“The world does not take seriously the wishes of the weak.
Weakness is too great a temptation for the strong.”
And finally I quote:
“Above all, it seems to me, we must correct the tragic
misunderstanding that a policy directed at security is a war
policy.”
The best witness with regard to this question, which is so important for
the Defendant Keitel, is the book by a British Major General, A. C.
Temperley, (Publishers Collins, 1938) _The Whispering-Gallery of
Europe_, for which the British Foreign Secretary of the second World
War, Mr. Anthony Eden, wrote a very friendly, concurring preface.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, wouldn’t it be possible for you to pass over
the reading of these passages which come from the book of Major General
Temperley? The Tribunal will take notice of them. There are quite a
number of long speeches from the book.
DR. NELTE: I intended to ask the Tribunal whether it would kindly take
judicial notice of these passages if I submit them.
They carry particular weight because Temperley reports and judges
retrospectively from the year of 1936.
The statements made by Temperley, who witnessed the disarmament
conference, the official negotiations and the negotiations behind the
scenes, are deeply moving because they reveal the tragic—I must use the
word—fateful—and primary conflict: fateful because the thesis
presented by the representatives of the different countries—which was
derived from the national, given conditions and from traditionally bound
conceptions—proved that the difficulties could not be overcome and thus
formed the origin of the confusion the last consequences of which we
have just experienced. Temperley says:
1) (Page 50) “The French had studied the question of disarmament
much more thoroughly than any other nation, and some of their
best brains of the General Staff and Naval Staff had examined
the problem for months... To characterize their problem roughly,
it was their goal to disarm themselves as little as possible
although they were the strongest power of the world, but at the
same time to keep Germany in a state of disarmament down to the
minutest detail according to the conditions of the peace
treaty...
(Page 71) “In the report which I gave, I spared neither the
French nor us. We had made big mistakes, but at that time I came
to recognize that in reality the French never thought of
disarming at all... M. Paul Boncour certainly was honest and
worked intensively in order to achieve success, but the pressure
of the French General Staff upon the Government was too great...
2) (Page 126) “Mr. Stresemann knew his people best. It was a
race against time. How long could he keep his people in an
atmosphere of cooperative acquiescence without any tangible
success in the form of concessions on the part of the Allies?
Ought the Allied Governments to have given faster and more
willingly what they were ready to give? Would this gesture have
prevented the catastrophe?... Doubtless, history will provide
the answer. I do not know what kind of an answer it is going to
be, but it seems certain to me that the most important period,
when Germany turned away from the road of peace, will be found
to be the period of co-operation between 1929 and 1930... Would
a less hesitating policy as regards the cancellation of the
debts, economic reconstruction, and concessions in the treaties
have prevented Hitlerism and all its consequences? Who knows?...
In his _Review of International Affairs_, 1930, Professor Arnold
Toynbee writes: ‘For the foreign observer who visited Germany at
that time it was a terrible and strange drama to see a whole
nation—one of the greatest and most civilized nations of the
world—engaged in a heroic struggle against fate, half paralyzed
already in titanic battle, driven by the conviction that its
steps had already irresistibly been led on to the path of
destruction.’ (Pages 128 and 129) “The German people had lost
hope... The French had always contended that Germany would
maintain a pretext of modesty as long as the Rhineland was
occupied, and that when the occupation ceased the true color
would show... This has proved to be a good prediction, yet it
was a concurrence of circumstances and the expression of a
people taking its last gasp rather than premeditated planning...
3) (Page 151) “I was present at the session and was profoundly
moved in the face of the attitude of the French delegation and
that of the Little Entente. They believed that they now had
Germany financially by the throat and that her utter ruin was
only a question of weeks. Our Foreign Office recognized the
situation. Yet after a discussion with Henderson I ask myself
whether he really did recognize the abyss which was gaping
before us...”
Perhaps one certain passage might be of interest, on Page 38, under (4):
“I also name the general staffs, because there is no greater
illusion than that they, taken as a whole, are in favor of war.
I know the general staffs of many countries very well, and have
never known any general staff which would have glorified war or
would have wished for war. They knew too much about it. If they
advocated strength, it was because they believed in the idea
that armed strength can prevent war.
“In opposition to the bloodthirsty pacifists who reject modern
weapons, but who immediately clamor for their presence on the
battlefield when one must resist attackers... This leads to the
conclusion that armaments are not the main reason for wars. The
history of the years 1926 to 1931 is not that of a race for
rearmament, but that of a slowly developing deterioration of the
international situation because of the economic and political
chaos, which made disarmament impossible and rearmament
unavoidable...
(Page 222) “The Germans actually repeated their successful
tactics in circumventing treaties, the very tactics they had
used in Napoleon’s time. And yet, one wonders what other
honor-loving nation in the same circumstances would not also
have done its utmost to circumvent a treaty which had been
forced upon it at the point of the bayonet...
(Page 232) “The following 6 months brought Germany’s return,
Hoover’s failure and that of the French plans, and the complete
change in the atmosphere through Hitler’s seizure of power.
