Now, Defendant, supposing that in February or March 1938, Hitler had

wanted to discuss Austria before the same Council, the same limited

number of people. Just let us see who would have taken the places of the

people who were there. Instead of Von Blomberg and Von Fritsch, you

would have had the Defendant Keitel as Chief of the OKW, and Von

Brauchitsch as Commander-in-Chief, would you not?

VON NEURATH: Yes, I believe so.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: As a matter of fact, Raeder and Göring

maintained their positions; the Defendant Von Ribbentrop had taken

yours; and you were president of the Secret Cabinet Council. Lammers was

secretary of the Cabinet, and Goebbels had become more important as

Minister of Propaganda.

Well now, I would just like you to look and see who the people were that

formed the Secret Cabinet Council.

Your Lordship will find that on Page 8 of Document Book 12; and it is

Page 7 of the German document book.

[_Turning to the defendant._] Now, do you see who they are? There are

the Defendant Von Ribbentrop, the Defendant Göring, the Führer’s Deputy,

Hess, Dr. Goebbels, and the Chief of the Reich Chancellery, Lammers, Von

Brauchitsch, Raeder, and Keitel. You are saying, if I understand you,

that this Secret Cabinet Council had no real existence at all. Is that

your case?

VON NEURATH: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Why were you receiving special funds for getting

diplomatic information as president of the Secret Cabinet Council?

VON NEURATH: I did not receive any. I should like to know...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Oh, didn’t you?

VON NEURATH: No.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, let us just have a look at this. Would you

look at Document 3945-PS?

My Lord, it is 129 in Document Book 12a. It will be Exhibit GB-518.

If you will look at the letter of the 28th of August 1939 from Lammers

to you:

“In conformity with your request, I have had the sum of 10,000

Reichsmark, which had been placed at your disposal for special

expenses in connection with the obtaining of diplomatic

information, handed to Amtsrat Köppen.

“I enclose the draft of a certificate showing how the money was

used, with the request to send me the certificate after

execution, at the latest by the end of the financial year.”

And if you will turn over to the next page, 131, you will see that at

the end of March, which was toward the end of the financial year, you

signed a certificate saying:

“I have received 10,000 Reichsmark from the Reich Chancellery

for special outlays entailed in obtaining diplomatic

information.”

Now, will you tell us why you were getting special expenses for

obtaining diplomatic information?

VON NEURATH: Yes, I can tell you that. That is an expression used at the

request of Lammers who had the treasury of the Reich Chancellery under

him, so that I could meet the expenses of my office; that is, for one

typist and for one secretary. And in order to justify this to—I do not

know which authority, what this authority is called, to the Finance

Ministry—I had no special budget—Herr Lammers asked me to use this

expression. That can be seen from a certificate which is also in there.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is all right. I am going to refer to the

other letters. But why was it necessary that the expenses of your one

secretary and one typist should not be audited? As it shows on pages...

My Lord, the pages are 134 and 135.

VON NEURATH: I just said that...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: On Page 134 you will see there is a letter from

you to Lammers: “In my bureau there is a need to incur special expenses,

to audit which it does not appear to me advisable.”

Why wasn’t it advisable to audit the expenses of your typist and

secretary?

VON NEURATH: I can no longer tell you that just now. But at any rate, I

did not use any more money for diplomatic information; but these are

merely office expenses which I figured in there. And so at the end of

this letter which you have submitted to me there is...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now...

VON NEURATH: Please, let me finish my statement.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Certainly.

VON NEURATH: There is a report here to me, from my—from this secretary,

in which he says—no, this is not the letter I thought it was.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, if you are finished, I anticipated

you might say it was office expenses. Would you look at Document

3958-PS?

My Lord, that will be Exhibit GB-519.

[_Turning to the defendant._] I submit, that shows you your office

expenses were carried on the ordinary budget, the letter of 8 April 1942

to you.

THE PRESIDENT: Is that in the book?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, yes; I am so sorry. It is 140. I beg

Your Lordship’s pardon.

[_Turning to the defendant._] That is a letter to you which says:

“The Reich Minister for Finance has agreed that the budgetary

needs announced by you for the financial year 1942 be shown in

Special Plan 1. I therefore have no objections to having the

necessary expenditure granted—even before the establishment of

Special Plan I—within the limits of these amounts, namely:

“For personal administrative expenditures, up to 28,500

Reichsmark; for official administrative expenditures, up to

25,500 Reichsmark; total 54,000 Reichsmark.”

That was providing for your office and personal expenditures during the

same period for which you were getting these additional sums. So I am

suggesting to you that if these sums of 10,000 marks which you got every

now and then were not for office expenditures, I would like you to tell

the Tribunal what they really were for.

VON NEURATH: Yes, I would be very pleased if I were also told about

this, for I no longer know.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, they are your letters, and you got the

money. Can’t you tell the Tribunal what you got it for?

VON NEURATH: No, I cannot right now. Perhaps I can tell you afterward.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Possibly it was for obtaining diplomatic

information, it says—

My Lord, Dr. Von Lüdinghausen makes the point that the letter I put was

in 1939. Of course, there were other letters. I have not troubled the

Tribunal with each one, but there is another letter in which there is a

reference to a payment on the 9th of May 1941, and, of course, another

reference to a payment on the 30th of June 1943. My Lord, these are

Pages 133 and 134. I am sorry; I did not give the details. Perhaps I

ought to have indicated that.

THE PRESIDENT: The letter on Page 137, which may have some bearing, is a

letter from the man signed “K”—from the man who made the previous

applications?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes.

Perhaps would you like to look at that, Defendant? It is Document

3945-PS, a letter of the 14th of July 1943, signed “K”:

“When I went into the matter of the special funds, the competent

people in the Reich Chancellery showed an entirely understanding

attitude in this matter and asked for a written application from

Your Excellency. When I replied that I did not wish to produce

such an application before success was guaranteed, they asked

for a little more time for a further exchange of views. After a

few days I was told that I could produce the application without

hesitation, upon which I handed over the letter which I had

previously withheld. The amount requested has been handed to me

today and I have duly entered this sum in my special cashbook as

a credit.”

VON NEURATH: Yes, but in spite of this...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now does that help you? Can you tell the

Tribunal what were the outlays, the special outlays for the obtaining of

diplomatic information for which you received this money?

VON NEURATH: I am very sorry; I absolutely cannot—I can no longer

recall this matter at all. And the remarkable part is that this letter

is dated the 14th of July 1943, when I no longer had any functions

whatsoever, when I had left altogether. At this moment, I do not know.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is very strange, you know. In a further

letter, in Document 3958-PS, on 8 January 1943, and in succeeding

letters on the 4th of March and the 20th of April, the end of your

occupation of the premises of 23 Rheinbabenallee is explained there and

when your expenses ceased when you went to live in the country. I was

just going to ask you about that—a little about that house. If you will

just look at the affidavit of Mr. Geist, the American consul...

My Lord, that is Document 1759-PS, Exhibit USA-420.

[_Turning to the defendant._] I referred to this this morning, and the

passage that I want you to tell us about is in the middle of a

paragraph.

My Lord, it is at the foot of Page 11 of the affidavit in the English

version.

THE PRESIDENT: Do you have the separate document?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord, it is at the foot of Page 11. The

paragraph begins:

“Another instance of the same nature occurred with regard to my

landlord...”

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, if Your Lordship goes on another 10

lines, after explaining about his landlord having to give up his house

to the SS, he says:

“I know that on many occasions where it was thought necessary to

increase the pressure, the prospective purchaser or his agent

would appear accompanied by a uniformed SA or SS man. I know

because I lived in the immediate neighborhood and knew the

individuals concerned, that Baron von Neurath, one time Foreign

Minister of Germany, got his house from a Jew in this manner.

Indeed, he was my next-door neighbor in Dahlem. Von Neurath’s

house was worth approximately 250,000 dollars.”

[_Turning to the defendant._] Was that 23 Rheinbabenallee?

VON NEURATH: Yes, yes...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Who acquired it for you, so that the president

of the nonexistent Secret Cabinet Council could have it as an official

residence? Who acquired it?

VON NEURATH: I did not understand that. Who did what?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Who acquired 23 Rheinbabenallee? Who got it?

VON NEURATH: I can tell you about that. In the year 1937, when Hitler

was erecting the large buildings for his Reich Chancellery, he told me

one day that I would have to move from my apartment, which was situated

behind the Foreign Office, because he wanted the garden for his Reich

Chancellery, and the house would be torn down.

He said that he had given instructions to the Reich Building

Administration to find other living quarters for me. The Reich Building

Administration offered me various expropriated Jewish residences. But I

refused them. But now I had to look for a house myself, and my personal

physician, to whom I happened to mention this matter, told me that he

knew of a place in Dahlem, that was Number 23 Rheinbabenallee, where he

was house physician to the owner. This owner was Lieutenant Colonel

Glotz, who was the brother of a close friend of mine. I informed the

Reich Building Administration about this and told them that they should

get in touch with this gentleman. In the course of the negotiations,

which were conducted by the Reich Building Administration, a contract of

sale was drawn up for the price quoted by Mr. Geist, and the price was

in marks, not in dollars. This sum, at the request of Lieutenant Colonel

Glotz, was paid to him in cash, and on his wish I persuaded the Finance

Minister to have this money transferred to Switzerland.

I might remark that I was still Foreign Minister at the time. Afterward,

I remained in this house for the simple reason that I did not find

another one, and Herr Von Ribbentrop, my successor, moved into the old

Presidential Palace.

Then in the year 1943 this house was destroyed. At the moment,

therefore, I still cannot explain what these moneys were for and whether

they were official payments made by the Reich Treasury. With the best

intentions, I cannot tell you. But the statements made by Mr. Geist here

are completely wrong as I have just stated. I did not buy or have this

house transferred from a Jew, but from the Christian Lieutenant Colonel

Glotz.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You tell us that you passed the money on to

Switzerland on his account?

VON NEURATH: I? Yes. Because Herr—Herr Glotz went to Switzerland. I

believe, indeed, his wife was non-Aryan.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. I would just like to put the next

sentence and then I will leave this document:

“I know too that Alfred Rosenberg, who lived in the same street

with me, purloined a house from a Jew in similar fashion.”

Do you know anything of that?

VON NEURATH: I do not know how Herr Rosenberg acquired his house.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, Defendant, I want you to come now to March

of 1938. Perhaps I can take this shortly if I have understood you

correctly. You know that the Prosecution complained about your reply to

the British Ambassador with regard to the Anschluss. As I understand

you, you are not now suggesting that your reply was accurate; but you

are saying that that was the best of your information at the time, is

that right?

VON NEURATH: Yes, that is quite correct. It is true. That was an

incorrect statement but I just did not know any better; do you see?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You say that you did not hear—that neither

Hitler nor Göring told you a word about these ultimatums which were

given first of all to Herr Von Schuschnigg and secondly to President

Miklas; you were told nothing about that? Is that what you are telling?

VON NEURATH: No, at that time—at that time I knew nothing. I heard

about them later.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I am going to leave that. I am not

going into that incident in detail—we have been over it several

times—in view of the way that the defendant is not contesting the

accuracy.

THE PRESIDENT: I should like to know when he heard of the true facts.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am much obliged.

[_Turning to the defendant._] When did you hear of the true facts of the

Anschluss?

