One Hundred and Sixty-third Day, Tuesday, 25 June 1946,
Morning Session 1
Afternoon Session 37
One Hundred and Sixty-fourth Day, Wednesday, 26 June 1946,
Morning Session 79
Afternoon Session 115
One Hundred and Sixty-fifth Day, Thursday, 27 June 1946,
Morning Session 149
One Hundred and Sixty-sixth Day, Friday, 28 June 1946,
Morning Session 179
Afternoon Session 211
One Hundred and Sixty-seventh Day, Saturday, 29 June 1946,
Morning Session 244
One Hundred and Sixty-eighth Day, Monday, 1 July 1946,
Morning Session 274
Afternoon Session 308
One Hundred and Sixty-ninth Day, Tuesday, 2 July 1946,
Morning Session 339
Afternoon Session 362
One Hundred and Seventieth Day, Wednesday, 3 July 1946,
Morning Session 393
Afternoon Session 426
One Hundred and Seventy-first Day, Thursday, 4 July 1946,
Morning Session 458
Afternoon Session 496
One Hundred and Seventy-second Day, Friday, 5 July 1946,
Morning Session 516
Afternoon Session 546
One Hundred and Seventy-third Day, Monday, 8 July 1946,
Morning Session 575
Afternoon Session 614
ONE HUNDRED AND SIXTY-THIRD DAY
Tuesday, 25 June 1946
_Morning Session_
[_The Defendant Von Neurath resumed the stand._]
DR. OTTO NELTE (Counsel for Defendant Keitel): Mr. President, I should
like to advise the Tribunal that the first half of the manuscript of my
final defense speech in typescript will be ready tomorrow and the second
half by next Saturday. I am sorry to say that I personally can furnish
only eight copies, six of which are earmarked for the interpreters to
facilitate their difficult task. I am sorry that I could not furnish
more copies since I personally have no mimeographing machine. I hope the
Tribunal will appreciate the fact that after the statement made by the
chief prosecutor for the United States on Friday, I cannot make any
claims on the technical assistance of the Prosecution.
Therefore, I am asking the Tribunal to decide whether it would be worth
while, in order to expedite the presentation, to have the translation of
my speech put before them. In this event I would request that the
necessary arrangements be made. I am prepared to place my manuscript at
the disposal of the Tribunal, under the conditions announced by you, Mr.
President. What applies for me personally would, so far as I am advised,
apply also for the rest, at least for the majority of Defense Counsel.
In order to expedite the proceedings and to reduce the time spent on the
presentation of the final defense speeches, it is important to have this
point clarified.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, if you would hand in the manuscript to which
you have referred, the Tribunal will make arrangements to have it
translated into the various languages. I think that will meet the
position so far as you are concerned.
DR. NELTE: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has an announcement upon the subject, which
I am about to read. The announcement is this:
“In view of the discussion which took place on the 13th of June
1946, on the question of time to be taken by Defense Counsel,
the Tribunal has given the matter further consideration.
“When the Defense Counsel stated the time they wished to take,
the Tribunal observed that some of the defendants required more
time than others, and to this extent they did make an
apportionment among themselves. The Tribunal feels that the
suggested times are much too long and some voluntary restriction
should be made.
“Except as to a few of the defendants whose cases are of very
wide scope, the Tribunal is of the opinion that half a day to
each defendant is ample time for the presentation of his
defense; and the Tribunal hopes that counsel will condense their
arguments and limit themselves voluntarily to this time. The
Tribunal, however, will not permit counsel for any defendant to
deal with irrelevant matters or to speak for more than one day
in any case. Four hours will be allowed at the beginning for
argument on the general questions of law and fact, and counsel
should co-operate in their arguments in such a way as to avoid
needless repetition.”
As heretofore stated, the Tribunal would like to have a translation of
each argument in French, Russian, and English submitted at the beginning
of the argument. Counsel may arrange for the translation themselves if
they so desire; but if they will submit copies of their arguments to the
translating department as soon as possible and not less than 3 days in
advance of delivery, the translation will be made for them and the
contents of the copies will not be disclosed.
That is all.
Yes, Dr. Lüdinghausen.
DR. OTTO FREIHERR VON LÜDINGHAUSEN (Counsel for Defendant Von Neurath):
Last night we had stopped in our treatment of the various points raised
by the Prosecution. I should like to continue now and to put the
following question to you, Herr Von Neurath.
The Prosecution is charging you with the fact that in the Protectorate
Germans had a preferential position as compared with Czechs and that you
were responsible for that. Will you please comment on this?
CONSTANTIN VON NEURATH (Defendant): The position of Germans in the
Protectorate was not a preferential position which was vested with any
real preferences and advantages as compared with the Czechs, but it was
an entirely different position. The Germans had become citizens of the
Reich and, therefore, had the rights of Reich citizens, such as the
right to vote in Reichstag elections. The Czechs did not have this right
to vote, which is understandable in view of the existing
difference—variance between the German people and the Czech people.
There were at no time any actual advantages connected with the position
of the Germans in the Protectorate.
Efforts to have preferential treatment were made, of course, in the
chauvinistic Party and in nationalist circles. But I always opposed them
vigorously and prevented any practical realization of such efforts. In
this connection, however, I should like to stress once more that the
Czech people did not consider themselves inferior to the German people
in any way.
It was a question simply of a different people which had to be treated,
politically and culturally, according to its own characteristics. That
was also the reason for the maintenance of the so-called autonomy which
meant nothing more than the separation of the two nationalities with a
view toward securing for the Czechs their own way of living; and it is
evident that this autonomy had to be kept within certain limits,
dictated by the prevailing necessities of the Reich as a whole,
especially in times of war.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Now, I should like to deal with the individual
points raised in the Czech indictment, or rather the points found in the
Czech report, which is the basis for this charge. In this report it is
asserted that the freedom of the press was suppressed Is that correct
and what role did Herr Von Gregory play in the treatment of the press?
VON NEURATH: Herr Von Gregory had been the press attaché at the German
Legation in Prague and was subordinate to the Propaganda Ministry. Then
he came, as chief of my press department, to my administration and
controlled the Czech press according to the directives of the Propaganda
Ministry in Berlin. The Czech press, of course, was not free—no more
than the German press. Control of circulation and other measures,
especially censorship measures, were the same.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: The Czech report further raises the charge that
the local Czech administrative offices were in many cases dissolved and
then reorganized and key positions filled with officials and town
councillors who were German or Czech collaborators. Is that correct?
VON NEURATH: These were communities with a considerable German minority,
particularly in Moravia. That they should also have a representation in
the local administration seemed to me a natural thing. Prague, for
instance, had a Czech mayor and a German assistant mayor. This could
hardly be objected to. With regard to the attempts of the Germans in the
various cities or districts to take a part in the local administration
to an extent that did not seem justified by their numerical strength, I
intervened and rejected them. In the municipal administrations of purely
Czech districts, such as in West Bohemia, there were generally no German
representatives at all. But on the other hand, there were
German-speaking enclaves, such as the region of Iglau, where the Germans
were dominant in numbers and thus, of course, in influence as well.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: The Czech report accuses you of having—in this
way and through the appointment of higher land councillors
(Oberlandräte)—germanized the Czech administration, and this report
bases its accusations on a statement which you allegedly made to the
former Bohemian Landespräsident, Bienert, in which you said, “All that
has to be digested in 2 years time.”
VON NEURATH: I do not recall having made such a statement. And I cannot
imagine having uttered it. Here we are concerned with the co-ordination
of the Czechs—of the Czech with the German administration. The
Oberlandräte were not appointed by me, but their office was created as a
controlling agency by the Reich Government by the decree of 1 September
1939 in connection with the setting up of German administrations and the
Security Police. When the Oberlandräte appeared before me to give their
reports, I told them time and again that they were not to do any
administrative work themselves but were to supervise only. The Czech
method of administration was frequently superior to the German, I told
them.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: With regard to this I should like to refer to
Document Number Neurath-149 of my document book, the decree on the
organization of the administration and the German Security Police, dated
1 September 1939. In Paragraphs 5 and 6 the appointment and the duties
of these Oberlandräte are described more in detail. A quotation of this
document might be redundant.
The Czech indictment further contains a statement by Herr Bienert to the
effect that on the problem of the co-ordination of the Czech
administration you had remarked to him something like: “That must be
carried out strictly; after all, this is war.” At the same time Bienert
stated in his interrogation that the purpose of this measure, that is,
the co-ordination of the Czech and the German administration, had been
to assure Germany of a peaceful hinterland during the war.
Will you kindly also comment on this.
VON NEURATH: It is possible that I told Bienert something along these
lines. However, I cannot remember it at this date. But it can be taken
for granted that in the sphere of administration, as in every other
sphere in the Protectorate also, the necessities of war were the main
concern. Restrictions of the autonomy in the Czech national
administration have to be considered from this point of view. That it
was my constant endeavor to keep the country quiet in the interest of
the Reich, and therewith in the interest of all, can hardly be held
against me. Apart from that, I should like to remark that the
introduction of restrictions on the autonomy was already contained
explicitly in the decree setting up the Protectorate.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: In this connection I should like to refer to the
order contained in my document book under Number Neurath-144, Document
Book Number 5. The order was issued by the Führer and Reich Chancellor
on the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia and is dated 16 March 1939.
Under Article 11 it was even then stipulated that the Reich could
incorporate departments of the administration of the Protectorate into
their own administration. The Czech report further refers to a statement
made by the former Czech Minister Havelka dealing with the persecution
of the members of the Czech Legion of the first World War insofar as
they held public office. What can you tell us about this question of the
Legionnaires?
VON NEURATH: The Czech Legion had been founded in Russia during the
first World War. It was composed partially of volunteers, partially of
the balance of Czech regiments which had belonged to the old
Austro-Hungarian Army and had become prisoners of war in Russia. These
Czech Legionnaires enjoyed a certain exceptional position after the
founding of the Czech Republic. In part they were filled with strong
chauvinistic resentment toward the Reich which dated back to the time of
the nationalities fights. This, the so-called Legionnaire mentality, was
a catchword in Bohemia; and in times of political unrest it could
signify a certain political danger. By the way, this preferential
position which the Legionnaires enjoyed was widely attacked in the
Protectorate by the Czechs themselves. Therefore an effort was made, and
by Frank particularly, to remove the Legionnaires from public office.
But this took place only in the crassest cases and only insofar as those
Legionnaires had joined the Czech Legion voluntarily, that is, it did
not apply to those who were members of the former Austro-Hungarian Army.
From the very beginning I tried to make this discrimination, which
approximately corresponds to the situation—or corresponds with the
distinction—which today is made in Germany between the voluntary
members of the SS and the Waffen-SS.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: The Czech indictment is further accusing you of
having supported the Czech Fascist organization Vlayka. It bases this
charge on a memorandum which you yourself wrote concerning a discussion
which you had with Hacha, the President of Czechoslovakia, on 26 March
1940. According to this memorandum you told Hacha that the personal and
moral qualities of the Vlayka leaders were well known to you; in any
case, you had to confirm the fact that this movement, this organization,
was the only one which had taken a positive stand toward the Reich and
toward collaboration with the Reich. How about that?
VON NEURATH: The Vlayka movement was the same as the collaborationists
in France. This movement worked to bring about a German-Czech
collaboration and, in fact, long before the Protectorate was
established. But the leaders of this movement were, in my opinion,
rather dubious characters, as I showed in the words to Hacha quoted
above. These leaders threatened and slandered President Hacha and
members of the Czech Government among others. State Secretary Frank had
known these men from former times and he wanted to support them merely
in consideration of their former co-operation with him. However, I
refused to do this, just as I refused the various applications of these
people to visit me.
