Arthur and Wei-hai-Wei, Japan had accomplished the major part of the
work which she had proposed to herself. The remainder of the story of
the war may be briefly told. Hai-cheng was taken by the Third Division
(of the First Army Corps) on December 13, and the Chinese made in
January and February three unsuccessful attempts to retake this
important walled city. The First Division (of the Second Army Corps)
advanced from Kin-chow on February 10 toward Ying-kow, or the treaty
port of "Niu-chwang," while the First Army Corps in two bodies pressed
northward and then westward with the town of Niu-chwang as its objective
point, whence it intended to join the First Division at Ying-kau.
Niu-chwang was seized on March 4 after a sanguinary fight on the streets
in which more than 1880 Chinese lost their lives. Two days later, the
First Division captured Ying-kau without the coöperation of the First
Army Corps and with no effective resistance from the enemy. The two
armies then joined in the cannonading of Tien-chwang-tai on the other
side of the Liao River, which was razed to the ground in order to
prevent the Chinese from returning to it.
Toward the end of March a column of Japanese troops seized the Pescadore
Islands near Formosa.
The Chinese government, which had already twice sent abortive peace
envoys with insufficient powers, now ordered Viceroy Li Hung Chang to
sail to Japan and sue for peace. He arrived at Shimonoseki on March 19,
where he was met by the Japanese peace commissioners, Premier Count
(soon to be Marquis) Itō and Foreign Minister Viscount (soon to be
Count) Mutsu. Li was later joined by his son-in-law, Li Ching Fang, as
plenipotentiary. Li Hung Chang proposed an armistice, but the conditions
demanded by Japan appeared to him too onerous to accept. On the 24th, as
he was returning from a conference to his lodging, a fanatic, R. Koyama,
who had led himself to believe that Li was the disturber of the peace of
the East, shot at him with a revolver and wounded him on the left
cheek--an incident which plunged the entire nation into profound regret.
The emperor now almost unconditionally granted an armistice for three
weeks. Li soon recovered from his wound, and resumed negotiations on
April 10. The Japanese terms for peace had on his request been shown to
him April 1, and these with various amendments became the basis of the
Treaty of Shimonoseki, signed on April 17 and ratified on May 8. By this
treaty the absolute independence of Korea was at last assured; China
agreed to cede to Japan the Liao-tung peninsula, Formosa, and the
Pescadores, and to pay 200 million taels as indemnity; and Kang-chow,
Su-chow, Sha-shi, and Chung-king were opened to foreign trade, and the
foreigners were granted the right of engaging in manufacturing
enterprises in China. The war, which had lasted for more than seven
months and cost Japan nearly 200 million _yen_ and the loss of 1005
killed and 4922 wounded (besides 16,866 deaths from disease), now came
to an end. Japan had placed on the field 120,000 men in two armies and
five columns, and carried out the campaign in all its complexity with
remarkable success.
A few words may be said regarding the effects of the war upon China and
Japan. The former's reverses were in a large measure a blessing in
disguise, for they revealed, as nothing else would, the radical faults
of her policy and administrative system, and convinced many of her
patriots of the need for a reform. It was largely due to this fact that
the two nations emerged from the war with no ill-will against each
other. On the contrary, the more thoughtful among the Chinese seemed to
be attracted to Japan by her success in the same proportion that they
became alive to the causes of the failure of their own government. In
such a vast and conservative country as China a reform must come slowly,
but it is safe to say that some of its seeds were sown as a result of
the war of 1894-1895. As for Japan herself, her position suddenly rose
in the eyes of the nations of the world. Even those foreigners who had
heard little of her great progress in arts and sciences and still
greater hopes of further growth were now forced to admit the foresight,
endurance, courage, and power of organization manifested by the Japanese
during the campaign. The more one knew the practical side of so large an
undertaking the more he realized the magnitude of Japan's success. This
appreciation of the world naturally stimulated the Japanese to a larger
ambition for future progress. The stimulus after the war, however, came
as well from the victory, as from the bitter experience which closely
followed it--the forcible intervention of three European powers against
Japan, which at once changed the whole aspect of the Eastern question.
Chapter XX
JAPAN AND RUSSIA IN KOREA AND MANCHURIA
1893-1904
When the peace negotiations between the Japanese and Chinese
plenipotentiaries were in progress at Shimonoseki, Russia and France had
been preparing themselves to intervene, and Germany had for diplomatic
reasons consented to aid the Russian overtures, while Great Britain,
which had once before made a fruitless effort to bring about a concerted
mediation by the powers, declared that she had no objections to Japan's
claims. The plan of intervention having been matured, the Russian,
French, and German representatives at Tōkyō called at the foreign office
on April 23, 1895, and on their separate cordial reception, presented
notes from their governments in which the latter counseled Japan to
return to China the Liao-tung peninsula of South Manchuria, for its
retention by Japan would, in their opinion, not only endanger the
position of the Chinese capital, but also render the independence of
Korea illusory, and permanently threaten the general peace of the Far
East. While the notes were couched in polite terms, the Eastern
squadrons of the three powers manifested such an activity as to
demonstrate the determination of the intervening states to enforce their
demand, if necessary, by a concerted appeal to arms. At this grave
crisis the Japanese authorities agreed among themselves that after the
exhausting war of the last eight months it would be impossible for Japan
to fight single-handed with the three European powers. May 10, 1895,
found the Japanese nation eagerly perusing the imperial decree which
reiterated the unalterable devotion of the emperor to the cause of
peace, for the sake of which the three friendly powers had advised, and
his own sense of magnanimity also counseled, the retrocession to China
of the entire peninsula of Liao-tung. The feeling excited among all
ranks of the people by this memorable incident was intense. It seemed
plain to everyone that the conduct of the powers in thus depriving Japan
of what appeared to be a just fruit of her costly war could not have
been animated by a genuine respect for the integrity of the Chinese
empire. None wished the independence of Korea and the progress of China
more deeply than did the Japanese, while, on the other hand, Russia, the
central figure in the intervention, probably had a design upon Port
Arthur and the whole of Manchuria. The fall of this vast territory into
Russia's hands would eventually threaten the independence of Korea, and,
consequently, the safety of Japan herself. The Japanese nation naturally
awoke to the conviction that, in order to secure the peace of the East
and the repose of Japan, the latter must strengthen and enrich herself,
so that the humiliation of 1895 should never recur. The conviction was
based, it should be clearly noted, not so much upon a desire for revenge
as upon the determination to safeguard the common vital interests of
Japan and the general Far East by means of progress and civilization.