VON NEURATH: I heard the details for the very first time here, when this

report of Legation Counsellor Hewel was submitted to me. Prior to this

time I probably heard that there had been pressure exerted on Herr

Schuschnigg, but nothing else. I actually learned the exact details for

the first time here in Nuremberg.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I only want to get it quite clear. You say that

between the 11th of March and your coming to Nuremberg, you never heard

anything about the threat of marching into Austria, which had been made

by the Defendant Göring, or Keppler, or General Muff on his behalf? You

never heard anything about that?

VON NEURATH: No, I heard nothing of that sort.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, then I do want to ask you about the

assurance that you gave to M. Mastny, the Czechoslovak Minister in

Berlin. I would like you to look at Document TC-27 which you will find

in Document Book 12, Page 123 of Document Book 12. The passage that I

want to ask you about is in the sixth paragraph. After dealing with the

conversation with the Defendant Göring about the Czechoslovak

mobilization, it goes on:

“M. Mastny was in a position to give him definite and binding

assurances on this subject”—that is, the Czechoslovak

mobilization—“and today”—that is, the 12th of March—“spoke

with Baron von Neurath, who, among other things, assured him on

behalf of Herr Hitler that Germany still considers herself bound

by the German-Czechoslovak Arbitration Convention concluded at

Locarno in October 1925.”

Now, you have told the Tribunal—we have had the evidence of Baroness

von Ritter—that the meeting on the 5th of November had this very

disturbing effect on you and in fact produced a bad heart attack. One of

the matters that was discussed at that meeting was attack, not only on

Austria but also on Czechoslovakia, to protect the German flank. Why did

you think, on the 12th of March, that Hitler would ever consider himself

bound by the German-Czechoslovak Arbitration Treaty which meant that he

had to refer any dispute with Czechoslovakia to the Council of the

League of Nations or the International Court of Justice? Why on earth

did you think that that was even possible, that Hitler would submit a

dispute with Czechoslovakia to either of these bodies?

VON NEURATH: I can tell you that quite exactly. I already testified

yesterday that Hitler had me summoned to him on the 11th for reasons

that I cannot explain up to this day and told me that the march into

Austria was to take place during the night. In reply to my question, or

rather to my remark that that would cause great uneasiness in

Czechoslovakia, he said that he had no intentions of any kind at this

time against Czechoslovakia and that he was—he even hoped that

relations with Czechoslovakia would be considerably improved by the

invasion or occupation of Austria.

From this sentence and from his promise that nothing would happen, I

concluded that matters would remain as they were and that, of course, we

were still bound to this treaty of 1925. Therefore, I was able to assure

M. Mastny of this with an absolutely clear conscience.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you believe a word that Hitler said on the

12th of March? Did you still believe a word that Hitler said on the 12th

of March 1933?

VON NEURATH: Yes, still at that time.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I thought Von Fritsch was a friend of yours;

wasn’t he?

VON NEURATH: Who?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Colonel General Von Fritsch; he was a friend of

yours?

VON NEURATH: Yes, indeed.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You did not believe that he had been guilty of

homosexuality did you?

VON NEURATH: No, never.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, didn’t they—didn’t you know that he had

been subject in January 1938 to a framed-up charge?

THE PRESIDENT: Will you please answer instead of shaking your head.

VON NEURATH: Yes, I knew that, of course; and I learned of it and the

fact that this charge was a fabrication of the Gestapo but not of

Hitler, at least in my opinion.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, didn’t you know that those—these unsavory

matters concerning Field Marshal Von Blomberg and Colonel General Von

Fritsch had been faked up by members of the Nazi gang, who were your

colleagues in the Government?

VON NEURATH: Yes. The details were unknown to me, of course.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You see, you remember that at the time of

Munich, when you came back to the field—came back into activity for

some time, President Beneš did appeal to this German-Czechoslovak

Arbitration Convention and Hitler brushed the appeal to one side. Do you

remember that? In September 1938?

VON NEURATH: No; that, I do not know, for at that time I was not in

office any longer and I did not get to see these matters at all. I do

not know about that.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, you don’t know; of course, it was in the

German press and every other press that he appealed to this treaty and

Hitler refused to look at it; but you say that you honestly believed on

the 12th of March that Hitler would stand by that Arbitration Treaty;

that’s what you said?

VON NEURATH: Yes, I had no misgivings.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, that might be a convenient moment to

break off.

[_A recess was taken._]

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, you spoke yesterday with regard to

the memorandum of Lieutenant General Friderici. Do you remember in that

memorandum he referred to a memorandum of yours on how to deal with

Czechoslovakia?

Well, now, I would like you just to look at Document 3859-PS, so that

the Tribunal can see your attitude toward the Czechs from your own

words.

My Lord, that is at Page 107 of Document Book 12a.

[_Turning to the defendant._] I will read first your letter to Lammers

of the 31st of August 1940.

My Lord, that will be Exhibit GB-520.

[_Turning to the defendant._] You say:

“Dear Herr Lammers: Enclosed I send you the memorandum which I

mentioned in advance in my letter of 13 July 1940 ... about the

question of the future organization of the Bohemian-Moravian

country. I enclose another memorandum on the same question,

which my Secretary of State K. H. Frank has drawn up

independently of me and which, in its train of thoughts, leads

to the same result”—I ask you to note, the next words—“and

with which I fully agree. Please present both memoranda to the

Führer and arrange a date for a personal interview for myself

and State Secretary Frank. As I have heard from a private source

that individual Party and other offices intend to submit

proposals to the Führer for separating various parts of the

Protectorate under my authority, without my knowing these

projects in detail, I should be grateful to you if you would

arrange the date for my interview early enough for me, as the

competent Reich Protector and one who understands the Czech

problem, to have an opportunity, together with my State

Secretary, to place our opinions before the Führer before all

sorts of plans are suggested to him by other people.”

Now, I would just like to take what I hope will be the gist of your own

memorandum. If you will turn it over—this is your memorandum—take the

first paragraph, Section I:

“Any considerations about the future organization of Bohemia and

Moravia must be based on the goal which is to be laid down for

that territory from a state-political (staatspolitisch) and

ethnic-political (volkspolitisch) point of view.

“From a state-political standpoint there can be but one aim:

total incorporation into the Greater German Reich; from an

ethnic-political standpoint to fill this territory with

Germans.”

And then you say that you point the path; and if you go on to Section

II, in the middle of Paragraph 2, you will find a subparagraph

beginning—

My Lord, it is the top of Page 109, Your Lordship’s copy:

“These 7.2 million Czechs, of whom 3.4 millions live in towns

and communities of under 2,000 and in the country, are led and

influenced by an intelligentsia which is unduly puffed up in

proportion to the size of the country. This part of the

population also tried, after the alteration of the

constitutional situation of this area, more or less openly to

sabotage or at any rate postpone necessary measures which were

intended to fit the circumstances of the country to the new

state of affairs. The remainder of the population, that is small

craftsmen, peasants, and workmen, adapted themselves better to

the new conditions.”

Then, if you go on to Paragraph 3, you say:

“But it would be a fatal mistake to conclude from this that the

Government and population behaved in this correct manner because

they had inwardly accepted the loss of their independent state,

and incorporation into Greater Germany. The Germans continue to

be looked upon as unwelcome intruders and there is a widespread

longing for a return to the old state of affairs, even if the

people do not express it openly.

“By and large, the population submit to the new conditions but

they do so only because they either have the necessary rational

insight or else because they fear the consequences of

disobedience. They certainly do not do so from conviction. This

will be the state of affairs for some time to come.

“But”—go on to Section III—“as things are like that, a

decision will have to be taken as to what is to be done with the

Czech people in order to attain the objective of incorporating

the country and filling it with Germans as quickly as possible

and as thoroughly as possible.

“The most radical and theoretically complete solution to the

problem would be to evacuate all Czechs completely from this

country and replace them by Germans.”

Then you say that that is not possible because there are not sufficient

Germans to fill it immediately.

Then, if you go on to Paragraph 2, to the second half, you say—My Lord,

that is the last six lines of Page 110:

“It will, where the Czechs are concerned, rather be a case on

the one hand of keeping those Czechs who are suitable for

Germanization by individual selective breeding, while on the

other hand of expelling those who are not useful from a racial

standpoint or are enemies of the Reich, that is, the

intelligentsia which has developed in the last 20 years. If we

use such a procedure, Germanization can be carried out

successfully.”

Now, Defendant, you know that in the Indictment in this Trial we are

charging you and your fellow defendants, among many other things, with

genocide, which we say is the extermination of racial and national

groups, or, as it has been put in the well-known book of Professor

Lemkin, “a co-ordinated plan of different actions aiming at the

destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups with

the aim of annihilating the groups themselves.” What you wanted to do

was to get rid of the teachers and writers and singers of

Czechoslovakia, whom you call the intelligentsia, the people who would

hand down the history and traditions of the Czech people to other

generations. These were the people that you wanted to destroy by what

you say in that memorandum, were they not?

VON NEURATH: Not quite. Here there are...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But just before you answer, what did you mean by

saying, in the last passage that I read to you, “...expelling those who

are not useful from a racial standpoint or are enemies of the Reich,

that is, the intelligentsia which has developed in the last 20 years”?

Did you mean what you said? Were you speaking the truth when you said it

was necessary to expel the intelligentsia?

VON NEURATH: To that I can answer only “yes” and “no.” First of all, I

should like to say that from this report it becomes apparent that the

memorandum was written by Frank. I joined my name to it, and this was on

31 August 1940. The memorandum which I—the memorandum which is referred

to in the Friderici report is from a—is dated later I think, although I

do not know offhand.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I think you will find—I will give you, in a

moment, the letter from Ziemke, who transmits Hitler’s view, and I think

you will find that it is this memorandum that Hitler is dealing with. I

will show you Frank’s memorandum in a moment. I am suggesting to you

now, as you say to Lammers, that you enclosed your memorandum and you

enclosed another memorandum, of which I will read you the essential part

in a moment, which is the memorandum of Karl Hermann Frank. But this is

a...

VON NEURATH: They are both by Frank.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I’ll show it—no; but look at your own letter of

the 31st of August: “Enclosed I send you the memorandum,” and you go on:

“I enclose another memorandum... which my State Secretary K. H. Frank

has drawn up independently of me... with which I fully agree.” I am

suggesting to you, you know that this is your—this is your memorandum

referred to as the—in the Friderici document...

My Lord, that is Page 132 of Document Book 12.

[_Turning to the defendant._] ...where General Friderici says, “After

ample deliberation the Reich Protector expressed his view about the

various plans in a memorandum.” I am suggesting to you that this is your

memorandum which you sent on to Lammers for submission to the Führer.

Are you saying—are you really going to tell the Tribunal that this is

not your memorandum?

VON NEURATH: No, I do not want to say that at all. At the moment I

really do not know any longer. I did not write it, but I agreed with its

contents; the letter to Lammers says so.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, if you agreed with its contents, what

did you mean by saying that you would have to expel the intelligentsia,

except that you were going to break down the Czechs as a national entity

and expel the people who would keep going that history and tradition and

language? Isn’t that why you wanted to expel the intelligentsia?

VON NEURATH: I never mentioned the word “destroy,” but said that the

intelligentsia...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I said “expel”...

VON NEURATH: I see.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: ...which is your own word.

VON NEURATH: The class of the intelligentsia was the greatest obstacle

to co-operation between Germans and Czechs. For that reason, if we

wanted to achieve this co-operation, and that was still the aim of our

policy, then this intelligentsia had to be reduced in some way and

principally their influence had to be diminished, and that was the

meaning of my explanation.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, you said to achieve your policy, but by

achieving your policy you meant to destroy the Czech people as a

national entity with their own language, history, and traditions, and

assimilate them into the Greater German Reich. That was your policy,

wasn’t it?

