press, or to hold a meeting. It was quite out of the question. I could
only speak to Hitler personally or, at the beginning, in the Cabinet in
protest against this policy. There was no freedom of the press any
longer, any more than in Russia. In the same way no meeting was
possible. Consequently...
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): I am not asking you about Russia; I am
asking you about your expressing your views publicly. In other words,
you never expressed them.
VON NEURATH: No.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): And in that way nobody in Germany could
know, or did know, about the fact that you were not in agreement with
the policy on the part of Hitler’s Government?
VON NEURATH: I always expressed myself quite unmistakably about it, but
not in articles, nor in meetings either; but otherwise I always
expressed myself clearly about it.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Yes, but only in your _tête-à-tête_
with Hitler, only personally to Hitler. You said so, did you not?
VON NEURATH: No; I tell you I said that to everyone who would listen,
but I could not do so in public meetings, in speeches, or in articles.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): And you remained a member of the
Government in spite of the fact that you were not in agreement with the
Government’s policy; is that so?
VON NEURATH: Yes, for that very reason.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): In order to counteract his policy?
VON NEURATH: Yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Do you know the results of Such
counteracting?
VON NEURATH: I did not understand that.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): What were the results of counteracting
the policy of Hitler’s Government?
VON NEURATH: Well, I am not in a position to give the details on that.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): In particular, as to the question of
aggression, were you against the joining of Germany and Austria?
VON NEURATH: Yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): The German Government, in spite of
this, joined Austria to Germany; is that so?
VON NEURATH: I believe it has been clearly expressed here that at the
last moment Hitler did that.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): You were against the seizing of
Czechoslovakia?
VON NEURATH: Yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): And the German Government, in spite of
this, seized Czechoslovakia?
VON NEURATH: I was no longer a member of the Government at that time.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): But as a statesman whose opinion should
have been considered, you, of course, expressed your opinion against it,
did you not?
VON NEURATH: Always.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): You were against the attack on Poland?
VON NEURATH: Yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): And in spite of that Germany did attack
Poland.
VON NEURATH: I repeat, I was no longer a member of the Government. I
learned of it only at the last moment.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): You were against the attack on the
U.S.S.R.?
VON NEURATH: Yes, more so indeed; I always wanted the exact opposite. I
wanted co-operation with the Soviet Union, I said that as early as 19...
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): And still Germany attacked the Soviet
Union?
VON NEURATH: Yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Judging from your explanations, Hitler
must have known about your political opposition and your disagreement
with his policy; is it correct?
VON NEURATH: He knew that very well, for I resigned in 1938 for that
reason.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Yes. And you know how Hitler made short
work of his political opponents?
VON NEURATH: In the Reich, yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): And so far as you were concerned, in
spite of the fact that you sided with the opposition, nothing happened;
that is true, is it not?
VON NEURATH: I did not understand.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): So far as you were concerned, in spite
of the fact that you declared yourself for the opposition, nothing of
the kind happened?
VON NEURATH: No, but I always expected it.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): And could you not tell us whether Sir
Nevile Henderson, in his book, the _Failure of a Mission_, expressed the
facts concerning you personally correctly or not? Do you consider that
Sir Nevile Henderson expressed the facts correctly concerning you
personally? Does he express them correctly?
VON NEURATH: I must admit frankly that I read this book by Sir Nevile
Henderson only once, 3 or 4 years ago. I cannot remember now what he
said about me. I heard excerpts from it here once or twice but I cannot
say what he writes about me.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): But I assume that you are familiar
enough with the excerpts presented by your defense counsel in his
document book?
VON NEURATH: Yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Now, for instance, that which is
expressed in his excerpts so far as you are concerned, is it correct or
not?
VON NEURATH: I assume so, yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): That is to say, it is correct. And is
it quite correct what he writes in reference to your membership in the
Party? He writes that “Baron von Neurath himself remained in the regime
of Hindenburg, and he was not a member of the Nazi Party.”
VON NEURATH: Yes, I believe I have said so repeatedly here in the last
few days.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): And further on he informs us that “he
(Neurath) became a member of the Party later.”
VON NEURATH: I have already explained how that happened. In 1937 I
received a Golden Party Badge without my...
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Yes, we have heard that before, but is
it true or not that you became a member of the Nazi Party later, as Sir
Nevile Henderson states?
VON NEURATH: No, I...
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): So this particular part is not correct,
is it?
VON NEURATH: I received the Golden Party Badge with Hitler’s statement
that this involved no obligations towards the Party.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): We have heard this already. That means
that in Sir Nevile Henderson’s statements not everything is true as far
as your person is concerned?
VON NEURATH: I do not know. With the best intentions I cannot remember
what Sir Nevile Henderson wrote about me.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): And the last question I have, which is
in regard to your memorandum: I did not quite understand the
explanations which were given by you to Sir David and later to your
defense counsel. Now, in forwarding Frank’s memorandum, in the letter
addressed to Lammers, you wrote that you considered this memorandum
absolutely correct. Is that true?
VON NEURATH: Yes, that is true. I should also like to tell you the
reasons. This memorandum...
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): You already explained the reasons
before. I just wanted to establish the fact that you really wrote this.
VON NEURATH: Up to now I have not told the reason why I wrote this to
Lammers. The reason why I wrote to Lammers to this effect was that he
was the one who submitted this memorandum to the Führer. So I had to
write to the same effect.
THE PRESIDENT: There are two subjects I want to ask you about and the
first relates to the letter that you wrote on the 31st of August 1940.
That is the letter which General Nikitchenko has just referred to; you
remember that?
VON NEURATH: Yes, indeed.
THE PRESIDENT: And you remember that you said in that letter that you
fully agreed with the memorandum which your Secretary of State Frank had
drawn up independently of you. He said that “Germanization provides for
the changing of the nationality of racially suitable Czechs; and
secondly, the expulsion of racially unassimilable Czechs and of the
intelligentsia who are enemies of the Reich or special treatment for
these and all destructive elements.” My question is: What did you
understand by “special treatment”?
VON NEURATH: Well, as far as I read this extract at all at the time, I
had in no way ever thought of the term “special treatment” as it has
become known here during the Trial. I was certainly not at all in
agreement with this attitude of Frank as represented in the report, and
I only had the intention of frustrating this whole affair in order to
sidetrack it. The content of these reports was only intended to present
this to Hitler in Hitler’s language, or in the language of Himmler and
others, in order to dissuade him from it later on.
THE PRESIDENT: Was it not misleading to write to Herr Lammers with the
view that it should be put forward to Hitler, saying that you fully
agreed with the memorandum with which you did not agree?
VON NEURATH: Mr. President, as things were, I could not write to
Lammers. I did not intend to carry out anything which is written in
there, but since Lammers was presenting this to Hitler, I first had to
tell him I agreed with it. Afterward I reported to Hitler and gave him
an explanation in a personal conference during the meeting with Frank
and Gürtner which has been mentioned here.
THE PRESIDENT: Then your answer is that you do not know what was meant
by “special treatment”?
VON NEURATH: No; in any case I did not know at the time.
THE PRESIDENT: Now, there is one other question that I should like to
put to you. You remember when you were called on the 11th of March 1938,
at the time of the Anschluss with Austria, and you wrote the letter of
the 12th of March 1938, in answer to the memorandum which you received
from the British Government through Sir Nevile Henderson. You knew Sir
Nevile Henderson quite well, did you not?
VON NEURATH: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: And in that letter you said this:
“It is untrue that the Reich used forceful pressure to bring
about this development; especially the assertion, which was
spread later by the former Chancellor, that the German
Government had presented the Federal President with a
conditional ultimatum, is pure invention. According to the
ultimatum, he had to appoint a proposed candidate as Chancellor
and form a Cabinet conforming to the proposals of the German
Government, otherwise the invasion of Austria by German troops
was held in prospect.”
And then you go on to say what you allege was the truth of the matter.
You know now, do you not, that your statements in that letter were
entirely untrue?
VON NEURATH: That did not come through.
THE PRESIDENT: Have you heard any part of the question that I was
putting to you?
VON NEURATH: Unfortunately not.
THE PRESIDENT: It is a pity that you did not say so earlier. Do you
remember the 11th of March 1938 and being called in to represent the
Foreign Office, and you have told me just now that you knew Sir Nevile
Henderson quite well?
VON NEURATH: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: And you remember the letter which you wrote on the 12th
of March 1938?
VON NEURATH: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: And you admitted to Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe that the
statements in that letter were untrue?
VON NEURATH: Untrue, yes—not entirely. They are presented incorrectly.
THE PRESIDENT: What steps did you take to find out whether or not they
were true?
VON NEURATH: I did not learn of the incorrectness of this presentation
until much later.
THE PRESIDENT: That is not an answer to my question. I said, “What steps
did you take to find out whether the statement was correct?”
VON NEURATH: The statement which Hitler gave me I first simply presumed
to be true. I certainly could not check up on it in any way.
THE PRESIDENT: Why should you assume it to be true when it was in
contradiction of what the British Government had stated?
VON NEURATH: I had no other knowledge of the events which had occurred
and therefore could only say what I knew.
THE PRESIDENT: You had the letter, the protest from the British
Government, had you not?
VON NEURATH: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: You knew Sir Nevile Henderson perfectly well?
VON NEURATH: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: And you then wrote this letter contradicting the
statements which had been made on behalf of the British Government; that
is right, is it not?
VON NEURATH: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: And you took no steps to check the facts which had been
stated to you by Hitler? Will you answer that, please?
VON NEURATH: Yes. Your Lordship, how was I to do that? There was no one
else who knew about it. It was only what Hitler had commissioned me to
tell the Foreign Office. The draft of this note was drawn up by the
Foreign Office according to the information which I had received from
Hitler. I had no other chance to clear this up.
THE PRESIDENT: There were all the other persons who were concerned with
the matter whom you could have communicated with, but your statement is
that you did nothing?
VON NEURATH: I can only repeat that I had no opportunity to procure any
other information. No one knew about it except Hitler.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you telling the Tribunal that Göring did not know
about it?
VON NEURATH: Perhaps Göring knew about it.
THE PRESIDENT: That is all. The defendant can return to the dock.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I ask permission to call the first
witness, the former Ministerial Director, and head of the political
section in the Foreign Ministry, Dr. Köpke.
[_The witness Köpke took the stand._]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please?
GERHARD KÖPKE (Witness): Gerhard Köpke.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat the oath after me: I swear by God—the
Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will
withhold and add nothing.
[_The witness repeated the oath._]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Dr. Köpke, how long have you known Herr Von
Neurath?
KÖPKE: I have known Herr Von Neurath for over 40 years. His career is
well known. Therefore I can limit myself to stating that we worked
together as vice consuls in London, as legation counsellors in the
Foreign Office and later, after Herr Von Neurath became Minister in
1932, until my resignation in 1935. In the meantime Von Neurath was in
Copenhagen, Rome, London, and for some time at his home, and finally in
Prague. We met only occasionally when I was in Berlin, and we kept up a
comparatively lively correspondence with each other as old friends. I
myself was employed in the Foreign Office during the entire period. From
1921 on I was director of the Legal Department, and from 1923 I was
director of the political, so-called Western Department, which I
directed until I left the service. I voluntarily tendered my resignation
at the end of 1935.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What do you know about the attitude, the
fundamental attitude of Herr Von Neurath on domestic and foreign policy,
but only on broad lines?
KÖPKE: In domestic politics, Herr Von Neurath stood close to the
conservative circles but he was never a member of the Conservative
Party. From this basic conservative attitude and also because of his
outstanding character traits of loyalty to duty and reliability, he had
the confidence of Reich President Von Hindenburg, and retained it
without interruption until the latter’s death. Herr Von Hindenburg
esteemed Von Neurath as a prudent, moderate, reliable diplomat. Men of
other party inclinations also had confidence in Von Neurath. I shall
mention only the deceased Reich President, Ebert, who recalled Neurath
to office during his term.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What do you know about Von Neurath’s appointment
as Reich Foreign Minister in the summer of 1932?
KÖPKE: The appointment of Herr Von Neurath as Reich Foreign Minister was
based on a personal wish of President Von Hindenburg. Neurath did not
become Foreign Minister within the Von Papen Cabinet, but became Foreign
Minister as the special confidant of President Von Hindenburg.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Then how did it happen that Von Neurath remained
Foreign Minister in the new Hitler Government also?
