They have systems of signalling and
of scouting, of posting sentinels and videttes, and of herding their
animals." They are remarkably expert horsemen, and are so dependent on
their steeds, that "a Sioux on foot is a Sioux warrior no longer." Gen.
Crook testifies to their adroitness and skill as follows:--
"When the Sioux Indian was armed with a bow and arrow he was more
formidable, fighting as he does most of the time on horseback, than
when he came into possession of the old fashioned muzzle loading
rifle. But when he came into possession of the breech loader and
metallic catridge, which allows him to load and fire from his horse
with perfect ease, he became at once ten times more formidable.
With the improved arms I have seen our friendly Indians, riding at
full speed, shoot and kill a wolf, also on the run, while it is a
rare thing that our troops can hit an Indian on horseback though
the soldier may be on his feet at the time.
"The Sioux is a cavalry soldier from the time he has intelligence
enough to ride a horse or fire a gun. If he wishes to dismount, his
hardy pony, educated by long usage, will graze around near where he
has been left, ready when his master wants to mount either to move
forward or escape. Even with their lodges and families they can
move at the rate of fifty miles per day. They are perfectly
familiar with the country, have their spies and hunting parties out
all the time at distances of from twenty to fifty miles each way
from their villages, know the number and movements of all the
troops that may be operating against them, just about what they can
probably do, and hence can choose their own times and places of
conflict or avoid it altogether."
The primary causes of the hostilities of the Indians which made this
campaign and previous ones against them necessary, extend far back and
are too numerous to be here fully stated. The principal Indian
grievances however, for which the government is responsible, are a
failure to fulfil treaties, encroachment on reserved territories, and
the dishonesty of agents. Col. Miles speaks of our relationship with the
Indians for the last fifty years, as the dark page in our history,
which, next to African slavery, has done more to disgrace our
government, blacken our fair name, and reflect upon our civilization,
than aught else. It has, he says, been a source of corruption and a
disturbing element, unconfined to any one political party or class of
individuals.
Wendell Phillips asserts that the worst brutality which prurient malice
ever falsely charged the Indian with, is but weak imitation of what the
white man has often inflicted on Indian men, women and children; and
that the Indian has never lifted his hand against us until provoked to
it by misconduct on our part, compared with which, any misconduct of his
is but dust in the balance.
The great difference in the condition and character of the Indians over
the Canada line and our own, can only be accounted for by the different
treatment they have received. The Canadian Indians are, on the whole, a
harmless, honest people, who, though they are gradually disappearing
before the white man, bear him no ill-will, but rather the contrary.
Bishop Whipple of Minnesota, an earnest advocate of the peace policy,
draws the following contrast:--
"Here are two pictures--on one side of the line a nation has spent
$500,000,000 in Indian war; a people who have not 100 miles between
the Atlantic and the Pacific which has not been the scene of an
Indian massacre; a government which has not passed twenty years
without an Indian war; not one Indian tribe to whom it has given
Christian civilization; and which celebrates its centennial year
by another bloody Indian war. On the other side of the line there
is the same greedy, dominant Anglo-Saxon race, and the same
heathen. They have not spent one dollar in Indian war; they have
had no Indian massacres. Why? In Canada the Indian treaty calls
these men 'the Indian subjects of her Majesty.' When civilization
approaches them they are placed on ample reservations; they receive
aid in civilization; they have personal rights of property; they
are amenable to law and are protected by law; they have schools,
and Christian people delight to give them their best men to teach
them the religion of Christ. We expend more than one hundred
dollars to their one in caring for Indian wards."
The results of the Indian disturbances, whatever their causes, have
borne heavily on the hardy and enterprising settlers along the border.
Of these citizens Gen. Crook says:--
"I believe it is wrong for a Government as great and powerful as
ours not to protect its frontier people from savages. I do not see
why a man who has the courage to come out here and open the way for
civilization in his own country, is not as much entitled to the
protection of his Government as anybody else. I am not one of those
who believe, as many missionaries sent out here by well-meaning
eastern socities do, that the people of the frontiers are
cut-throats, thieves, and murderers. I have been thrown among them
for nearly 25 years of my life, and believe them to compare
favorably in energy, intelligence and manhood with the best of
their eastern brethren. They are mercilessly plundered by Indians
without any attempt being made to punish the perpetrators, and when
they ask for protection, they are told by some of our peace
commissioners sent out to make further concessions to the Indians,
that they have no business out here anyhow. I do not deny that my
sympathies have been with the frontier people in their unequal
contest against such obstacles. At the same time I do not wish to
be understood as the unrelenting foe of the Indian."
The Sioux Indians, embracing several tribes, are the old Dakotahs, long
known as among the bravest and most warlike aboriginals of this
continent. They were steadily pushed westward by the tide of
civilization to the Great Plains north of the Platte, where they claimed
as their own all the vast region west of the Missouri as far as they
could roam or fight their way. They resisted the approach of all
settlers and opposed the building of the Pacific Railroad.
In 1867, Congress sent out four civilians and three army officers as
Peace Commissioners, who, in 1868, made a treaty with the Sioux, whereby
for certain payments or stipulations, they agreed to surrender their
claims to a vast tract of country, to live at peace with their
neighbors, and to restrict themselves to a territory bounded south by
Nebraska, west by the 104th meridian, and north by the 46th parallel of
latitude--a territory as large as the State of Michigan. "They had the
solemn pledge of the United States that they should be protected in the
absolute and peaceable possession of the country thus set apart for
them; and the constitution makes such treaties the highest of all
authorities, and declares that they are binding upon every citizen."
In the western part of the Sioux territory, lying between the two forks
of the Cheyenne River, is the Black Hills country with an area of four
or five thousand square miles. Of the interior of this region up to 1874
nothing was known excepting from the indefinite reports of hunters who
had penetrated therein. The arrival at a trading post of Indians who
offered gold-dust for sale which they said was procured at the Black
Hills, caused much excitement; and a military expedition of 1200 men was
sent from Fort Lincoln in July 1874, to explore the Hills and ascertain
if gold existed there. As was expected, no hostile enemy were
encountered by the large expedition which thus invaded the Indian
territory. A few lodges of Indians were met in the Hills, and they ran
away notwithstanding friendly overtures were made. An attempt was made
to lead the pony of one mounted Indian to headquarters, but he got away,
and a shot was fired after him which, says General Custer, wounded
either the Indian or his pony as blood was found on the ground.
The geologists of the expedition reported that there was gold in the
Black Hills, and miners and others began to flock thither. In 1875,
troops were sent to remove the trespassers on the Indian reservation,
but as fast as they compelled or persuaded the miners to go away others
came to fill their places; and at the present date there are more
settlers there than ever before.
Of the treaty of 1868 and the so-called peace policy then inaugurated
various opinions are entertained. Gen. Sherman, a member of the
commission, in his report for 1876, says:--
"The commission had also to treat with other tribes at the south;
viz,--the Cheyennes, Arapahoes, Kiowas and Commanches; were engaged
for two years in visiting and confering with these scattered bands;
and finally, in 1868, concluded many treaties, which were the best
possible at that date, and which resulted in comparative peace on
the Plains, by defining clearly the boundaries to be thereafter
occupied by the various tribes, with the annuities in money,
provisions, and goods to be paid the Indians for the relenquishment
of their claims to this vast and indefinite region of land. At this
time the Sioux nation consisted of many distinct tribes, and was
estimated at 50,000, of whom some 8,000 were named as hostiles.