VON NEURATH: My policy was, first of all, to assimilate Czechoslovakia,

as far as possible. But in the final analysis that could not have been

achieved for generations. The first thing to do was to bring about

co-operation so as to have peace and order.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now before I put to you the memorandum of

Frank with which you entirely agree, would you look at Paragraph VII of

your own memorandum?

My Lord, it is Page 113 of Document Book 12a.

[_Turning to the defendant._] In Section VII you say:

“If one considers the gigantic tasks facing the German nation

after a victorious war, the necessity for a careful and rational

utilization of Germans will be apparent to everyone. There are

so many tasks that have to be tackled at once and simultaneously

that a careful, well-thought-out utilization of the Germans who

are suitable for carrying out these tasks is necessary.

“The Greater German Reich will have to make use of the help of

foreigners on a large scale in all spheres and must confine

itself to appointing Germans to the key positions and to taking

over branches of public administration where the interests of

the Reich make it absolutely necessary...”

You were, in this memorandum, blueprinting the plans for dealing with

the Czechs after the war on the basis of the German victory; that is,

that they should disappear as a nation and become assimilated to the

German Reich. Wasn’t that what was in your mind?

VON NEURATH: To make the Czechs disappear as a nation was altogether

impossible. That was not possible at all. But they were to incorporate

themselves more closely into the Reich, and that is what I mean by the

word “assimilate.”

Moreover, it is also stated in this memorandum—earlier, much

earlier—that from the racial point of view—if you want to use that

unpleasant expression—there was an extraordinarily large number of

Germans within Czechoslovakia.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, just turn over and see how the—your

State Secretary’s memorandum with which you entirely agree—how that

runs.

My Lord, Your Lordship will find the beginning of that is enclosure

Number 2 on Page 115.

[_Turning to the defendant._] The State Secretary states his problem. He

says, in the second sentence:

“The question as to whether the Protectorate, with a Reich

Protector as its head, is suitable for settling the Czech

problem and should therefore be retained or whether it should

now give place to some, other form of government is being raised

by various people and is the cause of this memorandum. It will

briefly: (A) Indicate the nature of the Czech problem; (B)

analyze the present way in which it is being dealt with; (C)

examine the proposed alterations from the point of view of their

suitability, and finally: (D) express an independent opinion on

the whole question.”

Well now, I would like you just to look at your State Secretary’s

independent opinion with which you entirely agree.

THE PRESIDENT: Oughtn’t you to read the last two lines?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Oh yes, My Lord, I’m sorry.

“On a correct decision depends the solution of the Czech

problem. We thus bear the responsibility for centuries to come.”

Now, My Lord, Frank’s own opinion starts on Page 121 in Section D of the

memorandum, and he begins by saying:

“The aim of Reich policy in Bohemia and Moravia must be the

complete Germanization of area and people. In order to attain

this there are two possibilities:

“I. The total evacuation of the Czechs from Bohemia and Moravia

to a territory outside the Reich and settling Germans in the

freed territory; or,

“II. If one leaves the majority of the Czechs in Bohemia and

Moravia the simultaneous application of a great variety of

methods working toward Germanization, in accordance with an

X-year plan.

“Such a Germanization provides for: 1) The changing of the

nationality of racially suitable Czechs; 2) the expulsion of

racially unassimilable Czechs and of the intelligentsia who are

enemies of the Reich, or ‘special treatment’ for these and all

destructive elements; 3) the recolonizing of the territory thus

freed with fresh German blood.”

Now, I want you just to turn to where your State Secretary gets down to

concrete suggestions as to this policy of Germanization. Remember that

you entirely agree, in your letter to Lammers.

If Your Lordship will turn to Page 123, there is a heading “Youth;

fundamental change in education; extermination of the Czech historical

myth.”

[_Turning to the defendant._] That is the first point: Destroy any idea

they might have of their history, beginning with the time of St.

Wenceslaus, nearly a thousand years ago. That is your first point.

“Education toward the Reich idea; no getting on without perfect

knowledge of the German language; first doing away with the

secondary schools, later also with the elementary schools; never

again any Czech universities, only transitionally the _Collegium

Bohemicum_ at the German university in Prague; 2 years

compulsory labor service.

“Large-scale land policy, creation of German strongpoints and

German bridges of land, in particular pushing forward of the

German national soil from the north to the suburbs of Prague.

“Campaign against the Czech language, which is to become merely

a dialect as in the 17th and 18th centuries, and which is to

disappear completely as an official language.

“Marriage policy after previous racial examination.

“In attempts at assimilation in the Reich proper, the frontier

Gaue must be excluded.

“Apart from continuous propaganda for Germanism and the granting

of advantages as an inducement, severest police methods, with

exile and ‘special treatment’ for all saboteurs. Principle:

‘Zuckerbrot und Peitsche.’”—What is that “Zuckerbrot und

Peitsche”?

“The employment of all these methods has a chance of success

only if a single central Reich authority with one man at its

head controls its planning, guiding, and carrying out. The

direct subordination of the ‘master in Bohemia’ to the Führer

clarifies the political character of the office and the task,

and prevents the political problem from sinking down to an

administrative problem.”

In other words, it was essential to this policy that you should keep

your job as Reich Protector and Frank should keep his as State

Secretary, and the Gauleiter of the Danube should not be able to

interfere and take away Brno as the capital of his Gau.

Defendant, do you tell this High Tribunal, as you told Dr. Lammers, that

you entirely agree with what I suggest to you are dreadful, callous, and

unprincipled proposals? Do you agree with these proposals?

VON NEURATH: No, I do not agree in the least.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, why did you tell Lammers you did? Why,

when things were going well, did you tell Lammers that you did agree

with them?

VON NEURATH: Later I made an oral report to the Führer about this. Apart

from that, the statements which you just made show quite clearly that

this first memorandum was written by Frank, who then added the second

memorandum to it, and if you say, as you said at the end just now, that

it was my purpose to remain in office as Reich Protector, then I can

only tell you that the purpose, if there was a purpose in this

connection, was that Frank wanted to become Reich Protector. However,

from the point of view of the contents of this memorandum, I can

certainly no longer identify myself with them today, nor did I do so on

the occasion when I reported to the Führer. This becomes clear from the

testimony which I gave yesterday. This testimony...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I’m not concerned with your testimony

yesterday; I am concerned with what you wrote in 1940 when you

wrote—and I will read the words again; I have read them three times:

“I enclose another memorandum on the same question which my

State Secretary, K. H. Frank, has drawn up independently of

me”—independently of me—“and which in its train of thoughts

leads to the same result, and with which I fully agree.”

Why did you...

VON NEURATH: I have just now told you that I no longer agree with these

statements today, and that at the time when I verbally reported to the

Führer, I did not support these statements either, but to the contrary,

I made the proposals to him which I explained yesterday and to which I

received his agreement.

THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, are these documents correctly copied? Because

you see that in the letter of the 31st of August 1940 there is a

reference in the margin, “Enclosure 1; Enclosure 2.”

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord.

THE PRESIDENT: Therefore, the letter identifies the document.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord, that is so. The one is, as I am

suggesting, the defendant’s; the other is Frank’s.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you have mentioned, Defendant, about

what—that you dealt with them otherwise to the Führer. I suggest to you

that that is not true, that is not true that you dealt with them

otherwise to the Führer. I am putting it quite bluntly that it is not

true.

VON NEURATH: In that case I must regret to say that you are lying. For

I—I must know. After all, I must know whether I talked to the Führer. I

delivered a verbal report to him in person and Frank was not present.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, just let us look at the report, at

your report. Your Lordship will find it on Page 7.

We will see whether it is true or not.

THE PRESIDENT: Page what?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Page 7, My Lord. It is Document D-739 of the

same book, 12a; it is Exhibit G-521.

Now, this is a memorandum, a secret memorandum of the representative of

the Foreign Office in the Office of the Reich Protector, of the 5th of

October.

[_Turning to the defendant._] You will remember your letter was the 31st

of August. It says:

“Regarding the reception of the Reich Protector and State

Secretary Frank by the Führer, I have learned the following from

authentic sources:

“To begin with, the Minister of Justice, Gürtner, gave a report

on the Czech resistance movement, during the course of which he

maintained that the first trial of the four chief ringleaders

would shortly take place before the Peoples’ Court.

“The Führer objected to this procedure and declared that

execution squads were good enough for Czech insurgents and

rebels. It was a mistake to create martyrs through legal

sentences, as was proved in the case of Andreas Hofer and

Schlageter. The Czechs would regard any sentence as an

injustice. As this matter had already entered the path of legal

procedure it was to be continued with in this form. The trials

were to be postponed until after the war, and then amidst the

din of the victory celebrations, the proceedings would pass

unnoticed. Only death sentences could be pronounced, but would

be commuted later on to life imprisonment or deportation.

“Regarding the question of the future of the Protectorate, the

Führer touched on the following three possibilities:

“1. Continuation of Czech autonomy in which the Germans would

live in the Protectorate as co-citizens with equal rights. This

possibility was, however, out of the question as one had always

to reckon with Czech intrigues.

“2. The deportation of the Czechs and the Germanization of the

Bohemian and Moravian area by German settlers. This possibility

was out of the question too, as it would take 100 years.

“3. The Germanization of the Bohemian and Moravian area by

Germanizing the Czechs, that is, by their assimilation. The

latter would be possible with the greater part of the Czech

people. Those Czechs against whom there were racial objections

or who were anti-German were to be excepted from this

assimilation. This category was to be weeded out.

“The Führer decided in favor of the third possibility; he gave

orders via Reich Minister Lammers, to put a stop to the

multitude of plans regarding partition of the Protectorate. The

Führer further decided that, in the interests of a uniform

policy with regard to the Czechs, a central Reich authority for

the whole of the Bohemian and Moravian area should remain at

Prague.

“The present status of the Protectorate thus continues.”

And look at the last sentence:

“The Führer’s decision followed the lines of the memoranda

submitted by the Protector and State Secretary Frank.”

Now, Defendant, although you answered me so sharply a moment ago, that

document says that after the reception of the Reich Protector and the

State Secretary, the representative of the Foreign Office in your office

says that the decision of the Führer followed the lines of the memoranda

put forward by you and your State Secretary Frank. Why do you say that I

am wrong in saying it is untrue that a different line was followed by

the Führer? It is set out in that document.

VON NEURATH: To that I have the following reply to give: First of all,

the document shows that the Führer touched upon the following three

eventualities with reference to the question of the future of the

Protectorate. They are the three possibilities which I said yesterday I

had proposed. The document also shows, though not directly, that the

cause for this Führer conference was primarily quite a different one

than merely deciding the question of the Protectorate. On the contrary,

the Minister of Justice was present and a legal question in regard to

the treatment of the members of the resistance movement was the cause

for the discussion and Frank came to Berlin for this reason. I had been

to Berlin before that and I talked to the Führer, not about the

memorandum, which I had in my hand, but about my misgivings in general

and the future of our policy in the Protectorate. My report included

those proposals which are mentioned here under 1, 2, and 3.