From 1895, therefore, began the most rapid advance in all directions of
Japan's material power that has ever taken place in any period of the
same length in her past history.
In China, however, the clever diplomacy of Russia entered a new epoch
after the intervention of 1895. The first definitely known understanding
between the two powers concerned a Chinese loan of four hundred million
francs, $80,000,000, guaranteed by Russia and raised mainly at Paris in
July, 1895, which was intended for the payment of one-half of the
indemnity due to Japan. Then, the Russo-Chinese Bank was organized by a
syndicate of capitalists of Paris and St. Petersburg, with its
headquarters in the latter city, where the intimate friend of the tsar,
Prince Ukhtomsky, was made its president. An important agreement was
entered upon on September 8, 1896, between this bank and the Chinese
minister at St. Petersburg, which has since proved to be the basis of
many another striking document. By this agreement and also by the
Russian statutes based upon it, it was provided that the Russo-Chinese
Bank should undertake to organize the Eastern Chinese Railway Company,
which should construct a branch line of the great Siberian Railway
through the Hei-lung and Kirin provinces of Manchuria and connect it
with the South Ussuri branch railway. Only Russian and Chinese subjects
could be its shareholders. The Chinese government was to take over the
road after eighty years without payment, or with a due payment after
thirty-six years. It was also agreed that both imports and exports
between China and Russia carried by the new railway should pay only
two-thirds of the regular tariff rates of China.
No sooner was the first sod of the railway cut on its eastern extremity
than events occurred which led to a further extension by the Russians of
the railroad toward the most strategic points in the Liao-tung peninsula
which they leased--points which had so recently been retroceded by
Japan, on Russia's advice, for the peace and independence of China and
Korea. It belongs to the history of China to recount how, at the murder
by a mob of two German Catholic missionaries in Shan-tung, the
government of the kaiser succeeded in March, 1898, in wresting from
China a ninety-nine-year lease of the Bay of Kiao-chow and its
hinterland, together with railway and mining concessions between the
shore and Tsi-nan-fu. This was a signal for the advent of a remarkable
series of territorial demarcations to be made by the rival powers of
Europe which had been no less eager than Germany to seize the first
opportunity to carve out their respective "spheres" of influence or
interest on the soil of the feeble Chinese empire. The act of Germany
disturbed the balance of power in the Far East which could not be
restored until the aggressive passions of all competing powers should
have been satiated. Great Britain obtained in February a pledge never to
alienate to any other power any portion of the extensive provinces
adjoining the Yang-tse River. This was followed by the lease to Russia
for twenty-five years, subject to renewal, of Port Arthur and
Ta-lien-wan. The Russo-Chinese agreement signed on March 27 declared
that the lease constituted no prejudice against the Chinese sovereignty
over the territory, but was designed for the protection of the Russian
navy in the waters of North China. It must be remembered that Russia
with her immense dominion of Siberia had up to this time possessed no
adequate naval station on its shores which was not bound by ice during
the winter months. Now at length she secured the almost ice-free Port
Arthur and Ta-lien-wan, of which the former and a portion of the latter
were agreed to be used exclusively for naval purposes, while the
remaining portion of Ta-lien-wan was to be opened to the merchant
vessels of all nations. The agreement further provided that a branch
line might be built by Russia from the Manchurian railway to Ta-lien-wan
and, as was later stipulated, to Port Arthur, and, if necessary, also a
line from the open port of Niu-chwang to the Yalu River on the Korean
border. A special agreement was further concluded on May 7 to supplement
the one of March 27, which has been described. The Russian lease on the
tip of the Liao-tung peninsula induced Great Britain, on July 1, to
obtain under similar terms on the opposite promontory of Shan-tung the
lease of the Bay of Wei-hai-wei. This port had still been under the
occupation of Japanese troops, pending the final payment of the Chinese
indemnity, but was now cheerfully evacuated by them to be replaced by
the forces of the power with which the relations of Japan had already
begun to be especially amicable. In South China the rivalry between
France and Great Britain was manifested afresh by the proposed opening
of the West River and concessions in Yunnan obtained by the latter, and
the sphere created on the Kwang-chow Bay by the former. Japan also
secured the pledge of non-alienation of the province of Fuh-kien, which
lies opposite her new territory of Formosa.
[Illustration: FOREIGN SPHERES OF INFLUENCE IN CHINA AND MANCHURIA]
It is necessary in order to comprehend the situation with any degree of
clearness, sharply to distinguish the nature of the Russian concessions
in Liao-tung from those of all the other "spheres" in North and South
China. It was alone in the former instance that new naval posts of great
moment were directly connected by a railroad with the military centers
of an enormous and contiguous dominion which represented an expansion
through centuries. The creation of naval posts on the strategic points
of the peninsula would be sufficient, as was avowed by Russia herself
three years before, to threaten Peking, render the independence of Korea
illusory, and continually imperil the peace of the Far East, and its
dangers must further be measured by the immense pressure which might be
exercised with the military resources of all the Russias that lay behind
Liao-tung and were now connected thereto by rail.
The situation was made worse by an Anglo-Russian railway agreement of
April 28, 1899. The origin of this document belongs to the history of
China. It suffices here to point out that it provided that Great Britain
should not seek any railway concession north of the Great Wall, and
Russia should observe the same principle in the Yang-tse basin. The
peculiarity of this agreement consists in the fact that one of its
signatories was not, as usual, the Chinese government, but that two
European powers thereby pledged themselves not to infringe upon each
other's sphere of railroad concession in China. Diplomatic exigencies
might (as they have since done beyond the wall) induce one of the
parties to interpret the railroad sphere in the light of a political
sphere.