On the other hand, it is possible that Frank supported them from a fund
which Hitler had placed at his disposal without my knowledge and about
which Frank was under obligation not to tell me anything.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What attitude, now, did you take to the
dissolution of parties—of political parties—and of trade unions?
VON NEURATH: That was like the control of the press, a necessity which
resulted from the system, from the political system of the Reich. In any
event, through this step taken by President Hacha and despite the
measures taken by Germany, no country suffered less from the war than
the Protectorate. The Czech people were the only ones in middle and
eastern Europe who could retain their national, cultural, and economic
entity almost to its full extent.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Now I should like to turn to the point raised by
the Prosecution which is concerned with an alleged cultural suppression.
What can you tell us about the handling of Czech educational affairs?
VON NEURATH: The Czech universities and other institutions of higher
education, as has been stated before, were closed at Hitler’s order in
November 1939. Again and again, at the request of President Hacha and of
the Protectorate Government, I appealed directly to Hitler to have these
schools reopened. But due to the dominating position of Herr Himmler, I
had no success. The consequence of the closing of the universities, of
course, was that a large number of young people who otherwise would have
become university students now had to look for work of a manual sort.
The closing of the institutions of higher learning also had
repercussions on the secondary school level. This had already been
heavily burdened after the separation of the Sudetenland in the autumn
of 1938, for the entire Czech intelligentsia from this region had
returned to the Czech-speaking area, or what was later the Protectorate.
Hence for the young people from the secondary schools there was hardly
any employment left. It was about the same situation which is now
prevailing in Germany. Concerning the closing of Czech lower schools and
other planned efforts to restrict Czech youth in their cultural freedom
and their educational possibilities, I know nothing.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did you yourself approve of the closing of Czech
institutions of higher learning ordered by Hitler?
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Von Lüdinghausen, he said that he tried to intervene
and get rid of Hitler’s order.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: If that is sufficient for the Tribunal then he
need not answer the question further.
THE PRESIDENT: Don’t you think that is sufficient?
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Yes, I just wanted to have it expressed once again
in a somewhat stronger way; however, if the Tribunal is satisfied with
the clarification of this problem, I am completely satisfied.
THE PRESIDENT: It would not make it any better if it was said twice.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Yes, if you—but, it is sufficient.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Do you know anything about an alleged
plan, mentioned in the Czech report, to turn the Czech people into a
mass of workers and to rob them of their intellectual elite?
VON NEURATH: No. Only a madman could have made a statement like that.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: The Czech indictment, or report, asserts that
through your agencies, that is, with your consent and endorsement,
destruction and plundering of Czech scientific institutions took place.
On Page 58 of the German text, Page 55 of the English of this report,
USSR-60, it says:
“The Germans occupied all universities and scientific
institutions. They immediately got hold of the valuable
apparatus, instruments, and scientific installations in the
occupied institutions. The scientific libraries were plundered
systematically and methodically. Scientific books and films were
torn up or taken away. The archives of the academic Senate, the
highest university authority, were torn up or burned; and the
card indexes destroyed and scattered to the four winds.”
What can you tell us in regard to this?
VON NEURATH: In this connection, I can say only that I never heard of
any plundering and destruction of the sort described either in Prague or
later. The Czech Hochschulen, or institutions of higher education, were
closed together with the universities in the year 1939 at Hitler’s
order. The buildings and installations of the Prague Czech University,
as far as I know, were partly put at the disposal of the German
university which had been closed earlier by the Czechs, since, after the
Czech Hochschulen were closed, they could not be used any longer for
Czech scientific purposes.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know anything at all about this...
THE PRESIDENT: I did not understand that answer. As I got it, “The
buildings, in part, were put at the disposal of German universities
which had been closed by the Czechs.”
VON NEURATH: In Prague. In Prague was the oldest German university; it
had been closed by the Czechs after the last war, and after the
establishing of the Protectorate it was reopened; and, as far as I know,
some of the equipment and buildings were used for this German
university.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know anything else about the removal of
scientific equipment, collections, objects of art, and so forth?
VON NEURATH: The only case about which I have any knowledge concerned
the removal of historically valuable old Gobelins from the Maltese
Palace in Prague. These were removed by a member of the Foreign Office
in Berlin, allegedly by order of the chief of protocol; and this was
done at night, secretly, and without my knowledge or the knowledge of my
officials. As soon as I learned of this I contacted the Foreign Office,
and I requested immediate restoration. Whether restoration was made, I
do not know; that was only in 1941, and meanwhile I had left Prague.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: May I here...
VON NEURATH: I know nothing about other incidents. Apart from that, I
specifically prohibited the removal of art objects from the Protectorate
to the Reich.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: In this connection, I should like to submit an
extract from the interrogation of the former State Secretary Frank,
dated 10 June 1945. This is Number Neurath-154 of my Document Book
Number 5, and I should like to ask the Tribunal to take notice of this
statement.
[_Turning to the defendant._] What happened to the objects of art and
the furniture, which were Czech State property and with which the
Czernin Palace in Prague, which you used as your official residence, was
furnished?
VON NEURATH: This house was the former official residence of the Czech
Foreign Minister, and the partly valuable furnishings belonged to the
Czech State. Since there was no inventory of any sort of these items,
before moving in in the fall of 1939, I called in the Czech director of
the castle administration and the Czech art historian, Professor
Strecki; and I had a very exact inventory taken. One copy of this
inventory was left in my office and another one was deposited with the
administration of the castle. After I left Prague in the autumn of 1941,
I had a record made through my former caretaker and again in the
presence of a representative of the castle administration, Professor
Strecki, that the articles which were mentioned in the inventory were
actually still there.
THE PRESIDENT: I don’t think we need details of the inventory, but there
is one thing I should like to ask. The translation came through to me
that the inventory was made in the fall of 1938. Was that right?
VON NEURATH: 1939. I only wanted to mention that naturally I did not
take any of these articles.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Another point raised by the Czech indictment deals
with the confiscation of the so-called Masaryk houses in various cities
and with the destruction of Masaryk monuments and monuments erected to
other personalities famous in Czech history. What do you know about
that?
VON NEURATH: While I was in office, some of these Masaryk houses were
closed by the Police because they were centers of agitation against
Germany. The destruction or the removal of Masaryk or other Czech
national monuments I had specifically prohibited. Apart from that, I
expressly permitted the laying of wreaths at the grave of Masaryk at
Lanyi, which Frank had prohibited, and this actually took place on a
large scale.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: It is further asserted that Czech literature was
suppressed and muzzled to a large extent.
VON NEURATH: The printing and dissemination of Czech anti-German
literature was prohibited of course, just as the further dissemination
of English and French works was prohibited in the entire Reich during
the war. Aside from that, all this material was treated according to the
direct orders of the Propaganda Ministry. However, while I was in
office, there were still many Czech book stores and book-publishing
concerns which published books by Czech authors in large numbers and
disseminated them. The selection of Czech books of every type in the
book stores was considerably larger than the selection of German books.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Could you say anything about the suppression of
Czech cultural life, of theaters, movies, and so forth, to which the
Prosecution refers?
VON NEURATH: There was no question at all of a limitation of the
cultural autonomy of the Czechs, aside from the university problem. In
Prague a great number of large Czech theaters of every description were
open all the time, especially the Czech opera and several theaters. On
the other hand there was only one permanent German theater with daily
performances. There was a constant production of many Czech plays and
operas, and the same applied to music. The well-known Czech Philharmonic
Orchestra at Prague played Czech music primarily and was absolutely
independent regarding its programs.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Lüdinghausen, we don’t need details. The defendant
says that theaters and cinema theaters were allowed and there was only
one German theater. We don’t want any further details about it.
DR. LÜDINGHAUSEN: Very well, Mr. President. I asked about these matters
only because they are rather extensively dealt with in the Indictment.
[_Turning to the defendant._] And what about the film industry, Herr Von
Neurath?
VON NEURATH: The same applied to the movie industry. It was even
especially active.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Now, I should like to turn to the alleged
suppression of religious freedom, of which you are being accused in the
Czech indictment. The Czech indictment speaks of a wave of persecution
which inundated the churches and which started immediately when the
German troops marched in to occupy the country. What about that?
VON NEURATH: A systematic persecution of the churches is quite out of
the question. The population was quite free as concerns public worship,
and I certainly would not have tolerated any restrictions along this
line. The former Under State Secretary Von Burgsdorff has testified to
that point here already. It may be true that in individual cases
pilgrimages or certain religious processions were prohibited by the
Police, even though I personally do not remember it clearly. But that
took place only because certain pilgrimages, consisting of many
thousands of people, were exploited as political demonstrations at which
anti-German speeches were made. At any rate, that had actually occurred
several times and had been brought to my knowledge. It is true that a
number of clerics were arrested in connection with the action at the
beginning of the war, which we have already mentioned here. But these
arrests did not take place, because the men were clerics but because
they were active political opponents or people who were political
suspects. In cases of this nature I made special efforts to have these
people released.
My personal connections with the archbishop of Prague were absolutely
correct and amicable. He and the archbishop of Olmütz specifically
thanked me for my intervention on behalf of the Church, as I remember
distinctly. I prevented any measure against the public worship of the
Jews. Every synagogue was open to the time I left in the autumn of 1941.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: In connection with the last point, I should like
to put one more question about the position of Jews in the Protectorate.
What can you tell us about it?
VON NEURATH: The legal position of the Jews had to be co-ordinated with
the position of the Jews in the Reich, according to instructions from
Berlin. The directives with regard to this had been sent to me already
in April of 1939. Through all sorts of inquiries addressed to Berlin, I
tried and succeeded in not having the laws go into effect until June
1939, so as to give the Jews the opportunity to prepare themselves for
the imminent introduction of these laws.
The so-called Nuremberg Laws were introduced into the Protectorate, too,
at that time. Thereby the Jews were removed from public life and from
leading positions in the economic life. However, arrests on a large
scale did not take place. There were also no excesses against Jews,
except in a few single instances. The camp at Theresienstadt was not
erected until long after my time of office, and I prevented the erection
of other concentration camps in the Protectorate, too.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: The Czech report accuses you of personally
carrying through anti-Jewish measures. They maintain that, first of all,
you charged the Czech Government, that is to say the autonomous
government, with the carrying through of the anti-Jewish laws and that
when Ministerpräsident Elias refused to do so, you personally took the
necessary steps.
VON NEURATH: As I said just now, the introduction of the anti-Jewish
laws came about on Hitler’s direct order, that is to say through the
competent authorities in Berlin. The representation...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Von Lüdinghausen, why do you want to go over all this
again? The defendant has given the evidence that he succeeded in putting
off the laws until June 1939 and that then the Nuremberg Laws were
introduced. He has given us the various qualifications which he said he
made; and then you read him the Czech report and try to get him to go
over it all again, it seems to me. It is now quarter past 11.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: All right, then, I shall consider the first
question sufficiently answered and we shall not deal with the matter of
confiscation either.
[_Turning to the defendant._] The Czech report further accuses you of
the dissolution of the organizations of the YMCA and YWCA, and the
confiscation of their property in favor of German organizations.
VON NEURATH: I must admit that I do not recall these confiscations at
all. If this dissolution and confiscation took place before I left, it
must have been a police measure only.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: The Czech report further mentions the destruction
of Czech economic life and the systematic plundering of Czech stocks of
raw materials and accuses you in that regard. What are the facts with
regard to that?
VON NEURATH: With the establishment of the Protectorate, the Czech
economy almost automatically was incorporated into the German economy.
The export trade, for which Czech industries had worked to a
considerable degree, was stopped for the duration of the war, that is to
say, it had to trade with the Reich.