"These Indians, as all others, were under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Indian Bureau, and only small garrisons of
soldiers were called for at the several agencies, such as Red Cloud
and Spotted Tail on the head of the White Earth River in Nebraska
(outside their reservation), and at Standing Rock, Cheyenne, and
Crow Creek on the Missouri River, to protect the persons of the
agents and their employes. About these several agencies were
grouped the several bands of Sioux under various names, receiving
food, clothing, etc., and undergoing the process of civilization;
but from the time of the Peace Commission of 1868 to the date of
this report, a number of Sioux, recognized as hostile or 'outlaws,'
had remained out under the lead of Sitting Bull and a few other
chiefs."
"The so-called peace policy," says Bishop Whipple, "was commenced
when we were at war. The Indian tribes were either openly hostile,
or sullen and turbulent. The new policy was a marvellous success. I
do honestly believe that it has done more for the civilization of
the Indians than all which the Government has done before. Its only
weakness was that the system was not reformed. The new work was
fettered by all the faults and traditions of the old policy. The
nation left 300,000 men living within our own borders without a
vestige of government, without personal rights of property, without
the slightest protection of person, property, or life. We persisted
in telling these heathen tribes that they were independent nations.
We sent out the bravest and best of our officers, some who had
grown gray in the service of the country; men whose slightest word
was as good as their bond--we sent them because the Indians would
not doubt a soldier's honor. They made a treaty, and they pledged
the nation's faith that no white man should enter that territory. I
do not discuss its wisdom. The Executive and Senate ratified it....
A violation of its plain provisions was an act of deliberate
perjury. In the words of Gen. Sherman, 'Civilization made its own
compact with the weaker party; it was violated, but not by the
savage.' The whole world knew that we violated that treaty, and the
reason of the failure of the negotiations of last year was that our
own commissioners did not have authority from Congress to offer the
Indians more than one-third of the sum they were already receiving
under the old treaty."
"The Sioux Nation," says Gen. Crook, in his report of Sept. 1876,
"numbers many thousands of warriors, and they have been encouraged
in their insolent overbearing conduct by the fact, that those who
participated in the wholesale massacre of the innocent people in
Minnesota during the brief period that preceded their removal to
their present location, never received adequate punishment
therefor. Following hard upon and as the apparent result of the
massacre of over eighty officers and men of the army at Fort Phil
Kearney, the Government abandoned three of its military posts, and
made a treaty of unparalleled liberality with the perpetrators of
these crimes, against whom any other nation would have prosecuted a
vigorous war.
"Since that time the reservations, instead of being the abode of
loyal Indians holding the terms of their agreement sacred, have
been nothing but nests of disloyalty to their treaties and the
Government, and scourges to the people whose misfortune it has been
to be within the reach of the endurance of their ponies. And in
this connection, I regret to say, they have been materially aided
by sub-agents who have disgraced a bureau established for the
propagation of peace and good will, man to man.
"What is the loyal condition of mind of a lot of savages, who will
not allow the folds of the flag of the country to float over the
very sugar, coffee and beef, they are kind enough to accept at the
hands of the nation to which they have thus far dictated their own
terms? Such has been the condition of things at the Red Cloud
Agency.
"The hostile bands roamed over a vast extent of country, making the
Agencies their base of supplies, their recruiting and ordinance
depots, and were so closely connected by intermarriage, interest
and common cause with the Agency Indians, that it was difficult to
determine where the line of peaceably disposed ceased and the
hostile commenced. They have, without interruption, attacked
persons at home, murdered and scalped them, stolen their stock--in
fact violated every leading feature in the treaty. Indeed, so great
were their depredations on the stock belonging to the settlers,
that at certain times they have not had sufficient horses to do
their ordinary farming work--all the horses being concentrated on
the Sioux Reservation or among the bands which owe allegiance to
what is called the Sioux Nation. In the winter months these
renegade bands dwindle down to a comparatively small number; while
in summer they are recruited by restless spirits from the different
reservations, attracted by the opportunity to plunder the
frontiersman, so that by midsummer they become augmented from small
bands of one hundred to thousands.
"In fact, it was well known that the treaty of 1868 had been
regarded by the Indians as an instrument binding on us but not
binding on them. On the part of the Government, notwithstanding the
utter disregard by the Sioux of the terms of the treaty, stringent
orders, enforced by military power, had been issued prohibiting
settlers from trespassing upon the country known as the Black
Hills. The people of the country against whom the provisions of the
treaty were so rigidly enforced naturally complained that if they
were required to observe this treaty, some effort should be made to
compel the Indians to observe it likewise.
"The occupation by the settlers of the Black Hills country had
nothing to do with the hostilities which have been in progress. In
fact, by the continuous violations by these Indians of the treaty
referred to, the settlers were furnished with at least a reasonable
excuse for such occupation, in that a treaty so long and
persistently violated by the Indians themselves, should not be
quoted as a valid instrument for the preventing of such occupation.
Since the occupation of the Black Hills there has not been any
greater number of depredations committed by the Indians than
previous to such occupation; in truth, the people who have gone to
the Hills have not suffered any more and probably not as much from
Indians, as they would had they remained at their homes along the
border."
"In 1868," says Wm. R. Steele, delegate from Wyoming, "the United
States made a treaty with the Sioux Nation, which was a grave
mistake, if it was not a national dishonor and disgrace; that
treaty has been the foundation of all the difficulties in the Sioux
country. In 1866, Gen. Pope established posts at Fort Phil Kearney,
Reno, and Fort Smith, so as to open the road to Montana and protect
the country and friendly Crows from the hostile Sioux. In keeping
these posts and opening that road, many men, citizens and soldiers,
had been killed. Notable among the actions that had taken place was
the massacre of Fetterman and his command at Fort Phil Kearney; and
yet after these men had sacrificed their lives, the Government went
to work and made a treaty by which it ignominiously abandoned that
country to these savages, dismantling its own forts, and leaving
there the bones of men who had laid down their lives in the
wilderness. Was it to be wondered at, under these circumstances,
that Sitting Bull and his men believed they were superior to the
general government? Any body who knows anything about Indian
nature knows that the legitimate result of that cowardly policy of
peace at any price, was to defer only the evil day which has now
come upon us. Since that time the Sioux have been constantly
depredating on the frontiers of Nebraska, Wyoming and Montana, and
more men have fallen there in the peaceful vocations of civil life,
without a murmur being heard, than fell under the gallant Custer.
The friendly Crows have been raided with every full moon; so with
the Shoshones; and at last these outrages have become so great and
so long continued that even the peaceable Indian Department could
not stand them any longer, and called on the military arm of the
Government to punish these men."
President Grant, in his message of December, 1876, uses the
following language:--"A policy has been adopted towards the Indian
tribes inhabiting a large portion of the territory of the United
States, which has been humane, and has substantially ended Indian
hostilities in the whole land, except in a portion of Nebraska, and
Dakota, Wyoming, and Montana territories, the Black Hills region,
and approaches thereto. Hostilities there have grown out of the
avarice of the white man, who has violated our treaty stipulations
in his search for gold. The question might be asked, why the
Government had not enforced obedience to the terms of the treaty
prohibiting the occupation of the Black Hills region by whites? The
answer is simple. The first immigrants to the Black Hills were
removed by troops, but rumors of rich discoveries of gold took into
that region increased numbers. Gold has actually been found in
paying quantity, and an effort to remove the miners would only
result in the desertion of the bulk of the troops that might be
sent there to remove them."
The causes and objects of the military operations against the Sioux in
1876, as stated by the Secretary of War in a letter to the President
dated July 8th, 1876, were in part as follows:--
"The present military operations are not against the Sioux nation
at all, but against certain hostile parts of it which defy the
Government, and are undertaken at the special request of the bureau
of the Government charged with their supervision, and wholly to
make the civilization of the remainder possible. No part of these
operations are on or near the Sioux reservation. The accidental
discovery of gold on the western border of the Sioux reservation
and the intrusion of our people thereon have not caused this war,
and have only complicated it by the uncertainty of numbers to be
encountered. The young warriors love war, and frequently escape
their agents to go to the hunt or war path--their only idea of the
object of life. The object of these military expeditions was in the
interest of the peaceful parts of the Sioux nation, supposed to
embrace at least nine-tenths of the whole, and not one of these
peaceful treaty Indians has been molested by the military
authorities."