The peculiarly favorable position of the United States rendered it both
possible and desirable for her to maintain in China the principles of
the territorial integrity of the empire and of the equal opportunity
therein for the economic enterprise of all nations--the latter principle
often called that of the "open door." Between the end of 1899 and the
beginning of 1900 Secretary Hay induced the great powers, though with
nominal success, to declare anew that they would observe the avowed
policy of the "open door" in their respective spheres in China. He had,
however, hardly received the replies of the powers when the reports of
an anti-foreign campaign of an unusually serious character began to
arrive from China. The story of the so-called Boxer uprising, with its
thrilling episodes, will be told in the volume on China, and here it is
enough for us to observe its two features, namely, Japan's share in the
suppression of the trouble, and the bearing of the latter upon the
Manchurian question.
By the middle of June, 1900, the representatives of twelve powers, as
well as many other foreigners and native Christians, had already found
themselves besieged in Peking and gallantly defending themselves against
the frequent attacks of the Boxers and imperial troops; Admiral Seymour
and his twelve hundred marines had already found it impossible to force
their way to the relief of the besieged foreigners. At this juncture
the government of Great Britain perceived that no other power could with
greater dispatch and success come to the rescue of the legations than
Japan. The latter, however, had resolved to act only in concert with
other powers, or, if alone, only at their united and explicit request.
She therefore contented herself with transporting 3000 soldiers for Taku
to move strictly in unison with the forces of the other allies. The
negotiation carried on by Lord Salisbury with the continental
governments in relation to the advisability of requesting Japan
immediately to mobilize 25,000 or 30,000 troops from her shores had
resulted, early in July, in evoking from Germany a dissent from the
proposition so long as the allies could act in harmony, and from Russia
a reply that she deemed it unwise to intrust a single power with the
restoration of order in China, but that she would welcome 20,000 or
30,000 additional troops from any one of the powers which would move in
perfect accord with the others. Impatient of the dilatory and indefinite
replies, the British government went so far as to guarantee on its own
responsibility the cost of mobilizing the desired number of troops from
Japan. This was on July 6, and on the same day Japan at last resolved to
dispatch, with no condition whatsoever from the other powers, troops
aggregating 22,000. By this time the Japanese Chancellor Sugiyama and
the German Minister von Ketteler had been murdered in Peking, the Taku
forts had been taken by the allies, and the prospect had been that both
the British and the German forces would soon aggregate 10,000 men.
Tientsin fell before the allies on July 14, three days before the
arrival of the fresh troops from Japan. After three weeks at Tientsin
during which nothing could be done, 15,780 allied forces, of which 8000
were the Japanese, began to march toward Peking on August 4. All along
the way there were sanguinary encounters with the Boxers and Chinese
troops, so that the allies probably lost 800 men before they reached
Peking on August 14. The Japanese soldiers, after a terrible battle
lasting for nearly fifteen hours till 9.50 P. M., bombarded the eastern
walls at two of the gates and rushed into the Forbidden City, while
previously a column dispatched by them had led the rest of the allied
forces toward the British legation through the gate which the Russians
had exploded about 5 P. M. With what wild burst of joy and enthusiasm
the foreigners, who had been defending themselves under unspeakable
difficulties within the walls of the British legation, received the
triumphant entry of the allied soldiers may better be imagined than
told. The siege had at length been raised, the imperial court had fled
toward Si-ngan, and the capital of China fell into the hands of the
powers.
It is unnecessary to remind the reader that all during this memorable
campaign the Japanese soldiers won universal praise for their dash and
discipline. With no less admiration were their commissariat system and
method of transportation regarded by their comrades. Repeatedly was it
seen by impartial observers that even in orderliness among themselves
and just and moderate treatment of the non-combatants, the troops of the
non-Christian Japan were behind those of no Christian country then
represented in North China. They excelled also in the power of
organization and control in their dealings with the people of Peking,
who had come under the provisional government of the conquering powers.
All these merits were externally visible, but only the Japanese soldier
himself will know what burning love of his country's name, which he
carried deep in his bosom, animated him with courage and patience and
bridled his animal passion. He marched shoulder to shoulder with the
troops of the powers, three of which had five years before treated his
country with indignity and forced her to forsake the price of the blood
of her sons only to appropriate it for themselves. He could now show
them that he had not been forever reduced by them into an insignificant
position, but, on the contrary, had advanced beyond his former degree of
military efficiency, and could vie with any one of them either in the
art of war or in the moral qualities that constitute the modern soldier.
His experience was invaluable both in training his mind and body and in
demonstrating anew that, after all, his racial identity was hardly a bar
against his full participation in the arts of civilization. As precious
for his country may be regarded the fact that her position in the East
rose, through the North China campaign, considerably higher in the
esteem of the powers than even after the Chinese war of 1894-1895.
Otherwise the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902 probably would not have
been so soon formed. Nor could Japan have since proceeded with her
national activities with such a calm confidence.
How far Japan had outrun in the march of national progress her
neighboring empire of China, whose disciple she once was, was strikingly
illustrated by the telegraphic messages that the emperors of the two
nations exchanged both before and after the capture of Peking. Nor can a
stronger refutation of the oft-repeated theory that one day Japan will
revive the moribund China and form with her a pan-"yellow" alliance
powerful enough to exclude the Caucasian influence from the Orient, be
found than in the comparison of the Chinese epistles and the Japanese
replies in which both emperors faithfully expressed the attitude of
their respective nations. On July 3, or half a month after the fall of
the Taku forts, his majesty the emperor of China telegraphed a personal
message to the Japanese emperor in which he laid great stress upon the
idea that in the present rivalry between the East and the West, the
former was supported by only two nations, the Chinese and the Japanese.
Could it be China alone that the Occidental powers covet with their
tiger's eye? "If China should fall," said his majesty, "perhaps your
country would be unable to stand alone." On the strength of this
argument, the Son of Heaven made an earnest appeal to his
fellow-sovereign to sink minor differences and rescue the Orient from
the impending crisis. To this remarkable communication responded the
emperor of Japan, saying that he considered it incumbent upon China
immediately to suppress the internal disorder and save the foreign
envoys, whose persons were inviolable, and that after the restoration of
normal order by China's own efforts Japan would, during the negotiations
of the powers, safeguard the interests of the great empire. The author
of the original message may have thought Japan a renegade of the Orient,
but the reply of the latter's sovereign implied her irrevocable policy
of acting upon the dictates of the most advanced standards of mankind--a
policy which is infinitely removed from the defensive position of one
form of civilization or one section of the earth's surface as over
against another. Nearly three months later, on September 24, the Chinese
emperor again communicated from Ta-yuan to the Japanese sovereign his
sense of gratitude for the work of the latter's soldiers, and solicited
his persuasion of the other powers to expedite the conclusion of peace.