KÖPKE: Von Neurath did not participate so far as I know in the
negotiations with Hitler about the assumption of power. If I can rely
only on my memory, he was sick abed with a heart disease during the
decisive days, but he remained Foreign Minister, again at the special
wish of Von Hindenburg.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Can you tell us anything about the attitude, the
relationship of Neurath to Hitler?
KÖPKE: I should like to remark by way of introduction that I cannot
testify on this subject from my own immediate observation. I was never
present at conferences which Herr Von Neurath held with Hitler. I myself
never had any official conversation with Hitler whatsoever. But,
according to Neurath’s own description, and according to the information
which I received from other important personalities in the course of
time, I had the impression that, especially in the first years, Hitler
treated Herr Von Neurath carefully and politely. To what extent this was
out of respect for the Reich President, whose regard for Von Neurath
was, of course, known to Hitler, I cannot say. In any case, Neurath was
never actually in the confidence of Hitler and was not in the small
circle close to Hitler, the powerful men of the Party. After the death
of President Von Hindenburg, Von Neurath remained because he had
promised the Reich President to do so. During the following period also,
Neurath repeatedly attempted to exercise his moderating and calming
influence on the Party. However, I know that as disappointments and
differences of opinion multiplied, Herr Von Neurath tried many times to
separate from Hitler. In this connection I can recall two occasions on
which he offered his resignation, and one of these appeals he showed me.
It was in writing and must have been dated from the beginning of the
year 1936. For at that time I had already resigned and visited Herr Von
Neurath as a friend in a purely private capacity.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Now can you also give us a brief picture of
Neurath’s attitude toward the National Socialist Party?
KÖPKE: At first Herr Von Neurath adopted an attitude of reserve toward
the Party and in particular its leading men. To my knowledge he was
personally acquainted with hardly any of these men, since, indeed, he
had lived most of the time abroad. Neurath was convinced that by reason
of his years of experience as an old diplomat and supported by his
confidential position with the Reich President, and the latter’s
moderating influence, he would succeed in working in accordance with his
policy, which was directed toward compromise and understanding.
Before me, and I believe also before his other colleagues, Neurath
frequently referred to experiences of this sort which he had had with
Fascism in Rome. He occasionally said that such revolutionary elements
should just be allowed to develop and that these hotheads would come to
their senses if they were given time and opportunity to gather
experience themselves in responsible positions.
By the way, Neurath also shared the opinions of State Secretary Von
Bülow in this respect. He retained this State Secretary of Reich
Chancellor Brüning, and also protected him until his death against
repeated attempts of the Party to get rid of him.
Moreover, I should like to mention a small detail which was very
valuable to us in the office at the time. When State Secretary Von
Bülow, who was generally popular, died suddenly, Neurath managed to get
Hitler to attend the funeral at the Kaiser Wilhelm Memorial Church. The
old officials of the Foreign Office saw in that a gratifying and
reassuring sign for the strong position of our Minister in relation to
the Party. This event, which in itself is perhaps unimportant, happened
exactly 10 years ago today.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: As head of the Political Department of the Foreign
Office, you were one of Neurath’s foremost co-workers, and can surely
tell us what was the dominant tendency of Neurath’s foreign policy.
KÖPKE: Neurath’s political attitude on the whole was, in accordance with
his whole character and his years of experience in politics, inclined
toward compromise, waiting, negotiation. Measures backed up by
ultimatums and attempts at solution by violence did not suit Von
Neurath’s temperament. Neurath was neither a gambler nor a fighter by
nature.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Now I come to individual important foreign
political events which occurred during the period in which you worked
under Herr Von Neurath and were head of the political section.
In October 1933 Germany left the Disarmament Conference and the League
of Nations. Now, I should like to ask you whether this step of
Germany’s, leaving the Conference and the League of Nations, was based
on any aggressive or belligerent tendencies for the moment or for the
future?
KÖPKE: No. As far as the picture of the events mentioned by defendant’s
counsel was clear to us, the experts, it was as follows: No one of us in
the Foreign Office thought of warlike plans or preparations for war. It
was only done to proclaim as impressively as possible that Germany would
no longer allow herself to be considered a nation without the same
rights and obligations as other peoples.
In the same way the militarization of the Rhineland was not based on any
aggressive intention, either for the moment or for the future.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: In the next few years, in 1935, Germany’s military
sovereignty was reintroduced, and a year later, the demilitarized
Rhineland zone was remilitarized. I should like to read you one sentence
from the affidavit of the former minister and interpreter Paul Schmidt
of the Foreign Office. He says the following with regard to the events
in the spring of 1935:
“The conclusion of a pact of mutual assistance between France
and Russia on 2 May 1935 followed the proclamation of the
establishment of a German Air Force and the introduction of
general compulsory military service in March 1935.”
Will you please give us a brief review of the historical development of
these matters which led to the reintroduction of military sovereignty in
1935 and to the remilitarization of the Rhineland in March 1936?
KÖPKE: I believe...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Von Lüdinghausen, we have had the historical
development of these matters over and over again. Surely we do not want
it from this witness.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Only very briefly, only the dates, in proper
order, Mr. President; no explanations about it. I should only like to
emphasize strongly once more how the individual events are connected
with each other.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal have the dates in their minds. We really
have had these dates in our minds for some months.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Very well. If the Court believes that it does not
need to be informed about it, I must, of course, dispense with it. Then
I come to a last...
THE PRESIDENT: Well, you can put any question you really want to put
about it, but you said, “Will you give us the historical developments
from the 2d of May 1935?” We have heard that over and over again.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Yes, Mr. President. I was interested only in the
following: From this affidavit of Herr Schmidt which I have just quoted,
one could directly follow...
THE PRESIDENT: Ask the question, whatever you want to ask about this
affidavit.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Then I shall formulate the question as follows:
[_Turning to the witness._] I have just read this sentence by Herr
Schmidt, and I have also told you what can be read from it; namely, that
the conclusion of the Franco-Russian Pact of 2 May 1935 was the result
of the restoration of military sovereignty. Is that true or what was the
case?
KÖPKE: That question is difficult to answer if one merely considers
these two events in chronological order. The conclusion of the
Franco-Russian Pact was on 2 May 1935; the restoration of military
sovereignty was already in March 1935.
However, the negotiations for this treaty of assistance go back much
farther, and I should like to recall the fact that the critical stage,
into which these negotiations had entered before the restoration of
military sovereignty, is shown very clearly in the report of the French
Military Committee’s reporter in which the latter speaks quite openly of
a close entente between the two nations. That was on 23 November 1934.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Now I come to another question and should like to
ask you whether you know the opinions and attitude of Von Neurath
concerning the Austrian question, at least during your time?
KÖPKE: I have known Herr Von Neurath’s attitude toward the Austrian
question for a much longer time than the period when we worked together
during his term as Minister, for as a southern German he was always
particularly interested in the problem and I recall many conversations
which I had with him even when I was still a vice consul. His attitude
and intentions had always been to make the relations between Germany and
Austria closer in the economic sphere, chiefly in the interests of
Austria, and politically to guarantee a similar policy by treaties, but
otherwise not to encroach on Austria’s independence; that is what we in
the Foreign Office had already learned several years before he became
Minister, from our experience with the customs union, which at that time
was actually intended only in an economic sense. The fact that this
attempt was quite generally considered as a political union gave pause
for thought and should have warned everyone who had resolved to touch
this hot iron again. Therefore, Neurath, during his period of office,
whenever he discussed the problem with me and worked on it, thought
along just these lines.
I should like to add here that the critical time on the Austrian
question was probably after I left office. Moreover, even Hitler
originally shared Neurath’s moderate conception, as was shown in his
conversation with Mussolini in Venice in the summer of 1934. Especially
interesting, however, are the remarks which Hitler made on the Anschluss
problem to Sir John Simon during the negotiations in Berlin in March
1935. At that time Hitler expressed himself to the English statesman
about that as follows:
If the people in London knew Austria as well as he did, they would
believe his assurance that he could not want to increase our economic
troubles by adding another field of economic difficulties. Germany did
not want to interfere in this country at all. He was perfectly aware
that any interference in Austrian affairs, even if it meant carrying out
the wish of the Austrian people themselves for an Anschluss, could not
be legalized. That was Hitler’s opinion at that time.
Neurath also rejected all interference in Austrian internal affairs and
strongly condemned the attempts which could be noticed in Party circles
to give direct support to the Austrian National Socialists. During my
time Neurath did everything he could to keep the Foreign Office out of
the internal political struggle in Austria.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Still one more question. Up to the time of your
resignation at the beginning of 1936, was there ever any talk in the
Foreign Office of attacking Czechoslovakia or not observing existent
treaties with Czechoslovakia?
KÖPKE: Never, neither the one nor the other. Our economic and political
relations with Czechoslovakia were, as long as I was in office, very
good. We had no occasion whatsoever to change them, not even the
slightest.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: And now my last question. Can you tell us anything
about Herr Von Neurath’s attitude toward the race question?
KÖPKE: On this question Neurath was completely opposed to the Party
attitude. In this connection I should like to recall an experience which
Neurath told me personally.
When the Jewish legislation was about to be proclaimed the Reich
Minister of Justice Gürtner came to him in great excitement and told Von
Neurath that he, Gürtner, had warned Hitler in vain against proclaiming
these quite impossible laws. He strongly urged Herr Von Neurath as
Foreign Minister to point out the enormous dangers which this madness
could set loose abroad. Neurath told me that he did this immediately,
but that all his efforts had been in vain.
Neurath’s personal attitude on the Jewish problem was thoroughly
conciliatory and reasonable, in keeping with his generally kind
personality and his religious attitude. Among many examples I should
like to refer here to only one, which is the following:
During the time when we were in London together, the Jewish doctor at
the Embassy was also one of the closest friends of the Neurath family.
When he had to leave London during the World War and was homeless and
without employment, Neurath immediately took active steps to help his
old friend.
As Reich Foreign Minister also, Von Neurath always helped non-Aryan
colleagues, although that brought him often under attack from the Party
circles and was not always easy.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I have no further questions to put
to the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Does any other member of the defendants’ counsel want to
ask any question?
[_There was no response._]
Do the Prosecution wish to ask any questions?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, the Tribunal will, of course, not
consider that the Prosecution are accepting every statement of the
witness; but I do not think that it would be a useful appropriation of
time to cross-examine him. Therefore, I shall ask no questions.
THE PRESIDENT: One moment, Sir David. Sir David, would it be convenient
to you and to the members of the defendants’ counsel to discuss the
questions of supplementary applications for witnesses and documents at 2
o’clock?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Certainly, My Lord, it would be very convenient
to me. I do not think there are many serious matters about which there
will be serious dispute.
THE PRESIDENT: No, I thought there were not. Very well, we will do that
then.
The witness can retire.
Dr. Von Lüdinghausen, call your next witness and then we can have him
sworn before the adjournment.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: May I ask that Dr. Dieckhoff be allowed to follow
Dr. Köpke?
[_The witness Dieckhoff took the stand._]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name please?
HANS HEINRICH DIECKHOFF (Witness): Hans Heinrich Dieckhoff.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the
Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will
withhold and add nothing.
[_The witness repeated the oath._]
THE PRESIDENT: Now the Tribunal will adjourn.
[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship please, My Lord, the first
application is on behalf of the Defendant Von Neurath with regard to M.
François-Poncet. That has been dealt with; that is covered.
Then, My Lord, the next is an application from Dr. Marx on behalf of the
Defendant Streicher to put in an affidavit by the publisher, Herr
Gassner of _Der Stürmer_. My Lord, the publisher is intended to deal
with the question of the rise and the circulation of Der Stürmer during
the years 1933 to 1935. The Prosecution have already submitted to the
Tribunal that they did not think that that was relevant when an
application was made to call Herr Gassner as a witness. The Prosecution
still take the same position. My Lord, it is for an affidavit, and we
leave to the Tribunal as to whether they would like the affidavit, but
the Prosecution fail to see the relevance of that evidence.
THE PRESIDENT: Would Dr. Marx like to say something about that now?