The Czech heavy industries, especially the Skoda Works and the arms
industry, as direct war industries, were taken over to supplement German
armaments production by the Delegate for the Four Year Plan.
At the beginning I tried especially to avoid selling out of the
Protectorate, which would have been hard on the population. An effective
means for that purpose was the maintenance of the customs boundaries
which existed between Czechoslovakia and Germany. After heated conflicts
with the Berlin economic departments, I succeeded in having the customs
barrier maintained up to October 1940, for another year and a half,
though it had already been rescinded on 16 March 1939.
I believe I am also accused of having been responsible for the removal
of raw materials and the like. In that connection I should like to say
that the office of the Delegate for the Four Year Plan was the only
authority which could take such measures.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: In this connection I should like to refer to the
decree which has already been submitted, the decree dated 16 March 1939,
Number Neurath-144 of my Document Book Number 5. In this decree I should
like to call special attention to Articles 9 and 10.
[_Turning to the defendant._] You are further charged with and accused
of the fact that the rate of exchange of Czech kronen to marks was
established as 10 to 1, for in this way the buying out of
Czechoslovakian goods was said to have been favored. Are you responsible
for the establishing of this rate?
VON NEURATH: No. In the decree of 16 March 1939 dealing with the
establishment of the Protectorate—a decree in the drafting of which I
did not take part in any way—it was already stipulated that the rate of
exchange would be determined by the Reich Government. As far as I know,
the same rate was the customary one at the stock exchange and in trade
before the incorporation of the Sudetenland into the Reich as well as
afterwards. An official rate had to be determined, of course, and this
was done through the decree issued by the authorities in Berlin.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: In connection with the decree dated 16 March 1939,
which was just mentioned and which is to be found under Number
Neurath-144 of my Document Book Number 5, I should like to call your
attention especially to Article 10 which sets forth: “The ratio of the
two currencies, the Czechoslovakian and the German, to each other will
be determined by the Reich Government.”
[_Turning to the defendant._] The Czech report further accuses you of
the fact that railroad rails allegedly were removed and taken to
Germany. Do you know anything about this matter?
VON NEURATH: I know nothing about this matter and I think this is
certainly an error. I know only that in the year 1940 there were
negotiations between the German Reich railroads and the Czech State
railroads concerning the borrowing of railroad cars and of engines
against remuneration. But the stipulation in this case was that this
rolling stock could be spared by the transport system in the
Protectorate. Aside from that, the railroads in the Protectorate, were
not under my supervision; but they were directly subordinate to the
Transportation Ministry in Berlin.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I should like to refer to Article 8 of the decree
which I have just mentioned, a decree which is found under Number
Neurath-144 of my Document Book 5.
[_Turning to the defendant._] It is further asserted that the Reich
Commissioner at the Prague National Bank stopped all payments for abroad
and confiscated all the stocks of gold and of foreign currencies of the
National Bank.
Did you have anything to do with this matter?
VON NEURATH: I had nothing at all to do with these matters. The Reich
Commissioner for the Prague National Bank was appointed directly by the
Reichsbank in Berlin, or rather by the Ministry of Finance; and he got
his orders from them.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: The Czech report states further that you are to be
blamed, or are to be made co-responsible, for the alleged confiscation
of the Czech banks and industrial undertakings by the German economy.
VON NEURATH: The German banks, and to an extent the German industries as
well, had a real interest in getting a firm foothold in the economic
life of the Protectorate. However, this was something which applied long
before the establishment of the Protectorate. Therefore it was not
strange that the big German banks, in particular, used the opportunity
to acquire Czech stocks and securities; and in this way the controlling
interest in two Czech banks together with their industrial holdings were
transferred to German hands in a manner which was economically quite
correct.
I believe the Union Bank is mentioned in the Czech report, a bank which
was taken over by the Deutsche Bank; and I know in this case quite
coincidentally that the initiative did not originate on the German side,
but rather from the Czech Union Bank itself. But neither I nor my
agencies tried to foster this development in any way. Apart from that
all these enterprises had Czech general directors, and in very few cases
were German officials taken in. By far the largest part of all
industrial enterprises remained purely Czech as before.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What was the situation with regard to the alleged
coercive measures which the Prosecution maintains were used against
Czech agriculture? Can you tell something about this and about your
attitude and the measures you took?
VON NEURATH: This chapter belongs to the whole scheme of plans by the
Party and SS, relative to Germanization, which have already been
mentioned. The instrument of this German settlement policy was to be the
Czech Land Office (Bodenamt), which in itself was a Czech office, which
was a survival of the former Czech office for agrarian reform. Himmler
first of all assigned to the Land Office an SS Führer as its provisional
leader.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal does not want to know all the details about
this. The Czech report apparently alleges coercion in agriculture. The
defendant says that it was due, if any, to the Party and the SS; and he
had nothing to do with it. What is the object of his giving us all these
details about the history of agriculture in Czechoslovakia? You must
realize the Tribunal...
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Yes, but I should like to point out one thing
only.
[_Turning to the defendant._] The Land Office, which was acting in the
interests of National Socialism, was restaffed by you with new personnel
after a long struggle. I considered it important to clarify this too.
Mr. President, I should like to make a general remark. I said yesterday
that my examination would last another hour. But yesterday, when I left
the session, I found another document book to the indictment which has
forced me to deal in greater detail with individual questions here. And
for this reason, a reason which I could not foresee, I will have to take
additional time.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, the Tribunal has not taken up the question of
time at the moment.
Why do you have to go into some questions of—I do not know what the
word is, “Amt”—to do with agriculture? Why do you want to go into that?
He, the defendant, said he had nothing to do with it.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Yes, in a way he was connected with it, Mr.
President, insofar as these agricultural efforts were made through the
Land Office.
THE PRESIDENT: If he was connected with it let him explain it. I thought
he said the Party and the SS did it.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Yes, but via the Land Office, and he prevented
this.
Perhaps you can tell us briefly about this, Herr Von Neurath.
VON NEURATH: I believe that according to the statements of the President
of the Court, that is hardly necessary. As a matter of fact, I had no
direct connection with the Land Office. I only succeeded in having a
rather unpleasant leader of this office, a member of the SS, removed.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: During your period of office as Reich Protector,
was there any compulsory transportation of workers to the Reich?
VON NEURATH: No. In this connection I shall also be brief.
Compulsory labor did not exist at all while I was in the Protectorate.
There was an emergency service law which was issued by the Protectorate
Government and applied to younger men who were employed in urgently
needed work in the public interest in the Protectorate. Compulsory
deportations of workers to the Reich did not occur in my time. On the
contrary, many young people reported voluntarily for work in Germany,
because labor conditions and wages were better in the Reich than in the
Protectorate at that time.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: How did your resignation from office—and this is
my last question—your leaving your office as Reich Protector come
about?
VON NEURATH: First of all I should like to tell you why I remained as
long as I did, in spite of all these occurrences and difficulties. The
reason for it was that I was convinced, and I am still convinced today,
that I had to stay as long as I could reconcile this with my conscience,
in order to prevent this country, which was entrusted to Germany, from
coming under the definite domination of the SS. Everything that happened
to the country after my departure in 1941 I had actually prevented
through my presence; and even if my work was ever so much limited, I
believe that by remaining I not only rendered a service to my own
country but to the Czech people as well, and under the same
circumstances I would not act differently even today.
Apart from this I believed that in time of war, especially, I should
leave such a difficult and responsible office only in case of the utmost
necessity. The crew of a ship does not go below deck and fold their
hands in their laps if the ship is in danger.
That I could not comply with the wishes of the Czechs 100 percent is
something that will be understood by everybody who had to deal with
politics in a practical and not merely theoretical way. And so I believe
that by my persevering in office I prevented much of the misery which
befell the Czech people after I left. This opinion was also shared by a
large number of the Czech population, as I could gather from the
numerous letters which were addressed to me by the Czech people later
on.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: And how did it happen that you left, that you
resigned from your office?
VON NEURATH: On 23 September 1941 I received a telephone call from
Hitler asking me to come to headquarters immediately. There he told me
that I was being too mild with the Czechs and that this state of affairs
could not be continued. He told me that he had decided to adopt severe
measures against the Czech resistance movement and that for this purpose
the notorious Obergruppenführer Heydrich would be sent to Prague. I did
everything in my power to dissuade him from this but was not successful.
Thereupon I asked permission to resign, since I could never be
responsible for any activity of Heydrich’s in Prague. Hitler refused my
resignation but permitted me to go on leave. I flew back to Prague and
on the following day I continued my journey home. At the same hour that
I left Prague, Heydrich arrived.
Then I wrote to Hitler from my home and again asked to resign
immediately. When in spite of a reminder I did not receive any answer I
repeated my request, and at the same time I explained that under no
circumstances would I return to Prague, that I had dissolved my office
and I refused to act as Reich Protector from now on. I was not
officially relieved from my office until October 1943.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I should like to conclude my
examination of the defendant with a brief quotation from the Czech
indictment.
THE PRESIDENT: Just one moment, was your going on leave made public?
VON NEURATH: Yes.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Yes, I was just going to quote that, Mr.
President. In that text of the Czech indictment it says:
“When at last in the second half of September the underground
Czech revolt committees, with the help of the BBC, began a
successful boycott campaign against the German controlled press,
the German authorities seized the opportunity to aim a heavy
blow at the Czech population. On 27 September 1941 radio station
Prague gave out the following report:
“‘Reich Minister Baron von Neurath, Reich Protector of Bohemia
and Moravia, has found it necessary to ask the Führer for a long
leave in order to restore his impaired health.’”
Then in conclusion it says:
“Under these circumstances the Führer agreed to the request of
the Reich Protector and charged SS Obergruppenführer Heydrich
with the direction of the office of Reich Protector of Bohemia
and Moravia during the time of the illness of Reich Minister Von
Neurath.”
With this my examination is ended, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: From September 1941 until October 1943, did you live on
your own estates, or what?
VON NEURATH: Yes, Mr. President.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: My examination is over.
THE PRESIDENT: The Court will adjourn now.
[_A recess was taken._]
THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the defendants’ counsel wish to ask the witness
any questions?
DR. EGON KUBUSCHOK (Counsel for Defendant Von Papen): Is it known to you
that immediately before Germany left the League of Nations, Von Papen
followed Hitler to Munich to persuade him to remain in the League of
Nations?
VON NEURATH: Yes, that is known to me. In fact, I myself induced him to
do so.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: During the time he was Vice Chancellor in 1933 and 1934,
did Von Papen protest in the Cabinet against unfriendly acts of the
German policy toward Austria, as for instance, the introduction of the
1,000-mark embargo?
VON NEURATH: Yes, that line was continuously followed by him and by
other ministers and naturally by myself, too.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did Hitler mention to you that this attitude of Papen’s
in the Austrian problem induced him to transfer the mission in Vienna to
Papen after the murder of Dollfuss?
VON NEURATH: Yes, Hitler did speak about that.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did Hitler discuss with you the reasons why he addressed
the letter of 26 July 1934 to Papen, announcing that Papen would be sent
to Austria?
VON NEURATH: Yes, but the way it happened was as follows: When Hitler
told me about his intention to send Papen to Vienna, I reminded him
that, in order to give the latter any weight, he should first of all,
after the events of 30 June, clear up the relationship between himself,
Hitler, and Papen, and clear it up publicly. This letter which was read
here in Court can be traced to that.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In 1937 you paid a visit to the Austrian Government which
led to demonstrations. Were you and Von Papen surprised by these
demonstrations, and did you agree with them?