In reply, Japan's ruler suggested that peace would follow if the court
should at once return to Peking, calm the minds of the people, and
manifest to the powers its sincere regrets for the recent outrages, and
also if the reactionary ministers were removed from office and a new
government was organized of men whose ability was universally
recognized.
It was after a number of conferences that, on November 9, the peace
commissioners at Peking came to the final conclusion regarding the terms
of peace, which were reduced into an identical note two months later.
This protracted period of negotiation was mainly due to the difficulty
of maintaining a strict harmony between the several powers on all points
under discussion. We cannot tarry over the details of the discussion,
for they properly belong to the history of China. Nor need we point out
the exact contributions that Japan made toward the peace settlement,
which were in the main of a moderating character. Of the indemnity,
amounting to 450 million Hai-kuan taels ($333,900,000), Japan shared
about 7.73 per cent. Previous to the conclusion of peace an incident
occurred at Amoy which has caused misunderstanding in certain quarters.
On August 24 a mob burned a Japanese Buddhist building in the city, upon
which some Japanese bluejackets were landed to protect the consulate and
the resident subjects of Japan. More marines were later landed, and
still more were reported to be coming via Formosa. A widespread rumor
ensued that Japan was bent on the occupation of Amoy, and the
consternation among the citizens ran so high that the local _taotai_,
together with a large number of _literati_ and wealthy merchants, made a
personal appeal to the Japanese consul to evacuate, themselves pleading
to indemnify the burned building and the landing of the marines. In the
meantime a British and a German war vessel had arrived, and the Japanese
reinforcements bound for Amoy had been recalled from Formosa. The people
who had unnecessarily dreaded the presence of the Japanese forces now
began to manifest contempt of the Japanese residents in Amoy, whose
position was imagined to have suddenly fallen at the coming of the
foreign marines. A general evacuation soon followed the restoration of
order, leaving the status of the Japanese in the city much the same as
before the incident. Although it can hardly be concealed that some of
the Japanese residing in Fuh-kien and Formosa were at the time animated
by a certain degree of chauvinism, the intentions of the government at
Tōkyō could not have been but entirely pacific.
Perhaps in no other instance have the powers more repeatedly and
unequivocally given expression to their avowed devotion to the doctrine
of the territorial integrity and the open door in China than during and
after the Boxer insurrection. Not the least clear declarations came from
Russia, whose conduct, however, could at least as well be explained by
another principle which she has persistently denied. Facts would lead
one to suppose that she at first regarded the trouble in North China as
slight enough to die of its own inanity or be readily suppressed by the
assistance of herself alone. Count Muraviev, the Russian foreign
minister, even prophesied that order would be restored within two weeks.
The serious nature of the uprising, however, soon made it evident that
it hardly was an occasion for any single power thus to ingratiate itself
with the helpless Chinese government. Russia hence joined the concert of
the powers in the march toward Peking, but at least some of her press
and authors continued to regard her joint action with the allies as
rather incidental, for, according to their opinion, the trouble had been
caused by the offensive acts of the other powers in China in which
Russia had had no share. Subsequent events show, however, that, if she
attached a relatively small importance to the conditions in North China,
Russia at the same time grasped the Manchurian situation with great
celerity and vigor. It is impossible to judge from our present state of
knowledge whether the aggressive attitude of Russia in Manchuria
preceded or followed the appearance of threatening signs of danger
against her interests in that territory. Most of the actual troubles,
however, seem to have occurred after Russia had suddenly assumed, from
June 26 on, a belligerent movement in Manchuria on a vast scale which
was to cost her in the end no less than sixty-two million rubles.[1] In
a few days adjoining regions in Siberia were declared as in a state of
war, and troops from Vladivostok, Khabarovsk, Blagovestchensk, and the
Trans-Baikalia, as well as from European Russia, began to press into
Manchuria. It is as unnecessary as impossible to mark at each point of
the widespread warfare that followed whether the initiative was taken by
the Chinese or by the Russians. It is evident that some strategic points
in Manchuria had already been infested by the Boxers and their
sympathizers, who set about from what time is not known, obstructing and
damaging railroad construction, attacking the churches, and persecuting
the converts in the southern region, and, on July 16, bombarding the
Russian city of Blagovestchensk across the Amur, the navigation of which
was consequently stopped, and a week later murdering some eighty
Russians in An-tung near the Korean border. Other outrages followed as
the Russian aggression excited more resentment among the Chinese. The
forces of the tsar occupied the open port of Niu-chwang, where on
August 5 they organized a provisional government. The Russian possession
of Niu-chwang was followed, before the allies entered into Peking, by
that of Hun-chun, Argun, Harbin, Aigun, San-sin, and other centers
scattered over the surface of Manchuria, while in July the dismissal by
the Chinese government of the Chinese manager of the Manchurian railroad
which had hitherto been partly under the nominal control of China, left
the Russians in full and sole possession.
Thus far Russia had no more subdued all Manchuria than the allies had
restored order in North China, and the tsar's government surprised the
other powers, on August 25, only ten days after the rescue of the
legations in Peking, by declaring Russia's intention to withdraw her
minister and troops from Peking. It was thought by observers, and freely
admitted by some Russian writers, that this unexpected move by Russia
was by no means out of the line of her traditional policy of conferring
favor upon the neighbor whose house should as long as possible be left
in a state of confusion and disorder. The proposition was deemed none
the less as acceptable in principle as impracticable in detail at that
early date. In regard to Manchuria, the same Russian circular of August
25 declared that evacuation would occur as soon as peace was permanently
restored and measures were taken to protect the railways, and other
powers threw no obstacle in the way. It was soon seen, however, that the
armed pacification of Manchuria could not so abruptly stop. On the
contrary, the occupation of many strategic points, including Ninguta,
Tsitsihar, Mukden, Kin-chow, and An-tung, was yet to come, until early
in December the entire three eastern provinces had completely fallen
into the hands of the Russians.