It says there at the end, “The decision followed the lines of the

memoranda submitted by the Protector and State Secretary Frank.” That

remark was added by Herr Ziemke or whoever had written the document, but

what I said yesterday about the policy is correct. And even if I admit

that at that time in the letter to Lammers I did identify myself with

these enclosures it was nevertheless dropped.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I want to remind you that in the passage

which I referred to last in your memorandum, as opposed to that of

Frank, you were putting forward the organization of the Greater German

Reich. I take it in this way, that you envisaged yourself that in the

event of a German victory in the war the Czech part of Czechoslovakia

would remain part of a Greater German Reich.

VON NEURATH: No, I beg your pardon. It had already been incorporated and

here it is also expressly stated that it should remain in that

condition, as a protectorate but as a special structure.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, I just—are you saying that your

policy, after this period—this was in the autumn of 1940—that your

policy towards the Czechs was sympathetic?

VON NEURATH: I do not think it changed except when there were strong

resistance movements there.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, why was it that you forbade, in the

middle of 1941, any reference of the handling—to the discussion of the

handling and treatment of all questions about the German-Czech problem?

Why did you forbid its discussion?

VON NEURATH: To prevent these problems which were the cause of this

memorandum from arising again and again, namely the problem of

individual parts of the Protectorate being torn away and added to the

lower Danube or the Sudeten country with a general resettlement. That

was the purpose of my report to the Führer, as I explained yesterday, so

as to put a stop to that discussion once and for all.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But you also—you particularly prohibited, did

you not, any public statements addressed to the Czech population? Well,

let us look at the document.

It is Document Number 3862-PS, My Lord. Your Lordship will find it at

Page 126 of Document Book 12a. My Lord, it becomes Exhibit GB-522.

[_Turning to the defendant._] It is for distribution through your

various offices and you say:

“For the motive stated I order that in the future, when

arrangements and publications of any kind concerning the

German-Czech problem are made, the views of the whole population

are more than ever to be directed to the war and its

requirements while the duty of the Czech nation to carry out the

war tasks imposed on it jointly with the Greater German Reich is

to be stressed.

“Other questions concerning the German-Czech problem are not

suitable subjects for public discussion at the present time. I

wish to point out that, without detriment to my orders,

administrative handling and treatment of all questions about the

German-Czech problem are to be in no way alluded to.”

Then the last paragraph:

“Requisite public statements about the political questions of

the Protectorate and in particular those addressed to the Czech

population are my business and mine alone and will be published

in due time.”

Why did you want to prohibit so severely the addressing of any public

statements to the Czech population?

VON NEURATH: That is addressed not only to the Czech population, but

especially to the Germans, and just for this reason—that was some

special event which I no longer remember—it says here “for the motive

stated I order that”—when there was again a discussion about the future

of the Protectorate or something was published. That was the reason and

I pointed out that that is why it was forbidden.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, I suggest to you about the—your

proposals and Frank’s speak for themselves. I want you to help me on one

other matter.

Do you remember after the closing of the universities that the question

arose, what was to happen to the students? There were about 18,000

students who were, of course, out of work because they could not...

VON NEURATH: I beg your pardon, I beg your pardon. There were not so

many; there were at the most 1,800 in all.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, you got it—with the greatest respect either

you are wrong or your office. According to the note from Group X of your

office:

“According to the data at my disposal the number of students

affected by the closure”—I should think that would include high

schools as well—“for 3 years of the Czech universities is

18,998.

“According to the press communications, dated the 21st of this

month only 1,200 persons were arrested in connection with the

events of the 15th of this month.”

And then your office goes on to say by a process of subtraction that

leaves 17,800. You were faced with their occupation.

My Lord, it is Page 104, Document 3858-PS. Exhibit GB-523.

VON NEURATH: I do not want to deny my official’s statement. He must have

known better than I. I am merely surprised that there should have been

18,000 students in two Czech universities, in a country with a

population of 7 millions.

THE PRESIDENT: Hadn’t you better check that by the original?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I shall. I am much obliged to Your

Lordship. Well, My Lord, it is quite clear that both figures—they are

in figures, and they are 18,998, and then there is the check below, and

you have to take off 1,200; that leaves 17,800. My Lord, if it were only

1,800, the second figure could not arise.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, somewhere there must be an error.

That would have been more for two universities in Czechoslovakia than

there were in Berlin at the best of times. There was a maximum of 8,000

to 9,000 in Berlin per year and in the case of a nation of only 7

millions there are supposed to be 18,000 students in two universities.

This cannot be right.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, it may be that there are three age

groups. Your Lordship sees that it is “according to the data at my

disposal, the number of students affected by the closure for 3 years of

the Czech universities is 18,000.” It may be that is the intake for 2

years, in addition to present students.

[_Turning to the defendant._] Anyhow, this is the figure; and it is this

problem which has been dealt with by your Ministry. It may be that it

includes certain high schools, but at any rate, these are your

Ministry’s documents, and I want to know what happened. This was the

minutes, as I understand it, from Dennler, Dr. Dennler, who was the head

of Group X of your office, to Burgsdorff, who had a superior position;

and, if I may summarize it, this letter of 21 November 1939 suggests

that the students should be taken forcibly from Czechoslovakia to the

old Reich and put to work in the old Reich; and then, the next—on 25

November, you will notice that in Paragraph 2 it says—the writer, who

is Burgsdorff, is saying that he is dealing with X 119/39, which is

Dennler’s memorandum; and Burgsdorff says that he does not want them to

go into the Reich because at that time there was some unemployment in

the Reich, and suggests that they should be dealt with by compulsory

labor on the roads and canals in Czechoslovakia. Now, these were the two

proposals from your office.

My Lord, the second one is Document 3857-PS, which will be Exhibit

GB-524.

[_Turning to the defendant._] What happened to the unfortunate students?

VON NEURATH: Nothing at all happened to them.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, did either of these proposals of Dr.

Dennler for forced labor in the Reich and of Burgsdorff for forced labor

in Czechoslovakia, did they come up to you?

VON NEURATH: No, none of them.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did they come to you for decision? Did they come

to you for decision?

VON NEURATH: I think they were submitted to me, but I cannot tell you

for certain.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, will you agree with me, or perhaps you

will be able to correct my knowledge, that this is the earliest

suggestion—you said it was not put into effect—but the earliest

suggestion of forced labor came from an officer of your department? Do

you know of any other department of the Reich that had suggested forced

labor as early as November 1939?

VON NEURATH: There is no connection, and, moreover, if you were to look

through suggestions made by all your subordinates, then you, too, might

find some proposal which you afterward rejected. Suggestions made by an

adviser do not mean anything at all.

Apart from that, perhaps I can clear up this figure of 18,000. Here it

says, “According to the data at my disposal, the number of students who

will be affected by closing the Czech universities for 3 years will be

18,000.” It is, therefore, three times 6,000, is it not? Which is

approximately 18,000.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I had already put forward that suggestion,

Defendant, about 10 minutes ago, but I respectfully agree with you. That

is one matter in which we are not in difference.

Well now, you understand what I am suggesting. It is that these

proposals germinated in your office, because they were quite in keeping

with the proposals in the memoranda which I have just read to the

Tribunal, that you should not only get rid of Czech higher education,

but you should have forced labor. Do you remember that was in the State

Secretary’s memorandum? What I am suggesting is that it was in your

department—the idea of forced labor—as early as 21 November 1939.

Now, Defendant, I have only one other matter, and I hope, as it is a

question of fact, that perhaps you will be able to agree with me on

reflection. You suggested this morning that the German university in

Prague was closed down after the founding of Czechoslovakia in 1919.

That is how it came to us. On reflection, do you not know that it

continued and that many thousands of students graduated in the German

university of Prague between 1919 and 1939?

VON NEURATH: As far as I know, it was a department of the Czech

university, a German part of the Czech university, as far as I know.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But it continued—it continued as a university?

VON NEURATH: Yes, it continued, but as a Czech university.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, but German students came there and could

take their degrees in German? It was a permitted language? I suggest to

you that there are thousands of people who went there from Austria and

from the old Reich—went there as Germans and took their degrees in

German.

VON NEURATH: Yes, only the old German university, the so-called Charles

University, was closed by the Czechs. But a German department, or

whatever one might call it, still remained. The Germans studied and took

their examinations there.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I think the point is clear. I am not going to

argue about the actual thing, but that there was a German university,

where German students could study, you will agree.

THE PRESIDENT: Do the Prosecution wish to cross-examine further?

STATE COUNSELLOR OF JUSTICE M. Y. RAGINSKY (Assistant Prosecutor for the

U.S.S.R.): Defendant, tell us please, when you were Minister of Foreign

Affairs did Ribbentrop try to intervene in the foreign affairs of

Germany?

VON NEURATH: Is that a question?

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Yes, that is a question.

VON NEURATH: Yes.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Would you please tell us in what form this

intervention took place?

VON NEURATH: By communicating to the Führer his own ideas on foreign

policy, without giving them to me for consideration.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: All right. Yesterday you stated here that in

1936 you had differences of opinion with Hitler and that on 27 of July

1936 you asked to be relieved of your duties as a Minister. This

document was cited here yesterday, but did you not write to Hitler

then?—and I will read the last sentence of your letter to him:

“Even if I am no longer Minister, I shall be constantly at your

disposal, if you so desire, with my advice and my years of

experience in the field of foreign policy.”

Did you write these words in your letter to the Führer?

VON NEURATH: Yes indeed; yes indeed.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: And did you fulfill the promises you made to

Hitler? Whenever it was necessary to cover by diplomatic manipulations

the aggressive actions of Hitler, as for instance at the time of the

annexation of the Sudetenland, during the invasion of Czechoslovakia,

and so on? Did you help Hitler with your experience? Is that right?

VON NEURATH: That is a great mistake. On the contrary, as I have stated

here yesterday and today, I was called in by Hitler only once; and that

was on the last phase of the Austrian Anschluss. With that my activities

came to an end, but in 1938, to be sure, I went to see him of my own

accord, to restrain him from starting the war. That was my activity.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: We have already heard this. I would like to ask

you another question concerning the memorandum of Friderici without

repeating what has already been said here concerning it. You remember

this memorandum well, as it was just presented to the Court a short time

ago. In the last part of the memorandum of Friderici—it is the last

paragraph but one—it is stated:

“If the governing of the Protectorate were in reliable hands and

guided exclusively by the order of the Führer of the 16th of

March 1939, the territory of Bohemia and Moravia would become an

integral part of Germany.”

It was for this purpose that Hitler chose you to be Protector; is that

not so?

VON NEURATH: Not a bit; that was not the reason at all. The reason

was—I have described it in detail yesterday.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: All right. We shall not repeat the reasons; we

spoke about them yesterday.

Well, you deny that you were precisely the man who was supposed to carry

through the invasion of Czechoslovakia?

VON NEURATH: To that I can only answer “no.”

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: All right. Do you admit that you were, in the

Protectorate, the only representative of the Führer and of the

Government of the Reich, and that you were directly subordinate to

Hitler?

VON NEURATH: Yes, that is right; that is stated in Hitler’s decree.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Yes, it is stated there. I will not read this

decree, which would only delay the interrogation. This decree has

already been presented to the Court.

Do you acknowledge that all administrative organs and authorities of the

Reich in the Protectorate with the exception of the Armed Forces, were

subordinate to you?

VON NEURATH: No. I am sorry to have to say that that is a mistake. That

is also stated in the same decree of 1 September 1939. Apart from that,

there were numerous other organizations, that is, Reich authorities,

which were not under my jurisdiction; quite apart from the Police.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Well, as far as the Police are concerned, we

will speak about that separately. So you think it is a mistake that the

decree does not mention it, or do you interpret the decree otherwise?