DR. HANNS MARX (Counsel for Defendant Streicher): Mr. President, I have
just discussed this matter with Defendant Streicher; and he tells me
that the witness, Herr Gassner, whom I have proposed to call and from
whom an affidavit had been proposed, would only be in a position to
speak about the publication figures of Der Stürmer from the year 1941
onwards. That, of course, is of no interest whatever to the defense. I
shall, therefore, forego the affidavit and rely on what the witness
Hiemer has said in that respect. Therefore, it will not be necessary at
all to procure the affidavit.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, the next application is by Dr.
Kranzbühler on behalf of the Defendant Dönitz for further consideration
and admission of the affidavit of the former fleet judge, Jäckel, by
reason of the course of the cross-examination.
My Lord, I think the most convenient course would be if the Prosecution
do not object to the application at this time but reserve the right,
when Dr. Kranzbühler makes the use that he desires of the affidavit, to
consider whether we shall then object.
THE PRESIDENT: This is really evidence in rebuttal, is it?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, in rebuttal of the points raised in the
cross-examination. It is very difficult to decide whether one should
make a final objection until one knows what use Dr. Kranzbühler is going
to make of it. I suggest that we do not object at this stage.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, these applications and the Tribunal’s orders
granting the witnesses are always subject to that provision.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship please, then the Prosecution
makes no further objection.
My Lord, then there are two applications on behalf of the Defendant Von
Neurath, a request for minutes from the interrogatory of the...
THE PRESIDENT: They have both been withdrawn, have they not?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Oh, they have? I was not certain.
My Lord, then Dr. Thoma makes application on behalf of the Defendant
Rosenberg for three matters: The exchange of letters between Dr. Ley and
the defendant; the entry of Dr. Strauber 27 May 1944; and third, a note
of the Ministerialrat, Dr. Beil.
My Lord, the Prosecution feel that these documents are cumulative, and
they leave it to the Tribunal with that suggestion—that the case is
already well covered. I do not know if Dr. Thoma wishes to say anything
further.
DR. ALFRED THOMA (Counsel for Defendant Rosenberg): Gentlemen of the
Tribunal, I should like to refer to it quite briefly, as apparently
there is an error in the matter of Dr. Beil. It is a question here of
the interrogatory. I have sent to Beil an interrogatory which has not
yet been returned. Otherwise, there is nothing that I know about this
matter; but I have made an application which has not been mentioned yet.
I applied for some of Rosenberg’s writings, _Tradition und Gegenwart_,
new speeches and translations, to be included in the document book, for
these deal with questions which were discussed on the occasion of Gau
educational meetings and discussions and which also deal with such
questions as the peaceful living together of the nations of Europe,
religious tolerance, his advocacy of an ideal humanity, and similar
writings. I request that these articles be admitted. Apart from that, I
have no further applications to make; and for the rest I leave the
decision, of course, to the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: If I understand what you said aright, Dr. Thoma, you were
not referring to any of the applications which are before us. The
applications which are before us are an exchange of letters between Dr.
Ley and the defendant in the autumn of 1944; another is an entry which
Dr. Strauber made; and the third is a note of Dr. Beil; you have not
referred to them, have you?
DR. THOMA: Yes, that is right. I have to confess that these applications
are completely new to me. These applications must have been made by
Rosenberg on his own initiative, because I cannot find any trace of
them. Or perhaps an error was made in the memorandum to the Tribunal. I
do not know the applications.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Thoma, the copies of the applications are
before us, and they appear to be signed both by the Defendant Rosenberg
and by yourself.
DR. THOMA: In that case, this must have happened months ago. I cannot
remember; this is from 3 June.
THE PRESIDENT: At any rate, you do not want them?
DR. THOMA: Application Number 3 is settled.
I have re-read the applications just now, and I do remember them. I ask
you to make a decision favorable to the defendant.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, the next applications are for a number
of documents on behalf of the Defendant Von Papen, and the Prosecution
have no objection to this.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, a good many of them—certainly Numbers 3, 5,
and 13—have either been admitted or rejected, I think.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is so, My Lord. I had a note opposite 13. I
really think they have been dealt with, My Lord; they are in the books,
and I do not think any further discussion is required.
THE PRESIDENT: Are they all in the book?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I think so, My Lord. I do not know if—Dr.
Kubuschok says he agrees with me.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship please, the next is an
application on behalf of the Defendant Bormann, a request for a decree
of Hitler’s and a decree issued by Bormann in 1944. My Lord, the
Prosecution have no objection to these.
THE PRESIDENT: I do not quite understand the meaning of the last one.
Can you tell me what it means?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I took it myself that it was “to” the
SD, instead of “of” the SD—the appertaining of members of the head
office of the National Socialist Party of the SD. I am afraid that that
guess on my part does not meet with approval.
DR. FRIEDRICH BERGOLD (Counsel for Defendant Bormann): My Lord, this
concerns a decree from Bormann in which he prohibits members of the
Party Chancellery belonging to the SD. It is a decree of Bormann’s
applying to the Party Chancellery.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, the remaining applications are on
behalf of the Defendant Göring, the admission of an affidavit by Baron
von Gersdorff, and a book by Joseph Chapski. My Lord, my Soviet
colleague has dealt with that by submission in writing, dated 20 June. I
did not propose to say anything further about that, My Lord. Colonel
Pokrovsky is here if Your Lordship would like to hear him further.
THE PRESIDENT: I thought we had already made an order with reference to
this.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Your Lordship has.
THE PRESIDENT: We made the order on 9 June, apparently, that for the
Defendant Göring three witnesses could be produced either personally...
Perhaps we had better hear from Dr. Stahmer about this.
DR. OTTO STAHMER (Counsel for Defendant Göring): Mr. President, that is
the way I understood the decision of the Tribunal. I had applied for
five witnesses. The Tribunal ordered that I could produce only three out
of the five witnesses.
THE PRESIDENT: That is right.
DR. STAHMER: Then with reference to the affidavit nothing was said, as
far as I can remember, in that particular decision, so that I had
assumed that I would be free to ask for admission of affidavits insofar
as the Tribunal considers them necessary.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, after the Tribunal had made that order about
limiting the number of witnesses to three, did you not receive a
communication, to which you have replied, I think, suggesting that
possibly you might be able to dispense with actual oral witnesses and do
that whole part of the case by affidavits?
DR. STAHMER: Yes, Mr. President, I received that communication; and I
have already negotiated about the matter with the Russian Prosecution.
We did not quite reach an agreement, however; and therefore I made a
written application to the Tribunal a few days ago.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but was not the agreement which you were trying to
arrive at an agreement that only three affidavits should be produced on
either side? Or was it more than three?
DR. STAHMER: No. The question which remains and which we have not agreed
upon is whether I will be given the opportunity to read a few of the
affidavits here.
THE PRESIDENT: I see. Dr. Stahmer, I think the position is, then, that
unless you are able to arrive at an agreement with the Soviet
Prosecution, we shall have to abide by our previous order.
DR. STAHMER: Very well.
THE PRESIDENT: You will make further efforts to achieve an agreement
with the Soviet Prosecution and let the Tribunal know.
DR. STAHMER: I will.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I wonder if your Lordship will grant me the
indulgence of mentioning three exhibits. They all refer to the diary of
Admiral Assmann, My Lord, which was introduced during the cases of the
Defendants Dönitz and Raeder. There are three exhibits concerned.
The first is Document D-879. We thought that would be more complete if a
connecting page was put in to make the continuity of the exhibit. For
that purpose, My Lord, the Prosecution asks that Exhibit GB-482 be
withdrawn and that there be submitted the two pages which were
originally in it with a connecting page. That is merely adding a
connecting page, My Lord.
The second is Document D-881...
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any objection to that on the part of the
Defense?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I do not think so, My Lord; I have not heard of
any.
THE PRESIDENT: What do the documents relate to, did you say?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The diary of Admiral Assmann, who was on the
staff of the Defendant Raeder.
THE PRESIDENT: Oh, yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, it is only a question of putting the
exhibit in proper form.
The second document, My Lord, is D-881, which is another passage from
the same diary, on 23 February 1940. I promised Your Lordship that I
should put in an exhibit when I dealt with the diary in
cross-examination; and, My Lord, the exhibit has been prepared, and I
want to put it in under the Number GB-475. That is, Document D-881 will
become Exhibit GB-475.
The third, which is in the same position as the second, is Document
D-892. That exhibit has now been prepared and will become Exhibit
GB-476. Copies are available for the defendants and will be given to
them after the approval of the Court is given.
THE PRESIDENT: And copies, of course, will be supplied to the Court as
well?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Of course, My Lord. They are just awaiting the
formal approval of the Court, and they will be submitted.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Sir David, that is all right.
Then, Sir David, we will consider the other matter.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship please.
THE PRESIDENT; Very well.
Yes, Dr. Thoma.
DR. THOMA: Mr. President, I just wanted to use this opportunity to
submit to the Tribunal the affidavit of Robert Scholz, the Chief of
Special Staff Rosenberg. It has been translated into English and French,
and I should now like to submit it under Exhibit Number 41 to the
Tribunal. I have already shown it to Mr. Dodd, and he has not objected.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
PROFESSOR DR. HERBERT KRAUS (Counsel for Defendant Schacht): Mr.
President, I wanted to ascertain whether and up to what date after this
session we may submit affidavits and documents. The reason is that
during recent days I have received two affidavits and a document, the
relevance of which we have not yet definitely decided upon.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, the Tribunal would like to know when the
Counsel for the Prosecution and Counsel for the Defense think would be
the best time to deal with these matters which are outstanding and with
any evidence which either the Defense or the Prosecution may wish to
bring in rebuttal.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord, I have not had the chance of
discussing it with any of the Counsel for the Defense; but I should have
thought at the end of the evidence. One might reasonably hope that the
evidence will finish this week. It might be possible to deal with it on
Saturday morning or on Monday, and suit the Counsel for the Defense,
and, of course, as the Tribunal decides.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. The Tribunal, I think, will expect the Defense
Counsel and the Prosecution to be ready, directly when the end of the
evidence comes, to deal with all these additional questions which are
outstanding and also with any applications that they may have with
reference to rebuttal.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship please, yes.
THE PRESIDENT: I wanted that to be clearly understood, that it will be
expected that it is to be done immediately the evidence closes. That, I
think, answers Dr. Kraus’ point about the affidavits and documents. That
would be the most appropriate time.
Sir David, have you got any ideas as to how long that would take?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I think a very short time. I should
have thought that 2 days or thereabouts would see it through. I have
discussed it with Mr. Dodd, and that was the view we took.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. In about 2 days at the outside?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: At the outside, My Lord, yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship please.
[_The witness Dieckhoff resumed the stand._]
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Witness, since what date do you know Herr Von
Neurath?
DIECKHOFF: Since 1913; I met him when I joined the Foreign Office. He
was legation counsellor in the Foreign Office at that time. I then met
him again in Constantinople, and there I had contact with him. Then I
did not meet him again until 1930.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: In what capacity did you have dealings with Herr
Von Neurath beginning with 1930?
DIECKHOFF: Herr Von Neurath was then, from 1930 till 1932, Ambassador to
London; and I was head of the Department “England-America” in the
Foreign Office.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: How was the co-operation during that time between
the Foreign Office—that is, yourself—and Herr Von Neurath, who was
then Ambassador to London?
DIECKHOFF: The co-operation was excellent.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know anything about Herr Von Neurath’s
appointment to the position of Reich Foreign Minister?
DIECKHOFF: I remember that most of the leading officials of the Foreign
Office were greatly upset by the sudden departure of Brüning, whose
steady and moderate policy we approved at the time. We submitted to the
change in the person of the Foreign Minister only because Neurath
replaced Brüning and we knew that Herr Von Neurath was a man of high
standards and an experienced diplomat. Furthermore, we knew that he had
represented Brüning’s policy in London; and we expected that as Foreign
Minister he would continue Brüning’s policy.
I welcomed Herr Von Neurath, I think it was on 2 June, at the station in
Berlin when he arrived in Germany. From conversations with him I
gathered the impression that he very much disliked to leave London and
to take over the Foreign Ministry. But he said to me, “I do not think I
shall be able to refuse the wish of the old gentleman.” That, of course,
was Reich President Von Hindenburg.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What position did you hold yourself during the
time when you worked under Herr Von Neurath in the Foreign Ministry?