VON NEURATH: The demonstrations were a complete surprise to me,
especially because of their tremendous size. They certainly did not
please me, because they cast a certain shadow on the discussions between
Herr Von Schuschnigg and myself.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Then, the last question: Before Schleicher’s Government
was formed there was a meeting of the Cabinet on 2 December 1932. The
day before Papen had been given orders by Hindenburg to send the
Parliament on leave and to form a new government. Is it correct that
Papen reported on this matter to the Cabinet and that Schleicher, as
Reichswehrminister, made a statement to the effect that this would lead
to civil war and that the forces of the Wehrmacht were too weak to cope
with such a civil war?
VON NEURATH: Yes, I remember this occurrence very accurately. We were
all somewhat surprised at Schleicher’s statement. However it was so well
founded that we had to accept it as true.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any other defendants’ counsel wish to ask any
questions?
[_There was no response._]
The Prosecution?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the United Kingdom):
At the time about which Dr. Kubuschok has just been asking you, in the
second half of 1932, did you know that President Von Hindenburg, the
Defendant Von Papen, and General Von Schleicher were discussing and
considering very hard what would be the best method of dealing with the
Nazi Party?
VON NEURATH: No. As I have already testified, I had no connection in
that respect. I knew absolutely nothing about all these negotiations.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want to make it clear, I am not suggesting you
were in the negotiations. But didn’t you know that the problem as to how
to deal with the Nazi Party was exercising the minds of the President
and the Defendant Von Papen and General Von Schleicher; that it was a
very urgent problem in their minds?
VON NEURATH: Yes, I knew that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And again, do not think, Defendant, I am
suggesting that you were in the negotiations. You may take it—well, I
will make all the suggestions perfectly clear.
You knew that in the end the method which commended itself to President
Von Hindenburg, to the Defendant Von Papen, and to General Von
Schleicher was that there should be a government with Hitler as
Chancellor, but well brigaded by conservative elements, in harness with
conservative elements; that was the plan that was ultimately resolved
on? You knew that much, I suppose, didn’t you?
VON NEURATH: Yes, but the plan was not quite like that. At that time,
the time you are talking about, there was only mention of the fact that
we were obliged to bring the Nazi Party into the Government.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But eventually, when the Nazi Party came in, on
30 January 1933, the plan was that it would be well harnessed to
conservative elements. That was the idea in President Von Hindenburg’s
mind, was it not?
VON NEURATH: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you were one of the conservative and stable
elements, if I understand you rightly; isn’t that so?
VON NEURATH: Yes. It has been explained here that it was the special
wish of President Von Hindenburg that I should remain in the Government.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: In order to keep Hitler’s Government
peace-loving and respectable. Is that a fair way of putting it?
VON NEURATH: Yes, so as to prevent Hitler’s revolutionary movement in
general from exercising their methods too much within the Government,
too.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And, Defendant, you have told us that up to this
time you had been a diplomatist. When you became a Minister, did you not
think that you had some responsibility for keeping the Government
respectable and peace-loving as a Minister of the Reich?
VON NEURATH: To be sure, but the question was only how far it was in my
power to accomplish this.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I don’t want to go into the workings of your
mind too much, I just want to get this clear. You realized that as a
Foreign Minister, and as a well-known figure to all the Chancelleries of
Europe, that your presence in the Government would be taken throughout
Europe, as a sign of your approval and your responsibility for what the
Government did, did you not?
VON NEURATH: I doubt that very much. Perhaps one might have hoped so.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, just let’s consider it. Is it your
case that up to November of 1937 you were perfectly satisfied with the
peace-loving intentions and respectability of the Government?
VON NEURATH: I was convinced of the peaceful intentions of the
Government. I have already stated that. Whether I was satisfied with the
methods...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What about respectability? By “respectability” I
mean the general standard of decency that is required by any government,
under which its people are going to be reasonably happy and contented.
Were you satisfied with that?
VON NEURATH: I was by no means in agreement with the methods, above all
in connection with the domestic policy.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I would just like to look at that for a
moment. Did you know about the “Brown Terror” in March of 1933, some 6
weeks after the Government was formed?
VON NEURATH: I only knew of the boycott against the Jews, nothing else.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you remember the affidavit that has been put
in evidence here, made by the American Consul, Mr. Geist, Document
1759-PS, Exhibit USA-420?
VON NEURATH: May I see it?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, just let me remind you. It is a long
affidavit, and there are only one or two parts I want to put to you.
Mr. Geist gives detailed particulars of the bad treatment, the beating,
and assaulting, and insulting, and so on, of Jews as early as March
1933. Did you know about that?
VON NEURATH: I know of these occurrences; I do not know this affidavit,
I have not seen it, but I do know about the occurrences from complaints
made by foreign diplomatic representatives. And according to them—and
as concerns my attitude to these events—I repeatedly applied to Hitler
and urgently implored him to have them stopped. But I do not know
anything more about the details.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just leaving that affidavit for the moment, as
Foreign Minister, you would receive—you did receive, did you not, a
synopsis or account of what was appearing in the foreign press?
VON NEURATH: Yes, that I did but whether I received all of those things
I do not know.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just let me take an example. You had been
Ambassador at the Court of St. James from 1930 to 1932, if my
recollection is right; had you not?
VON NEURATH: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you realized—whether you agreed with what
was in them or not—the London _Times_ and the _Manchester Guardian_
were newspapers that had a great deal of influence in England, didn’t
you?
VON NEURATH: Yes, yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you know that in April 1933 both these
newspapers were full of the most terrible stories of the ill-treatment
of Jews, Social Democrats, and Communists in Germany?
VON NEURATH: Yes, that is quite possible. I cannot remember it any more
now; but those were certainly the very cases which I brought up before
Hitler, drawing his attention to the effect that this was having abroad.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I just want to consider the extent which
these papers were alleging. As early as the 12th of April 1933 the
_Manchester Guardian_ was saying:
“The inquirer, by digging only an inch below the surface, which
to the casual observer may seem tranquil enough, will, in city
after city, village after village, discover such an abundance of
barbarism committed by the Brown Shirts that modern analogies
fail...”—describing them as an instrument—“...of a Terror that
although wanton is systematic—wanton in the sense that unlike a
revolutionary Terror it is imposed by no outward necessity, and
systematic in the sense that it is an organic part of the
Hitlerite regime.”
Did you know that this and quotations like these were appearing in
responsible British papers?
My Lord, that is D-911, which is the collection of extracts and, with
Mr. Wurm’s affidavit, will be Exhibit GB-512.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Did you know that was the line that was
being taken, that it was systematic in the sense of being an organic
part of the Hitler regime?
VON NEURATH: No, in that sense certainly not.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you know that the British paper, the
_Manchester Guardian_, was quoting, “...an eminent German conservative,
who is in close touch with the Nationalist members of the German
Government, and certainly more sympathetic to the Right than to the
Left...” has given the number of victims as 20,000—as many as 20,000 in
April? Did you know that the figure was being put that high?
VON NEURATH: No, and I do not believe it, either.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, let us see what the German press was
saying.
On the 24th of April 1933 the _Times_ was quoting the _Hamburger
Fremdenblatt_, which, in turn, was invoking official sources and stating
that there were 18,000 Communists in prison in the Reich and that the
10,000 prisoners in Prussia included many social intellectuals and
others.
Would the _Hamburger Fremdenblatt_, which had a very long career as a
newspaper, if it misquoted official sources under your Government in
April 1933, have misrepresented the position? It would not, would it?
VON NEURATH: That I do not know, but I do know that a lot of trouble is
always being stirred up by means of figures.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But Defendant, here is a figure quoted, as far
as I know, by a responsible Hamburg paper, as an official figure,
requoted by the London _Times_, which is the principal paper in England.
Wasn’t that sufficiently serious for you to bring it up in the Cabinet?
VON NEURATH: I am very sorry, but with all respect to the papers—and
even the London papers—they do not always tell the truth.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No. That is a perfectly reasonable comment.
Newspapers, like everyone else, are misinformed. But when you had a
widespread account of terrible conditions giving large numbers, did you
not, as one of the respectable elements in this Government, think that
it was worthy of bringing it up in Cabinet and finding out whether it
was true or not?
VON NEURATH: How do you know that I did not do that?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is what I am asking. Did you bring it up,
and what was the result when you did?
VON NEURATH: I have already told you before that I always remonstrated
about these incidents, with Hitler—not in the Cabinet, but with Hitler.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is not what I asked you. You see,
Defendant, what I asked you was why you did not bring it up in the
Cabinet. Here was a Cabinet established with conservative elements to
keep it respectable. Why did you not bring it up in the Cabinet and try
and get the support of Herr Von Papen, Herr Hugenberg, and all the other
conservative gentlemen in the Cabinet of whom we have heard? Why did you
not bring it up?
VON NEURATH: For the very simple reason that it seemed to be more
effective to tell Hitler directly.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: In April 1933, some 2 months after it was
formed, are you telling the Tribunal that you did not think it was worth
while to bring a matter up in the Reich Cabinet? Within 2 months of
Hitler coming into power, it had become so “Führer-principled” that you
could not bring it up in the Cabinet?
VON NEURATH: I repeat—and after all I alone should be the one to
judge—that I considered direct representations made to Hitler more
effective.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. Well, now, I just want—I do not suppose
you were interested, but did you know about the putting into
concentration camps of any of the gentlemen that I mentioned to the
Defendant Von Papen: Herr Von Ossietzski or Herr Mühsam or Dr. Hermann
Dunker, or any of the other left-wing writers and lawyers and
politicians? Did you know that they had gone to a concentration camp
from which they never returned?
VON NEURATH: No.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You did not know at all?
VON NEURATH: No.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: At any rate, you knew—as your documents have
shown—when you went to London in June, you knew very well how, at any
rate, foreign opinion had crystallized against Germany because of the
treatment of the Jews and the opposition parties, did you not, when you
went to the world economic conference in June?
VON NEURATH: Yes. That was mentioned by me in a report that was read in
Court.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now you say that your reaction was to go to
Hitler and protest. I just want to look at what the existing documents
show that you did. Now, let us take April, first of all. Would you look
at Document D-794?
[_The document was handed to the defendant._]
My Lord, it is Document Book 12a, Page 8. It will be Exhibit GB-513.
Now, this is a letter from you to Hitler dated the 2d of April 1933:
“The Italian Ambassador telephoned me last night and informed me
that Mussolini had declared himself prepared to deny, through
the Italian delegations abroad, all news about the persecution
of the Jews in Germany that had been distorted by propaganda, if
we should consider this course useful. I thanked Herr Cerruti,
also on your behalf, and told him that we would be glad to
accept his offer.
“I regard this friendly gesture of Mussolini’s as important
enough to bring it to your notice.”
What did you think had been distorted by propaganda?
VON NEURATH: Yes, please read this part. Here it says, “the news had
been distorted by propaganda.” That is what it is about.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is what I was so interested in, Defendant.
What did you think had been distorted, and how much knowledge had you,
so that you could decide whether the news had been distorted or not?
VON NEURATH: That I really cannot tell you any more today.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You knew that Jews had been beaten, killed,
taken away from their families, and put into concentration camps and
that their property had been destroyed and was beginning to be sold
under value. You knew that all these things were happening, did you not?
VON NEURATH: No, certainly not at that time. That they were beaten, yes,
that I had heard; but at the time no Jews were murdered or perhaps only
once in one individual case.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, so you see that the _Times_ and
_Manchester Guardian_ of that date gave the most circumstantial examples
of typical murders of Jews? You must have seen that; you must have seen
that the foreign press was saying it. Why did you think that it was
distorted? What inquiry did you make to discover whether it was
distorted?
VON NEURATH: Who—who—who—who gave me information
about—about—about—murders?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am putting it to you that it was in the
foreign press. I have given you the two examples from the press of my
own country; and obviously from what Signor Mussolini was saying, it was
in the press of other countries. You must have known what they were
saying. What inquiries did you make to find out whether it was true or
not?