I shall read the first paragraph of the decree of 1 September 1939. It

is stated there:

“All the authorities, offices and organizations of the Reich in

the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, with the exception of

the Armed Forces, are under the jurisdiction of the Reich

Protector.”

It is also stated in Paragraph 2:

“The Reich Protector supervises the entire autonomous

administration of the Protectorate.”

And Paragraph 3:

“The office of the Reich Protector is in charge of all

administrative branches of the Reich administration with the

exception of the Armed Forces.”

As you see, it is stated very bluntly and definitely here that all the

institutions of the Reich were subordinate to you, while you were

subordinate to Hitler.

VON NEURATH: I have to tell you again that as to administrative

agencies, yes; but there were a number of other authorities, Reich

authorities and offices which did not come under my jurisdiction, for

instance, the Four Year Plan.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Now let us pass to the question of the Police.

Yesterday, in answer to a question of your counsel, you stated to the

Tribunal that as to this decree of 1 September, signed by Göring, Frick,

and Lammers, Paragraph 13 was not comprehensible to you. Let us examine

other paragraphs of the same chapter concerning the Police.

Paragraph 11 says:

“The organs of the German Security Police in the Protectorate of

Bohemia and Moravia have the task of investigating and combating

all hostile attempts toward the government and population in the

territory of the Protectorate, informing the Reich Protector as

well as the subordinate organizations, keeping them currently

informed on important events, and advising them as to what to

do.”

Paragraph 14 of the same decree states:

“The Reich Minister of the Interior (the Reichsführer SS, and

the Chief of the German Police), with the agreement of the Reich

Protector in Bohemia and Moravia releases the legal and

administrative directives necessary for carrying out this

order.”

Thus, according to this decree, the Police and the SS were obliged to

let you know about all their measures and, moreover, all their

administrative and legal acts and measures had been carried out with

your knowledge. Do you acknowledge that?

VON NEURATH: No; that is not right. First of all, there was at one time

an order that they were to inform me. But that was not carried out and

was forbidden by Himmler directly. And the other, the second regulation

to the effect that the administrative measures—or whatever it is

called—could or should be carried out with my approval, was never

applied.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: So you deny it?

VON NEURATH: Yes.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: I now present to you the testimony of Karl

Hermann Frank, of 7 March 1946, on this very question; that is, on the

question of the Police and to whom they were subordinated.

Mr. President, I present this testimony as Exhibit Number USSR-494.

THE PRESIDENT: Is this in the English book as well, do you know?

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: No, Mr. President. This document that I am

presenting now is an original, signed by Frank.

[_Turning to the defendant._] Karl Hermann Frank, during an

interrogation, testified:

“According to the order on ‘The Structure of the German

Administration in the Protectorate and the German Security

Police,’ all German authorities and offices in the Protectorate

and thereby the entire Police, too, excepting the Armed Forces

are formally subordinated to the Reich Protector and are bound

by his directions. Owing to this the Security Police was bound

to carry out this basic political policy set forth by the Reich

Protector. Orders as to carrying out State Police measures were

mainly issued by the Chief of the Security Police with the Reich

Security Main Office in Berlin.

“If the Reich Protector wanted to carry out some State Police

measures, he had to have the permission of the Reich Security

Main Office in Berlin; that is, in this case the State Police

also submitted each order for reconfirmation to the Reich

Security Main Office in Berlin. The same applied also to

directives for the carrying out of State Police measures given

by the Higher SS and Police Leader to the Chief of the Security

Police.”

I would like to draw your attention to this paragraph that I am reading

now:

“This system of channels for issuing directives remained in

force during the whole existence of the Protectorate and was

used as such by Von Neurath in the Protectorate. In general the

Reich Protector could, on his own initiative, issue directives

to the State Police through the Chief of the Security Police.

The carrying out of such directives was, however, subject to

approval by the Reich Security Main Office if State Police

measures were concerned.

“In regard to the SD (Security Service), which had no executive

powers, the authority of the Reich Protector respecting the

issuing of directives to the SD was greater and not subject to

the approval of the Reich Security Main Office in every case.”

Do you confirm this testimony of Frank?

VON NEURATH: No.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: All right.

VON NEURATH: I refer you to a statement by the same Frank, which I have

learned about here, which was made last year, during which he said

something quite different. He said that the entire Police were not under

the Reich Protector, but came under the Chief of the Police in Berlin,

namely, Himmler. It ought to be here somewhere—this statement.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Don’t worry about it; I will come back to this

testimony.

Tell me, please, who was the political adviser in your service?

VON NEURATH: Political adviser?

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Yes, political adviser.

VON NEURATH: In general I had various political advisers.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: In order not to waste time, I will show you a

short document, and I ask you to read it.

On 21 July 1939 the Chief of the Security Police wrote a letter to your

State Secretary and Higher SS and Police Leader, Karl Hermann Frank. The

letter had the following contents:

“In an order of 5 May 1939 the Reich Protector of Bohemia and

Moravia appointed the SD Leader and Chief of the Security Police

as his political adviser. I have ascertained that this order has

not yet been published or carried out. Please provide for

carrying out this order.

“Signed, Dr. Best.”

Do you remember your order now?

VON NEURATH: I cannot remember that decree at the moment, but I do

remember that this was never carried out, because I did not have this SD

leader as my political adviser.

THE PRESIDENT: This would be a convenient time to break off.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Mr. President, just one more minute, please, to

finish this question, and then we can break off.

[_Turning to the defendant._] But did you issue such an order on 5 May?

VON NEURATH: I can no longer tell you about that at this date—but it is

probably true. I do not want to deny it; I do not know any more.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: But you did issue this order?

All right. I thank you, Mr. President. It is possible to adjourn now. I

shall require 30 minutes more.

[_The Tribunal adjourned until 26 June 1946, at 1000 hours._]

ONE HUNDRED AND SIXTY-FOURTH DAY

Wednesday, 26 June 1946

_Morning Session_

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will not sit on Thursday, tomorrow

afternoon, in open session, but will sit in closed session. That is to

say, we will sit tomorrow, Thursday, from 10 till 1 in open session, and

we will sit in the afternoon in closed session.

On Saturday morning, the Tribunal will sit in open session from 10 till

1.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Mr. President, I am aware that yesterday when I

submitted the Document USSR-494, the necessary copies of this document

were not submitted to the Tribunal. I am very sorry about this, and I

would ask you to accept the necessary copies now which I am going to

submit.

[_The Defendant Von Neurath resumed the stand._]

Let us go back, Defendant, to your warning issued in August 1939. If I

understood you correctly, you said here before the Tribunal that this

warning was issued in connection with the military situation of the

time; is that correct?

VON NEURATH: With reference to the military situation nothing had

happened at that time; absolutely no political tension had become

noticeable in the meantime; therefore, it was not directly in connection

with the military situation. There was certainly nothing wrong yet at

that time.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: That is regardless of the military situation,

all right. Do you acknowledge that by this order of yours, or by this

warning, you had introduced a system of hostages? Do you admit that?

VON NEURATH: I did not understand the question.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: I am going to repeat the question. I am asking

you, do you acknowledge that by means of this warning of August 1939—I

am submitting this document as evidence under Document Number

USSR-490—that by this order you were setting up a system of hostages?

Do you admit that?

VON NEURATH: I did not understand.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Was it correctly translated to you just now?

VON NEURATH: Yes; the translation did not come through on the last

question, or rather the last sentence. I did not understand the last

sentence.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Well, I will put it to you that you know the

document well.

VON NEURATH: Yes; but I did not understand the last sentence of your

question.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: I shall try to say it in such a way that you

will understand it now. In this order of yours, in the penultimate

paragraph, it is stated, “The responsibility for all acts of sabotage

will be borne not only by the individual perpetrators, but by the entire

Czechoslovak population.” This means that not only guilty persons have

to be punished, but there were punishments set up for innocent people

too. With this order you inaugurated the mass terrorism against the

Czech population.

VON NEURATH: Not at all. It only meant that the moral responsibility for

any possible acts was to be laid to the account of the Czech people.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Well, in Lidice, was this not applied in

practice? Was it only a question of the moral responsibility there?

VON NEURATH: Yes, yes.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: In this order you state the following: “Those

who do not take these necessities into account will be considered

enemies of the Reich.” To the enemies of the Reich you applied only the

principles of moral responsibility and nothing else?

VON NEURATH: Yes, if someone did not obey orders, then naturally he was

punished.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: That is exactly what I am trying to determine

and that is why I put this question to you, that just by this order of

August 1939 you started the general terrorism of a massacre and

punishment of innocent people.

VON NEURATH: Well, I do not know how you can draw this conclusion from

this warning.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: We are going now to the deductions which we can

make out of this. In the report of the Czechoslovak Government,

submitted as evidence, Document USSR-60, which is a report on the final

result of the investigation of the crimes committed by you and your

collaborators, all this has been stated. And you just flatly deny all

this documentary evidence. I am not going to argue with you regarding

this document, but I am going to read into the record some of the

testimony by the witnesses; and I would like you to reply whether you

corroborate this evidence or whether you deny it. I am going to read

into the record an excerpt from the testimony of the former Minister of

Finance, Josef Kalfus, of 8 November 1945.

The Tribunal will find these excerpts on Page 12 of the English text,

Document USSR-60.

Kalfus stated:

“The economic system introduced by Neurath and after him by the

later German regime, was nothing else than systematic, organized

robbery. As to the occupation of decisive positions in the Czech

industry and finance, it should be pointed out that, together

with Neurath, a vast economic machinery was installed, which

immediately occupied the chief positions in industry. The Skoda

Works, Brno Armament Works, steel works at Vitkovice, important

banks—Bohemian Discount Bank, Länder Bank, and Bohemian Union

Bank—were occupied as well.”

Do you corroborate this evidence?

VON NEURATH: I talked about this matter in great detail yesterday, and I

refer you to my statement I made yesterday. I have nothing to add.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Thus, you do not corroborate this evidence?

VON NEURATH: Not in the least.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: The former, President of Bohemia, Richard

Bienert, during the interrogation of 8 November 1945, stated—Mr.

President, this excerpt is on Page 13 of the English text of the

Document USSR-60:

“When we got to know him more closely, we noticed that he,

Neurath, was ruthless toward the Czechs. As the Landespräsident

of Bohemia I knew that it was Neurath who subjected the

political administration in Bohemia and Moravia to German

control, both the state administration and the local government

as well. I remember also that Neurath caused the abolition of

the local school counsellors, and the appointment of German

school inspectors in their place. Neurath ordered the

dissolution of the regional representative bodies; he caused

Czech workers to be sent to the Reich from April 1939 onward in

order to work for the war machine of the Reich. He ordered the

closing down of the Czech universities and of many Czech

secondary and elementary schools.

“He abolished the Czech sport clubs and associations, such as

Sokol and Orel, and ordered the confiscation of all the property

of these gymnastic organizations; he abolished ... the Czech

recreation homes and sanatoria for young workmen and students,

and ordered the confiscation of their property. The Gestapo

carried out the arrests, but on the order of the Reich Protector

... I myself was arrested on 1 September 1939, as well.”

Will you still deny this testimony?

VON NEURATH: No, no. About all the matters which are listed here, I

spoke yesterday in great detail. I do not intend to repeat it all over

again now. Moreover, it seems strange to me that Mr. Bienert of all

people, who knew perfectly well what I had ordered and what my relations

were to the Gestapo and so forth, that Mr. Bienert of all people should

say things like that.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Very well. Let us look at some other testimony.