DIECKHOFF: At first, I remained at the head of the England-America
Department until 1936. Afterward, in April 1936, I took over the
re-established political department. In June State Secretary Von Bülow
died, and in August 1936 I was appointed acting State Secretary in the
Foreign Office. I remained in that provisional position until March
1937, and then I became Ambassador to Washington.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did Herr Von Neurath, as Foreign Minister, retain
the old officials of the Foreign Office?
DIECKHOFF: He retained the old officials in practically all the leading
positions of both the domestic and the foreign service. The State
Secretary Von Bülow for instance remained for 4 years, until his death,
in the same position in the Foreign Office.
He sent Ambassador Von Hoesch to London as his successor, and he sent
Ambassador Von Hassell to Rome, and Ambassador Köster to Paris—all of
these were old diplomatic officials.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Can you tell us from your own experience during
your activities what the aims of Neurath’s foreign policy were?
DIECKHOFF: It was the aim of Herr Von Neurath to maintain good relations
with all states and thereby to re-establish gradually Germany’s status
of equal rights which we had lost in 1919. This was the same policy that
had been pursued by Stresemann and Brüning. Herr Von Neurath was aware
of the difficulties of Germany’s position. He talked to me about it
repeatedly. He was under no misapprehension about it. He saw things
realistically. His tendency was to exercise moderation.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What do you know about Herr Von Neurath’s entry
into Hitler’s Government, which was formed on 30 January 1933?
DIECKHOFF: I know about this only what I was told by State Secretary Von
Bülow when I returned to Berlin from leave at the beginning of February
1933. According to this, Herr Von Neurath had no part in the formation
of the new Cabinet, that is, Hitler’s Cabinet. Apart from that, he was
sick during that time. He heard of the plan of making Hitler Reich
Chancellor and of forming a new government. He wanted to discuss it with
Reich President Von Hindenburg in order to obtain certain reservations
for himself; but he came too late and could not obtain these
reservations. In spite of this, he retained the Foreign Ministry in the
new Cabinet because he did not want to refuse the wish of the Reich
President.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know anything about Herr Von Neurath’s
attitude toward the National Socialist domestic policy?
DIECKHOFF: I know that Herr Von Neurath, soon after 30 January 1933
viewed the domestic policy with some anxiety, chiefly because he felt
that it strongly affected our foreign policy. When, in June 1933, I
visited him in London, where he attended a conference as head of the
German delegation, he told me about his anxieties; but he thought that
these things would die down and that developments would be similar to
those in Fascist Italy, where things had been very wild in the
beginning, but had settled down afterward. He was hoping that the same
would happen in Germany.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I am coming now to the year 1936. One of the
principal questions which dominated that year was the Austrian problem.
Can you tell us what Herr Von Neurath’s attitude was toward the repeated
interferences of German circles in the internal affairs of Austria?
DIECKHOFF: Yes. Herr Von Neurath considered such German interference in
the internal affairs of Austria not only inadmissible but damaging. He
told me so repeatedly. He was striving for an improvement of the
economic relations with Austria and thereby trying to improve gradually
the political relations also. He wanted to leave the sovereignty of
Austria untouched. This was also the aim of the agreement of 11 July
1936 between Germany and Austria, that is, the economic strengthening of
Austria and thereby the re-establishment of good political relations
between the two countries.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did you hear anything before March of 1938 that
Hitler had the intention to incorporate Austria into Germany, if
necessary, with force?
DIECKHOFF: No.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did you ever hear anything before 1938 that Hitler
had intended to solve the Sudeten problem by force or even to attack
Czechoslovakia?
DIECKHOFF: No.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know whether Hitler was in full agreement
until November 1937 with the peaceful policy which Herr Von Neurath
pursued with regard to both Austria and Czechoslovakia and also with
regard to the other European countries?
DIECKHOFF: Until Herr Von Neurath’s resignation in February 1938, I
always presumed that Hitler agreed with the peaceful policy pursued by
Herr Von Neurath; and I never heard or learned anything to the contrary.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know what the thoughts, the considerations
of Herr Von Neurath in 1935 were regarding the question of rearmament,
that is to say, the re-establishment of Germany’s military sovereignty?
DIECKHOFF: I know that Herr Von Neurath held the view that Germany, by
the declaration of the Western Powers on 11 December 1932, had been
granted equality of rights; and he considered her to have the
indisputable right to rearm after all disarmament efforts had failed.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I should like to put the same question to you,
with regard to the considerations and attitude of Herr Von Neurath, with
reference to the remilitarization of the demilitarized Rhineland.
DIECKHOFF: I know that Herr Von Neurath was aware of the seriousness of
this problem, for he knew that the problem of the remilitarization of
the Rhineland was interconnected with the Locarno Pact; but I know that
he saw a breach of the Locarno Pact in the Franco-Russian Agreement of
Mutual Assistance concluded in May 1935 and that as a result of the
ratification of this pact, or its going into effect, he firmly believed
that Germany had the right to re-establish military sovereignty in the
Rhineland.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What was the general political situation in those
days? Taking it into consideration, was it not justified to assume that
sooner or later a peaceful solution of this Rhineland problem would be
arrived at in any case?
DIECKHOFF: At any rate, the actual development after 7 March 1936 showed
that the Western Powers, though they did not agree to the
remilitarization of the Rhineland, nevertheless very quickly acquiesced
in the _fait accompli_.
I was at that time, during the second half of March 1936, for 2 weeks in
London on behalf of the Reich Government; and I had the opportunity to
discuss this matter with many Englishmen; and the view I found in the
widest circles was that as Germany had been granted equality of rights
one could not deny her the right to remilitarize the Rhineland. In some
circles I even found the view that it was a relief that the
remilitarization of the Rhineland, which was due sooner or later in any
case, was carried out so quickly and comparatively painlessly.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: And now one last question. What do you know about
Herr Von Neurath’s resignation from the position of Reich Foreign
Minister in February 1938?
DIECKHOFF: I was Ambassador to Washington at that time and I was
completely surprised by Foreign Minister Von Neurath’s sudden departure.
I did know that there were many things he did not agree with and that he
had asked several times to be allowed to resign. I also knew that he was
ill; he suffered from a neurotic heart. I also knew that he had passed
his sixty-fifth birthday, which gave him the right to retire. But I was
surprised all the same, particularly as I did not know the details at
that time. I regretted the resignation of the Foreign Minister, in whose
peace policy I had confidence, very much. I remember that the official
circles in Washington also regretted the departure of Herr Von Neurath
very much, for Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles approached me a
few days after this event and told me that the American Government
regretted the departure of this man who had pursued a moderate policy.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I have no further questions to this
witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any other members of the defendants’ counsel wish to
ask him any questions?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: One single question, Witness. You said that if Von
Neurath assumed the office of Foreign Minister, you had expected that he
would continue Stresemann’s and Brüning’s policy. According to your
knowledge did he actually continue this policy of Brüning’s after he
became Foreign Minister?
DIECKHOFF: Yes.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Thank you.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, on the same basis I intimated with
regard to the last witness, the Prosecution do not desire to take up
time by asking any questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness may retire.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, may I then have your permission to
call my third and last witness, Dr. Völkers, into the witness stand.
[_The witness Völkers took the stand._]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please?
HANS HERMANN VÖLKERS (Witness): Hans Hermann Völkers.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the
Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will
withhold and add nothing.
[_The witness repeated the oath._]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Witness, you were twice the personal adviser to
Herr Von Neurath; first in his position as Foreign Minister and later in
his position as Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia; is that correct?
VÖLKERS: Yes; since 1920 I was a member of the Foreign Office, and I
spent all my time abroad. Under Stresemann I spent 4 years in Geneva as
Consul General and as the permanent German representative to the League
of Nations; and in 1932 I was called to the Foreign Office and became
personal adviser to the newly, appointed Foreign Minister, Herr Von
Neurath. I remained in that position for a year; and then, upon my own
request, I was sent to Madrid as Embassy Counsellor, and later I became
Minister to Havana. In 1939 I was called back to the Foreign Office to
act as personal adviser with the title of chief of the office of Herr
Von Neurath, who in the meantime had been appointed Reich Protector in
Prague.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did this appointment as personal adviser to Herr
Von Neurath in Prague take place on the basis of any personal relations
or merely for professional reasons?
VÖLKERS: Only for professional reasons. Until I was his attaché in
Berlin I did not know Herr Von Neurath.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What was the attitude of the officials of the
Foreign Ministry toward Herr Von Neurath’s appointment as Foreign
Minister?
VÖLKERS: I had the impression that the officials of the Foreign Office
were generally most satisfied that in view of the difficult internal
political situation an old professional diplomat and expert minister
took over the direction of the Foreign Ministry, because they saw in
that a guarantee for a steady foreign political course; all the more so
as it was known that Herr Von Neurath had the special confidence of
Reich President Von Hindenburg and because he enjoyed, due to his entire
personality and his equanimity, the special recognition and veneration
of all the officials of the Foreign Office.
When Hitler came to power I had the impression that he was skeptical and
reserved toward him. He did not belong to the circle of the closer
associates of Hitler, and during the time I was with him he never
attended these evening conferences which Hitler held in the Reich
Chancellery in those days.
Gradually, however, the pressure on the Foreign Office increased more
and more. The Auslands-Organisation was created and the office of
Ribbentrop started a competitive enterprise into which were called all
sorts of people who had been abroad. They made all sorts of reports
which went directly to the Führer without being controlled by the
Foreign Office. And then later on the head of the Auslands-Organisation
was installed as commissioner in the Foreign Office while Prince Waldeck
was transferred into the personnel department of the Foreign Office. At
that stage the pressure became so strong that finally one could not
fight against it any more.
But the fact that the Foreign Office had isolated itself for so long and
that it was still evading the pressure of the Party, that, I think, is
certainly the merit of the then Foreign Minister and his State Secretary
Von Bülow. When the Jewish laws were then introduced into the Foreign
Office, too, I know that Herr Von Neurath protected, as far as that was
possible, his officials. I was in Stockholm during the last 2 years of
the war and met there two former colleagues of mine with whom I am close
friends. One is Ministerial Director Richard Meier who used to be in
charge of the Eastern department and who had to leave quite soon and who
often told me in Stockholm how grateful he was to Herr Von Neurath for
not only having enabled him to take with him his family and his
furniture and everything when he went abroad but also that Herr Von
Neurath, until the collapse, continued to pay him his monthly pensions
in Swedish kroner.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What was your position and your activity in Prague
in the Government of the Protectorate?
VÖLKERS: My position in Prague with the Government of the Protectorate
was approximately the same as the one I had 7 years earlier when I had
been personal adviser to the Foreign Minister in the Foreign Office in
Berlin, with the exception that in the Foreign Office there is a special
protocol department and a chief of protocol, whereas in Prague I was
also in charge of all protocols and ceremonial affairs, and that was
really my chief occupation. I was head of the so-called Office of the
Reich Protector, not to be confused with the principal authority, with
which I had nothing to do. When I came to Prague in the summer of 1939
the office already had been functioning for several months. My
predecessor was one Legation Counsellor Von Kessel from the Foreign
Office. Apart from myself two other officials from the Foreign Office,
who were subordinated to me, belonged to the Office of the Reich
Protector, also one Count Waldburg, whose mother was a Czech and who was
engaged by the Reich Protector because he was hoping to establish,
especially through him, good relations with the Czechs.
The office was responsible, apart from the general and usual routine
matters, for dealing with the private correspondence and the handling of
personal petitions. In the course of time we had to set up a special
department, because later on, when the many arrests took place, we
received so many petitions, most of which were addressed to the Reich
Protector personally...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Von Lüdinghausen, surely this is very remote from
anything we have got to consider, and all the previous evidence this
witness has given has been cumulative evidence which has not been
cross-examined upon before; and now what he is saying is all very remote
to anything we have to consider.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: In fact, I have already come to an end, Mr.
President. I merely wanted to show that he is in a position to answer
the following questions from his own knowledge.
[_Turning to the witness._] What can you tell us from your own
observations and experiences about the attitude of Herr Von Neurath
toward the Czechs?