Of the hostile Indians referred to by the Secretary of War, Hon. E.P.
Smith, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, reported Nov. 1st, 1875:--"It
will probably be found necessary to compel the Northern non-treaty
Sioux, under the leadership of Sitting Bull, who have never yet in any
way recognized the United States Government, except by snatching rations
occasionally at an agency, and such outlaws from the several agencies as
have attached themselves to these same hostiles, to cease marauding and
settle down, as the other Sioux have done, at some designated point."
Soon afterwards, Indian Inspector E.C. Watkins addressed the
Commissioner respecting these Indians, as follows:--"The true policy in
my judgment is to send troops against them in winter, the sooner the
better, and whip them into subjection. They richly merit punishment for
their incessant warfare and their numerous murders of white settlers and
their families, or white men whenever found unarmed."
Early in December, by the advice of the Secretary of the Interior,
Commissioner Smith directed that runners be sent out to notify "said
Indian Sitting Bull, and others outside their reservation, that they
must move to the reservation before the 31st day of January, 1876; that
if they neglect or refuse so to move, they will be reported to the War
Department as hostile Indians, and that a military force will be sent to
compel them to obey the order of the Indian officer." Respecting this
order to the Indians, Bishop Whipple, in a letter to the _New York
Tribune_, says:--
"There was an inadequate supply of provisions at the agencies that
Fall, and the Indians went out to their unceded territory to hunt.
They went as they were accustomed to do--with the consent of their
agents and as provided by the treaty. * * * The Indians had gone a
way from the agencies to secure food, and skins for clothing. The
United States had set apart this very country as a hunting-ground
for them forever. Eight months after this order to return or be
treated as hostile, Congress appropriated money for the seventh of
thirty installments for these roaming Indians. It was impossible
for the Indians to obey the order. No one of the runners sent out
to inform the Indians, was able to return himself by the time
appointed; yet Indian women and children were expected to travel a
treeless desert, without food or proper clothing, under the penalty
of death."
As the order and warning were disregarded by the Indians, the Secretary
of the Interior notified the Secretary of War, Feb. 1st, 1876, that "the
time given him (Sitting Bull) in which to return to an agency having
expired, and advices received at the Indian Office being to the effect
that Sitting Bull still refuses to comply with the direction of the
Commissioner, the said Indians are hereby turned over to the War
Department for such action on the part of the army as you may deem
proper under the circumstances."
By direction of Lieut. General Sheridan, Commander over the vast extent
of territory included in the Military Division of Missouri, Brig. Gen.
George Crook, Commander of the Department of the Platte, an officer of
great merit and experience in Indian fighting, now undertook to reduce
these Indian outlaws to subjection, and made preparations for an
expedition against them.
CHAPTER II.
BATTLES OF THE POWDER AND ROSEBUD.
General Crook started from Fort Fetterman, W.T., March 1st, 1876, at the
head of an expedition composed of ten companies of the 2d and 3d Cavalry
under Col. J.J. Reynolds, and two companies of the 4th Infantry, with
teamsters, guides, etc., amounting in all to nearly nine hundred men.
His course was nearly north, past the abandoned Forts Reno and Phil.
Kearney to Tongue River. He descended this river nearly to the
Yellowstone, scouted Rosebud River, and then changed his course to the
south-east toward Powder River. At a point on the head of Otter Creek,
Crook divided his command, and sent Col. Reynolds with six companies of
cavalry and one day's rations to follow the trail of two Indians
discovered that day in the snow.
Col. Reynolds moved at 5 P.M. of the 16th, and at 4.20 A.M., after a
night's march of thirty miles, was near the forks of Powder River. The
following extracts are copied from a letter written to the _New York
Tribune_:--
"A halt was called here and the column took shelter in a ravine. No
fires were allowed to be kindled, nor even a match lighted. The
cold was intense and seemed to be at least 30 deg. below zero. The
command remained here till about 6 o'clock, doing their uttermost
to keep from freezing, the scouts meantime going out to
reconnoitre. At this hour they returned, reporting a larger and
fresher trail leading down to the river which was about four miles
distant. The column immediately started on the trail. The approach
to the river seemed almost impracticable. Before reaching the final
precipices which overlooked the riverbed, the scouts discovered
that a village lay in the valley at the foot of the bluffs. It was
now 8 o'clock. The sun shone brightly through the cold frosty air.
"The column halted, and Noyes's battalion, 2d Cavalry, was ordered
up to the front. It consisted of Company I, Capt. Noyes, and
Company K, Capt. Egan. This battalion was ordered to descend to the
valley, and while Egan charged the camp, Noyes was to cut out the
herd of horses feeding close by and drive it up the river. Capt.
Moore's battalion of two companies was ordered to dismount and
proceed along the edge of the ridge to a position covering the
eastern side of the village opposite that from which Egan was to
charge. Capt. Mills's battalion was ordered to follow Egan
dismounted, and support him in the engagement which might follow
the charge.
"These columns began the descent of the mountain, through gorges
which were almost perpendicular. Nearly two hours were occupied in
getting the horses of the charging columns down these rough sides
of the mountain, and even then, when a point was reached where the
men could mount their horses and proceed toward the village in the
narrow valley beneath, Moore's battalion had not been able to gain
its position on the eastern side after clambering along the edges
of the mountain. A few Indians could be seen with the herd, driving
it to the edge of the river, but nothing indicated that they knew
of our approach.
"Just at 9 o'clock Capt. Egan turned the point of the mountain
nearest the river, and first in a walk and then in a rapid trot
started for the village. The company went first in column of twos,
but when within 200 yards of the village the command 'Left front
into line' was given, and with a yell they rushed into the
encampment. Capt. Noyes had in the meantime wheeled to the right
and started the herd up the river. With the yell of the charging
column the Indians sprang up as if by magic and poured in a rapid
fire from all sides. Egan charged through and through the village
before Moore's and Mills's battalions got within supporting
distance, and finding things getting very hot, formed his line in
some high willows on the south side of the camp, from which he
poured in rapid volleys upon the Indians.
"Up to this time the Indians supposed that one company was all they
had to contend with, but when the other battalions appeared,
rapidly advancing, deployed as skirmishers and pouring in a galling
fire of musketry, they broke on all sides and took refuge in the
rocks along the side of the mountain. The camp, consisting of 110
lodges, with immense quantities of robes, fresh meat, and plunder
of all kinds, with over 700 head of horses were in our possession.
The work of burning immediately began, and soon the whole
encampment was in flames.
"After the work of destruction was completed the whole command
moved rapidly up the river twenty miles to Lodgepole Creek. This
point was reached at nightfall by all except Moore's battalion and
Egan's company. Company E was the rear guard, and assisted Major
Stanton and the scouts in bringing up the herd of horses; many of
these were shot on the road, and the remainder reached camp about 9
P.M. These troops had been in the saddle for 36 hours, with the
exception of five hours during which they were fighting, and all,
officers and men, were much exhausted.
"Upon arriving at Lodgepole, it was found that General Crook and
the other four companies and pack-train had not arrived, so that
everybody was supperless and without a blanket. The night,
therefore, was not a cheerful one, but not a murmur was heard. The
tired men lay upon the snow or leaned against a tree, and slept as
best they could on so cold a night. Saturday, at noon, General
Crook arrived. In the meantime a portion of the herd of horses had
straggled into the ravines, and fallen into the hands of the
Indians."