VON NEURATH: I used the only way possible for me, namely through the
police authorities concerned.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you ask Himmler, or did you ask the
Defendant Göring?
VON NEURATH: Most certainly not.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What? You asked Himmler? Or did you ask the
Defendant Göring? Why not? Why not? He was the head, inventing the
Gestapo and the concentration camps at that time. He would have been a
very good man to ask, would he not?
VON NEURATH: The man who could have given me information was the chief,
the supreme head of the Police, and it was in no way personally...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you ask the Defendant Frick?
VON NEURATH: In any case, I did not ask him personally.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now...
VON NEURATH: Certainly not personally.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: May I suggest to you that I do not want to take
up time? Why did you not take the trouble to ask Göring or Frick or
anyone who could have given you, as I suggest, proper information?
Would you look at Document 3893-PS?
[_The document was handed to the defendant._]
The Tribunal will find it at Page 128 of Document Book 12a. My Lord,
that will become Exhibit GB-514.
This is the _Völkischer Beobachter_, quoting you on the 17th of
September 1933, on the Jewish question:
“The Minister had no doubt that the stupid talk abroad about
purely internal German affairs, as for example the Jewish
problem, will quickly be silenced if one realizes that the
necessary cleaning up of public life must temporarily entail
individual cases of personal hardship but that nevertheless it
served only to establish all the more firmly the authority of
justice and law in Germany.”
Was that your view in September 1933, of the action against the Jews and
against the left-wing sympathizers up to that time, that it was a
“necessary cleaning up of public life,” which would, of course,
temporarily involve “individual cases” of hardship, and that was
necessary “more firmly” to establish “the authority of justice and law
in Germany”? Was that your view?
VON NEURATH: I told you during—during—during my—I think it was the
day before yesterday in answer to the question of what my attitude was
toward the Jewish problem, that in view of the inundation and domination
of public life in Germany by Jews which occurred after the last war, I
thought it absolutely right to have these things either eliminated or
restricted. That is what I am referring to here.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So that it is right—I mean, you are not running
away from what you said on the 17th of September 1933—that you thought
the treatment of the Jews in 1933 a “necessary cleaning up of public
life” in Germany? Are we to take it that your view then is your view
now, and you do not deviate from it at all? Is that right?
VON NEURATH: That is still my view today, do you not see, only it should
have been carried out by different methods.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: All right. Well, we will not go into discussions
of it.
Am I to take it that you knew and approved of the breakdown of political
opposition?
VON NEURATH: No, that is...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, then, let us take it by stages. Did you
believe in the prescribing, the making illegal of the Communist Party?
VON NEURATH: In those days, most certainly, because you have heard, have
you not, that we were facing civil war.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Very well. You agreed with that. Did you agree
with the breaking down and making illegal of the trade unions?
VON NEURATH: No.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What did you do to protest against the breaking
down of the trade unions?
VON NEURATH: That was in a sphere—this sphere did not concern me at
all. I was Foreign Minister and not Minister of the Interior.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. Well, again, I am not going to argue with
you. You thought it was perfectly right as Foreign Minister to remain
and give your support and authority to a government which was doing
something of which you disapproved, like breaking down the trade union
movement. Is that how we are to take it?
VON NEURATH: Yes. Did you ever hear that a minister...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now what about...
VON NEURATH: I would like to say, did you ever hear that every cabinet
minister must leave the cabinet if he does not agree with one particular
thing?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Every cabinet minister for whom I have any
respect left a cabinet if it did something of which he morally
disapproved, and I understood from you that you morally disapproved of
the breaking down of the trade union movement. If I am wrong, correct
it. If you did not disapprove, say so.
VON NEURATH: I did not think that it was immoral. It was a political
measure, but not an immoral one.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then let us take Number 3, take the Social
Democratic Party, that was a party which had taken a great share in the
Government of Germany and of Prussia for the years since the war. Did
you think it right, morally right, to make that party illegal and unable
to take any further share in the carrying on of the country?
VON NEURATH: No, certainly not. But I do not at all know...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let us get it clear. Did you think it right or
not?
VON NEURATH: I just told you “No” but I do not at all know whether
you...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What did you do to protest against that? What
did you do to protest against the dissolution of the Social Democratic
Party?
VON NEURATH: The most I could do against this dissolution was to state
my objections.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: To whom did you state your objection against the
dissolution of the Social Democratic Party?
VON NEURATH: To Hitler, again and again.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Again and again you didn’t raise the dissolution
of the parties, the opposition parties? You never raised that in the
Cabinet; that is right, isn’t it?
VON NEURATH: I cannot remember whether this question was discussed in
the Cabinet; I do not know any more.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. All right. Let us just pass to another
aspect and still on 1933. I just want you to have in mind what was
happening in 1933. Did you know that after you had announced that
Germany was leaving the Disarmament Conference and the League of
Nations, that orders for military preparations to deal with the
possibility of war, as consequent on that action had been got out?
VON NEURATH: No. In 1932-1933 I knew nothing about it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: In 1933, yes, it started—in Document C-140,
Exhibit USA-51—on the 25th of October 1933. Now, Defendant, you were
Foreign Minister. Are you telling the Tribunal that neither had Hitler
nor Marshal Von Blomberg—I think he was Reichswehrminister—that none
of them told you, as a result of this action, “we shall have to have the
preparations ready in case sanctions, including military sanctions, are
imposed on Germany.” Did none of them tell you that that was to be the
result of your move in foreign policy?
VON NEURATH: No, nor was there any action to be feared.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. Well, now it is rather—you will agree
with me—it is rather odd not to inform the Foreign Minister of the
possible consequences of his policy in the military preparations you are
taking to deal with it; it is rather odd, isn’t it in any system of
government, of totalitarian, democratic, or anything you like, it is
rather odd not to tell the Foreign Minister what you are doing in the
way of military preparations, to deal with his policy, isn’t it?
VON NEURATH: I certainly had to decide on the opinion as to whether any
danger threatened from our withdrawal from the League of Nations and the
Disarmament Conference, that is, I had to decide whether this might have
any probable consequences. The military had their own opinion, and
presumably—but I do not know, anyhow, I was not informed; but there
were certain discussions amongst the General Staff, I assume.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, I just want to sum up for 1933 and I
want to do that quickly. May I take it, that up to the end of 1933,
despite these matters which I have put to you, that you were perfectly
satisfied with the respectability and peace-loving intentions of the
Government; is that right?
VON NEURATH: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, just let us turn to 1934. You
remember your conversation with Mr. Dodd, the American Ambassador, which
you mentioned in your Document Book Number 1, at Page 54. It was on the
28th of May 1934; and Mr. Dodd had told you, apparently, what he had
said to Hitler about the way Americans are trying to control
profiteering by great financial interests. He said he was glad
that—then he says that you said that you were glad that he had informed
Hitler and then Mr. Dodd added “that the Chancellor had not agreed with
me.” Then he says:
“Von Neurath was silent for a moment after my remarks. It was
plain that he was entirely of my way of thinking. He begged me
to say to Washington that the outbreak was entirely contrary to
the German Government purpose, but he did not commit himself on
Hitler.”
What did you mean by that, “...that the outbreak against Jews was
entirely contrary to German Government purpose...”?
VON NEURATH: By that I wanted to say that the members of the Cabinet,
the majority of them, were against these methods. Apart from that, I can
add that I had just asked Mr. Dodd to go and see Hitler personally so as
to give backing to the suggestions I was making to Hitler. I took him
there.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But did you know, in May 1934, that the German
Government was going in for systematic and virulent anti-Semitism,
didn’t you know that?
VON NEURATH: Anti-Semitic propaganda, I knew mainly from Herr Goebbels’
speeches.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes; well, let us pass to something a little
more concrete. Had you any reason for disliking General Von Schleicher
or General Von Bredow?
VON NEURATH: No.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What was the effect on your mind of these two
gentlemen and Frau Von Schleicher being killed in the blood purge of the
30th of June 1934?
VON NEURATH: I hardly need to answer that. Of course, I was repulsed by
it, that is clear; but then I told you the other day that unfortunately
in the case of such a revolt, innocent people always have to suffer as
well.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. But just let us get it clear. You told
the Tribunal the other day that you thought—and had some reason for
thinking—that there was a movement in the SA, that is, a movement led
by Röhm and Ernst, and I suppose people that you would consider
undesirable, of that sort. What reason had you to suppose that General
Von Schleicher and General Von Bredow had been in a conspiracy, if any?
VON NEURATH: I had no reason at all, and I do not believe today that
they were plotting.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you hear about the unfortunate way in which
Herr Von Papen kept on losing secretaries at the same time? You
remember, you know.
VON NEURATH: Exactly the same.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you know that Herr Von Bose and Jung were
killed, Von Tschirschky was arrested, and two other gentlemen were also
arrested? Did you hear about that?
VON NEURATH: Yes, I did, through Herr Von Papen.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And did you regard the blood purge of the 30th
of June as just another element in the necessary cleaning up of public
life?
VON NEURATH: To the extent that it was carried out with all the outrages
and murders of innocent people, most certainly not.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Why did you go on in a government that was using
murder as an instrument of political action?
VON NEURATH: I have already told you twice that in the case of such
revolutions such mishaps cannot be avoided, most unfortunately.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. Well, now, let us take just another of
your 1934 experiences. You knew about the terroristic acts that were
going on in Austria in May and June of 1934, did you not? And by
“terroristic acts”—don’t let us have any doubt about it—what I mean is
causing explosions in Austrian public utilities and railways and things
like that. I mean dynamite. I don’t mean anything vague. You knew that
such acts were going on in Austria in May and June 1934, did you not?
VON NEURATH: Yes, I heard about it, and I always opposed that sort of
thing because I knew that it was done by Nazis; and let me say once
more, mostly by Austrian Nazis.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What position did Herr Köpke have in your
Ministry on the 31st of May 1934?
VON NEURATH: He was the Ministerial Director.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Ministerial Director: Quite a responsible
position, was it not?
VON NEURATH: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you remember Herr Köpke reporting to you on
the 31st of May 1934, on a visit of Baron von Wächter?
VON NEURATH: No, I cannot remember that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, just think; you know. Baron von Wächter
was one of the leaders of the Putsch against Dollfuss 6 weeks later on
the 25th of July. Don’t you remember Herr Köpke making a report to you
and you passing it on to Hitler?
VON NEURATH: No, I cannot remember that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let’s refresh your memory if you don’t remember
it. Would you look at Document D-868? It will become Exhibit GB-515.
Just look at it. I will read it over, but just look at the signatories
carefully; and if you will be good enough to look at the top, I think
you will find on the original, there are your own initials; and on the
left hand side there is a note: “The Reich Chancellor has been informed
6/6.” That is on the 6th of June. That is initialed “L” by Lammers—Dr.
Lammers. Then there is a note below that: “From the Reich Chancellor on
6th June,” also initialed by Lammers I think. And on the other side you
will see there is a note which is certainly initialed “Lammers.”
“Habicht is coming today... L 6/6.” And this memorandum comes back from
the Reich Chancellor to the Foreign Office on the same day. Now just
let’s see what report you were getting from Austria and passing on to
Hitler. We will omit, unless you want it particularly, a description of
Baron von Wächter’s fresh, youthful appearance in Paragraph 1; but it
goes on to say:
“His statements were obviously made in full consciousness of
serious responsibility. His estimation of the affairs and
personalities that came under review was clear and definite.
Herr Von Wächter drew up for me, too, a picture of the situation
in Austria which was, in some of its colors, even darker and
more serious than it had appeared to us here up till now. The
extremist tendencies of the National Socialists in Austria were
constantly on the increase. Terrorist acts were multiplying.