It was doubtless with a grave apprehension of this Manchurian situation
that Great Britain had induced Germany to sign, on October 16, 1900, the
ill-fated Anglo-German agreement. It sought to effect a difficult
combination of three principles not easily reconcilable with one
another: the integrity of the remaining territory of China, an open
door, and equal advantage to men of all nations in the trading ports and
marts, and the protection of the interest already acquired in China by
the signatories. The strength of the combination was further reduced by
the manner in which the first and the third principles were upheld in
the agreement, which declared that neither power would make use of the
present complication to acquire any territorial advantages, but that if
another power should act contrary to this view, then the signatories
might consult together as to the measures of protecting their own
interests. At their invitation to accept the principles of the
agreement, Russia, as well as France, cleverly replied that they saw
therein nothing other than the same old principles which they had
repeatedly advocated, while the United States expressed assent to the
first two of the principles, but deemed the third as not concerning her.
Japan entered the agreement as a signatory. Judged from the very purpose
for which the document had been framed by Great Britain, the agreement
may be said to have ended in a failure, for what was the use of
reiterating the first principle if Manchuria was not considered a part
of the Chinese territory, whose integrity was thereby respected? Yet
Count von Bülow, imperial chancellor of Germany, said in the Reichstag
on March 15, 1901, as he again did toward the end of 1903, that the
Anglo-German agreement had no reference to Manchuria. "I can imagine
nothing," he was reported to have said, "which we regard with more
indifference" than Manchuria. "The Yang-tse agreement" was the name
given to the document by the Germans, who were pleased to interpret it
as applying with particular force, not to Manchuria, but to the British
sphere in the basin of the great river which had always been an eyesore
to Germany. With one of the contracting parties at variance with the
very aim of the agreement, it was useless for the marquis of Lansdowne
to declare, on August 6, 1901, that it "most unquestionably extended to
Manchuria, which was part of the Chinese empire." It is to be doubted
that the convention had exerted the slightest influence in staying the
hand of Russia in the three eastern provinces.
Toward the close of 1900 appeared in the London _Times_ a dispatch from
its Peking correspondent, Dr. George E. Morrison, containing the
contents of a secret treaty alleged to have been concluded in November
between Tsang-chi, the Tartar-general at Mukden, and Admiral Alexiev,
which stipulated that Tsang should pacify Manchuria and then report the
detail of his administration of the territory to a Russian resident to
be stationed at Mukden. This convention was not ratified either by the
tsar or by the Son of Heaven. This was merely a prelude to a more
serious development. Early in 1901, when the peace commissioners at
Peking were discussing the matter of the punishment to be demanded of
China for the local officials who had been privy to the Boxer outrages,
Russia showed signs of isolating herself from the concert of the powers
and taking side with the Chinese sentiment. This characteristic action
of the Russians was accompanied by the rumor of negotiations for a
secret convention carried on at St. Petersburg between the government of
the tsar and the Chinese minister. Of this supposed convention several
versions were afloat, some of which would have one believe that in its
scope were comprised, not only Manchuria, but also Ili, the New
Territory, Mongolia, and the provinces of Kan-su, Shen-si, and Shan-si,
as Russian spheres of one sort or another. Either in its truer form or
after some concession on the Russian part, the secret treaty, as it was
more definitely known, was said to have contained the following eight
points, which are worthy of enumeration as showing at least some of the
original intentions Russia had regarding Manchuria: 1, that Russia
should continue the military occupation of Manchuria pending the
restoration of order and the settlement of the question of war
indemnity; 2, that China should consult Russia as to where and how many
Chinese troops might be stationed in Manchuria; 3, that China should at
any time dismiss at Russia's request those Manchurian generals and other
officials whose conduct was deemed prejudicial to mutual amity; 4, that
the number of the Chinese police should also be determined by consulting
Russia, and the use of artillery should be forbidden; 5, that there
should be organized a special official system for the neutral territory
already marked; 6, that no railway or mining concession in Manchuria
should be granted to citizens of any other nation without consulting
Russia; 7, that the railroad indemnity should, through an agreement made
with the railway company, be wholly or in part paid by the profit of the
roads; and 8, that Russia should be allowed to construct a branch line
from the Manchurian railway to the Great Wall. The result of these
demands, were they real and had China granted them, would have been a
complete Russian protectorate over Manchuria, for although it was made
to imply that the military occupation of Manchuria should cease with the
restoration of peace, such concessions were demanded as would tend to
perpetuate the Russian control of the territory. Japan first saw the
gravity of the situation, and communicated about the matter with the
United States and Great Britain. The last power consulted other powers.
The powers thus assumed a united front in warning China of the unwisdom
of concluding with a single power before she had reached a common
agreement with all the allies. The protest, however, bore no appreciable
effect upon Russia, which persisted in avowing that the intended
agreement was unlike the one reported in the press, but was merely a
provisional step toward the evacuation of Manchuria. Before the end of
March, Japan and Great Britain directly communicated with Russia, which
adroitly retorted to the latter that it was not customary with the
tsar's government to show to a third power a treaty to be concluded with
an independent nation. To Japan's request to submit the agreement to the
discussion of the allied powers' commissioners at Peking, with whom all
matters concerning the late complication should rest, Russia replied
that the intended treaty contained injury to none and might well be made
public after conclusion. This reply was dated March 26. On April 5 Japan
forwarded to Russia her second message, supported by a firm
determination. Russia now suddenly withdrew her demands, declaring at
the same time that, owing to the obstruction placed in the way of
effecting the first move preliminary to the eventual evacuation of
Manchuria, she was obliged to maintain for the present the military
occupation of its provinces.
It was again rumored in June that another secret Manchurian convention
was afoot, which, if real, however, must have miscarried. No more
successful was the patriotic effort of the Viceroy Chang Chih-tung and
the late Viceroy Liu Kan-yi to create among the peace commissioners a
sentiment for the opening to foreign trade of the whole of Manchuria.
Toward the last of August Paul Lessar was appointed the Russian minister
at Peking. The peace protocol agreed upon between China and the allied
powers was finally signed on September 7, 1901, the imperial court was
expected shortly to return to Peking, and the Chinese government began
to look anxiously for the withdrawal of foreign troops from the realm.
Seizing this opportunity, Russia proposed a new Manchurian treaty whose
comparatively mild terms made it appear acceptable at this moment to the
Chinese commissioners, especially to the pro-Russian, Li Hung Chang.