The village thus destroyed was that of Crazy Horse, one of the avowedly
hostile chiefs. "He had with him," wrote Gen. Crook, "the Northern
Cheyennes, and some of the Minneconjous--probably in all one-half of the
Indians off the reservations." The Indian loss was unknown. Four of
Reynolds' men were killed, and six men including one officer were
wounded. The whole force subsequently returned to Fort Fetterman,
reaching there March 26th.
The results of this expedition were neither conclusive or satisfactory.
Therefore, Gen. Sheridan determined to proceed more systematically by
concentric movements. He ordered three distinct columns to be prepared
to move to a common centre, where the hostiles were supposed to be, from
Montana, from Dakota, and from the Platte. The two former fell under the
command of Gen. Alfred H. Terry, Commander of the Department of Dakota,
and the latter under Gen. Crook. These movements were to be
simultaneous, so that Indians avoiding one column might be encountered
by another.
Gen. Crook marched from Fort Fetterman on the 29th of May, with two
battalions of the 2d and 3d Cavalry under Lieut. Col. W.B. Royall, and a
battalion of five companies of the 4th and 9th Infantry under Major
Alex. Chambers, with a train of wagons, pack-mules, and Indian scouts,
all amounting to 47 officers and 1,000 men present for duty. This
expedition marched by the same route as the preceding one, to a point on
Goose Creek, which is the head of Tongue River, where a supply camp was
established on June 8th. During the preceding night a party of Sioux
came down on the encampment, and endeavored to stampede the horses,
bringing on an engagement which resulted in the discomfiture and retreat
of the enemy. On the 14th, a band of Shoshones and Crows--Indians
unfriendly to the Sioux--joined Crook, and were provided with arms and
ammunition.
The aggressive column of the expedition resumed the march forward on the
morning of the 16th, leaving the trains parked at the Goose Creek camp.
The infantry were mounted on mules borrowed from the pack-train, and
each man carried his own supplies consisting of only three days' rations
and one blanket. At night, after marching about 35 miles, the little
army encamped between high bluffs at the head waters of Rosebud River.
At 5 A.M. on the morning of the 17th the troops started down the valley
of the Rosebud, the Indian allies marching in front and on the flanks.
After advancing about seven miles successive shots were heard in front,
the scouts came running in to report Indians advancing, and Gen. Crook
had hardly time to form his men, before large numbers of warriors fully
prepared for a fight were in view.
The battle which ensued was on both banks of the Rosebud, near the upper
end of a deep canyon having sides which were steep, covered with pine,
and apparently impregnable, through which the stream ran. The Indians
displayed a strong force at all points, and contested the ground with a
tenacity which indicated that they were fighting for time to remove
their village, which was supposed to be about six miles down the Rosebud
at the lower end of the canyon, or believed themselves strong enough to
defeat their opponents.
The officers and men of Crook's command behaved with marked gallantry
during the engagement. The Sioux were finally repulsed in their bold
onset, and lost many of their bravest warriors; but when they fled they
could not be pursued far without great danger owing to the roughness of
the country. The Indian allies were full of enthusiasm but not very
manageable, preferring to fight independently of orders. Crook's losses
were nine soldiers killed, and twenty-one wounded, including Capt. Henry
of the 3d Cavalry. Seven of the friendly Indians were wounded, and one
was killed.
Gen. Crook was satisfied that the number and quality of the enemy
required more men than he had, and being encumbered with wounded he
concluded to retreat. The night was passed on the battle-field, and the
next day he started for his camp on Goose Creek, which was reached June
19th. Couriers were sent to Fort Fetterman for reinforcements and
supplies, and the command remained inactive for several weeks awaiting
their arrival.
The battle of the Rosebud was fought not very far from the scene of
Custer's defeat a few days later, and Gen. Crook concludes that his
opponents were the same that Custer and Reno encountered.
"It now became apparent," says Gen. Sheridan in his report "that Gen.
Crook had not only Crazy Horse and his small band to contend with, but
that the hostile force had been augmented by large numbers of the young
warriors from the agencies along the Missouri River, and the Red Cloud
and Spotted Tail agencies in Nebraska, and that the Indian agents at
these agencies had concealed the fact of the departure of these
warriors, and that in most cases they continued to issue rations as
though they were present."
CHAPTER III.
TERRY'S EXPEDITION--OPENING OF THE CAMPAIGN.
General Terry left Fort Abraham Lincoln on the Missouri River, May 17th
1876, with his division, consisting of the 7th Cavalry under Lieut. Col.
George A. Custer, three companies of infantry, a battery of Gatling
guns, and 45 enlisted scouts. His whole force, exclusive of the
wagon-train drivers, numbered about 1000 men. His march was westerly,
over the route taken by the Stanley expedition in 1873.
On the 11th of June, Terry reached the south bank of the Yellowstone at
the mouth of Powder River, where by appointment he met steamboats, and
established his supply camp. A scouting party of six companies of the
7th Cavalry under Major M.A. Reno was sent out June 10th, which ascended
Powder River to its forks, crossed westerly to Tongue River and beyond,
and discovered, near Rosebud River, a heavy Indian trail about ten days
old leading westward toward Little Big Horn River. After following this
trail a short distance Reno returned to the Yellowstone and rejoined his
regiment, which then marched, accompanied by steamboats, to the mouth of
Rosebud River where it encamped June 21st. Communication by steamboats
and scouts had previously been opened with Col. John Gibbon, whose
column was at this time encamped on the north side of the Yellowstone,
near by.
Col. Gibbon of the 7th Infantry had left Fort Ellis in Montana about the
middle of May, with a force consisting of six companies of his regiment,
and four companies of the 2d Cavalry under Major J.S. Brisbin. He had
marched eastward down the north bank of the Yellowstone to the mouth of
the Rosebud, where he encamped about June 1st.
Gen. Terry now consulted with Gibbon and Custer, and decided upon a plan
for attacking the Indians who were believed to be assembled in large
numbers near Big Horn River. Custer with his regiment was to ascend the
valley of the Rosebud, and then turn towards Little Big Horn River,
keeping well to the south. Gibbon's troops were to cross the Yellowstone
at the mouth of Big Horn River, and march up the Big Horn to its
junction with the Little Big Horn, to co-operate with Custer. It was
hoped that the Indians would thus be brought between the two forces so
that their escape would be impossible.
Col. Gibbon's column was immediately put in motion for the mouth of the
Big Horn. On the next day, June 22d, at noon, Custer announced himself
ready to start, and drew out his regiment. It consisted of 12 companies,
numbering 28 officers and 747 soldiers. There were also a strong
detachment of scouts and guides, several civilians, and a supply train
of 185 pack mules. Gen. Terry reviewed the column in the presence of
Gibbon and Brisbin, and it was pronounced in splendid condition. "The
officers clustered around Terry for a final shake of the hand, the last
good-bye was said, and in the best of spirits, filled with high hopes,
they galloped away--many of them to their death."