VÖLKERS: I can give you only general impressions. As I have already told
you, I had nothing to do with the actual activities of the office but
was attached to Herr Von Neurath personally only for his private affairs
and all ceremonial matters. But I do know, and he told me, that when he
took over his position as Reich Protector, he did so with the intention
of treating the Czech population as justly and decently as possible in
order to create, by smoothing out the differences, a healthy basis for a
peaceful living, side by side, of the two nations. He told me frequently
that he was appointed Reich Protector, that is, protector of the Czechs;
and we knew that the last German Ambassador in Prague, Dr. Eisenlohr,
had often reported that the last Czechoslovakian Government, for their
part, had been prepared to effect an Anschluss with Germany. He was an
opponent of using military measures, and Herr Von Neurath told me when I
came to Prague—I think it was in September 1938—that he had expressed
himself very strongly against their use and that he together with Göring
had visited Hitler in Munich in order to dissuade him from that.
In my office I experienced again and again that Herr Von Neurath—shall
I go on—was very open-handed toward the Czechs with regard to
petitions. He had a lot of sympathy and understanding; he examined each
individual case, and that was very well known among the Czechs. And as
we in this office had the possibility of submitting each single request
and petition of Czech individuals directly to the highest chief, the
Czech petitioners very frequently and gladly used this channel because
the prospects for a positive action on their private requests and
petitions through the highest local chief promised to be much more
favorable than if they were quickly processed by the authorities
concerned in the Government. Particularly this practice brought us in
conflict with the State Secretary...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Von Lüdinghausen, this witness is simply making
speeches, you know. You are not asking him any questions at all. He is
simply going on...
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Witness, what do you know about the personal and
official relationship between Von Neurath and the President of State
Hacha?
VÖLKERS: According to my observations, the personal and official
relationship between the Reich Protector and the President of State
Hacha was excellent; and I believe that this was not merely a matter of
form, but I had the impression that Herr Von Neurath really and
sincerely liked the President of State because he considered him a very
decent and upright man who, under the existing circumstances...
THE PRESIDENT: Witness, when you see your counsel has heard enough of
your answer, surely you can stop...
VÖLKERS: Very well.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What was the relationship between Herr Von Neurath
and the State Secretary attached to him, Frank?
VÖLKERS: That was a very bad one. Herr Von Neurath told me already at
the time when I assumed my office that he had had considerable
difficulties with him because of his definite anti-Czech attitude, as a
Sudeten German—an attitude which a Reich German could not easily
understand. He had always hoped, however, that Frank, who was not a
civil servant but an outsider, would gradually follow his policy and
adapt himself to the civil service staff. But unfortunately this was not
possible. I do not know when...
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Witness, can you describe to us briefly what the
actual official powers of Herr Von Neurath and Frank were in relation to
each other?
VÖLKERS: Herr Von Neurath was the superior of the State Secretary. The
State Secretary was in charge of the entire internal administration,
which was a very large one. Under State Secretary Von Burgsdorff, who I
think has been examined already before this High Tribunal, worked under
him. Besides being State Secretary, Frank was also the Higher Police and
SS Leader.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Now, did Herr Von Neurath have a certain influence
on this part of Frank’s activities, that is to say, in his capacity as
Higher SS and Police Leader?
VÖLKERS: The way conditions were he had practically no influence. I do
not know whether in the beginning the matter had already been legally
settled. In practice, however, the Police and the State Secretary were
completely independent from Herr Von Neurath regarding police measures.
This had some connection with the situation in the Reich, where Himmler,
too, led the entire Police and SS, having taken the police powers away
from the Ministry of the Interior. As far as I can remember, the matter
was legally settled in the autumn of 1939 to the effect that the Police
was independent and that Herr Von Neurath was to be informed afterward
of all measures taken.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: You mean by that the decree regarding the
organization of the administration and the German Security Police in the
Protectorate, under date of 1 September 1939?
VÖLKERS: Yes, I think that is the one. The first part referred to the
administration and the second part to the Police.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, may I remind you that the wording
of this decree is contained in my document book under Number
Neurath-149.
THE PRESIDENT: It has been submitted as evidence?
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Yes. I merely wanted to remind you that I have
presented it.
[_Turning to the witness._] Was Herr Von Neurath at least informed
afterward, in accordance with the instructions, of the police actions
which Frank carried out independently?
VÖLKERS: The Chief of the Police was an SS man by the name of Böhme. He
used to report to the Reich Protector several times each week. I do not
believe that he informed him in advance of intended police actions. We
never heard anything like that. Whether he reported such actions
afterward and in their entirety is something which I cannot say. The
rule was that the Reich Protector sent to him, for comment, the various
petitions from the next of kin of Czechs who had been arrested and that
Böhme would bring them along when he came to report. That was generally
the way the Reich Protector was afterward informed.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Well then, when Herr Von Neurath was later on
informed of such police measures, no matter in which way, did he make
attempts for the suspension of arrests or for any limitation and
mitigation of such police measures?
VÖLKERS: As I have already told you, we had set up in the small office
of the Reich Protector a special department for the purpose of receiving
such applications. This department, which of course was directly under
the jurisdiction of the Reich Protector, did everything possible in
order to reassure the next of kin and to bring about the releases of the
detained persons. The work was particularly difficult because these
local departments, the local police chief and also State Secretary
Frank, usually took a negative attitude. Again and again the Reich
Protector would then appeal directly to Himmler and very often to the
Führer himself. I know and remember that there was a very excited
correspondence with Himmler and that Herr Von Neurath repeatedly
complained to the Führer about this.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Witness, can you judge, or can you tell us how far
Herr Von Neurath, as Reich Protector, apart from the Police and police
measures, was free and independent in his political and economic
measures and orders, or how far he was depending on Berlin when giving
those?
VÖLKERS: When I came to Prague there were all sorts of other offices
beside that of the Reich Protector. For instance, there was a Reich
Commissioner for Economy who, as far as I can remember and as I heard at
the time, had already begun to exercise his functions when the Office of
the Reich Protector had not yet been established. Then there was a
Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan and there was the Armed Forces
Plenipotentiary who had a large staff. Even the Party agencies were not
centrally organized. Prague and the north belonged to the Sudetengau
under Gauleiter Henlein; the whole of Moravia belonged to the
Niederdonau Gau, under Gauleiter Dr. Jury; and the west belonged to a
third Gau. All these Gauleiter tried, in turn, on their part...
THE PRESIDENT: Counsel, this is all detail, is it not, and quite
unnecessary detail?
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know anything about Von Neurath’s attitude
toward numerous plans of germanizing the Czechs?
VÖLKERS: No, I know nothing about that. I remember only that, right at
the beginning of the war, Herr Von Neurath told me that the whole
structure of the Protectorate was regarded by him as a temporary
solution and that the peace would have to decide the ultimate fate of
Czechoslovakia.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Well, then, as you probably remember, in the
autumn of 1939 there were the first demonstrations in Prague on the
occasion of the Independence Day of Czechoslovakia, on 28 October 1939.
VÖLKERS: Well, I cannot remember the details. There were demonstrations
on a Czech national holiday in October. As far as I can remember, they
took place on the Wenzel Platz, and the Národni-ulice. I, personally,
did...
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What do you know about the consequences of new
demonstrations particularly on the part of the students at Prague when a
wounded student died and was buried on 15 November? What do you know
about these demonstrations and what happened immediately in the wake of
these demonstrations?
VÖLKERS: Previous to the second demonstration, as far as I remember, the
instruction was given to exercise restraint. The demonstrations were
generally, as I was told later, not particularly alarming. In spite of
this, Frank had reported to Berlin about it. At any rate, the Reich
Protector and Frank and General Friderici were called to Berlin for a
conference with Hitler in the Reich Chancellery. I accompanied the Reich
Protector at the time. Chvalkovsky, the Czech Minister in Berlin, was
also invited. I was present when Hitler, in a very excited and rude
manner, reproached the Minister because of the events, for which he was
holding the Czech Government responsible. Whether the closing of
universities was discussed on that occasion, I cannot remember, nor can
I remember having heard him threaten the shooting or arrest of students.
The manner in which Hitler treated the Minister was most embarrassing to
us. The Minister then left the room without saying a single further
word. As far as I can remember, the subject was then mentioned no
further. We had lunch, and when saying goodby, Hitler said to Frank that
he wanted to talk with him some more.
Herr Von Neurath was not asked to stay and I remember that while walking
home with him he was very angry about it. On the following day, I
traveled back with Herr Von Neurath while Frank had already left the
same night for Prague. I remember that when I came into the office in
Prague, I saw a red poster declaring that because of the demonstrations,
the shooting of the leaders and the arrest of students and the closing
of universities had been ordered; that poster carried Neurath’s
signature. As I did not know what had happened in Prague in the
meantime, I was utterly surprised, because I had heard nothing about
these measures in Berlin; and I suspected an intrigue on Frank’s part
and went to report the matter to Neurath. I had the impression that Herr
Von Neurath was deeply upset and just as unpleasantly surprised as I was
and that he had known nothing at all about this previously. Soon
afterward Frank passed through my room going into Neurath’s room,
carrying that red poster under his arm. I do not know whether Von
Neurath had sent for him or whether he came on his own initiative.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did Herr Von Neurath afterwards, at least after
this unfortunate matter had occurred, use his influence for the release
of these students who had been arrested?
VÖLKERS: Yes. He immediately used his influence, but he did not even
succeed in getting hold of the list of names of the arrested students.
Only after urging the Czechs for a long time did we receive from the
Czech Government an incomplete list of names. In spite of this, Herr Von
Neurath immediately worked for their release; and he did, in fact, have
excellent results in that connection as time went by.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know anything about what was done to
accommodate or employ those students who, on account of these
demonstrations and the subsequent closing of the universities, had more
or less become idle?
VÖLKERS: No, I know nothing about that, and I had nothing to do with
that matter.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: But do you know whether Herr Von Neurath
repeatedly urged Hitler to reopen the universities?
VÖLKERS: Yes, I remember that the chancellor, named Rosny, of the Czech
University, whom I knew well, had asked me once for that and I reported
it to Herr Von Neurath and Herr Von Neurath again made efforts at the
time; but as far as I know, as long as we were in Prague the
universities were not reopened.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you remember a Czech Fascist organization,
Vlayka? I do not know whether I pronounce the name correctly.
VÖLKERS: Yes, I do, but I know very little about it. I only know that we
received in the office a number of pledges of loyalty sent to us by
members of the movement, and I also know that we had been informed by
Czech sources that these people were partly criminal and generally not
worth much. Herr Von Neurath adopted quite generally the view that this
was an internal affair of the Czechs and that, after all, these were
people who wanted to work together with us. But he, on his part, refused
any collaboration; and such letters and pledges were never answered, I
believe, by our office. But I know...
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Herr Von Neurath was also, besides being Reich
Protector, president of the Secret Cabinet Council. Did you, since you
partly handled his correspondence of a more personal nature, notice
anything indicating that Herr Von Neurath became active in this capacity
as president of the Secret Cabinet Council?
VÖLKERS: No. As long as I was in Prague, Herr Von Neurath was never
active. On the contrary, on one occasion he told me that Hitler, when he
appointed him, had told him that he should not think that he would ever
call a meeting of the Cabinet Council.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Herr Von Neurath was also a member of the
so-called Defense Council. Did he ever have anything to do in this
capacity in Prague?
VÖLKERS: No, I did not know that he was a member of the Defense Council.
The fundamental decrees from Berlin concerning the Protectorate were
frequently signed by the Ministerial Council for the Defense of the
Reich—I believe that was the name—but Neurath had never signed or
countersigned them.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Herr Von Neurath was appointed, as is well known,
an honorary Gruppenführer of the SS and later, honorary
Obergruppenführer of the SS. Did Herr Von Neurath at that time, when he
was in Prague, ever wear that uniform?
VÖLKERS: As a rule, he wore his Reich Minister uniform. A portrait was
also once made of him in that uniform. He used to wear civilian clothes
a great deal. It may be that he once wore the black uniform of the SS,
on the occasion of a parade of the SS; but I do not know for certain
now. Otherwise, he never wore it.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know anything about the circumstances and
reasons concerning Herr Von Neurath’s departure from Prague in September
1941?
VÖLKERS: When Herr Von Neurath was ordered to come to headquarters that
September, he was accompanied by his military adjutant. I met him at the
airfield; and in the car he told me that Hitler had been furious because
of the acts of sabotage in the Protectorate and wanted to send Heydrich
to do some exemplary punishing. He, Neurath, had stated that he did not
want to have anything to do with that and had asked for his release.