The former Prime Minister of the so-called Protectorate, Dr. Krejci,

during the interrogations on 8 November 1945, stated...

Mr. President, this excerpt can be found on Page 17 of the English text

of the Document USSR-60. Krejci testified:

“I know that the gymnastic associations were disbanded and their

property confiscated at the order of the Reich Protector, and

their funds and equipment handed over to be used by German

associations such as SS, SA, Hitler Youth, and so on. On 1

September 1939, when Poland was attacked by the German Army,

arrests took place on a large scale, especially arrests of army

officers, intellectuals, and important political personalities.

The arrests were made by the Gestapo, but it could not be done

without the approval of the Reich Protector.”

I am reading into the record one more excerpt from the next page of the

testimony:

“As far as the Jewish problem was concerned, the Government of

the Protectorate was forced by the Reich Protector into a

campaign against the Jews, and when this pressure had not the

desired result, the Germans—or the Reich Protector’s

office—started persecuting the Jews according to the German

laws. The result was that tens of thousands of Jews were

persecuted and lost their lives and property.”

Are you going to deny this testimony, too?

VON NEURATH: With reference to the order which you mentioned at the

beginning, concerning the sport clubs, I have to tell you that that was

a police measure which I had not ordered; and I go on to repeat, as I

said yesterday, that the arrests at the beginning of the war were

carried out by the Gestapo, by direct order from Berlin, without my even

having heard about the matter. I did not learn about it until afterward.

Finally, with reference to the Jewish problem which is mentioned in the

end, the statement which is contained in the Indictment, I think,

namely, that I had attempted to get the Government of Czechoslovakia to

introduce anti-Jewish laws, is an incorrect statement. I, or rather my

State Secretary, talked to Mr. Elias, as far as I know. I myself have

never talked to him. I talked to Mr. Hacha only afterward on a later

occasion, when there was an attempt to introduce racial laws with

reference to the Czechs; Mr. Hacha objected to this and I told him he

did not have to do this, as this was my responsibility.

The introduction of the anti-Jewish laws was carried out by a decree of

mine, to be sure, because as early as the beginning of April 1939, I had

received orders to introduce the anti-Jewish legislation in the

Protectorate which was not incorporated in the Reich. I delayed this

step until July by means of all sorts of inquiries in Berlin, so as to

give time to the Jews to prepare themselves in some way or other. These

are the actual facts.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Tell me, do you know Dr. Havelka?

VON NEURATH: I know Herr Havelka, yes.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: He knew exactly about your conversation with

Hacha?

VON NEURATH: Well, how much he knew about that, I do not know. Herr

Havelka came to see me once or twice. He was Transport Minister, I

think.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Yes, that is quite correct. He was the Minister

of Transport, but before that, he was the head of the chancellery of

Hacha’s office.

Havelka, during his interrogation on 9 November last year, gave the

following testimony, which can be found on Pages 18 and 19 of the

English text of Exhibit USSR-60—I am quoting an excerpt:

“He”—Neurath—“was not interested in the Czech nation and

interventions of Cabinet members and Dr. Hacha pressing Czech

demands were on the whole without any result.

“There were the following actions in particular:

“Arrests of Czechoslovak officers, intelligentsia, members of

the Czechoslovak Legion of the first World War, and politicians.

At the time of the attack on Poland by the German Army about six

to eight thousand persons were arrested. They were hostages. The

Germans themselves called them ‘held in protective custody.’ The

majority of those hostages were never interrogated, and all

steps taken at the office of the Reich Protector in favor of

these unfortunate men remained without any result.

“Neurath, as the only representative of the Reich Government in

the territory of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, was

responsible for the execution of nine students on 17 November

1939. The execution was carried out soon after...”

THE PRESIDENT: General Raginsky, would it not be better and perhaps

fairer to the defendant to ask him one question at a time? You are

reading long passages of these documents which contain many questions.

Perhaps you could take these two paragraphs you read now about the

arrest of officers and ask him whether he says those are true or untrue,

and then go on to the other paragraphs you want. It is very difficult

for him to answer a great number of questions at one time.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Mr. President, he has these documents before

him and he is acquainted with the testimonies in question, but I will

take into consideration what you have just told me. I will speak about

the shooting of the students separately.

[_Turning to the defendant._] Do you corroborate this part of the

evidence which I have just read into the record regarding the hostages?

VON NEURATH: About the arrest of the members of the so-called Vlayka, at

the beginning of September 1939, I have spoken earlier, and I spoke in

detail about that yesterday.

I said that these arrests—I am repeating it once more—were carried out

by the Gestapo without my knowledge. Herr Havelka’s statement, that no

steps had been taken in the interest of these people, is untrue. He

ought to know that I continuously fought for these people and that a

large number of them were released through my efforts.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Very well, let us go over to another question.

Here, before this Tribunal, a certain document has already been

introduced several times under Document Number USSR-223. This is the

diary of Frank.

Mr. President, I am not referring to Karl Hermann Frank, who was

sentenced to die for his crimes, but it is the Defendant Frank that I am

speaking about. This excerpt has already been quoted here, but I should

like to put a question to the defendant about it. I shall read it into

the record. During an interview with a correspondent of the _Völkischer

Beobachter_ in 1942, the Defendant Frank stated as follows:

“In Prague, for instance, some red placards were put out saying

that seven Czechs were being shot that day. Then I told myself

if I had to issue an order for such placards to be put up

regarding every seven Poles who were shot, then there would not

be enough timber in Poland to manufacture enough paper for such

placards.”

Please tell me if it is true that such red placards were put up in

Prague?

VON NEURATH: I mentioned that yesterday. I have already said yesterday

that this was the poster where my signature was misused, and that I had

not seen it in advance. That is that red poster.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Well, if you have not seen these posters, will

you please look at them. We are going to show it to you right now.

VON NEURATH: Yes, I know it very well.

THE PRESIDENT: General Raginsky, he did not say he had not seen it. He

said it was put up without his knowledge.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Mr. President, I am going to come back to this,

but I should like to establish that these were the red posters which

were mentioned by Frank in his diary, and I should like to submit this

poster under Document Number USSR-489.

I should like to read it into the record; it is very short and it will

not take much time. The text is as follows:

“In spite of repeated serious warnings, a number of Czech

intellectuals, in collaboration with _émigré_ circles abroad,

are trying to disturb peace and order in the Protectorate of

Bohemia and Moravia by committing major or minor acts of

resistance. In this connection it was possible to prove that the

ringleaders of these resistance acts are especially to be found

in the Czech universities. Since on 28 October and 15 November

these elements gave way to acts of physical violence against

individual Germans, the Czech universities have been closed for

the duration of 3 years, nine of the perpetrators have been

shot, and a considerable number of the participants have been

arrested.

“Signed, The Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia, Freiherr

von Neurath, Prague, 17 November 1939.”

You state here that you never signed this warning? Have I understood you

rightly?

VON NEURATH: Yes, indeed. I have already explained yesterday or the day

before how this came about, namely, in my absence.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Well, you should not repeat what you have

already stated.

I am going to read into the record a certain statement by Karl Hermann

Frank of 26 November 1945, connected with the subject. It can be found

on Pages 46 and 47 of the Russian text. The English text will be

submitted. Karl Hermann Frank, giving evidence regarding this poster,

the text of which I have just read into the record, stated:

“This document was dated 17 November 1939 and was signed by Von

Neurath who did not object either to the shooting of the nine

students...”

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, may I draw your attention to

something connected with this document. The document is neither dated

nor is it signed, at least not the copy I have. It does not make it at

all clear from whom the document originates, and I should like to take

this opportunity to protest against the reading of this document.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Von Lüdinghausen, is there not a certificate about

the document?

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Not in my copy.

THE PRESIDENT: Well...

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Mr. President, will you permit me to explain

this misunderstanding. Dr. Von Lüdinghausen has the full text of the

Document USSR-60. The English text was also submitted to the Tribunal.

This document was quoted yesterday by Dr. Lüdinghausen. There is a

certificate regarding the authenticity of this document signed by the

plenipotentiary of the Czechoslovak Government, and there is the date,

too.

Now, just to facilitate the proceedings, we have submitted another copy

of Frank’s testimony to Dr. Lüdinghausen, and it would be very easy to

determine that there is a certificate regarding the authenticity of this

statement which is dated 17 November...

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I should like to say the following about this

point: When I received this long indictment from Colonel Ecer of the

Czech Delegation, the document did not have any additions or appendices,

except texts of laws. I therefore endeavored to obtain these additions

because reference had been made to them. I then received only one annex

to an appendix, or supplement “Number 2”; the others I received in the

same condition as the one which I have here.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Von Lüdinghausen, will you wait a minute? Will you

kindly tell us what document it is you are referring to?

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: It is USSR-60.

THE PRESIDENT: USSR-60—well, that is the Czech report, is it not?

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: That is the Czech report, which is about this

thick [_indicating_] in German; that is the one in question. Annexes

have also been issued to this, and these annexes, I repeat, were not

made available to me; that is, I made a personal effort to get them, but

I received only one which is not identical with this document and which

I received much later and in the same condition as that which I hold in

my hand now, that is to say, without a heading, without a signature, and

without a date, and most certainly without any certificate as to when,

where, and by whom this supposed statement of Frank’s was taken down.

THE PRESIDENT: Let us hear what General Raginsky has got to say about

it.

As I understand General Raginsky, he says there is a certificate

identifying that document and what is being supplied to you is merely a

copy, which may not have the date and may not have the certificate on

it, but which is the same as the document which is certified.

Is that what you said, General Raginsky?

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Could you now show Dr. Von Lüdinghausen the certificate

and the document which is certified?

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: This certificate can be found on Page 44 of the

Russian text in the appendix to Document USSR-60 and it is signed for

General Ecer by Colonel of the General Staff Corps, Novack. This

certificate was submitted, in due course, by us to the Tribunal.

THE PRESIDENT: Is it necessary to take up the time of the Tribunal about

this particular document? It seems to me we are wasting a lot of time.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: After all, it is important. Otherwise I cannot

find out whether it is genuine. That is certainly my right.

THE PRESIDENT: I was asking General Raginsky whether he wanted to

persist in the use of the document. Is it worth while? I do not know

what the document is or what it says.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: I consider that is not necessary, because this

document has already been submitted to the Tribunal a few months ago and

accepted by the Tribunal as evidence. I really do not understand the

statements by Dr. Von Lüdinghausen.

THE PRESIDENT: Why do you not show Dr. Von Lüdinghausen that there is a

certificate which applies to the document which you put in his hand?

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Yes, certainly, Mr. President. I am holding in

my hand the Russian text of the certificate. I am quoting the Russian

text and I can present it to Dr. Von Lüdinghausen so that he can be

convinced. The original document has been submitted to the Tribunal and

is in the possession of the Tribunal.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, is there not a German translation of the

certificate and does not the certificate identify the document? Is there

a German translation of the certificate?

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Just at the moment I do not have it, but during

the intermission I shall be glad to produce the original German

document.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Von Lüdinghausen, the Tribunal is told that this

document was put in before and the certificate of General Ecer was put

in at the same time, certifying that this document is a part of the

Czech report. In those circumstances, the Tribunal will allow the

document to be used.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, then I have another objection to

the use of this document.