Regardless of who actually undertook the demolitions and other
terrorist acts in individual cases, each such act provoked a new
wave of extremism and also of desperate acts. As Herr Von
Wächter repeatedly and sadly stressed, uniformity of leadership
was lacking. The SA did what it wanted and what it, for its
part, considered necessary. The political leadership at the same
time introduced measures which sometimes meant the exact
opposite. Thus the great terrorist action, as the result of
which the railway lines leading to Vienna were blown up, was by
no means committed by Marxists but by the Austrian SA and indeed
against the wishes of the political leadership which, as he
believed, did not participate in any way either in the act or
its preparation. Such is the picture as a whole. In detail, in
individual provinces and districts, the confusion was, if
possible, even greater.”
Then he says that the main seat of unrest is Carinthia, and where
conditions were worst. And then he says:
“Herr Von Wächter thought that here improvements must be
introduced most speedily, that is, by means of the
centralization of all forces active in the interests of National
Socialism both in and outside Austria. Personal questions should
play no part here. The decisive word in this connection could,
of course, be given only by the Führer himself. He, Wächter, was
in complete agreement with Herr Habicht on all these matters. As
far as he knew, Herr Habicht had already succeeded in having a
brief conversation with the Reich Chancellor today.”
Now just let’s pause there for a moment. Herr Habicht was appointed
about that time press attaché at the German Embassy in Vienna. The
appointment of Herr Habicht as press attaché would be done either by you
or with your approval, would it not? It was under your department?
VON NEURATH: Right now I no longer know if Herr Habicht—Herr Habicht
was the National Socialist leader (Landesleiter) for Austria in Munich
and whether or not he went to Vienna as press attaché I do not know.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, you can take it that he went to Vienna as
press attaché at this time, at the end of May 1934; and what I am asking
you is, was it not either at your order or with your approval that he
was given a post which gave him diplomatic immunity in the middle of his
plottings?
VON NEURATH: If Herr Habicht was really there, this happened neither
with my knowledge nor with my approval; but presumably it was arranged
by the Ministry of Propaganda to whom these press men were subordinated.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, you will agree with me, Defendant, that
this is not a very pleasant document; it does not describe a very
pleasant state of affairs. Let me remind you, this came, from your
Ministerial Director to you and went on to the Führer and came back from
Dr. Lammers with a note: “Habicht is coming today.” Surely as...
VON NEURATH: To the Führer?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, yes.
VON NEURATH: Besides, Mr. Prosecutor, I want to point out to you that
here only the Austrian National Socialists are being discussed. With
them I had nothing at all to do.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What I am pointing out to you is that the
document, this Foreign Office document goes to the Reich Chancellery; it
comes back on the 6th of June with a note from Dr. Lammers saying,
“Habicht is coming today.” You must have known all about Habicht on the
6th of June. It is mentioned in this report.
VON NEURATH: Not at all. I have this note from Lammers which means that
Habicht was coming to see the Reich Chancellor. And this report from my
Ministerial Director I immediately passed on to the Reich Chancellor to
show him what the conditions were in Austria. That was the reason.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But you remember Herr Von Papen giving evidence
a few days ago; and when I asked him who were the leading Reich German
personalities who influenced the Putsch in Austria in July 1934, he
thought for a long time and the only leading Reich German personality
that he could remember as influencing the Putsch was this very Herr
Habicht?
VON NEURATH: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well then, what I am putting to you is—and
pausing there to get it—that you knew very well, on the 6th of June
1934, that Herr Habicht, this leading Reich personality according to the
Defendant Von Papen, was organizing revolution in Austria, didn’t you?
VON NEURATH: Whatever makes you suppose a thing like that? Herr Habicht
never came to see me. He went to see the Reich Chancellor.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You saw this report. This is a report of your
Ministerial Director. I have just read what Von Wächter thought.
VON NEURATH: There is not one word about Herr Habicht in it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, I just read that to you. May I remind you:
“The decisive word in this connection could of course be given
only by the Führer himself. He, Wächter, was in complete
agreement with Herr Habicht on all these matters.”
In other words, what Wächter is putting to the Foreign Office were the
views of Habicht no less than himself.
VON NEURATH: Yes, that is certainly in there. Well, all these terrorist
acts and all these disturbances which are described in this document
were brought to the attention of the Reich Chancellor by myself.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, just look what the report says at the
foot of the page:
“But when nothing happened in the meantime, and on the other
hand the counter measures of the Austrian Government grew more
brutal and severe from day to day, the radical elements made
themselves felt once more and came forward with the statement
that the Chancellor had issued his order only for tactical
reasons and was inwardly in agreement with every manly act of
opposition and had in view, as his own political aim, merely the
weakening of Dollfuss’ hateful system, though in a way which
should be as unobtrusive as possible to the outside world. They
are now working with this argument.”
Listen to the next bit, his suggestion to you, the nearest warning of
trouble which any Foreign Minister ever heard of:
“One constantly stumbles on this idea during discussions and it
is secretly spreading. A change must be made soon and a uniform
leadership created. Otherwise, as Herr Von Wächter concluded his
impressive description, a disaster may occur any day which would
have the worst possible consequences in foreign policy, not only
for Austria alone, but above all for Germany herself.”
And then, dramatically, in the middle of the conversation, Herr Von
Wächter receives a telephone message that he had better not go back to
Vienna or he will be arrested on his arrival; and within 6 weeks he had
started the Putsch and Chancellor Dollfuss had been shot. Do you
remember now? Did you not appreciate, at the beginning of June 1934,
that there was the greatest danger of an uprising and trouble in
Austria?
VON NEURATH: Yes, quite definitely so. That is the very reason why I
sent the report to the Chancellor. I could not interfere in Austria.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Perhaps you can tell me, on the question on
which the Defendant Von Papen was unable to specify, who, in your
opinion, were the other prominent Reich German personalities who were
behind the Dollfuss Putsch in Austria? You say you were not. Who, in
your opinion, were these personalities that Herr Von Papen mentions as
being behind the Dollfuss Putsch?
VON NEURATH: I know absolutely none. I know only Habicht, and him I knew
only as a person against whom I protested to Hitler because of his
inflammatory actions. Apart from him I did not know any Reich Germans.
The others were all Austrian National Socialists who have been mentioned
innumerable times during the Trial but whom I did not know.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am not mentioning them. I am mentioning the
Defendant Von Papen’s prominent Reich German personalities, and I am
trying very hard to find out who they were Are you taking the same line,
that the only one you can remember is the press attaché, Herr Habicht?
Is that all you can help the Tribunal in this matter?
VON NEURATH: I have already said—and that will have to suffice—I do
not know anyone.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Is it your opinion that your Minister, Dr.
Rieth, knew nothing about this, despite what Mr. Messersmith says on
that point? Do you think Dr. Rieth knew nothing about the Putsch?
VON NEURATH: I cannot tell you to what extent Herr Rieth was informed.
You know, however, that when he acted ostentatiously later on that I
recalled him right away. Apart from that, I always forbade the ministers
to meddle in such matters.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You haven’t any doubt in your own mind that Dr.
Rieth knew all about the impending Putsch, have you?
VON NEURATH: Oh yes, I have considerable doubts that he knew all about
it. I do not believe so because his whole character was not at all like
that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, at any rate, you knew on the 25th of
July that the Austrian Nazis had made this Putsch and had murdered
Dollfuss?
VON NEURATH: That is not exactly a secret.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, I know it. A lot of these things were not
secrets. What I am interested in was your knowledge—when you found out.
VON NEURATH: Afterward, yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But didn’t that give you any qualms about
remaining in a government which had extended its policy of murder from
at home to abroad, through the Party elements in Austria?
VON NEURATH: If I were responsible for every single murderer, for every
single German murderer who was active abroad, then I would have had a
lot of work to do, would I not?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You knew, Herr Von Neurath—and I shall remind
you how in a moment—you knew that the Austrian NSDAP was in close touch
with, and acting under, the orders of Hitler all the time when Hitler
was head of your Government; you knew that perfectly well, didn’t you?
VON NEURATH: He was the chief of the NSDAP. It is quite natural that
they were collaborating with him.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. Now there is just one other point...
VON NEURATH: Yes. I want to tell you another thing: I continuously
remonstrated with Hitler, together with Herr Von Papen, about the fact
that this Herr Habicht was doing the things he was.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We will take that up in a moment. I just want to
get one point of fact. Does this accord with your recollection: I have
been through all the reports of the Defendant Von Papen; and apart from
three personal reports, two dealing with Herr Von Tschirschky and one
dealing with abuse of Hitler, which is of no political significance, we
have 28 reports. Nineteen of these reports are marked as being copies to
the Foreign Office. Is that in accord with your recollection, that three
but of four of Herr Von Papen’s reports would come to you to be seen by
you?
VON NEURATH: That I cannot tell you at this late day.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You are quite right, Herr Von Neurath. You
wouldn’t know how many went to you, but you say you saw a considerable
number of Herr Von Papen’s reports. I think there were 19; I am sure you
can take it that they are marked—19 are marked, “Passed the Foreign
Office”.
VON NEURATH: I do believe you, yes; but the question is how many were
submitted to me, for I did not receive every individual report from
every ambassador or minister abroad. Otherwise, I would have been
drowned in paper.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I quite agree; but what I asked you was, did you
receive these from Herr Von Papen, who was supposed to be in a rather
special position dealing with a very difficult problem? Did you receive
a considerable number of reports from Herr Von Papen to Hitler as passed
to you?
VON NEURATH: I can tell you only that I received some reports but
certainly not all. I cannot tell you more than that today.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, perhaps this would be a convenient time
to break off.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn at this time.
[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I just want to get two or three facts clear
about 1935 before I put some questions to you.
On the 10th of March Germany announced the establishment of an air force
and on the 16th of March I think you, among others, signed the law
introducing compulsory military service. You explained all that to us; I
don’t want to go over it again, but I just want to ask you about the
Secret Reich Defense Law of the 21st of May 1935. Would you look at
General Thomas’ comment on it.
My Lord, it is at Page 52 of Document Book 12. It is about Page 71 of
the German document book.
THE PRESIDENT: Number 12a or b?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Number 12, My Lord. That is the original one;
Page 52, My Lord.
“The Central Directorate of the supreme Reich authorities,
ordered in case of war, has influenced the development and the
activity of the war economy organization to such an extent that
it is necessary to discuss this matter in detail. The
foundations had already been laid, for the central organization
of the supreme Reich authorities in the event of a war prior to
1933 in many discussions and decrees, but it was radically
altered when the National Socialists came into power, and
especially by the death of Reich President Von Hindenburg. The
latest orders were decreed in the Reich Defense Law of 21 May
1935, supposed to be published only in case of war but already
declared valid for carrying out war preparations. As this law
fixed the duties of the Armed Forces and the other Reich
authorities in case of war, it was also the fundamental ruling
for the development and activity of the war economy
organization.” (Document 2353-PS)
And you will remember that on the same day the Defendant Schacht had
been made Plenipotentiary for War Economy.
Did you appreciate at the time, Defendant, that that law was the
fundamental ruling for the development and activity of the war economy
organization?
VON NEURATH: Yes, but only in case of a war, that is, in case of
mobilization.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You see that the point that I am putting to you
is that it had already been declared valid for carrying out war
preparations. Didn’t you understand that it was a big step forward for
war preparations?
VON NEURATH: Not at all. It was not a big step forward at all. It was
only the establishing of the necessary measures in case of a war. In
every country you have to guarantee the co-operation of the various
offices in the event of an attack.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is your view. Now, at this time, up to May
1935, is it correct that the German Foreign Office was still staffed by
diplomats or Foreign Office officials of the older school and had not
yet been invaded by the products of the Bureau Ribbentrop?