Gen. Terry's orders to Custer were as follows:--
CAMP AT THE MOUTH OF ROSEBUD RIVER,}
June 22d, 1876.}
_Lieut. Col. Custer, 7th Cavalry._
COLONEL: The Brigadier General Commanding directs that as soon as
your regiment can be made ready for the march, you proceed up the
Rosebud in pursuit of the Indians whose trail was discovered by
Major Reno a few days ago. It is, of course, impossible to give any
definite instructions in regard to this movement, and, were it not
impossible to do so, the Department Commander places too much
confidence in your zeal, energy, and ability to wish to impose upon
you precise orders which might hamper your action when nearly in
contact with the enemy. He will, however, indicate to you his own
views of what your action should be, and he desires that you should
conform to them unless you shall see sufficient reason for
departing from them. He thinks that you should proceed up the
Rosebud until you ascertain definitely the direction in which the
trail above spoken of leads. Should it be found (as it appears to
be almost certain that it will be found) to turn towards the Little
Big Horn, he thinks that you should still proceed southward perhaps
as far as the head waters of the Tongue, and then turn toward the
Little Big Horn, feeling constantly, however, to your left, so as
to preclude the possibility of the escape of the Indians to the
south or south-east by passing around your left flank. The column
of Col. Gibbon is now in motion for the mouth of the Big Horn. As
soon as it reaches that point it will cross the Yellowstone, and
move up at least as far as the forks of the Big and Little Big
Horn. Of course its future movements must be controlled by
circumstances as they arise; but it is hoped that the Indians, if
up on the Little Big Horn, may be so nearly inclosed by the two
columns that their escape will be impossible. The Department
Commander desires that on your way up the Rosebud you should
thoroughly examine the upper part of Tulloch's Creek, and that you
should endeavor to send a scout through to Col. Gibbon's column
with information of the result of your examination. The lower part
of this creek will be examined by a detachment from Col. Gibbon's
command. The supply steamer will be pushed up the Big Horn as far
as the forks of the river are found to be navigable for that space,
and the Department Commander, who will accompany the column of Col.
Gibbon, desires you to report to him there not later than the
expiration of the time for which your troops are rationed, unless
in the meantime you receive further orders. Respectfully, &c.,
E.W. SMITH, Captain 18th Infantry,
Acting Assistant Adjutant General.
After proceeding southerly up the Rosebud for about seventy miles,
Custer, at 11 P.M. on the night of the 24th, turned westerly towards
Little Big Horn River. The next morning while crossing the elevated land
between the two rivers, a large Indian village was discovered about
fifteen miles distant, just across Little Big Horn River. Custer with
characteristic promptness decided to attack the village at once.
One company was escorting the train at the rear. The balance of the
force was divided into three columns. The trail they were on led down to
the stream at a point some distance south of the village. Major Reno,
with three companies under Capt. T.H. French, Capt. Myles Moylan, and
Lieut. Donald Mclntosh, was ordered to follow the trail, cross the
stream, and charge down its north bank. Capt. F.W. Benteen, with his own
company and two others under Capt. T. B. Weir and Lieut. E.S. Godfrey,
was sent to make a detour to the south of Reno. The other five companies
of the regiment, under the immediate command of Custer, formed the right
of the little army.
On reaching the river Reno crossed it as ordered, and Custer with his
five companies turned northerly into a ravine running behind the bluffs
on the east side of the stream.
CHAPTER IV.
GIBBON'S MARCH UP THE BIG HORN RIVER.
The supply steamer Far West with Gen. Terry and Col. Gibbon on board,
which steamed up the Yellowstone on the evening of June 23d, overtook
Gibbon's troops near the mouth of the Big Horn early on the morning of
the 24th; and by 4 o'clock P.M. of the same day, the entire command with
the animals and supplies had been ferried over to the south side of the
Yellowstone. An hour later the column marched out to and across
Tulloch's Creek, and then encamped for the night.
At 5 o'clock on the morning of the 25th, (Sunday) the column was again
in motion; and after marching 22 miles over a country so rugged as to
task the endurance of the men to the utmost, the infantry halted for the
night. Gen. Terry, however, with the cavalry and the battery pushed on
14 miles further in hopes of opening communication with Custer, and
camped at midnight near the mouth of the Little Big Horn.
Scouts sent out from Terry's camp early on the morning of the 26th
discovered three Indians, who proved to be Crows who had accompanied
Custer's regiment. They reported that a battle had been fought and that
the Indians were killing white men in great numbers. Their story was not
fully credited, as it was not expected that a conflict would occur so
soon, or believed that serious disaster could have overtaken so large a
force.
The infantry, which had broken camp very early, now came up, and the
whole column crossed the Little Big Horn and moved up its western
valley. It was soon reported that a dense heavy smoke was resting over
the southern horizon far ahead, and in a short time it became visible to
all. This was hailed as a sign that Custer had met the Indians, defeated
them, and burned their village. The weary foot soldiers were elated and
freshened by the sight, and pressed on with increased spirit and speed.
Custer's position was believed to be not far ahead, and efforts were
repeatedly made during the afternoon to open communication with him; but
the scouts who attempted to go through were met and driven back by
hostile Indians who were hovering in the front. As evening came on,
their numbers increased and large parties could be seen on the bluffs
hurrying from place to place and watching every movement of the
advancing soldiers.
At 8:40 in the evening the infantry had marched that day about 30 miles.
The forks of the Big Horn, the place where Terry had requested Custer to
report to him, were many miles behind and the expected messenger from
Custer had not arrived. Daylight was fading, the men were fatigued, and
the column was therefore halted for the night. The animals were
picketed, guards were set, and the weary men, wrapped in their blankets
and with their weapons beside them, were soon asleep on the ground.
Early on the morning of the 27th the march up the Little Big Horn was
resumed. The smoke cloud was still visible and apparently but a short
distance ahead. Soon a dense grove of trees was reached and passed
through cautiously, and then the head of the column entered a beautiful
level meadow about a mile in width, extending along the west side of the
stream and overshadowed east and west by high bluffs. It soon became
apparent that this meadow had recently been the site of an immense
Indian village, and the great number of temporary brushwood and willow
huts indicated that many Indians beside the usual inhabitants had
rendezvoused there. It was also evident that it had been hastily
deserted. Hundreds of lodge-poles, with finely-dressed buffalo-robes and
other hides, dried meat, stores, axes, utensils, and Indian trinkets
were left behind; and in two tepees or lodges still standing, were the
bodies of nine Indians who had gone to the "happy hunting-grounds."
Every step of the march now revealed some evidence that a conflict had
taken place not far away. The dead bodies of Indian horses were seen,
and cavalry equipments and weapons, bullet-pierced clothing, and
blood-stained gloves were picked up; and at last the bodies of soldiers
and their horses gave positive proof that a disastrous battle had taken
place. The Crow Indians had told the truth.
The head of the column was now met by a breathless scout, who came
running up with the intelligence that Major Reno with a body of troops
was intrenched on a bluff further on, awaiting relief. The soldiers
pushed ahead in the direction pointed out, and soon came in sight of men
and horses intrenched on top of a hill on the opposite or east side of
the river. Terry and Gibbon immediately forded the stream and rode
toward the group. As they approached the top of the hill, they were
welcomed by hearty cheers from a swarm of soldiers who came out of
their intrenchments to meet their deliverers. The scene was a touching
one. Stout-hearted soldiers who had kept bravely up during the hours of
conflict and danger now cried like children, and the pale faces of the
wounded lighted up as hope revived within them.
The story of the relieved men briefly told was as follows:--After
separating from Custer about noon, June 25th, (as related in the last
chapter) Reno proceeded to the river, forded it, and charged down its
west bank toward the village, meeting at first with but little
resistance. Soon however he was attacked by such numbers as to be
obliged to dismount his men, shelter his horses in a strip of woods, and
fight on foot. Finding that they would soon be surrounded and defeated,
he again mounted his men, and charging upon such of the enemy as
obstructed his way, retreated across the river, and reached the top of a
bluff followed closely by Indians. Just then Benteen, returning from his
detour southward, discovered Reno's perilous position, drove back the
Indians, and joined him on the hill. Shortly afterward, the company
which was escorting the mule train also joined Reno. The seven companies
thus brought together had been subsequently assailed by Indians; many of
the men had been killed and wounded, and it was only by obstinate
resistance that they had been enabled to defend themselves in an
entrenched position. The enemy had retired on the evening of the 26th.
After congratulations to Reno and his brave men for their successful
defence enquiries were made respecting Custer, but no one could tell
where he was. Neither he or any of his men had been seen since the fight
commenced, and the musketry heard from the direction he took had ceased
on the afternoon of the 25th. It was supposed by Reno and Benteen that
he had been repulsed, and retreated northerly towards Terry's troops.