Hitler then had ordered that he should first of all go on leave, and so
he did. He departed on one of the following days.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I have no further questions.
Mr. President, may I make one request at the end of my case. I have not
yet been able to submit all documents because I have not yet received
all the translations. May I reserve myself the right to submit the few
remaining documents, perhaps at the end of the case of my colleague, Dr.
Fritz?
THE PRESIDENT: You need not wait for the translation. You can offer the
documents in evidence now. Put in a list with the numbers.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I have not got them with me, I am
afraid. Perhaps, if I may, I could do so tomorrow or the day after when
Dr. Fritz is finished.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly.
Do any of the defendants’ counsel want to ask any questions?
[_There was no response._]
Does the Prosecution wish to cross-examine?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, the Prosecution do not wish to
cross-examine, on the same basis.
My Lord, may I refer to one collection of documents that are in our
Document Book 12b, the collection of the anti-Jewish decrees in the
Protectorate. They are all from the _Verordnungsblatt_ for the
Protectorate, and the Prosecution ask the Tribunal to take judicial
notice of them as being an official publication. The collection is
merely for convenience and access of the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness can retire.
Then that closes your case for the present, Dr. Lüdinghausen. The
Tribunal will now adjourn.
[_A recess was taken._]
THE PRESIDENT: I call on counsel for the Defendant Fritzsche.
DR. HEINZ FRITZ (Counsel for Defendant Fritzsche): Mr. President, I
intend to present the case of the Defendant Fritzsche as follows:
First, I should like to call the Defendant Fritzsche to the witness
stand and then the witness Von Schirmeister. In the course of these two
examinations I intend to present to the Tribunal a few affidavits and to
refer to these and to the rest of the contents of my two document books.
In its decision of 8 March 1946 the Tribunal granted as witnesses for my
case: First, Herr Von Schirmeister, second Dr. Krieg; and as documents:
The text of all radio speeches of the Defendant Fritzsche from 1932 to
1945 and the archives of Deutscher Schnelldienst (fast official news
service) of the Propaganda Ministry. Of all the evidence, in spite of
the efforts of the General Secretary, unfortunately only the witness Von
Schirmeister could be brought here. Therefore, I had to rearrange my
case and ask for the indulgence of the Tribunal if I go into a somewhat
greater detail than originally intended in examining the Defendant
Fritzsche and the witness Von Schirmeister.
With the approval of the Tribunal I shall now call the Defendant
Fritzsche to the witness stand.
[_The Defendant Fritzsche took the stand._]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please?
HANS FRITZSCHE (Defendant): Hans Fritzsche.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the
Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will
withhold and add nothing.
[_The defendant repeated the oath._]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. FRITZ: Herr Fritzsche, will you please describe briefly your career
up to the year 1933?
FRITZSCHE: As to that, may I refer to my affidavit, Document 3469-PS,
Points 1 and 3 to 8? In addition I can limit myself now to a broad
outline.
DR. FRITZ: Mr. President, I should like to remark at the beginning of
the examination that my document books, of which I have two, have not
yet been completely translated. This affidavit, which the defendant has
just mentioned, is also contained in the document book for the
Prosecution. I do not know whether the Tribunal now has this document
book.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, you can go on.
FRITZSCHE: I was born on 21 April 1900. My father was a civil servant. I
attended the gymnasium to study classics. Then I was a soldier in the
first World War, returned to school, and afterward, studied philosophy,
history, and national economics at various universities.
After the first World War my life and my work were determined by the
distress of my people. We called this distress “Versailles.” Enough has
been said here as to the Versailles Treaty. I need add nothing to what
has already been said.
DR. FRITZ: You were striving then in your journalistic work before 1933
for a change of the Versailles Treaty?
FRITZSCHE: Yes, of course.
DR. FRITZ: Did you seek this change through war?
FRITZSCHE: No, I sought it through the means of law, of politics, and
economic common sense, which were at that time all on the German side.
Along with this, certain restoration of the power of the German Reich
would have been desirable because I saw in the weakness of the Reich a
potential danger of war. But to change the Treaty of Versailles by means
of war did not seem to me to be possible, expedient, nor desirable. The
same sentiment prevailed later under the Hitler Government.
Adolf Hitler gave two assurances on just this point which, for me and
for millions of other Germans, were especially impressive. The first was
the assurance: “I myself was a simple soldier and therefore know what
war means.” The second was the statement: “In all the bloody wars of the
last thousand years not even the victors gained as much as they had
sacrificed in the war.” These two assurances sounded to German ears like
holy and binding oaths. Whatever in Hitler’s policy should have violated
these two assurances was a betrayal of the German people.
DR. FRITZ: When, how, and why did you come to the NSDAP?
FRITZSCHE: After my entry into the Propaganda Ministry I joined the
Party. I refer again to my affidavit, 3469-PS, to Points 9 to 13.
I did not join the NSDAP on account of the Party program, nor through
Hitler’s book _Mein Kampf_; nor did I join because of the personality of
Hitler, whose suggestive power, which has frequently been mentioned
here, escaped me entirely. I rejected the harsh radicalism of the
methods of the Party. This harsh radicalism was contrary to the habits
of my whole life and my personal principles. Due to this coarse practice
I even came into a conflict with the Party in 1932.
I joined the Party when it had, without doubt, won over the majority of
the German people. This Party had overcome, at the time, the disunion of
the German people and brought it unity after Brüning’s great attempt at
recovery on a democratic basis had failed on account of the foreign
political opposition, not because of the resistance of the German
people. After the cabinets also had failed to find a footing among the
people, the appointment of Hitler, as Reich Chancellor, meant a return
to democratic principles. Much has been said here about these matters. I
ask for permission to cite one circumstance which, to my knowledge, has
not yet been mentioned here and which does have a certain significance.
When I joined the NSDAP I did not believe I was really joining a party
in the true sense of the word, for the NSDAP did not have a party theory
similar to those of the Marxist parties which had a developed and mature
theory; all theorists of the Party were disputed. The theoretical
writings of Gottfried Feder had been prohibited. The theorist Rosenberg
was disputed in the Party to the very end. The lack of a theory for the
Party was so great that even the printing of the bare Party program was
forbidden for the German papers. The German papers were even forbidden a
few years after 1933 to quote arbitrarily any part of Hitler’s _Mein
Kampf_.
At that time, then, I did not believe that I was joining a narrowly
defined party but I thought I was joining a movement, a movement which
united in itself contrasts such as those between Ley and Funk, between
Rosenberg and the Reich bishop; a movement which was variable in its
choice of methods; which at one time prohibited the labor of women and
at some other time solicited this same labor of women. I believed I was
joining such a movement because one group within the NSDAP saw in the
swastika flag nothing but a new combination, a new form for the colors
black, white, and red, while another group saw in this banner the red
flag with a swastika. It is a fact that there were whole groups of the
former German Nationalist Party in the NSDAP or of former Communists in
the NSDAP. Thus, I hoped to find in this wide-flung Movement a forum for
intellectual discussions which would no longer be carried on with the
murderous animosity which had previously ruled in Germany but which
could be carried on with a certain discipline dominated by nationalist
and socialist conceptions.
For this reason and by making constant compromises, I put aside my own
wishes, my own misgivings, my own political beliefs. In many
conversations I advised my friends to do the same when they complained
that they and their interests were not given proper consideration during
the time of the Nazification. I came to the conviction that millions of
Germans had joined the Party only for this reason and in this
expectation. They thought they were serving a good cause. Out of pure
idealism they were willing to sacrifice everything to this cause,
everything except their honor. Meanwhile, I had to realize that the
leader of this cause accepted the sacrifice of these idealists, that he
squandered it, and that, besides, he stained their honor with a
senseless and inhuman murder, unique in history—a murder which no war
necessity could have justified, for which one could not even find any
reason in any necessity of war.
DR. FRITZ: Now, the Prosecution accuses you of having—and I quote,
“...sworn the customary oath of unconditional loyalty to Hitler” in
1933. For whatever reason you did this, the fact that you took this oath
is true, is it not?
FRITZSCHE: Yes, I also swore, twice, an oath to the Weimar Constitution,
in 1933 and 1938. Let me add something. It was always and it still is my
conviction that no oath relieves a man of his general duties to
humanity. No one is made an irresponsible tool by an oath. My oath would
never have made me carry out an order if I had recognized it to be
criminal. Never in my life did I obey anyone blindly. For that reason, I
do not refer for any of my actions to my duty to obey.
DR. FRITZ: Did you keep the oath which you took?
FRITZSCHE: Yes. No actions were expected of me which I could have
considered criminal or a violation of written or unwritten laws.
Moreover, I kept the oath which I took, not to Hitler, but to the German
people.
DR. FRITZ: How long did you keep the oath?
FRITZSCHE: I kept it to the end. Then, it is true, I remained in Berlin,
in violation of the order which I was given. When Hitler and his
entourage took the way of suicide or fled toward the West, I was, to my
knowledge, the only higher official to remain in Berlin. At that time I
gathered together the employees of the highest Reich authorities, who
had been left to their fate, in the ruins of my office. Hitler had left
behind an order to fight on. The commander of Berlin could not be found.
Therefore, as a civilian, I felt obliged to offer to the Russian Marshal
Zhukov the capitulation. As I was sending off the emissaries who were to
go across the battleline, the last military adjutant of Hitler
appeared—General Burgdorf—and was going to shoot me in compliance with
Hitler’s order. Nevertheless, we capitulated, even though it was signed
by the commander, who had been found in the meantime. Thus, I believe I
kept my oath, the oath which I had taken to the German people in the
person of Hitler.
DR. FRITZ: Did you hold an office in the Party?
FRITZSCHE: No.
DR. FRITZ: Were you a political leader?
FRITZSCHE: No.
DR. FRITZ: Were you in the SA or the SS or any one of the other
organizations which are accused here?
FRITZSCHE: No.
DR. FRITZ: Did you ever take part in a Party rally?
FRITZSCHE: No.
DR. FRITZ: In one of the celebrations of 9 November in Munich?
FRITZSCHE: No.
DR. FRITZ: Then, please describe briefly your position and your work
from 1933 to 1945.
FRITZSCHE: Here, again, I may refer to my affidavit, 3469-PS, that is,
to the rest of the affidavit. Thus I may again limit myself to a very
brief presentation to supplement what is said in the affidavit.
At the seizure of power by National Socialism, I remained what I had
been previously, Chief Editor of Drahtloser Dienst. That was the name of
the German radio news service. I held that position for 5 more years.
In May 1933 this wireless service, which had been a part of the Reich
Radio Company, was incorporated into the press section of the Propaganda
Ministry. As I was a specialist in journalistic news service, I soon was
entrusted with the news agencies, first the smaller ones such as
Transozean or Europapress or Eildienst. Later I was entrusted with the
big Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro (German news service).
At that time, I had no power to issue orders to the agencies, for I was
still an employee of the Ministry and not yet an official. I also had no
right to determine the contents of the news. I had only the
organizational supervision, but I believe that my advice was respected
at the time. In those days I also gave other advice of a journalistic
nature. Then in December 1938 I became head of the German Press Section.
I became Ministerial Director. As an official I still felt like the
journalist I had been for decades previously. I continued to direct the
German Press Section until the spring of 1942.
At that time I did not agree, among other things, with the colored press
reports of my superior, Reich Press Chief Dr. Dietrich. For that reason,
I became a soldier and went to the Eastern Front.
In the fall of 1942 I was called back by Dr. Goebbels. Dr. Goebbels
approved my previous criticism, of which he knew. He offered me the
direction of the Radio Section of his Ministry. I answered that I could
return to the Propaganda Ministry only if I had the certainty that a
termination of the war by political means would be sought and that total
military victory would not be striven after, which from the first day of
the war I had considered impossible. I told Dr. Goebbels at that time
literally, “I am not going to participate as a propagandist in a fight
of self—destruction such as was fought by the Goths at Mount Vesuvius.”
Dr. Goebbels answered that Hitler and he, also, were seeking a
termination of the war by diplomatic means on the basis of reaching some
sort of understanding. He promised me that he would inform me in time if
he noticed that the Führer was changing these intentions. Dr. Goebbels
repeated this promise at intervals of a few months, up to the end of the
war; and each time that he repeated it, he always gave me substantiated
indications about the political efforts in progress at the moment. Today
I have the feeling that he broke his promise.