VON NEURATH: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you receive any warnings from your own staff
as to the happenings in Austria, or the rearmament, the declaration of
the air force, and the conscription?
VON NEURATH: I was advised about happenings in Austria, as can be seen
from the report which you submitted to me. The re-establishment of the
Armed Forces was a decision which was made in the Cabinet, and of course
I knew about that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, but—I am sorry, probably I did not put the
proper emphasis on the word. When I said warning I meant a real warning
from your officials that these happenings were making Germany regarded
abroad as being bloodthirsty and warmongering. Did you get any warnings
from your officials?
VON NEURATH: Certainly not, for that was not the case, and if any
assertions like that were being made abroad, they certainly were not
true.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, would you look at Document 3308-PS, the
affidavit of the interpreter Paul Schmidt.
My Lord, it is Page 68 of Document Book 12a, and it is Page 65 or 66 of
the German version, Paragraph 4.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Now, just let me read you Paragraphs 4 and
5, as to what Herr Paul Schmidt says:
“4. The attempted Putsch in Austria and the murder of Dollfuss
on 25 July 1934 seriously disturbed the career personnel of the
Foreign Office because these events discredited Germany in the
eyes of the world. It was common knowledge that the Putsch had
been engineered by the Party, and the fact that the attempted
Putsch followed so closely on the heels of the blood purge
within Germany could not help but suggest the similarity of Nazi
methods, both in foreign and in domestic policy. This concern
over the repercussions of the attempted Putsch was soon
heightened by a recognition of the fact that these episodes were
of influence in leading to the Franco-Soviet Consultative Pact
of 5 December 1934, a defensive arrangement which was not heeded
as a warning by the Nazis.”
Defendant, let’s take that. In these three points, is it correct, as
Herr Schmidt says, that the attempted Putsch and the murder of Dollfuss
seriously disturbed the career personnel in the Foreign Office?
VON NEURATH: Not only the career personnel of my office were disquieted
over this but I, of course, was also disquieted.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And taking the last sentence:
“This concern”—that is the disturbance by the Putsch—“over the
repercussions of the attempted Putsch was soon heightened by a
recognition of the fact that these episodes”—blood purge and
the Putsch—“were of influence in leading to the Franco-Soviet
Consultative Pact of December 5, 1934, a defensive arrangement
which was not heeded as a warning...”
Is that correct, that among your staff the concern was heightened by
recognizing that the blood purge and the Putsch had alarmed France and
the Soviet Union as to the position of Germany and led to the
consultative pact?
VON NEURATH: No, that is a personal opinion of the interpreter Schmidt.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, with respect to you, Defendant, it is not.
What interpreter Schmidt is saying is that that was the opinion of your
experienced staff in the Foreign Office and that is what I am putting to
you. Is he not right in saying that your experienced staff were
concerned that these events had had their effect on the consultative
pact?
VON NEURATH: Not in the least.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, at any rate...
VON NEURATH: I can only repeat, the two things had no connection with
each other.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Is he correct in his last statement that that
arrangement was not heeded as a warning by the Nazis?
VON NEURATH: That I cannot say; I do not know.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, just look at the next paragraph.
“The announcement in March of the establishment of a German Air
Force and of the introduction of conscription was followed on 2
May 1935 by the conclusion of a mutual assistance pact between
France and the Soviet Union. The career personnel of the Foreign
Office regarded this as a further very serious warning as to the
potential consequences of German foreign policy, but the Nazi
leaders only stiffened their attitude toward the Western Powers,
declaring that they were not going to be intimidated. At this
time the career officials at least expressed their reservations
to the Foreign Minister, Neurath. I do not know whether or not
Neurath in turn related these expressions of concern to Hitler.”
Now, just let us take that. Did—do you agree that the career personnel
of the Foreign Office regarded the Franco-Soviet pact as a further very
severe, very serious warning as to the potential consequences of German
foreign policy?
VON NEURATH: I do not know in the name of which personnel Herr Schmidt
is making these statements. But I, at any event, heard nothing to the
effect that my career personnel had expressed these opinions.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, here is Herr Schmidt saying, “The career
officials, at least, expressed their reservations to the Foreign
Minister, Neurath.” That is you.
VON NEURATH: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Are you saying that Herr Schmidt, who after all
was a career official although he was an interpreter for a great deal of
the time—are you saying that Herr Schmidt is not stating what is
accurate when he says that your permanent officials expressed their
concern to you?
VON NEURATH: But quite decidedly. How could Herr Schmidt, who was only
an insignificant civil servant at that time, know what my career
personnel told me and in addition, how could Schmidt judge this? And I
should also like to add that Schmidt said here, before this Court, that
this affidavit, or whatever it may be, was submitted to him after a
serious illness and that he personally knew absolutely nothing more
about the contents. That now...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You may rest assured, the Tribunal will correct
me if I am wrong, that I put these paragraphs to Herr Schmidt and he
agreed with them when he was giving evidence before this Tribunal.
But now just look at one other statement at the end of Paragraph 6.
Well, we’ll just—we will read Paragraph 6, because I want to ask you
about the end:
“The re-entry of the German military forces into the Rhineland
was preceded by Nazi diplomatic preparation in February. A
German communiqué of 21 February 1936 reaffirmed that the
Franco-Soviet Pact of mutual assistance was incompatible with
the Locarno Treaties and the League Covenant. On the same day
Hitler argued in an interview that no real grounds existed for
conflict between Germany and France. Considered against the
background statements in _Mein Kampf_, offensive to France, the
circumstances were such as to suggest that the stage was being
set for justifying some future act. I do not know how far in
advance the march into the Rhineland was decided upon. I
personally knew about it and discussed it approximately 2 or 3
weeks before it occurred. Considerable fear had been expressed,
particularly in military circles, concerning the risk of this
undertaking. Similar fears were felt by many in the Foreign
Office. It was common knowledge in the Foreign Office, however,
that Neurath was the only person in Government circles consulted
by Hitler who felt confident that the Rhineland could be
remilitarized without armed opposition from Britain and France.
Neurath’s position throughout this period was one which would
induce Hitler to have more faith in Neurath than in the general
run of ‘old school’ diplomats, whom he (Hitler) tended to hold
in disrespect.”
Well, now, if this minor official, of whom you just talked, knew about
and discussed the march into the Rhineland some 2 or 3 weeks before it
occurred, how much before it occurred had you discussed it?
VON NEURATH: Herr Schmidt must have been clairvoyant, for 2 or 3 weeks
in advance even I did not know anything about it. I heard of it about 1
week before Hitler’s decision, and if I—if it says here that I—that it
was generally known in the Foreign Ministry that I was the only one in
the Government circles consulted by Hitler who was confident that the
Rhineland could be remilitarized without armed opposition from Britain
and France, it certainly turned out that I was right.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You were right—but is it true that you were the
only person in Government circles who thought that it could be occupied
without interference by Britain and France? Is that true?
VON NEURATH: I am not in a position to say whether I was the only one,
but at any rate, I was convinced of this on the basis of my knowledge of
international conditions.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And so that at any rate, whatever the
limitations of Paul Schmidt, he knew what your position was quite
accurately. Was he not right about it in the last sentence, that your
position throughout the period was one which would make Hitler look to
you rather than to the rest, the other figures of pro-Nazi diplomacy and
foreign affairs, because you were the person who was encouraging him? Is
that not the position?
VON NEURATH: I did not encourage him in any way, but I described the
situation to him as I saw it, and it was later proved that I had been
right.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, I just want you to deal with one other
point, which is really 1936, but we will deal with it as I have been
dealing with Austria.
You have said once or twice that you objected very strongly to the
description of the Austrian treaty, the treaty between the Reich and
Austria of the 11th of July as being a subterfuge or a façade. That is
right; is it not? You objected very strongly to that view?
VON NEURATH: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you know that Hitler had given instructions
to the Gauleiter of the Austrian NSDAP to carry on the struggle at the
same time as the treaty was signed?
VON NEURATH: No, I do not know anything about that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just let me remind you. I do not want to put
anything that seems unfair.
My Lord, it is Document Book 12, Page 97.
[_Turning to the defendant._] This is the report of Dr. Rainer, whom the
Tribunal has had the advantage of seeing, and if you will look at the
end of one paragraph he says:
“The agreement of 11 July 1936 was strongly influenced by the
activities of these two persons.”—That is Defendant
Seyss-Inquart and Colonel Glaise-Horstenau—“Papen mentioned
Glaise-Horstenau to the Führer as being a trusted person.”
Now the next paragraph:
“At that time the Führer wished to see the leaders of the
Party...”
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am sorry, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you say 97 of Document Book 12?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I did, My Lord, yes. Yes, My Lord; it is the
third paragraph and begins, “At that time...”
THE PRESIDENT: Oh yes, I see it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship please:
“At that time the Führer wished to see the leaders of the Party
in Austria, in order to tell them his opinion on what Austrian
National Socialists should do.” (Document Number 812-PS)
THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid it was another “at that time” that we were
looking at. Could you give us some other indication?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, it is in the middle.
THE PRESIDENT: It is on 98 in ours.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am so sorry, My Lord. The paging must be
different. I beg Your Lordship’s pardon.
[_Continuing._] “At that time the Führer wished to see the
leaders of the Party in Austria in order to tell them his
opinion on what Austria National Socialists should do. Meanwhile
Hinterleitner was arrested, and Dr. Rainer became his
successor...”
Mind you, this is the man who is making this statement.
“...successor and leader of the Austrian Party. On 16 July 1936
Dr. Rainer and Globocznik visited the Führer at the
Obersalzberg, where they received a clear explanation of the
situation and the wishes of the Führer. On 17 July 1936 all
illegal Gauleiter met in Anif near Salzburg, where they received
a complete report from Rainer on the statement of the Führer and
his political instructions for carrying out the fight. At the
same conference the Gauleiter received organizational
instructions from Globocznik and Hiedler.”
Did you not know—did Hitler not tell his Foreign Minister, who had just
supervised the conclusion of this treaty, that he intended to give the
illegal Gauleiter instructions as to how to carry on the fight? Didn’t
he tell you that?
VON NEURATH: No, he did not tell me that, but I do remember—I believe
it was the same Dr. Rainer who appeared here as a witness—who stated
that Hitler summoned him and other Gauleiter and told them that in the
future they were to observe strictly the agreements of 1936. By the way,
the matter that you just quoted is not mentioned at all in the document
which was submitted to me.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, that’s not mentioned. What is mentioned is
the political instructions for carrying out the fight and the
organizational instructions from Globocznik. At any rate, you knew
nothing about that?
VON NEURATH: No.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, it is rather difficult for you to judge
whether the treaty is made sincerely if you do not know the instructions
that are given to the illegal Party in Austria by Hitler, is it not?
VON NEURATH: Yes, naturally.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, just let’s deal with one or two other
points. I would just like you to look at what Mr. Messersmith says at
the end of 1935. You remember this statement—I will give you the
reference in a moment—that:
“...Europe will not get away from the myth that Neurath, Papen,
and Mackensen are not dangerous people and that they are
‘diplomats of the old school.’ They are in fact servile
instruments of the regime and just because the outside world
looks upon them as harmless, they are able to work more
effectively. They are able to sow discord just because they
propagate the myth that they are not in sympathy with the
regime.”
Now, can you tell us up to the date on which Mr. Messersmith wrote
that—on October 10, 1935—of a single instruction of Hitler’s that you
had not carried out?
VON NEURATH: I did not quite understand. A single instruction...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I am sorry; I mislaid the reference. It
is Document Book 12, Page 107. That is the reference to it.