However dreadful this was for the peace of the world—the other
powers, above all France, have only themselves to blame for
it... We should have exerted more pressure upon the French and
made greater efforts to keep a moderate government in office in
Germany.
(Page 256) “...they felt they were still being treated as
outlaws...”
I would like to ask that these opinions of the British general which, as
I already said, had the approval of the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Anthony
Eden, be taken into consideration. In this connection I want to refer
also to the statements by the following statesmen: Paul Boncour,
Henderson, Briand, and Cecil; these statements were submitted by Dr.
Schacht’s defense (Schacht Document Book Number 3, Exhibit Schacht-12)
on the same subject matter and were accepted by the Tribunal; I also
want to refer to the book by Viscount Rothermere: _Warnings and
Predictions_ (Page 100).
In examining and deciding whether the Defendant Keitel knowingly
violated the military clauses of the Treaty of Versailles in the meaning
of the Indictment, the Tribunal will have to consider the facts which
have been presented. Individual charges against him on this point have
not been made.
It is unquestionable that from 1933 on rearmament took place in the
Reich. The Defendant Keitel has admitted that, and he stated that in the
official positions he held up to 30 September 1934 and from 1 October
1935 on he participated in this rearmament in accordance with the
functions incumbent on him. Like everything the Germans do, the
rearmament too was well thought-out and organized. The Prosecution
collected data for that; especially Document Number 2353-PS and the
transcripts of the sessions of the Reich Defense Committee.
During the hearing of evidence the total picture of this period from
1935 to 1938 was not clearly defined. The Prosecution arranged its
presentation of evidence retrospectively and drew a conclusion from the
results of the war as to the motive for the rearmament, but at the same
time it deduced from the fact, which cannot be denied and has not been
denied, that this rearmament could not have been planned and carried out
by any one man, that it constituted a joint plot for the purpose of
aggressive war.
Now, where is the decisive criterion: in military armament or in other
preparations for war from which the conclusion may be drawn that these
measures have an aggressive character, that is to say, that they aim at
an aggressive war? In principle, from armament itself nothing can be
deduced as to the alleged intentions; armament may, in fact it must,
look just the same if carried out for security and defense as it would
if applied to aggressive war. Therefore, if the intention of rearmament
for the purpose of a plot is to be determined, distinction must be made
between:
(a) Armament and preventive measures which must be taken in case a
mobilization should become necessary for defense at any time;
(b) Rearmament and enacting of measures which exceed, in quantity or
quality, the volume under (a) to such an extent that the intention of
the political leadership to begin a war will be recognized by those
concerned, in which case the political question of whether an
aggressive, defensive, or preventive war is intended may be disregarded.
Therefore, in the end, the decisive question will be whether in
connection with these measures the intention of planning for an
aggressive war was expressed or had become otherwise noticeable, or
whether the measures, because of their nature and volume, demand the
conclusive deduction that an aggressive war was being prepared.
In retrospect, the events are presented as the logical chain of a
development according to plan. In reality, not only Hitler’s
far-reaching intentions and his planning were subject to an actual
course of events in which, objectively viewed, a certain causality seems
to be inherent, but the knowledge and approving support of co-operating
circles were equally subject to this. There can be no dispute over the
statement that the economic capacity of a country, which in its totality
must be regarded as armament for the case of war, will eventually get to
a point which must be considered of decisive importance in solving the
question of when the rearmament, that is, the status of the entire
industry essential for war, exceeds the capacity of armament for
defense.
While considering this, it must be taken into account, especially for
the Defendant Keitel as a soldier, that until he took over the office of
Chief of OKW on 4 February he had not held an important position.
Now, what part did the Defendant Keitel play at that time,
(a) In the field of rearmament with regard to material and personnel;
(b) in the field of administrative and—as charged by the
Prosecution—military-political rearmament as dealt with under the
heading of the Reich Defense Council?
I shall now skip Pages 43 to 46, since they contain the historical
development of the organizational principles, and I beg the Tribunal, if
it can make use of this information, to consider it in reaching a
verdict. I shall continue on Page 47.
When on 1 October 1935 the Defendant Keitel became the Chief of the High
Command of the German Armed Forces in the Reich Ministry of Von
Blomberg, there was a Military Economy Branch headed by Colonel Thomas.
He was appointed by Von Blomberg as an expert adviser for the
organization.
This Military Economy Branch, later called the Military Economy Staff,
as a ministerial service post had to represent the Reich Minister of War
with the competent and authoritative economy posts, later also with the
Plenipotentiary General for Economy (GB), nominated in 1935. The
Minister of War, Von Blomberg, generally communicated directly with
Thomas at the time when Field Marshal Keitel was Chief of the Armed
Forces Department.
To clarify the part Keitel had in the organizational development of
rearmament in this period, I would explain the following:
I. The position at the start in 1933 (for the period 1933-38) was as
follows: Lack of any kind of basis for production as a consequence of
the destruction of the armament industry following the Treaty of
Versailles.
Consequence: no capacity for production, no motor vehicles, no
mechanical equipment, no offices for construction, no experience.
Thus, the first stage for rearmament: the restoration of a basis for
production, and equipment and reconversion of factories.