A search for Custer and his men was immediately began, and it revealed a
scene calculated to appal the stoutest heart. Although neither Custer or
any of that part of his regiment which he led to combat were found alive
to tell the tale, an examination of their trail and the scene of
conflict enabled their comrades to form some idea of the engagement in
which they perished.
[Illustration]
CHAPTER V.
CUSTER'S LAST BATTLE.
General Custer's trail, from the place where he left Reno's and turned
northward, passed along and in the rear of the crest of hills on the
east bank of the stream for nearly three miles, and then led, through an
opening in the bluff, down to the river. Here Custer had evidently
attempted to cross over to attack the village. The trail then turned
back on itself, as if Custer had been repulsed and obliged to retreat,
and branched to the northward, as if he had been prevented from
returning southerly by the way he came, or had determined to retreat in
the direction from which Terry's troops were advancing.
Several theories as to the subsequent movements of the troops have been
entertained by persons who visited the grounds. One is, that the
soldiers in retreating took advantage of two ravines; that two companies
under Capt. T.W. Custer and Lieut. A. E. Smith, were led by Gen. Custer
up the ravine nearest the river, while the upper ravine furnished a line
of retreat for the three companies of Capt. G.W. Yates, Capt. M.W.
Keogh, and Lieut. James Calhoun. At the head of this upper ravine, a
mile from the river, a stand had been made by Calhoun's company; the
skirmish lines were marked by rows of the slain with heaps of empty
cartridge shells before them, and Lieuts. Calhoun and Crittenden lay
dead just behind the files. Further on, Capt. Keogh had fallen
surrounded by his men; and still further on, upon a hill, Capt. Yates'
company took its final stand. Here, according to this theory, Yates was
joined by what remained of the other two companies, who had been
furiously assailed in the lower ravine; and here Gen. Custer and the
last survivors of the five companies met their death, fighting bravely
to the end.
Another theory of the engagement is, that Custer attempted to retreat up
the lower ravine in columns of companies; that the companies of Custer
and Smith being first in the advance and last in the retreat, fell first
in the slaughter which followed the retrograde movement; that Yates'
company took the position on the hill, and perished there with Custer
and other officers; and that the two other companies, Keogh's and
Calhoun's, perished while fighting their way back towards Reno--a few
reaching the place where Custer first struck the high banks of the
river.
Still another theory is, that the main line of retreat was by the upper
ravine; that Calhoun's company was thrown across to check the Indians,
and was the first annihilated. That the two companies of Capt. Custer
and Lieut. Smith retreated from the place where Gen. Custer was killed
into the lower ravine, and were the last survivors of the conflict.
Near the highest point of the hill lay the body of General Custer, and
near by were those of his brother Captain Custer, Lieut. Smith, Capt.
Yates, Lieut. W. V. Riley of Yates' company, and Lieut. W.W. Cooke. Some
distance away, close together, were found another brother of Gen.
Custer--Boston Custer, a civilian, who had accompanied the expedition
as forage master of the 7th Cavalry--and his nephew Armstrong Reed, a
youth of nineteen, who was visiting the General at the time the
expedition started, and accompanied it as a driver of the herd of cattle
taken along. The wife of Lieut. Calhoun was a sister of the Custer's,
and she here lost her husband, three brothers, and a nephew.
Other officers of Custer's battalion killed but not already mentioned,
were Asst. Surgeon L.W. Lord, and Lieuts. H.M. Harrington, J.E. Porter,
and J.G. Sturgis. The last named was a West Point graduate of 1875, and
a son of General S.D. Sturgis, the Colonel of the 7th Cavalry, who had
been detained by other duties when his regiment started on this
expedition. The bodies of the slain were rifled of valuables and all
were mutilated excepting Gen. Custer, and Mark Kellogg--a correspondent
of the _New York Herald_. Gen. Custer was clad in a buckskin suit; and a
Canadian--Mr. Macdonald--was subsequently informed by Indians who were
in the fight, that for this reason he was not mangled, as they took him
to be some brave hunter accidentally with the troops. Others believe
that Custer was passed by from respect for the heroism of one whom the
Indians had learned to fear and admire.
The dead were buried June 28th, where they fell, Major Reno and the
survivors of his regiment performing the last sad rites over their
comrades.
A retreat to the mouth of Big Horn River was now ordered and
successfully effected, the wounded being comfortably transported on mule
litters to the mouth of the Little Big Horn, where they were placed on a
steamboat and taken to Fort Lincoln. Gibbon's Cavalry followed the
Indians for about ten miles, and ascertained that they had moved to the
south and west by several trails. A good deal of property had been
thrown away by them to lighten their march, and was found scattered
about. Many of their dead were also discovered secreted in ravines a
long distance from the battle field.
At the boat was found one of Custer's scouts, who had been in the
fight--a Crow named Curley; his story was as follows:--
"Custer kept down the river on the north bank four miles, after
Reno had crossed to the south side above. He thought Reno would
drive down the valley, to attack the village at the upper end,
while he (Custer) would go in at the lower end. Custer had to go
further down the river and further away from Reno than he wished on
account of the steep bank along the north side; but at last he
found a ford and dashed for it. The Indians met him and poured in a
heavy fire from across the narrow river. Custer dismounted to fight
on foot, but could not get his skirmishers over the stream.
Meantime hundreds of Indians, on foot and on ponies, poured over
the river, which was only about three feet deep, and filled the
ravine on each side of Custer's men. Custer then fell back to some
high ground behind him and seized the ravines in his immediate
vicinity. The Indians completely surrounded Custer and poured in a
terrible fire on all sides. They charged Custer on foot in vast
numbers, but were again and again driven back.
"The fight began about 2 o'clock, and lasted almost until the sun
went down over the hills. The men fought desperately, and after the
ammunition in their belts was exhausted went to their saddlebags,
got more and continued the fight. Custer lived until nearly all his
men had been killed or wounded, and went about encouraging his
soldiers to fight on. He got a shot in the left side and sat down,
with his pistol in his hand. Another shot struck Custer in the
breast, and he fell over. The last officer killed was a man who
rode a white horse--believed to be Lieut. Cooke, as Cooke and
Calhoun were the only officers who rode white horses.
"When he saw Custer hopelessly surrounded he watched his
opportunity, got a Sioux blanket, put it on, and worked up a
ravine, and when the Sioux charged, he got among them and they did
not know him from one of their own men. There were some mounted
Sioux, and seeing one fall, he ran to him, mounted his pony, and
galloped down as if going towards the white men, but went up a
ravine and got away. As he rode off he saw, when nearly a mile from
the battle field, a dozen or more soldiers in a ravine, fighting
with Sioux all around them. He thinks all were killed, as they were
outnumbered five to one, and apparently dismounted. The battle was
desperate in the extreme, and more Indians than white men must have
been killed."
The following extract is from a letter written to Gen. Sheridan by Gen.
Terry at his camp on the Big Horn, July 2d:--
"We calculated it would take Gibbon's command until the 26th to
reach the mouth of the Little Big Horn, and that the wide sweep I
had proposed Custer should make would require so much time that
Gibbon would be able to co-operate with him in attacking any
Indians that might be found on the stream. I asked Custer how long
his marches would be. He said they would be at the rate of about 30
miles a day. Measurements were made and calculations based on that
rate of progress. I talked with him about his strength, and at one
time suggested that perhaps it would be well for me to take
Gibbon's cavalry and go with him. To the latter suggestion he
replied:--that, without reference to the command, he would prefer
his own regiment alone. As a homogeneous body, as much could be
done with it as with the two combined. He expressed the utmost
confidence that he had all the force that he could need, and I
shared his confidence. The plan adopted was the only one which
promised to bring the infantry into action, and I desired to make
sure of things by getting up every available man. I offered Custer
the battery of Gatling guns, but he declined it, saying that it
might embarrass him, and that he was strong enough without it. The
movements proposed by General Gibbon's column were carried out to
the letter, and had the attack been deferred until it was up, I
cannot doubt that we should have been successful."