According to the reported tenor of this treaty, the Manchurian
evacuation was to be completed within two or three years, the Chinese
troops at Mukden were to be trained by Russian officers, and their
numbers to be determined by consulting Russia's wishes, and, as in the
treaty withdrawn in April, Chinese artillery was forbidden. Considering
the feeble attitude of the Chinese commissioners, it would have been
extremely difficult for Japan and Great Britain effectively to protest
against the acceptance of the Russian demands had not the Viceroys Liu
and Chang strongly reminded the emperor and the empress dowager of the
direct peril to the dynasty which might result from virtually forsaking
its ancestral home, Manchuria, to a foreign power whose ambition knew no
bounds. In accordance with the wishes of the court, the dying Li Hung
Chang, on his sick-bed, saw Lessar and appealed to the Russian
friendship for China to modify the terms of the proposed agreement. Li
soon passed away, on November 7, leaving the gravest problem of China in
a state of extreme uncertainty. Prince Ching presented a
counter-proposition, which among other things requested the evacuation
of Manchuria within one year. Russia's reply to this note arrived in
Peking the last of January, 1902, and was found to contain a demand for
an exclusive mining concession to Russia of all Manchuria, which is
noted for its untold stores of minerals. Against this the United States,
Great Britain, and Japan entered a firm protest. Secretary Hay, in his
note of February 3, reminded the Russian and Chinese governments of the
repeated assurances made by the tsar's foreign minister of his devotion
to the principle of the open door in all parts of China, and said: "An
agreement whereby China gives any corporation or company the exclusive
right or privilege of opening mines, establishing railroads, or in any
other way industrially developing Manchuria, can but be viewed with the
gravest concern by the government of the United States. It constitutes a
monopoly, which is a distinct breach of the stipulations of the treaties
concluded between China and foreign powers, and thereby seriously
affects the rights of American citizens." As usual, Russia, in her
reply, so strongly reinforced her former pledges of the principle of the
open door that the government at Washington found it impossible to
dispute them without questioning Russia's integrity, which Hay was not
disposed to do. By this time, however, an important event had taken
place in the diplomatic world which was popularly regarded as a virtual
protest against what was considered the Eastern policy of
Russia--namely, the conclusion of the agreement of the Anglo-Japanese
alliance signed at London on January 30, 1902.
The fair and open principles of this agreement may best be seen from its
text, which was as follows:
"The Governments of Great Britain and Japan, actuated solely by
a desire to maintain the _status quo_ and general peace in the
extreme East, being moreover specially interested in maintaining
the independence and territorial integrity of the Empire of
China and the Empire of Korea, and in securing equal
opportunities in those countries for the commerce and industry
of all nations, hereby agree as follows:
ARTICLE I.
"The High Contracting Parties having mutually recognized the
independence of China and Korea, declare themselves to be
entirely uninfluenced by any aggressive tendencies in either
country. Having in view, however, their special interests, of
which those of Great Britain relate principally to China, while
Japan, in addition to the interests which she possesses in
China, is interested in a peculiar degree politically as well as
commercially and industrially in Korea, the High Contracting
Parties recognize that it will be admissible for either of them
to take such measures as may be indispensable in order to
safeguard those interests if threatened either by the aggressive
action of any other power, or by disturbances arising in China
or Korea, and necessitating the intervention of either of the
High Contracting Parties for the protection of the lives and
property of its subjects.
ARTICLE II.
"If either Great Britain or Japan, in the defense of their
respective interests as above described, should become involved
in war with another power, the other High Contracting Party will
maintain a strict neutrality, and use its efforts to prevent
other powers from joining in hostilities against its ally.
ARTICLE III.
"If, in the above event, any other power or powers should join
in hostilities against that ally, the other High Contracting
Party will come to its assistance, and will conduct the war in
common, and will make peace in mutual agreement with it.
ARTICLE IV.
"The High Contracting Parties agree that neither of them will,
without consulting the other, enter into separate arrangements
with another power to the prejudice of the interests above
described.
ARTICLE V.
"Whenever, in the opinion of either Great Britain or Japan, the
above-mentioned interests are in jeopardy, the two governments
will communicate with one another fully and frankly.
ARTICLE VI.
"The present agreement shall come into effect immediately after
the date of its signature, and remain in force for five years
from that date.
"In case neither of the High Contracting Parties should have
notified twelve months before the expiration of the said five
years the intention of terminating it, it shall remain binding
until the expiration of one year from the day on which either of
the High Contracting Parties shall have denounced it. But if,
when the date fixed for its expiration arrives, either ally is
actually engaged in war, the alliance shall, _ipso facto_,
continue until peace is concluded."
To the Anglo-Japanese agreement Russia and her ally France retorted in
the following declaration of March 16:
"The allied Russo-French Governments are wholly pleased to discern that
the Anglo-Japanese convention supports the essential principles which,
according to the reiterated statement of France and Russia, constituted
and still constitute the foundation of their policy. Both governments
believe that the support of these principles is also a guarantee of the
interests of the Far East. They are compelled, however, not to lose from
view the possibly inimical action of other powers, or a repetition of
disorders in China, possibly impairing China's integrity and free
development, to the detriment of their reciprocal interests. They
therefore reserve to themselves the right to take measures to defend
these interests."
In this connection may be related the diplomatic comedy enacted at
Shanghai in October, in which the newly formed Anglo-Japanese alliance
played a part. According to the just wishes of the Chinese authorities,
Great Britain proposed on July 31 to Japan, Germany, and France to
withdraw the troops the four powers had been stationing at Shanghai,
where peace had been restored. Japan and France cheerfully assented, on
the condition, however, that all the parties should agree. Germany
showed an inexplicable dilatoriness in giving a definite answer,
proposing that the four powers should first come to an agreement as to
the date of a joint evacuation. Great Britain fixed November 1, to which
France agreed. Japan, however, delayed, as she descried a secret
movement being made by one of the parties. Finally, Japan heard on
October 6, and Great Britain on the 8th, that Germany had secured from
the Chinese government a pledge that it would give no additional rights
to any power in the Yang-tse basin, the British influence over which had
always embarrassed the German policy in China. The stroke dealt by
Germany could have been aimed at no other power but Great Britain. The
former notified the latter that her intention was to prevent any power
from taking the present opportunity to come to a secret agreement of an
exclusive nature with China--a possibility altogether incompatible with
the terms of the alliance so recently framed. At the same time, the
Chinese government pretended that it had made no special pledge to
Germany. Great Britain, now fully advised by Japan of the nature of the
case, declared that it would be unnecessary and undesirable to bind only
a few powers to guarantee the integrity of a portion of the Chinese
empire, and that to such an agreement, if any, she would not consider
herself in any way bound. She also expressed to Prince Ching her
resentment of his duplicity. In the meantime, the Viceroy Chang
Chih-tung, from whom the German consul had sought a similar pledge to
one that had been given by the prince, flatly refused the demand.