Well, at that time I took over the Radio Section of the Propaganda
Ministry, and I became Ministerial Director.
DR. FRITZ: Those were your official positions. But they were less known
to the public. Better known were your radio speeches. What about them?
FRITZSCHE: Since 1932 I spoke once a week, for 10 to 15 minutes, on some
German stations and on the Deutschlandsender (radio station for foreign
broadcasts). At the beginning of the war I spoke daily on all the
stations, I believe for 3 or 4 months. Then I spoke three times a week,
then twice a week, and finally once a week again. At first these radio
speeches were just reviews of newspaper articles; that is, a collection
of quotations from domestic and foreign newspapers. After the beginning
of the war, however, these speeches, of course, became a polemic on the
basis of quotations mostly from foreign papers and foreign radio
stations.
DR. FRITZ: Did your speeches have an official character? The Prosecution
says that they were, of course, under the control of the Propaganda
Ministry.
FRITZSCHE: That is not correct in that form. The speeches were not
official. At the beginning they were purely personal elaborations. Of
course, I could not prevent, as time went on, the private speeches of a
man holding a position in the Propaganda Ministry being no longer
considered as personal, but semi-official.
DR. FRITZ: You just said “personal elaborations,” which was later
considered “semi-official.” For clarification I ask, could one criticize
these speeches, or was one arrested for so doing?
FRITZSCHE: Criticism was not only allowed, but actually it was done. I
had an extensive correspondence with my critics, although only with
those who signed their names. There were of course also anonymous
critics, but I may add that the anonymous critics had only general
complaints.
After the outbreak of the war a South German office of public
prosecution and later the Ministry of Justice, offered me a certain
protection for my publications, apparently on the assumption that they
were official or semi-official. It was suggested to me to appear as
co-plaintiff in possible libel actions. I categorically refused this,
stating, as I have often done both privately and publicly, that people
must be allowed to grumble about something. If they are forbidden to
criticize the State and the Government, then they must be allowed at
least to criticize the press, the radio, and me.
DR. FRITZ: How did you prepare these speeches? Were they put down in
writing and censored beforehand?
FRITZSCHE: I always refused to let them be censored beforehand. The
material was gathered very carefully. It was kept in the so-called
“Archiv-Schnelldienst” which had been applied for and approved by the
Tribunal to be brought here but which could not be found.
The material consisted of clippings from papers, reports of news
agencies, and reports from foreign broadcasts. The investigation of
doubtful matters was done by a special official. A rough draft of the
speech was then dictated and then delivered freely. Therefore, this
procedure was different to that of writing an article; not every
sentence had to be polished, because in a written matter every word
counts, whereas in a speech it is more the total impression which is
decisive.
DR. FRITZ: Now, you worked in the Propaganda Ministry; Dr. Goebbels was
the Minister. His name has been mentioned here frequently in connection
with his various positions as Reich Minister for Propaganda, Reich
Propaganda Director of the NSDAP, Delegate for Total War Effort, and
Gauleiter of Berlin. In which of these capacities did you deal with Dr.
Goebbels?
FRITZSCHE: Exclusively in his capacity as Propaganda Minister.
DR. FRITZ: Were you his representative there?
FRITZSCHE: No. In the last 2½ years I was his commissioner for radio
broadcasting and, in addition, head of one of the 12 departments of his
Ministry. Dr. Goebbels’ representatives were his state secretaries. The
last one was Dr. Naumann who was his successor for one day.
DR. FRITZ: Was Dr. Goebbels your only and direct superior?
FRITZSCHE: No. There were many offices between him and me at first, and
still a few later on. This is the first time, here in the dock, that I
am without official superiors.
DR. FRITZ: By the way, whom of the defendants did you know or with whom
did you have official or personal relations?
FRITZSCHE: I had two or three official conversations, shortly after
1933, with Funk, who was then State Secretary in the Propaganda
Ministry, mainly dealing with economic and organizational matters. I
discussed with him the financial plans for the reorganization of the
news service.
Then, I once had a talk with Grossadmiral Dönitz on a technical matter.
I called on Seyss-Inquart in The Hague, and on Papen in Istanbul. I knew
all the others only by sight and first made their personal acquaintance
during the Trial.
DR. FRITZ: How about Hitler?
FRITZSCHE: I never had a conversation with him. In the course of 12
years, however, I saw him, of course, several times at the Reichstag on
big occasions or receptions. Once I was at his headquarters and was
invited to dinner with a large number of other people. Otherwise, I
received instructions from Hitler only through Dr. Dietrich or his
representative or through Dr. Goebbels and his various representatives.
DR. FRITZ: What were your relations with Dr. Goebbels? Were you on
friendly terms with him? Did you meet with him frequently?
FRITZSCHE: One can by no means say that we were friends. The
relationship was on an official basis, reserved and to a certain extent
formal. I was personally even less frequently with him than other
assistants of Dr. Goebbels of my rank. But I believed I observed that he
treated me with more respect than any other of his co-workers. To that
extent, I occupied a certain special position. I valued Dr. Goebbels’
intelligence and his ability, at least sometimes, to change his own
opinion in favor of a better argument. I saw him about twice a year
during the first 5 years. When I was head of a department I saw him
perhaps once a month. After the outbreak of war I saw him daily in the
course of a conference with 30 to 50 fellow employees; and in addition,
about once a week I had a conference on special subjects with him.
DR. FRITZ: Now we come to the subject of propaganda. Can you sketch the
propaganda system in the Third Reich?
FRITZSCHE: I shall try it. There were three types of propaganda. The
first was the unorganized agitation of the radical fanatics in the
Party. It was present in all fields, in the fields of religion, racial
policy, art, general policy, and the conduct of the war. As time went by
Martin Bormann became more and more the leader of this unorganized
agitation.
The second type of propaganda was under the Reich Propaganda Directorate
of the NSDAP. The head of this was Dr. Goebbels. It attempted to put the
agitation of the radicals on a more presentable basis.
The third type was the state organization of the Reich Propaganda
Ministry.
DR. FRITZ: The Prosecution contended at the beginning that you had been
also head of the Radio Section of the Propaganda Directorate of the
NSDAP. How about that?
FRITZSCHE: The Prosecution have withdrawn that assertion. They said that
they had no proof. It would have been more correct to say that this
statement has been proved to be false. I refer to my affidavit, 3469-PS,
Point 37. There I state that I was not—in contrast to all of my
predecessors, as far as I know—head of the Radio Section of the
Ministry and at the same time head of the Radio Section of the Party.
Today I supplement this statement by saying that I held no office
whatever in the Party.
DR. FRITZ: You have been accused of having helped Dr. Goebbels plunge
the world into the blood-bath of aggressive war. Is that true? Did Dr.
Goebbels ever speak with you about aggressive plans?
FRITZSCHE: No; I never heard of any intention to wage aggressive war,
either from Dr. Goebbels or from anyone else.
DR. FRITZ: In the course of this Trial some conferences have been
mentioned here several times at which, it was said, various aggressive
plans were discussed; for example, before the attack on Czechoslovakia,
before the attack on Poland, and on Norway, and on Russia. Did you
participate in these conferences? Did you hear of them?
FRITZSCHE: I did not participate in a single one of these conferences. I
heard of them for the first time here in the courtroom.
DR. FRITZ: Now, in case no plans for an attack were discussed in these
conferences, was there any talk at all about war or the possibility of
war?
FRITZSCHE: No; but the danger of war was mentioned as early as 1933—the
danger of war due to the one-sided disarmament of one state in the midst
of other states which were highly armed. This disproportion between
armament and nonarmament had to be considered as enticing an attack.
German propaganda after 1933 underlined this consideration and this
contention as one of the main reasons, first, for the demand for
disarmament of the other powers and afterwards for the German demand for
equality of armament. That seemed completely logical to me. But never
was the danger of war mentioned without, at the same time, making a
reference to the German will for peace. That seemed to me honest.
In the summer of 1939, when the danger of war became more and more
imminent, I saw Dr. Goebbels more often than ever before. I gave Dr.
Goebbels a number of little memoranda as, so to speak, a contribution
from my field of work, the news service. They were analyses of public
opinion in western countries, and they repeatedly indicated that England
was determined to go to war in case of a conflict with Poland. I recall
that Dr. Goebbels was deeply impressed when I once again gave him one of
these memoranda. He expressed his concern and decided immediately to fly
to Hitler. He said to me, literally, “Believe me, we did not work
successfully for 6 years in order to risk everything in a war now.”
Furthermore, in the summer of 1939, I knew of some serious gaps in
German armament which have already been mentioned in part here in the
courtroom. Therefore I was convinced of the honesty of the peaceful
intentions in Hitler’s policy.
If documents have been submitted during this Trial which indicate that
Hitler secretly thought differently or acted differently, then I am at a
loss to form a judgment, since the documents of the opposite side have
not yet been published. But if it should be, as the documents submitted
here say, I must state that I was deceived about the aims of German
policy.
DR. FRITZ: Mr. President, at the beginning of my case I had stated that
we were unable to produce here the radio speeches of the Defendant
Fritzsche. I tried to obtain them from German radio stations and
succeeded in getting at least a small part from the years 1939 and 1940.
I have selected a few of these speeches which I should like to submit to
the Tribunal as Exhibit Number Fritzsche-1.
To support what the defendant has just said, I should like to quote only
one sentence from the radio speech of Fritzsche of 15 November 1939:
“The sole reason for war, which a nation that as a whole never
longs for war, may have at all—the sole reason for war which is
also morally justifiable is the threat to the existence, to the
life of that nation.”
And this line emphasized by the Defendant Fritzsche at the beginning of
the war, was adhered to by him during the war as well. As proof of this,
I should like to quote another passage from the same document, from a
radio speech of Fritzsche of 23 July 1940:
“We Germans have experienced in the course of our history, and
especially 30 years ago, enough blood and tears and death to
face things honestly now. We knew what war meant, and therefore
we did not want war. And because the Führer knows it so well and
had experienced it himself, he offered on 6 October and 19 July
to make peace.”
DR. FRITZ: Did you in any way have anything to do with war preparations
of an intellectual or organizational kind?
FRITZSCHE: Not directly, but perhaps indirectly. I demanded the
disarmament of the others, and then equality of armament; and I
advocated the arming (Wehrhaftmachung) of the German people. The
expression “Wehrhaftmachung” is liable to be misunderstood, at any rate,
to be easily misinterpreted. I should like to define it expressly as the
ability to fight in self-defense. The German people were promised again
and again, often by me, that the restoration of military sovereignty
would be for defensive purposes only.
DR. FRITZ: How and where did you propagate this idea?
FRITZSCHE: In the modest sphere of my weekly radio speeches, while
making casual remarks. I was a patriot; but I feel myself to be free
from chauvinism, that is, exaggerated nationalism. To me, as a
historian, it was at that time already clear that, especially in the
narrow confines of Europe, the old nationalism was an anachronism and
that it was incompatible with modern communications and weapons. At that
time I believed I saw in Hitler’s doctrine also certain elements for a
new type of mutual understanding among peoples. It was particularly the
constantly repeated thesis that only the nationalism of one people can
understand the nationalism of another people.
Only today have I realized ideologically—but particularly, of course
materially—through the further development of arms, that the time of
nationalism is past, if mankind does not want to commit suicide, and
that the period of internationalism has come, for good or evil.
At that time, however, nationalism was not considered a crime. Everyone
advocated it. It can be seen that it is still advocated today, and I
also advocated it.
DR. FRITZ: Now, the Prosecution points out that before every attack a
press campaign was launched in Germany, the aim of which was to weaken
the victim of a planned attack and to prepare the German people
psychologically for the new drive. Although this is stated by the
Prosecution without as yet actually referring to you personally and even
though later no direct charge is made that you organized these press
campaigns, the Prosecution, nevertheless, stress very strongly your
connection with this practice.
Now, what facts do you have to state about your role in these
journalistic polemics?