CHAPTER VI.
RENO'S BATTLES ON THE LITTLE BIG HORN.
After the battle in which Lieut. Col. Custer lost his life, the command
of the 7th Cavalry regiment devolved on Major Reno. The following is a
copy of Reno's official report to Gen. Terry, excepting that a few
unimportant paragraphs are omitted. It is dated July 5th, 1876.
"The regiment left the camp at the mouth of Rosebud River, after
passing in review before the department commander, under command of
Brevet Major General G.A. Custer, Lieutenant Colonel, on the
afternoon of the 22d of June, and marched up the Rosebud 12 miles
and encamped. 23d--Marched up the Rosebud, passing many old Indian
camps, and following a very large lodge-pole trail, but not fresh,
making 33 miles. 24th--The march was continued up the Rosebud, the
trail and signs freshening with every mile until we had made 28
miles, and we then encamped and waited for information from the
scouts. At 9.25 P.M., Custer called the officers together, and
informed us that beyond a doubt the village was in the valley of
the Little Big Horn, and that to reach it, it was necessary to
cross the divide between the Rosebud and Little Big Horn, and it
would be impossible to do so in the daytime without discovering our
march to the Indians; that we would prepare to move at 11 P.M. This
was done, the line of march turning from the Rosebud to the right,
up one of its branches, which headed near the summit of the divide.
"About 2 A.M. of the 25th, the scouts told him that he could not
cross the divide before daylight. We then made coffee and rested
for three hours, at the expiration of which time the march was
resumed, the divide crossed, and about 8 A.M. the command was in
the valley of one of the branches of the Little Big Horn. By this
time Indians had been seen, and it was certain that we could not
surprise them, and it was determined to move at once to the attack.
"Previous to this no division of the regiment had been made since
the order was issued on the Yellowstone, annulling wing and
battalion organizations. General Custer informed me he would assign
commands on the march. I was ordered by Lieut. W.W. Cooke,
Adjutant, to assume command of Companies M, A, and G; Capt. Benteen
of Companies H, D, and K; Custer retaining C, E, F, I, and L, under
his immediate command; and Company B, Capt. McDougall, being in
rear of the pack train. I assumed command of the companies assigned
to me, and without any definite orders, moved forward with the rest
of the column, and well to its left. I saw Benteen moving further
to the left, and, as they passed, he told me he had orders to move
well to the left, and sweep everything before him; I did not see
him again until about 2:30 P.M. The command moved down the creek
towards the Little Big Horn Valley. Custer with five companies on
the right bank; myself and three companies on the left bank; and
Benteen further to the left, and out of sight.
"As we approached a deserted village, in which was standing one
tepee, about 11 A.M., Custer motioned me to cross to him, which I
did, and moved nearer to his column, until about 12:30 A.M., when
Lieut. Cooke came to me and said the village was only two miles
ahead and running away. To 'move forward at as rapid a gait as I
thought prudent and to charge afterward, and that the whole outfit
would support me.' I think those were his exact words. I at once
took a fast trot, and moved down about two miles, when I came to a
ford of the river. I crossed immediately, and halted about ten
minutes or less, to gather the battalion, sending word to Custer
that I had everything in front of me, and that they were strong.
"I deployed, and, with the Ree scouts on my left, charged down the
valley, driving the Indians with great ease for about 2-1/2 miles.
I, however, soon saw that I was being drawn into some trap, as they
certainly would fight harder, and especially as we were nearing
their village, which was still standing; besides, I could not see
Custer or any other support; and at the same time the very earth
seemed to grow Indians, and they were running toward me in swarms,
and from all directions. I saw I must defend myself, and give up
the attack mounted. This I did, taking possession of a point of
woods, which furnished near its edge a shelter for the horses;
dismounted, and fought them on foot, making headway through the
woods. I soon found myself in the near vicinity of the village, saw
that I was fighting odds of at least five to one, and that my only
hope was to get out of the woods, where I would soon have been
surrounded, and gain some high ground. I accomplished this by
mounting and charging the Indians between me and the bluffs on the
opposite side of the river. In this charge First Lieut. Donald
McIntosh, Second Lieut. Benjamin H. Hodgson, and Acting Assistant
Surgeon J. M. De Wolf were killed.
"I succeeded in reaching the top of the bluff, with a loss of the
three officers and 29 enlisted men killed, and seven men wounded.
Almost at the same time I reached the top, mounted men were seen to
be coming toward us, and it proved to be Capt. Benteen's battalion,
Companies H, D, and K; we joined forces, and in a short time the
pack train came up. As senior my command was then Companies A, B,
D, G, H, K, and M, about 380 men; and the following
officers:--Captains Benteen, Weir, French, and McDougall, First
Lieutenants Godfrey, Mathey, and Gibson, Second Lieutenants
Edgerly, Wallace, Varnum, and Hare, and A.A. Surgeon Porter. First
Lieut. De Rudio was in the dismounted fight in the woods, but
having some trouble with his horse did not join the command in the
charge out, and hiding himself in the woods, joined the command
after nightfall of the 26th.
"Still hearing nothing of Custer, and with this reinforcement, I
moved down the river in the direction of the village, keeping on
the bluffs. We had heard firing in that direction, and knew it
could only be Custer. I moved to the summit of the highest bluff,
but seeing and hearing nothing, sent Capt. Weir, with his company,
to open communication with the other command. He soon sent back
word by Lieut. Hare that he could go no further, and that the
Indians were getting around him. At this time he was keeping up a
heavy fire from his skirmish line. I at once turned everything back
to the first position I had taken on the bluff, and which seemed to
me the best. I dismounted the men, had the horses and mules of the
pack train driven together in a depression, put the men on the
crests of the hills making the depression, and had hardly done so
when I was furiously attacked. This was about 6 P.M. We held our
ground, with the loss of 18 enlisted men killed and 46 wounded,
until the attack ceased, about 9 P.M.
"As I knew by this time their overwhelming numbers, and had given
up any support from the portion of the regiment with Custer, I had
the men dig rifle-pits; barricaded with dead horses, mules, and
boxes of hard bread, the opening of the depression toward the
Indians in which the animals were herded; and made every exertion
to be ready for what I saw would be a terrific assault the next
day. All this night the men were busy, and the Indians holding a
scalp dance underneath us in the bottom and in our hearing.
"On the morning of the 26th I felt confident that I could hold my
own, and was ready as far as I could be, when at daylight, about
2:30 A.M., I heard the crack of two rifles. This was the signal for
the beginning of a fire that I have never seen equaled. Every rifle
was handled by an expert and skilled marksman, and with a range
that exceeded our carbine; and it was simply impossible to show any
part of the body, before it was struck. We could see, as the day
brightened, countless hordes of them pouring up the valley from out
the village, and scampering over the high points toward the places
designated for them by their chiefs, and which entirely surrounded
our position. They had sufficient numbers to completely encircle
us, and men were struck on the opposite sides of the lines from
which the shots were fired. I think we were fighting all the Sioux
nation, and also all the desperados, renegades, half-breeds and
squaw men, between the Missouri and the Arkansas and east of the
Rocky Mountains. They must have numbered at least 2,500 warriors.
"The fire did not slacken until about 9:30 A.M., and then we
discovered that they were making a last desperate attempt, which
was directed against the lines held by Companies H and M. In this
attack they charged close enough to use their bows and arrows, and
one man lying dead within our lines was touched by the 'coup stick'
of one of the foremost Indians. When I say the stick was only about
10 or 12 feet long, some idea of the desperate and reckless
fighting of these people may be understood. This charge of theirs
was gallantly repulsed by the men on that line led by Capt.