As is known, if any interrogation transcripts or affidavits from

witnesses are presented, the Defense have the right to summon these

witnesses for an interrogation. The former State Secretary Frank, who

has made this statement, is, however, as is known, no longer among the

living. Therefore, I also object for this reason to the use of this

document.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Mr. President...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Von Lüdinghausen, this document was offered and

accepted in evidence during the lifetime of this man, K. H. Frank. That

is one reason for accepting it.

The document is admissible under Article 21 of the Charter and was

submitted under that article and there is no such rule as you have

stated, that the Defense are entitled to cross-examine every person who

makes an affidavit. It is a matter entirely within the discretion of the

Tribunal and therefore that objection is rejected.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Mr. President, I do not want to hold you any

longer on this matter but I wanted to show that this was an unnecessary

delay as Dr. Von Lüdinghausen used the document himself to introduce

some extracts from the testimony of Frank in his document book.

Now I shall read into the record some statements made by Frank. This

document, I repeat, is in connection with the warning dated 17 November

1939 which we just exhibited to this Tribunal, and signed by Von

Neurath, who did not raise his voice either against the shooting of the

nine students nor as to the number of students who were to be sent to

concentration camps, and he did not really request any changes in this

legislation.

[_Turning to the defendant._] Did you hear the testimony, Defendant?

VON NEURATH: Yes, I have read it.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Do you deny this?

VON NEURATH: But most definitely. There was no possibility whatever of

my doing so because I was not in Prague and consequently I could neither

have had any knowledge of it, nor could I have signed it or passed it

on.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Very well. You still insist on stating that the

Police never informed you regarding the arrests which were made and

other police measures which were taken? Do you state that firmly?

VON NEURATH: I did not say that they never informed me, but that they

always informed me afterward. My information always came from Czech

sources.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Was not the state of affairs such that the

Police regularly reported to you regarding the important events which

took place?

VON NEURATH: Not at all. In particular I never learned anything about

what they were planning, at least not until afterward—or if I had

learned it from Czech sources and then made inquiries with the Police.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Very well. I am going to read an extract from

the testimony of Karl Hermann Frank, dated 7 March 1946. This testimony

was submitted by me to the Tribunal yesterday and it was partially read

by me already. Will you give a copy of the testimony, USSR-494, to the

defendant, please?

Frank states:

“The Reich Protector, Von Neurath, regularly received reports on

the most important events in the Protectorate which had some

bearing on the Security Police, from me, from the State

Secretary, as well as from the Chief of the Security Police. For

example, Von Neurath was informed in the special case concerning

the student demonstrations in November 1939 both by me and by

the Chief of the Security Police. This case dealt with Hitler’s

direct orders demanding the shootings of all the ringleaders.

The number of ringleaders was to be fixed by the Prague Stapo

and the Reich Protector was informed about this. In this case an

estimate on the number of the ringleaders was left to the

discretion of the State Police, or rather to the approval of the

Reich Protector. Reich Protector Von Neurath signed the official

dispatch announcing the execution of these students, thereby

approving this action. It can therefore not be said that in this

case the Reich Protector was merely responsible for the carrying

out of the general Hitler order which deals with the execution

of all ringleaders, but that he is also responsible for the

fixing of the number of ringleaders, namely nine. I informed him

in detail about the interrogation and he signed the poster.

“If this had not met with his approval and had he wished to

revise it, as for instance, making it less severe, which he had

the right to do, then I should have had to abide by his

decision.”

Now do you deny these statements?

VON NEURATH: Yes; I do not know how many times I have got to tell you

that I was not in Prague at all.

And besides I do not know under what sort of pressure Frank might have

made these statements. It does not give the date, but you just said that

he made this statement on 7 April, and therefore a few days before his

execution.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: I should like the Tribunal to note that the

defendant is deliberately distorting the facts. I repeated several times

that these statements were made by Frank on 7 March and not on 7 April,

or 2 days before the execution, as you are telling me now.

The document is before you and you can look at it yourself and see the

date.

VON NEURATH: All right, then 7 March instead of 7 April. I think I said

7 April because I did not see the date at the top. But as I have said—I

think I have already told you three times—I could not have known

anything at all about it because I was not there.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Well. But you are making too many mistakes.

Yesterday when giving testimony you were not very clear as to the number

of students, either.

VON NEURATH: I cannot remember what I said yesterday, but I could hardly

have made so many mistakes; I do not know if there were one or two less.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: I would like to remind you. Yesterday, in reply

to a question by Sir David, who submitted to you Document 3858-PS, from

which it was evident that after the closing of the higher institutions

of learning, 18,000 students found themselves out of school...

THE PRESIDENT: Is it necessary to go over Sir David’s cross-examination

again? Surely we have said that we do not want to go over the same

subject twice.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Mr. President, I do not want to go back to the

very same thing, and I do not want to add anything to the questions put

by Sir David who has carried out a very detailed interrogation. I wanted

only to establish the truth. When the defendant stated yesterday that in

the document which was submitted by Sir David there was a mistake—that

in Prague there existed only two institutions of higher learning and

that 12,000 students could not have been arrested, this was not correct.

The question was not merely about the closing of two Prague

universities, but, on the basis of the order of 17 November 1939, there

were closed the Czech university in Prague, the Czech university in

Brünn, the Czech Higher Technical School in Brünn, the Czech Higher

Technical School in Prague...

THE PRESIDENT: We heard all this yesterday, and we do not want to hear

it again. We heard all about the closing of the university in Prague.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Very well, Mr. President. I just wanted to

state that not 2 universities were closed, but 10 institutions of higher

learning.

I have just a few questions left which I should like to put to the

defendant.

[_Turning to the defendant._] You received many awards from Hitler, as

is evident from the documents, and as you yourself stated. For instance,

on 22 September 1940 you received the Iron Cross for Military Service.

For what kind of services did you receive this award from Hitler?

THE PRESIDENT: Surely we went into this yesterday, did we not, in Sir

David’s cross-examination, or in the examination-in-chief, I forget

which? I think it was the examination-in-chief—all these decorations

which were given the defendant.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Mr. President, I do not want to revert to these

orders, but I should like to ask the defendant, for what special

services he received the Iron Cross from Hitler in 1942.

THE PRESIDENT: All right, ask him that.

VON NEURATH: Unfortunately, I cannot tell you. I cannot tell you what

sort of merits I am supposed to have displayed. The award of this order

of merit was made generally to all higher officials who were in service

at the time.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Very well, I am not going to insist on your

reply. I just wanted to state here that you received this award in 1940

after the mass terror was applied against the Czechoslovak population.

VON NEURATH: I do not know that I am supposed to have carried out a mass

terror.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Very well, if you do not understand, we are not

going to argue about this question.

In February 1943, in connection with your jubilee, various articles

about you were published in many newspapers. I am not going to submit

all these papers to the Tribunal or quote these articles, but I should

like to read just two excerpts from the newspaper _Fränkischer Kurier_

of 2 February 1943. We shall submit to you one of the copies of this so

that you can follow me as I read this document into the record.

This newspaper is being submitted to the Tribunal under Document Number

USSR-495.

In connection with your anniversary, it was stated:

“The most outstanding events in the field of foreign policy

after Hitler’s coming to power, in which Freiherr von Neurath

played a most important role as Reich Foreign Minister and with

which his name will always be connected, are: Germany’s leaving

the Geneva Disarmament Conference...the reuniting of the Saar to

Germany...and the denouncing of the Locarno Pact.”

And further on:

“Reich Protector Freiherr von Neurath was repeatedly decorated

by the Führer for outstanding services in the interest of the

people and the Reich. He was decorated with the Golden Party

Badge of Honor, received the rank of SS Gruppenführer, was a

knight of the Order of the Eagle, and received the Gold Badge of

Honor for Faithful Service for his 40 years of diplomatic

service.

“In appreciation of his outstanding services in the field of

military efforts in the post of Reich Protector for Bohemia and

Moravia, the Führer decorated him with the Military Cross, First

Class.”

Are the facts correctly stated in this article?

VON NEURATH: If I had to investigate the correctness of every article

written by some journalist or other, I would have had a lot to do. These

statements are the opinion of a journalist and nothing more.

THE PRESIDENT: That was not the question. The question was whether they

were correctly stated, as a matter of fact. You can answer that.

VON NEURATH: Yes—no.

THE PRESIDENT: Which do you mean, “yes” or “no”?

VON NEURATH: The decorations are correctly stated. Apart from that it is

not correct.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: I have no further questions to put.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Lüdinghausen, do you wish to re-examine?

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, yesterday afternoon I had the

feeling and impression, probably not without reason, that Herr Von

Neurath was visibly tired and strained after the previous examination

and that he was no longer in a position to do complete justice to the

questions which were put to him. This, after all, is not surprising, if

one considers that Herr Von Neurath is in his seventy-fourth year and

besides that he is also suffering from a fairly serious heart disease. I

feel obliged, therefore, to refer back to various points of the

cross-examination of yesterday and put a few questions to him.

[_Turning to the defendant._] Herr Von Neurath, you stated yesterday

that because of the excesses of the SA and other radical groups in 1933

and later, you frequently protested to Hitler. What was the reason why

you remonstrated with Hitler directly and did not raise your objections

at the Cabinet meetings which were still taking place at that time?

VON NEURATH: I had already learned from personal experience that Hitler

could not stand contradiction of any kind and that he was not amenable

to any kind of petition if it was made before a fairly large group,

because then he would always develop the complex that he was facing some

sort of opposition against which he had to defend himself. It was

different when one confronted him alone. Then, at least during the

earlier years, he was accessible, thoroughly amenable to reasonable

arguments, and much could be achieved in the way of moderating or

weakening radical measures.

Moreover, I should like to mention again that just after the excesses

mentioned in Mr. Geist’s affidavit there was a meeting of the Cabinet,

during which strong protests were raised against the repetition of such

occurrences by various ministers including non-Nazi ministers. At that

time Hitler thoroughly agreed with these objections, and declared that

such excesses would not be allowed to recur. Shortly afterward he also

made a speech in which he publicly expressed an assurance to this

effect. From then until June 1934 no more excesses took place.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: But in April 1933 there was the well-known

anti-Jewish boycott, which lasted 24 hours, if I am not mistaken?

VON NEURATH: Yes, that was one of Herr Goebbels’ provocations. But

actually there were no excesses and acts of violence whatsoever on that

occasion. It was confined merely to boycotting.

Moreover, the fact that no further disturbances arose in that case was

the result of a joint intercession by Herr Von Papen and myself with

Hitler and especially with Hindenburg. A perfectly correct description

of this episode is to be found, as I recall, in an article of _Time_ for

April 1933, which is also contained in my document book.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, it was submitted in my document

book, Document Number Neurath-9.

[_Turning to the defendant._] In connection with the events that

occurred at that time, arrests, and so forth, Sir David yesterday

referred particularly to the arrest of the well-known author Ossietzski.

Do you recall that this Ossietzski had already been sentenced to a

fairly long prison term by a German court even before the seizure of

power?

VON NEURATH: Yes, I remembered that afterward. I remember which

government—Herr Ossietzski had been sentenced by a Reich that even

before the seizure of power—I do not know under court to a fairly long

term in the penitentiary for high treason, but he had not yet served it,

and consequently was arrested again.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Now I should like to ask you another question with

reference to the report submitted by the Prosecution yesterday. It is

the letter of Ministerial Director Köpke on 31 May 1934. That is

Document D-868. In this report, from the information noted down by Herr

Köpke, do you see any proof that the Foreign Office was drawn into the

subversive activities of the Austrian Nazis?