Germany ended the affair with a clever but unconvincing explanation to
Great Britain. Seeing that the sky was clear, Japan evacuated Shanghai,
alone and boldly, on November 22. The other powers soon followed.
It will be recalled that the Anglo-Japanese agreement was announced in
the midst of the negotiations between Lessar and the Chinese government
concerning Manchuria. During the diplomatic flurry attending the
momentous declarations made first by Japan and Great Britain and then by
Russia and France, the Manchurian negotiation seemed to have been
temporarily forgotten, until the world was taken by surprise to hear of
the conclusion, on April 8, 1902, of a new Russo-Chinese convention
regarding the three eastern provinces, which went into force
simultaneously with the signing of the agreement at three o'clock in the
afternoon of that memorable day. Not the least surprising feature of it
was the remarkable mildness of its terms. Russia promised, upon the
condition that China should protect the Russian railways, Russian
subjects, and their enterprises in Manchuria, to evacuate the territory
and restore it to Chinese sovereignty. The evacuation was to take place
at three different periods within the ensuing eighteen months, as
follows: from regions west of the Liao River, by October 8, 1902; from
the rest of the province of Sheng-king and the province of Kirin, by
April 8, 1903; and, finally, from the Amur (Hei-lung) province, by
October 8, 1903. Pending the evacuation, the number of Chinese troops
and the sites of their stations in Manchuria should be determined by
consultation between the Chinese and Russian officers, but after the
evacuation those troops might be freely distributed at the direction of
the Chinese officers. Then, however, the Russian Government should be
notified of every change made in this respect. Suppressing other points
in the convention which do not concern us directly, it is seen that it
says nothing about Chinese territories outside of Manchuria, and, within
the latter, contains no new mining or railway demands, while it appears
to promise an eventually complete restoration of Manchuria to China. The
moderate tone of the present instrument as compared with the former
abortive conventions, and coming so soon after the renewed declaration
of the Russo-French alliance of its devotion to the principle of the
territorial integrity of China, seemed to confirm the sincerity of
Russia's avowed intention in the East.
The first period of the Manchurian occupation, according to this
convention, was to close on October 8, 1902. Before that date the
Russian forces had completely withdrawn from that part of the Sheng-king
province lying to the west of the Liao River. Russia had fulfilled her
pledge. It was alleged, however, by several eyewitnesses that the
so-called evacuation largely meant the withdrawal of Russian troops from
Chinese quarters into the numerous and extensive Russian barracks and
blockhouses along the Manchurian railway. The most important section of
Manchuria, namely, the rest of the Sheng-king and the whole of the Kirin
province, was, according to the convention, to be evacuated on April 8,
1903. That day came and passed, without seeing, except in a few places,
even the nominal evacuation. In the midst of a suspense full of
apprehension the Russians lodged at the Chinese foreign office, as a
price for the yet unfulfilled evacuations, new demands in seven
articles, which astounded the diplomatic world. The demands were in
substance as follows: 1, the non-alienation of any part of Manchuria to
any other power; 2, the right to construct a Russian telegraph line
between Niu-chwang and Peking; 3, the promise that under no pretext any
other foreigner should be employed in North China; 4, the sole
management of the customs tariff at Niu-chwang by the Russo-Chinese
Bank, and the Russian supervision of the quarantine service at the same
port; 5, the opening of no new port or mart in Manchuria to foreign
trade; 6, the maintenance of the _status quo_ in the Mongolian
administration; and, 7, the pledge to be made by China that all the
privileges that the Russians enjoyed before the late _émeute_ should not
hereby be affected. The Japanese minister, Uchida, entered on April 21 a
vigorous protest at the foreign office at Peking, and was followed by
the British and American ministers. The United States, which had already
been negotiating with China for the opening of two new ports in
Manchuria, where she possessed the greatest interest of any nation in
the import trade, made a query on April 24 direct to St. Petersburg as
to the authenticity of the reported demand. She was assured both by the
Russian foreign minister and Minister Cassini, as was Great Britain by
the Russian representative at London, that the published reports of the
proposed convention were absolutely incorrect. It appeared as if the
Russian disclaimer were final and a signal diplomatic success had been
accomplished by Secretary Hay. But to say that the reported articles
were incorrect was not the same as to say that they were entirely
unfounded, or even that every one of them was incorrect. The government
of the tsar seems to have left sufficient room in its statements for the
inference not only that there was proceeding a _pourparler_ with the
Chinese foreign office, but also that some of the rumored articles were
not to be denied. However that may be, it is noteworthy that the
knowledge of the Russian demand aroused among the leading classes of the
Chinese people a patriotic ebullition not known even during the Japanese
war and the Boxer insurrection. Petitions from all of the eighteen
provinces reminded the Peking government in the strongest terms that the
loss of Manchuria would lead to a widespread uprising in the empire, a
repetition of the anti-foreign crusade of 1900, a probable wholesale
partition of the Middle Kingdom by the rebels and the powers, and an
eventual downfall of the ruling dynasty. In this remarkable upheaval,
merchants and students, including those staying in Japan, took no less
active part than the officials and literates, who, as the ruling class,
are usually the most alive to the interests of the government and the
civilization of China. Under these circumstances it is not strange that
before May 10 the foreign office at Peking replied to the Russian
government that the former could assuredly not concede to a demand that
ignored previous agreements, the stipulations of which China had never
violated.