Benteen. They also came close enough to send their arrows into the
line held by Companies D and K, but were driven away by a like
charge of the line, which I accompanied. We now had many wounded,
and the question of water was vital, as from 6 P.M. of the previous
evening until now, 10 A.M. (about 16 hours) we had been without it.
A skirmish line was formed under Capt. Benteen, to protect the
descent of volunteers down the hill in front of his position to
reach the water. We succeeded in getting some canteens, although
many of the men were hit in doing so.
"The fury of the attack was now over, and to my astonishment the
Indians were seen going in parties toward the village. But two
solutions occurred to us for this movement--that they were going
for something to eat, more ammunition (as they had been throwing
arrows), or that Custer was coming. We took advantage of this lull
to fill all vessels with water, and soon had it by the camp kettle
full; but they continued to withdraw, and all firing ceased, save
occasional shots from sharpshooters, sent to annoy us about the
water. About 2 P.M. the grass in the bottom was set on fire, and
followed up by Indians who encouraged its burning, and it was
evident it was done for a purpose, which purpose I discovered,
later on, to be the creation of a dense cloud of smoke, behind
which they were packing and preparing to move their tepees.
"It was between 6 and 7 P.M. that the village came out from behind
the clouds of smoke and dust. We had a close and good view of them,
as they filed away in the direction of the Big Horn Mountains,
moving in almost perfect military order. The length of the column
was fully equal to that of a large division of the cavalry corps of
the Army of the Potomac, as I have seen it on its march.
"We now thought of Custer, of whom nothing had been seen and
nothing heard since the firing in his direction about 6 P.M. on the
eve of the 25th, and we concluded that the Indians had gotten
between him and us, and driven him toward the boat, at the mouth of
Little Big Horn River; the awful fate that did befall him never
occurring to any of us as within the limits of possibilities.
During the night I changed my position, in order to secure an
unlimited supply of water, and was prepared for their return,
feeling sure they would do so, as they were in such numbers. But
early in the morning of the 27th, and while we were on the _qui
vive_ for Indians, I saw with my glass a dust some distance down
the valley. There was no certainty for some time what they were,
but finally I satisfied myself they were cavalry, and if so could
only be Custer, as it was ahead of the time that I understood that
General Terry could be expected. Before this time, however, I had
written a communication to Gen. Terry, and three volunteers were to
try and reach him (I had no confidence in the Indians with me, and
could not get them to do anything). If this dust were Indians, it
was possible they would not expect any one to leave. The men
started, and were told to go as near as was safe to determine if
the approaching column was white men, and to return at once in case
they found it so; but if they were Indians to push on to General
Terry. In a short time we saw them returning over the high bluff
already alluded to; they were accompanied by a scout who had a note
from Terry to Custer, saying, 'Crow scouts had come to camp saying
he had been whipped, but it was not believed.' I think it was about
10:30 A.M. that General Terry rode into my lines, and the fate of
Custer and his brave men was soon determined by Capt. Benteen
proceeding with his company to the battle ground.
"The wounded in my lines were, during the afternoon and eve of the
27th, moved to the camp of General Terry; and at 5 A.M. of the
28th, I proceeded with the regiment to the battle ground of Custer,
and buried 204 bodies, including the following named citizens:--Mr.
Boston Custer, Mr. Reed, and Mr. Kellogg. The following named
citizens and Indians, who were with my command, were also
killed:--Charles Reynolds (guide and hunter); Isaiah (colored)
interpreter; Bloody Knife (who fell from immediately by my side);
Bob-tailed Bull and Stab of the Indian scouts.
"After following over his trail, it is evident to me that Custer
intended to support me by moving further down the stream, and
attacking the village in flank; that he found the distance to the
ford greater than he anticipated; that he did charge, but his march
had taken so long, although his trail shows he moved rapidly, that
they were ready for him; that Companies C and I, and perhaps part
of Company E, crossed to the village or attempted it at the charge
and were met by a staggering fire; and that they fell back to
secure a position from which to defend themselves; but they were
followed too closely by the Indians to permit him to form any kind
of a line. I think had the regiment gone in as a body, and from the
woods in which I fought advanced on the village, its destruction
was certain; but he was fully confident they were running, or he
would not have turned from me. I think (after the great number of
Indians that were in the village) that the following reasons
obtained for the misfortune: His rapid marching for two days and
one night before the fight, attacking in the day time at 12 M. and
when they were on the _qui vive_, instead of early in the morning;
and lastly, his unfortunate division of the regiment into three
commands.
"During my fight with the Indians I had the heartiest support from
officers and men, but the conspicuous services of Brevet Colonel
F.W. Benteen, I desire to call attention to especially, for if ever
a soldier deserved recognition by his government for distinguished
services, he certainly does.
"The harrowing sight of the dead bodies crowning the height on
which Custer fell, and which will remain vividly in my memory until
death, is too recent for me not to ask the good people of this
country whether a policy that sets opposing parties in the field,
armed, clothed, and equipped by one and the same government, should
not be abolished. All of which is respectfully submitted."
The following is Capt. Benteen's account of his detour to the south and
junction with Reno:--
"I was sent with my battalion to the left to a line of bluffs about
five miles off, with instructions to look for Indians and see what
was to be seen, and if I saw nothing there to go on, and when I had
satisfied myself that it was useless to go further in that
direction to rejoin the main trail. After proceeding through a
rough and difficult country, very tiring on the horses, and seeing
nothing, and wishing to save the horses unnecessary fatigue, I
decided to return to the main trail. Before I had proceeded a mile
in the direction of the bluffs I was overtaken by the chief
trumpeter and the sergeant major, with instructions from Gen.
Custer to use my own discretion, and in case I should find any
trace of Indians, at once to notify Gen. Custer.
"Having marched rapidly and passed the line of bluffs on the left
bank of a branch of the Little Big Horn which made into the main
stream about two and a half miles above the ford crossed by Col.
Reno's command, as ordered, I continued my march in the same
direction. The whole time occupied in this march was about an hour
and a half. As I was anxious to regain the main command, as there
was no signs of Indians, I then decided to rejoin the main trail,
as the country before me was mostly of the same character as that I
had already passed over, without valley and without water, and
offering no inducement for the Indians. No valleys were visible,
not even the valley where the fight took place, until my command
struck the river.
"About three miles from the point where Reno crossed the ford, I
met a sergeant bringing orders to the commanding officer of the
rear guard, Capt. McDougall, to hurry up the pack trains. A mile
further I was met by my trumpeter, bringing a written order from
Lieut. Cooke, the adjutant of the regiment, to this
effect:--'Benteen, come on; big village; be quick; bring packs:'
and a postscript saying, 'Bring packs.' A mile or a mile and a half
further on I first came in sight of the valley and Little Big Horn.
About twelve or fifteen dismounted men were fighting on the plains
with Indians, charging and recharging them. This body numbered
about 900 at this time. Col. Reno's mounted party were retiring
across the river to the bluffs. I did not recognize till later what
part of the command this was, but was clear they had been beaten. I
then marched my command in line to their succor.
"On reaching the bluff I reported to Col. Reno, and first learned
that the command had been separated and that Custer was not in that
part of the field, and no one of Reno's command was able to inform
me of the whereabouts of Gen. Custer. While the command was
awaiting the arrival of the pack mules, a company was sent forward
in the direction supposed to have been taken by Custer. After
proceeding about a mile they were attacked and driven back. During
this time I heard no heavy firing, and there was nothing to
indicate that a heavy fight was going on, and I believe that at
this time Custer's immediate command had been annihilated."
In a letter addressed to the _Army and Navy Journal_, Lieut. E.L.
Godfry, of Benteen's battalion, gives the following information:--