[_Turning to the defendant._] You see, Mr. Messersmith is there saying
that you and the Defendant Von Papen and Von Mackensen are servile
instruments of the regime. Now, I am just asking you whether you could
tell us up to the date that Mr. Messersmith wrote, on 10 October 1935,
any instruction of Hitler’s that you had refused to carry out.
VON NEURATH: Not only one, but quite a few. I have testified as to the
number of times I contradicted Hitler, and I have expressed myself about
what Mr. Messersmith is assuming here again—about the importance of Mr.
Messersmith’s affidavit.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, I put it this way: Up to October 10,
1935, what did you tell the Tribunal was the most serious thing that
Hitler had ordered you to do and you had refused to carry out? What was
the most serious—the one that mattered most?
VON NEURATH: Well on the spur of the moment, that is a question that I
cannot answer. How should I know what the most serious question was
which I opposed? I opposed all sorts of things.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If you can’t remember what you think is the most
serious, I shan’t trouble you with it any more, but I want...
VON NEURATH: Well, you are quite welcome to submit it to me, but don’t
produce an allegation out of a clear sky without giving me the chance to
refute it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I was asking you to tell us, but I will pass on
to what another American diplomat put. I would like to ask you about Mr.
Bullitt’s report, with which I gather you agree. My Lord, that is L-150,
and it is at Page 72 of the Document Book 12.
My Lord, I hope that there is no difference of the paging—72 of mine.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes; it is 74.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, it is 74. I am sorry, My Lord.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Now, it is the second paragraph there.
After saying that he had a talk with you, he says:
“Von Neurath said that it was the policy of the German
Government to do nothing active in foreign affairs until ‘the
Rhineland had been digested.’ He explained that he meant that
until the German fortifications had been constructed on the
French and Belgian frontiers, the German Government would do
everything possible to prevent rather than encourage an outbreak
by the Nazis in Austria and would pursue a quiet line with
regard to Czechoslovakia. ‘As soon as our fortifications are
constructed and the countries of Central Europe realize that
France cannot enter German territory at will, all those
countries will begin to feel very differently about their
foreign policies and a new constellation will develop...’”
You agree you said that?
VON NEURATH: Yes, yes, certainly. Yesterday or the day before I
testified in detail about what that was supposed to mean. Moreover, it
does not make any difference.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I would like to see if you agree with the
meaning I suggest. That is that as soon as you had got your
fortifications in sufficiently good order on your western frontier, you
would proceed to try and secure an Anschluss with Austria and to get
back the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia. Isn’t that what it means?
VON NEURATH: No, no, not at all. That is quite clear in the document.
What I meant by this and what I expressed was that these countries,
particularly Czechoslovakia and France, would change their policy toward
Germany, because they could no longer march through Germany so easily.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You appreciate, Defendant, what I am putting to
you? I think I made it quite clear—that at the time that you were
facing the Western Powers with the remilitarization of Germany and the
Rhineland—that is in 1935 and 1936—you were then giving assurances to
Austria, which Hitler did in May 1935, and you made this treaty in 1936.
As soon as you had digested your first steps, you then turned against
Austria and Czechoslovakia in 1938. I am suggesting, you see, that you
were talking the exact truth and prophesying with a Cassandra-like
accuracy. That is what I am suggesting—that you knew very well that
these intentions were there.
VON NEURATH: What?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You say you didn’t?
VON NEURATH: Not at all, not at all, not at all! That is an assumption
on your part, for which there is absolutely no proof.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We will not argue it further because we will
come on to just one other point before we proceed to 1937.
You have told the Tribunal, not once but many times, that you did not
support the Nazi attitude toward the Christian churches, of oppressing
the churches. That is I have understood you correctly, have I not?
VON NEURATH: Yes, indeed.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, and you say that you resisted and actively
intervened against the repression of the Church. Would you just look at
Document 3758-PS.
My Lord, that will become Exhibit GB-516. My Lord, Your Lordship will
find it in Document Book 12a, Page 81.
[_Turning to the defendant._] This is an entry which must have been
fairly early in 1936 in the diary of the Reich Minister of Justice:
“The Reich Foreign Minister transmits, with a personal note for
confidential information, a letter from Cardinal State Secretary
Pacelli”—that is the present Pope—“to the German Ambassador in
the Vatican, in which he urges an act of pardon for Vicar
General Seelmeyer. He, the Reich Foreign Minister, remarks to
this that after the heavy attacks on German justice by the Holy
See in the note of 29 January, there is no reason in his opinion
to show any deference to the Vatican. He recommends it, however,
since for foreign policy reasons it is to our interest not to
let our good personal relations with Pacelli cool off.”
Now, Defendant, will you tell me anything that showed the slightest
personal interest in the fate of Father Seelmeyer, or were you only
concerned with showing a firm front to the Vatican and not losing your
good relations with Cardinal Pacelli?
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, the document has just been
submitted to me; I have had no opportunity whatsoever to look this
document over and inform myself about it. Likewise, I do not know of
there having been any talk about a diary of the Reich Minister of
Justice up to now in this Trial. Therefore, I am not in a position to
judge how the Reich Minister of Justice could have made this entry in
his diary at all.
Since these notes have apparently been taken out of their context, it is
not possible for me to form any kind of a picture of the significance of
the entry as a whole, and naturally it is even less possible for the
defendant to do so.
Therefore, I must protest against the admissibility of this question and
against the submission of this document.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: This is a perfectly good captured document. It
is a copy of the original diary of the Reich Minister of Justice, and it
is therefore admissible against the defendant.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Von Lüdinghausen, you can see the original document.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, actually, I am just told by my American
colleagues that this diary has been used before, that extracts were put
in in the case against the Defendant Von Schirach.
VON NEURATH: Mr. President, I have no objection...
THE PRESIDENT: One moment.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I could not understand a word, Mr. President. I am
sorry, I could not understand. I can hear now.
THE PRESIDENT: When you make an objection, you should see that the
instrument is in order.
What I said was that you can see the original document. And I am told
now that the original document has been used before, and that therefore
there is nothing to prevent its being used in cross-examination. It is a
captured document, and you can see the original.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I did not know that, Mr. President.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What I am putting to you, Defendant, is that
your statement to the Minister of Justice shows no concern for the
individual priest about whom the complaint had been made; it is merely
concerned with your relations with the Vatican and with Cardinal
Pacelli, as he then was. Is that typical of your interferences? Is this
typical of your interferences for the sake of ill-treated priests?
VON NEURATH: I naturally cannot remember this case any more, but the way
it stands there in the entry I was perfectly justified. According to the
entry, I said that we had no reason to show any special consideration
after the then Cardinal State Secretary, or Pope had attacked German
justice, but that, as Foreign Minister I considered it important not to
disturb our relations with Pacelli. I cannot see what conclusions you
want to draw from this.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I don’t want to trespass on the ground of
my Soviet colleagues, but you know that the Czech report accuses you,
with complete impartiality as far as sect is concerned, of your
Government ill-treating the Catholics, Protestants, Czech National
Church, and even the Greek Church in Czechoslovakia. You know that all
these churches suffered during your protectorate—do you agree that all
these churches suffered under your protectorate?
VON NEURATH: No, not at all.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: All right, I won’t go into the details, but I am
suggesting to you that your care about the various religious confessions
did not go very deep.
VON NEURATH: That is again an assertion on your part which you cannot
prove.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I would just like to put one thing. You
remember telling the Tribunal this morning of the excellent terms that
you were on with the archbishop of Prague?
VON NEURATH: I said that I had good relations with the archbishop.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I would just like you to look at this copy.
My Lord, this is a copy, but General Ecer assures me that he can get the
original from the Czech Government files. I received it only a half hour
ago. General Ecer, who is here from Czechoslovakia, says that he can
vouch for the original.
I’d like the defendant to look at it. Is that a letter which you
received from the archbishop?
My Lord, it is Document D-920, and it will be Exhibit GB-517:
“Your Excellency, very esteemed Herr Protector of the Reich:
“Your last letter has filled me with such sorrow because I could
not but gather from it that not even Your Excellency is prepared
to believe me—that I lost consciousness and had to call
university Professor Dr. Jirasek, who remained beside my sickbed
for an hour—he is coming again today, together with the
specialist on internal diseases....”
And then he gives his name.
“Your Excellency may be sure that I shall always do what I can
to please you. But please, have mercy on me, too, and do not
demand that I should act against the laws of the Church.
“Yours, _et cetera_, Karl Cardinal Kaspar, M. P. prince
archbishop.”
Do you remember that?
VON NEURATH: I cannot say what this refers to. I have no idea; there is
nothing in it, and I cannot tell you what it referred to.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You can’t remember this occasion when the prince
archbishop wrote to you and told you the effect, the illness that he had
suffered from and beseeched you not to ask him to do something against
the laws of the Church? It doesn’t remain in your mind at all, does it?
VON NEURATH: No.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: All right, we’ll leave that. Well now, I want
you to just tell me this, before we pass on to the later occurrences in
1937. You remember you dealt yesterday with your speech—I think it was
to the German Academy of Law. You remember the speech, in August of
1937? I can give you a reference. Would you like to look at it?
VON NEURATH: I only need the reference to where I spoke.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You remember it, I only wanted to save time.
Don’t you remember? I will put it to you if you like. It is the speech
of the 29th of August 1937, and I will give you the reference in one
moment. What I wanted to ask you was this—you said:
“The unity of the racial and national will created through
Nazism with unprecedented élan has made possible a foreign
policy by means of which the chains of the Versailles Treaty
were broken.”
What did you mean by “the unity of the racial will” produced by Nazism?
VON NEURATH: By that I probably meant that all Germans were unified more
than ever before. At this date I can no longer tell you what I meant by
this, either. But nevertheless I was merely establishing a fact.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. Now tell me. That was in August 1937. You
told the Tribunal the effect that the words of Hitler, on the 5th of
November 1937, had upon you, and your counsel has put in the statement
by Baroness von Ritter. After these words...
VON NEURATH: In November?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, November of 1937.
VON NEURATH: Yes, indeed.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, after these words had had that effect, with
whom did you discuss them among the people who had been present at the
Hossbach interview?
VON NEURATH: This speech was not made at Berchtesgaden at all. That is a
mistake; it was at Berlin, this address.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I didn’t say Berchtesgaden; I said at the
Hossbach conference. We call it the Hossbach conference because he took
the minutes.
VON NEURATH: I have already told you yesterday with whom I spoke,
General Von Fritsch, and with Beck, who was then Chief of the General
Staff; and I also testified that we agreed at that time jointly to
oppose Hitler and the tendency which he had revealed in this speech.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you speak about it to Hitler?
VON NEURATH: Yes. I testified yesterday in detail that I did not have a
chance to speak with Hitler until 14 or 15 January, because he had left
Berlin and I could not see him. That was the very reason why I asked for
my resignation at that time.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you speak about it to Göring or Raeder?
VON NEURATH: No.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now I want you to just tell me one word or two
about this Secret Cabinet Council to which you were appointed after you
left the Foreign Office.
Would you look at the first sentences of the report of that meeting on
the 5th of November?
My Lord, it is Page 81 in the English Document Book 12, and Page 93 of
the German document book.
It is only the first two sentences, Defendant:
“The Führer stated initially that the subject matter of today’s
conference was of such importance that its detailed discussion
would certainly, in other states, take place before the Cabinet
in full session. However, he, the Führer, had decided not to
discuss this matter in the larger circle of the Reich Cabinet
because of its importance.”
Then, if you will look at the people who were there: There is the
Führer; the Minister for War; the three Commanders-in-Chief; and the
Minister of Foreign Affairs.