FRITZSCHE: First, I can only point out that I described the
propagandistic actions in detail in my affidavit, Document Number
3469-PS, Points 23 to 33, starting with the Rhineland occupation up to
the attack on the Soviet Union. These descriptions also contain
information about the type and extent of my participation in these
actions. Beyond that, I may emphasize that any reference is missing in
the description made in my affidavit as to the question of the right in
each case. All attempts at political justification are lacking. I should
like to emphasize explicitly that in each case, in each action, I
believed I represented a good and just cause. It would be leading too
far if I were to explain that here for each case, inasmuch as many of
these cases have already been discussed here. I assume, or rather I
hope, that the Prosecution will ask questions on this subject for I
assert that, no matter what the facts may have been in the individual
cases, at every moment from the Anschluss of Austria on to the attack on
Russia, information given to me and through me to the German public left
no doubt of the legality or the urgent necessity of the German action;
and I, as the only surviving informer of the German public, consider it
my duty to be available here for any investigation of the correctness of
this statement of mine, which is of especial importance for the German
public.
DR. FRITZ: Some newspaper headlines are mentioned in your affidavit
which are considered typical for the various states of tension prior to
the individual action. What have you to say to that?
FRITZSCHE: The headlines are taken without exception from the
_Völkischer Beobachter_. These headlines were submitted to me and, of
course, I had to confirm their truth; but I may emphasize that the
_Völkischer Beobachter_ was not typical for the result of my press
policy. The _Völkischer Beobachter_ generally had its own direct
connections to headquarters and to Hitler. Typical products of my press
policy were papers such as the _Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung_, the
_Münchener Neueste Nachrichten_, and the _Hamburger Fremdenblatt_, to
name only a few.
DR. FRITZ: But the Prosecution is of the opinion that you also incited
to war by your domestic propaganda insofar as you tried to arouse
hostile feelings in the German people toward other peoples of Europe and
the world. In Captain Sprecher’s trial brief it is said, for instance,
that terms like “antagonism against the peoples of the Soviet Union” and
“an atmosphere of senselessness and hatred” were created by you or that
you had incited the Germans to blind hatred. Did you do that?
FRITZSCHE: No, I did not do that. Never did I attempt to arouse hatred
against the English, French, Americans, or Russians, _et cetera_. There
is not a single word of this type in perhaps a thousand speeches which I
made before the microphone. I did speak strongly against governments,
members of governments, governmental systems; but I never preached
hatred generally or attempted to awaken it indirectly as was the
case—and I ask your pardon for my taking an example from the
courtroom—at the moment when a film was presented here and the words
were spoken, “Here you see Germans laughing over hanged Yugoslavs.”
Never did I try to awaken hatred in this general form and I may point
out that for years many anti-National Socialist statements from certain
countries, which were still neutral at that time, remained unanswered.
DR. FRITZ: Did your superiors demand that you mark your propaganda with
the stamp of antagonism or to stimulate hatred?
FRITZSCHE: Yes, that happened frequently, but it was not demanded that
antagonism or hatred should be stirred up against peoples. That was
expressly forbidden because we wanted to win these peoples over to our
side, but again and again I was requested to arouse hatred against
individuals and against systems.
DR. FRITZ: Who requested you to do this?
FRITZSCHE: Dr. Goebbels, Dr. Dietrich, and both of them frequently on
the direct orders of Adolf Hitler. The reproach was repeatedly made that
the German press and the German radio did not arouse hatred at all
against Roosevelt, Churchill, or Stalin but that they made these three
personalities popular as efficient men. For that reason, for years the
German press was forbidden to mention these three names at all unless,
in an individual case, permission was given with exact instructions.
DR. FRITZ: Do you mean to say that you refused the request to change
your propaganda to incite antagonism and to arouse hatred and did not
carry it out?
FRITZSCHE: I should like to outline exactly what I did. When the
reproaches of Dr. Goebbels and Dr. Dietrich accumulated, I had all
caricatures from the first and second World War collected—from England,
the United States of America, France, and a few from Russia. In
addition, I had all anti-German propaganda films which I could lay my
hands on, collected. Then in five to six demonstrations of several hours
each, I presented these caricatures and these films to German
journalists and German radio speakers. I, myself, spoke only 2 or 3
minutes in introduction. It is quite possible that I created hatred
through these showings, but I should like to leave the judgment of this
means of producing hatred in the midst of war to the Tribunal. In any
case, Dr. Goebbels said later that he was dissatisfied and we were
“bunglers.”
I may add one statement. I would have had a means of carrying out my
orders of arousing real hatred, that is, not one means but a whole group
of methods; that would have been, to give only one example, a German
edition of the last two volumes of the Tarzan series, an adventure
series which was very popular in Germany at that time and of which the
last two volumes were strongly anti-German. I need not describe them
here. I never pointed out such early products of anti-German propaganda.
I always deliberately ignored such methods.
DR. FRITZ: If you say that you dispensed with hatred and antagonism in
your propaganda, what means did you use in your propaganda during the
war?
FRITZSCHE: During the war I conducted the propaganda almost exclusively
with the concept of the necessity and the obligation to fight. I
repeatedly painted the results of defeat very dark and systematically I
gave quotations from the press and the radio of the enemy countries. I
quoted repeatedly the enemy demands for unconditional surrender. I used
the expression of the “super-Versailles” frequently and did—I emphasize
that—describe the consequences of a lost war very pessimistically. It
does not behoove me today to make a comparison with reality.
DR. FRITZ: But could you not learn from the broadcasts of the enemy that
the fight of the Allies was not directed against the German people but
only against its leaders? Did you keep that from the German people?
FRITZSCHE: On the contrary, I did not keep it from them, but repeatedly
quoted it. However, I called it “incredible.” For example, I once used
the trick of quoting the wording of a medieval declaration of war in
which it had already been said that a war was declared only on the King
of France but that one wanted to bring freedom to the French people.
THE PRESIDENT: Would that be a convenient time to break off?
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 27 June 1946 at 1000 hours._]
ONE HUNDRED AND SIXTY-FIFTH DAY
Thursday, 27 June 1946
_Morning Session_
[_The Defendant Fritzsche resumed the stand._]
MARSHAL (Lieutenant Colonel James R. Gifford): If it please the
Tribunal, the report is made that Defendant Ribbentrop is absent.
DR. FRITZ: Mr. President, Gentlemen of the Tribunal, first a very brief
explanation: Yesterday I repeatedly mentioned the Indictment and intend
to do so in the course of the examination. Thereby I mean the
presentation of Fritzsche’s case by Captain Sprecher in the morning
session of 23 January 1946.
Herr Fritzsche, yesterday you spoke of your radio speeches concerning
the Allied propaganda—my last question: Did you attempt to split the
front of the Allies by your propaganda?
FRITZSCHE: Of course I attempted to do that. I elaborated on all
ideological and all practical political contrasts or differences between
the individual Allied nations. I considered that a permissible method of
waging war. At that time I wanted a split between the Allies just as
much as today I wish their unity, since Germany would be the first
victim of any conflict.
DR. FRITZ: Now, you are accused of assisting in establishing Nazi
control throughout Germany. Did you agitate against democracy?
FRITZSCHE: I never agitated against democracy as such. I attacked the
democracy of the 36 parties, the democracy which had prevailed in
Germany previously, the democracy under which even strong groups such as
the two Marxist parties, for example, were powerless. I criticized
foreign democracy only on two points: First, the elements which limited
the basic concept of democracy—I believe it is superfluous and perhaps
it would be misunderstood to enumerate them today. Secondly, I
criticized the demands of the foreign democracies to force their form of
government on us. According to my knowledge and information at that
time, it seemed unjustified to me.
DR. FRITZ: Well, did you consider dictatorship a better form of
government?
FRITZSCHE: I should like to emphasize that at that time, under the
existing conditions and only for a temporary emergency period, I did;
today, of course, no. After the totalitarian form of government has
brought about the catastrophe of the murder of 5 millions, I consider
this form of government wrong even in times of emergency. I believe any
kind of democratic control, even a restricted democratic control, would
have made such a catastrophe impossible.
DR. FRITZ: You are accused, furthermore, of having spread the doctrine
of the “master race.” The Prosecution makes this charge indirectly
against you. How about that?
FRITZSCHE: I never set up or voiced the theory of the “master race.” I
even avoided this term. I expressly prohibited this term being used by
the German press and the German radio when I was in charge of one or the
other. I believe that the term “master race” played a greater role in
the anti-National Socialist propaganda than in Germany proper. I do not
know who invented this term. To my knowledge it was publicly mentioned
only by men like Dr. Ley, for example, men—and I must explain this
frankly and expressly—who were not taken seriously by anyone in this
connection. It is true, however, that this term played a great role,
without being expressed openly, among the SS because of its racial
exclusiveness; but people of intelligence, tact and insight, and with
some knowledge of the world, very carefully avoided the use of this
word.
DR. FRITZ: Mr. President, at this opportunity, I should like to offer an
affidavit to the Tribunal by Dr. Scharping of 17 May 1946. Dr. Scharping
was Government Counsellor in the Propaganda Ministry up to the end. From
this affidavit I shall now quote only one sentence from Page 13. I
quote:
“In this connection it can be explained that Fritzsche always
opposed the term ‘the master race.’ He even expressly prohibited
the use of this word on the radio.”
[_Turning to the defendant._] But the Prosecution has quoted a passage
from one of your radio speeches to prove this assertion.
FRITZSCHE: The quotation is correct, but I ask you just to read it
carefully. The term “master race” is rejected in this quotation for the
Jewish and for the German people. The quotation cannot be misunderstood.
DR. FRITZ: Mr. President, that is in Captain Sprecher’s speech for the
Prosecution, English text, Pages 31 and 32.
[_Turning to the defendant._] But you carried on propaganda not only in
Germany, but also abroad. What was the difference?
FRITZSCHE: In my radio speeches there was no difference. Before the
outbreak of war I made a slight difference in the speeches for Germany
and those for other countries simply because the audience was different,
and because I had to presuppose a different level of knowledge. During
the war my speeches on the Reich German radio were simply transmitted
over the short-wave stations. What was said for Germany or for other
countries could be controlled by both sides. Moreover in the 12 years
during which I spoke on the German radio, I never permitted my speeches
to be translated, since that always involved a differentiation in
emphasis. Written articles can be translated, perhaps official speeches
also, but not rather light and half-improvised chats.
DR. FRITZ: Were your broadcasts abroad criticized internationally?
FRITZSCHE: Yes, very frequently. During the war there was often daily
criticism from some country or other. I had these criticisms collected.
I asked for them as documents, but my application was refused by the
Court. As far as I know, I am not accused of inciting war in these
criticisms.
DR. FRITZ: Now you not only acted as a mouthpiece for propaganda, but
also as an organizer of it. You are accused of having helped to create
an important instrument for the alleged conspiracy. The Prosecution says
that for 13 years you aided in the creation of the propaganda machine
which the conspiracy was able to put to such good use. Did you create
the press organization of the National Socialist State?
FRITZSCHE: No, I did not create this organization nor did I have any
part in its creation. It was created by Dr. Goebbels, Dr. Dietrich, and
Reichsleiter Amann. When, in the winter of 1938, I became head of the
so-called German Press Section, I attempted to loosen the bonds which
had been imposed on the German press. I attempted that in the material
and personnel field. For example, I called back to their work with the
press hundreds of editors of other parties who had been dismissed in
1933 and 1934. Today they will be angry with me. I had the best
intentions at that time. In addition to the official press conferences
which were very strictly controlled, also as far as their records were
concerned, by my superiors, I also arranged the so-called supplementary
conferences in which I met the representatives of the 50 or 60 most
important papers and discussed more freely the possibilities of their
work. I coined the slogan which was often used there: “You may write any
criticism you like in the German papers provided such criticism is not
shown in big headlines but is buried somewhere in the text in an elegant
form.” Very many German journalists made use of this possibility in the
past 12 years. I should be glad if this work, which was hidden work,
would be honored in some way today in the interest of these people who,
in part, returned to their profession as journalists only out of
personal confidence in me. Of course, I must add that the possibility of
criticizing was not unlimited.
DR. FRITZ: Mr. President, on this occasion, with the approval of the
Prosecution, I offer the Tribunal a document as Document Number
Fritzsche-4. It is an excerpt from a letter of the German Lieutenant
General Dittmar, who frequently commented on the military situation on
the German radio during the war and who is in British captivity. The
well-known English radio commentator, Mr. Liddell-Hart, has sent an
excerpt from the letter to the British Prosecution. I should like to
quote briefly this memorandum which was sent to me. May I quote this
passage?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, you may.