VON NEURATH: No, not at all. This has to do with a report which

Ministerial Director Köpke made to me about a visit by Herr Wächter,

whom he described as an Austrian with a sense of responsibility. This

Herr Wächter had tried to establish a connection with the Foreign Office

and with Hitler in order to draw attention to the dangers arising from

the growing radicalism of the Austrian Nazis. The head of the Political

Department, Herr Köpke, identifies himself with Wächter regarding these

apprehensions and agreed to make an oral report to that effect.

I do not think that anyone can doubt that my attitude was not quite the

same as that of Herr Köpke and I passed this report on to Hitler in

order to draw his attention to the matter.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: The Prosecution—or rather, Sir David—referred

yesterday to reports which deal with the treatment of the Czech problem

by you and Frank. This is Document 3859-PS, a letter which you sent to

the Chief of the Reich Chancellery, Lammers, on 31 August 1940, for the

preparation of your oral report to Hitler. Were these reports, that is,

the one drafted by Frank, identical with the memorandum mentioned in the

Friderici document of 15 October?

VON NEURATH: Yes, apparently these are the same reports.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Now, during your examination you spoke about the

Friderici document, which you said was based on plans of the SS, various

Party circles, and the Gauleiter of the Lower Danube district, regarding

a deportation of Czechs to the Eastern Territories. You went on to say

that in order to stop these plans, which you yourself described as

nonsensical, you had Frank prepare this memorandum in which a less

radical solution was recommended, which later had also been approved to

a certain extent by Hitler; and that in reality nothing happened, which

was what you intended, and that the idea of incorporation had

practically been buried. Is that right?

VON NEURATH: Yes, that is true. This entire affair and the origin of

these memoranda are extremely difficult to explain. It can be understood

only from the entire domestic political development. The efforts of the

Gauleiter of the surrounding districts to divide up the Protectorate had

proceeded rather far. They had all submitted memoranda and Herr Himmler

backed them up. All these memoranda envisaged a radical solution of

these problems; that meant there was reason to fear that Hitler would

comply with the wishes of these Gauleiter. In order to stop this I had

to make several proposals which I myself had said were impracticable,

and I identified myself with them primarily so as to declare them absurd

later on.

That is the only explanation of the origin of these memoranda. I did not

draft the memoranda myself, but that was done in my office, in

accordance, to be sure, with instructions given by me.

This was, however, and I should like to emphasize this expressly, a

purely tactical maneuver to get at Hitler, because I was afraid that he

would follow the radical suggestions made by Himmler and his associates.

I did actually manage to get Hitler to issue a strict order, which is

what I had requested, to the effect that all these plans were no longer

to be discussed, but that only the so-called assimilation plan was left,

which could be carried out only over a period of years; and, as a matter

of fact, nothing more happened, and that was exactly what I was aiming

at.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: A decree was submitted by the Prosecution

yesterday, which was issued to the German authorities in the

Protectorate, regarding the treatment to be given of the German-Czech

problem publicly. That is Document 3862-PS, dated 27 June 1941. Is that

in any way connected with these memoranda or the discussion you had with

Hitler about it?

VON NEURATH: Yes, it is most closely interconnected, and I think I said

so yesterday. In the following year the same agitation started all over

again for this Germanization and partitioning of the Protectorate, and I

opposed it, and, once the question was decided, I prohibited it from

being reopened.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: A document was submitted yesterday, USSR-487, the

Chief of the Security Police, addressed to State Secretary Frank, dated

21 July 1943, that is to say, after you had resigned. From that document

the Prosecution are attempting to draw the conclusion that, in

accordance with a decree dated 5 May 1939, you appointed the leader of

the SA and Security Police in Prague as your political expert.

In what way did the latter act in this capacity? Did he act at all?

VON NEURATH: No, he did not; that is just it. It is clearly apparent

from this letter of reminder, dated 21 July 1943, that he never became

at all active in this respect.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Mr. President, I should like to state here that

the question was incorrectly put. This document is not dated in the year

1943 or 1942, but it is dated 21 July 1939.

VON NEURATH: May I remark here that it makes no difference, as nothing

had happened. I did not appoint any political expert.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What measures followed Documents 3851-PS and

3858-PS, which were introduced yesterday by the Prosecution, and which

were proposals submitted by various departments and department heads of

your administration regarding the utilization for labor of the students

who became unemployed through the closing down of the Czech

universities?

VON NEURATH: I have already told you yesterday that this apparently

concerned a proposal from an adviser which never even reached me, but

was rejected by my State Secretary before it got to me. Just how I could

possibly be held responsible for the contents of a draft submitted by an

adviser, I cannot understand.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Now I should like to put one more question to you

regarding the German-Austrian agreement of July 1936. As is mentioned in

a report by Dr. Rainer to Bürckel which the Prosecution have already

submitted—I refer to Document 812-PS—is it correct that Hitler,

immediately after the signing of that agreement, had personally declared

to Dr. Rainer and the Austrian Nazi Leader Globocznik that this

agreement of 11 July 1936 was signed by him in all honesty and

sincerity, and that the Austrian National Socialists, too, should under

all circumstances adhere strictly to this agreement, and that they were

to let themselves be guided by him in their conduct toward the Austrian

Government?

VON NEURATH: Yes, that is correct. As I think I said to you yesterday, I

believe I can also remember that Rainer actually confirmed it when he

was here on the witness stand.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Von Lüdinghausen.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I would like to put a last question...

THE PRESIDENT: He answered these questions perfectly clearly, according

to his view, yesterday.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Yes, I am all through now. I should like to ask

him only one more question in conclusion of the entire examination of my

client.

[_Turning to the defendant._] The Prosecution and also Sir David brought

the following charge against you yesterday: They charged that although

by your own admission you were not in agreement with the Nazi regime and

its methods, and although you considered many of the things that

occurred reprehensible and immoral and abhorred them, you did not

resign, but remained in the Government. Will you please explain that to

us once more?

VON NEURATH: I have already mentioned in the beginning that I had given

my promise to Hindenburg to enter the Government and to remain there as

long as it was at all possible for me to follow a course unfavorable to

any use of violence and to protect Germany from warlike entanglements.

That was my task and nothing else. But it was not only this promise I

had given to Hindenburg, but also my sense of duty, and my feeling of

responsibility toward the German people, to protect them from warlike

entanglements as long as it was at all possible, which bound me to this

office. Beside these considerations all my personal wishes, which were

quite different, had to take second place.

Unfortunately, my power and influence as Foreign Minister did not reach

far enough to enable me to prevent pernicious and immoral actions in

other spheres, as for instance, that of domestic policy, although I did

try in many cases, not least of all in the Jewish question itself.

However, I considered that my highest duty was to carry out the work

assigned to me and not try to escape it, even if in another sphere where

I had no influence, things occurred which hurt me and my opinions very

deeply.

There may be many people who have different ideas and a different

attitude than I. I experienced similar attacks when I placed myself at

the disposal of a Social Democrat Cabinet in the year 1919 after the

first revolution; at that time, too, the strongest attacks and the most

serious accusations were made against me.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Yet you yourself have struggled hard with your

conscience, you have often told me.

VON NEURATH: Yes, of course I have. It is not easy to belong to a

government with whose tendencies you do not agree, and for which one is

to be made responsible later on.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, this completes my examination. I

would suggest we adjourn now and then I might be permitted to begin the

examination of my witnesses.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will now adjourn.

[_A recess was taken._]

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, you have some questions to ask?

DR. MARTIN HORN (Counsel for Defendant Von Ribbentrop): Mr. President, I

ask permission for my client to be absent from the session this

afternoon and tomorrow, because I have important questions to discuss

with him.

THE PRESIDENT: The Defendant Von Ribbentrop?

DR. HORN: Von Ribbentrop, yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly.

DR. HORN: Thank you.

DR. ALFRED THOMA (Counsel for Defendant Rosenberg): Mr. President,

yesterday afternoon General Raginsky asked whether Rosenberg interfered

in Neurath’s foreign policy. The interpreter just told me that she

translated it wrongly. She translated it “whether Ribbentrop interfered

in Neurath’s policy.” This question, therefore, has not been answered

yet; consequently, I ask permission to ask Baron von Neurath whether

Rosenberg interfered in Neurath’s foreign policy.

VON NEURATH: No, in no way. I never talked to Rosenberg about matters of

foreign policy.

DR. THOMA: Then I ask that the transcript be corrected accordingly, so

it should not read “whether Ribbentrop interfered in Neurath’s

policies,” but “whether Rosenberg interfered in Neurath’s policies.”

THE PRESIDENT: The record will be corrected.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Francis Biddle, Member for the United States): I want

to ask you just a very few questions. You will remember that the

Baroness von Ritter said that after the 5th of November 1937 you

recognized—I want to read it exactly:

“When Herr Von Neurath had to recognize for the first time from

Hitler’s statement on 5 November 1937 that the latter wanted to

achieve his political aims by using force toward neighboring

states, this shook him so severely mentally that he suffered

severe heart attacks.”

That is a correct description, is it not, of what you then recognized?

[_The defendant nodded assent._]

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Now, you stated that you spoke immediately

after that meeting to General Beck and General Von Fritsch. Do you

remember?

VON NEURATH: Yes.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And I think you said to Sir David that you

did not speak to the Defendant Göring. What I am asking you now is

whether you spoke of what Hitler had said to anyone else during the next

2 or 3 months. Did you speak to anyone in the Foreign Office?

VON NEURATH: I spoke to my State Secretary.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And with whom else from the Foreign Office?

VON NEURATH: No one, for Hitler had laid down the condition that silence

should be preserved about all these meetings; and for that reason I did

not speak with my officials about them. They knew nothing. They had

learned nothing from the military men, either.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Did you speak to the Defendant Von Papen when

you saw him next?

VON NEURATH: No. I believe I did not see him at all at that time.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And did you discuss it with anybody else

before your resignation?

VON NEURATH: No.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Now, I have only one other question. You

recognized, did you not, that Himmler would use methods which you would

not approve of; is that right?

VON NEURATH: Yes, but only gradually; that could not have been foreseen

from the beginning.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): That is just what I wanted to know. When did

you first realize that? When did you first begin, just as well as you

could tell? About when did you realize what sort of man Himmler was?

VON NEURATH: That was very difficult to recognize, because Himmler had

two faces; he was a perfect Janus; one could not see immediately what

his real thoughts were at all.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I am not asking you what he was like. If you

would just try to remember, you certainly realized that at some time.

Did you know it in 1937? You knew it in 1937 or 1938? Certainly in 1938,

did you not?

VON NEURATH: Probably in 1938, but it is hard for me to give a date at

the moment.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I do not want a specific date. My point is

that you knew it before you went to the Protectorate; you knew what

Himmler was before you went to the Protectorate, of course? There is no

question about that, is there?

VON NEURATH: Yes, certainly.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): That is all.

THE TRIBUNAL (Major General I. T. Nikitchenko, Member for the U.S.S.R.):

Did you ever express yourself openly against the policy of the Hitlerite

Government?

VON NEURATH: I am sorry, but the translation was not good.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): In your explanations made before the

Tribunal you stated that you were not in agreement with the policy of

Hitler’s Government, either on individual questions or taken as a whole,

as well. Is that true?

VON NEURATH: Yes.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Did you ever express yourself openly

with a statement of your disagreement with Hitler’s policy?

VON NEURATH: I did so more than once.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): In what manner was it, then? I am

asking you about your public statements, either in the press or while

addressing any meeting?