This reply of China to Russia hardly had a greater effect to settle the
dispute than did the pacific disclaimer given about ten days before by
Russia to the United States, but on the contrary, was followed by a
month the uncertain and trying nature of which to Prince Ching and his
foreign office has seldom since been equaled during the whole period of
the negotiations. While Pokotilov, the influential Peking agent of the
Russo-Chinese Bank, was reported to be freely dispensing gifts and
favors to win over certain members of the office and of the inner court,
the Russian _chargé_, Plançon, demanded an immediate reply to three of
the once proposed seven articles, which pertained to the non-alienation
of the Manchurian territory, the opening of no new ports, and the
maintenance of the _status quo_ in Mongolia. Prince Ching, as well as
the empress dowager, seemed to waver, or at least to bide time. The
attempt of some patriots to install in the foreign office the most
respected Viceroy Chang Chih-tung fell through, and the attitude of the
Japanese government was deemed not sufficiently reassuring to encourage
China once more to assume a decisive tone. In the meantime the Russian
minister, Lessar, returned on May 29 to Peking after an absence, and
severely reprimanded the foreign office for frequently allowing
diplomatic secrecy to be violated. In his conference with Prince Ching,
on June 10, he renewed the demand in each of the seven articles, every
one of which the prince however, was obliged to refuse, as before. At
Lessar's intimation that an indiscriminate refusal would result in
serious disadvantages to China, and his suggestion that some substitute
for the old demand might be devised for mutual benefit, the prince had
only to request the minister of the tsar to present his own substitute,
as the former naturally had none. A new demand was accordingly
presented, which embodied the first, fourth, and sixth articles of the
former convention, the fourth being now stated in two articles. Prince
Ching begged for five days' delay, and temporarily secluded himself from
the world, his negotiation with Lessar being in the meanwhile carried on
by secret correspondence. The protests from the Japanese, American, and
British ministers, as well as the renewed demand of the two former to
open new ports in Manchuria, did not avail.
Irritating to Japan as was the Manchurian situation, she was confronted
in Korea by a still more serious state of things. The diplomatic history
of the latter country since the conclusion of the war of 1894-1895 may
now be briefly recounted. The years between 1895 and 1898 witnessed
violent fluctuations of influence between the Russians and the Japanese
in Korea. The Japanese had been too eager for reform, and, at least on
the occasion of the murder of the queen on October 8, 1895, had allowed
themselves to be too much influenced by their less responsible element
to withstand the obstruction and diplomacy of the Russians. It was not
until the departure of Waeber, the astute Russian minister, and until
the activity of the Russians in China had become all-engrossing, that
the latter's influence was again eclipsed by that of the Japanese.
During this period of struggle Russia and Japan concluded three
agreements defining their position in Korea, namely, the Komura-Waeber
memorandum signed at Seul on May 4, 1896, the Yamagata-Lobanov protocol
signed at St. Petersburg on June 9, 1896, and the Nishi-Rosen protocol
concluded at Tokyo on April 25, 1898. Some of the more permanent of the
terms of these agreements deserve notice, as they gave to Japan a
conventional ground for her negotiations with Russia in 1903-1904, just
prior to the war. The two governments "recognized definitively the
sovereignty and the entire independence of Korea, and mutually engaged
themselves to abstain from all direct interference in the internal
affairs of that country." No military teacher or financial adviser
should be furnished to Korea by either power without consulting the
other. In view of the large development of the Japanese commercial and
industrial enterprises in Korea, the Russian government agreed not to
impede the development of the commercial and industrial relations
between Japan and Korea. In case further definitions of principles
should become necessary or other points for discussion should arise, the
representatives of the two powers should be instructed to negotiate
amicably. The arrangement made in these agreements was from its nature
temporary, and would have created fresh complications even if its terms
had been strictly observed.
As soon as her hands were freer in Manchuria, Russia, represented at
Seul by the ambitious Pavlov, and also by the semiofficial diplomats,
Baron Gunzburg and Miss Sonntag, employed such means as befitted the
peculiar situation of Korea in their persistent effort to overthrow
Japanese and promote Russian influence in the peninsula. For this
purpose they made to the Korean court propositions of almost every
conceivable nature, including demands for concessions at Masampo,
Chinhai Bay, and Kojedo Island, in the south, for the right to build
telegraph and railway lines in the north, and for the employment of
Russian financial advisers and military instructors. It was not till
April, 1903, however, that, simultaneously with her pressure upon
Peking, Russia began to work the timber concession which she was said to
have secured in 1896, when the Korean king had taken refuge in the
Russian legation at Seul. Early in May, ostensibly to defend the forest
land, forty-seven Russian soldiers arrived at Yongam-po on the Yalu,
where, despite protests from the Korean government, an extensive tract
of land was seized and fortification was begun. Presently, one hundred,
and then two hundred more Russian troops arrived, while on the
Manchurian side of the frontier fresh troops entered An-tung and
Feng-hwang-Cheng, so that the pressure of the Russian forces was heavily
felt upon the Korean border.
At length the Japanese government came to the decision that it should
deal directly with the government of the tsar in order to establish once
and for all the integrity of China in Manchuria, as well as the
independence and reform of Korea, to define the respective rights and
interests in those countries of Japan and Russia, and radically and
fundamentally to free the general peace of the Far East from the factors
that had continually and profoundly threatened it. The decision in its
main points had been reached by the press and the entire nation long
before the cabinet ministers and privy councilors met before the throne,
on June 23, and built thereon a definite policy to be pursued in the
coming negotiations with Russia. These negotiations were attended by
tortuous delays on the part of Russia, but the Japanese nation,
realizing that never in their long history had they been confronted with
a graver national problem, met it with a remarkable perseverance. The
government, also, conducted itself with dignity and consideration, for
none knew better than it that the immediate peace of the East was
dependent upon the success of the pending negotiations. The different
motives of Russia and Japan for these negotiations and the different
spirit in which each carried them on may be well seen in the following
official statements made by the respective governments soon after the
diplomatic relations between them had been severed. The Russian
communication, issued on February 9, 1904, by the foreign office at St.
Petersburg, said:
"Last year [1903] the Tōkyō cabinet, under the pretext of establishing
the balance of power and a more settled order of things on the shores of
the Pacific, submitted to the imperial government [of Russia] a proposal
for a revision of the existing treaties with Korea. Russia consented,
and Viceroy Alexiev was charged to draw up a project for a new
understanding with Japan in coöperation with the Russian minister at
Tōkyō, who was intrusted with the negotiations with the Japanese
government. Although the exchange of views with the Tōkyō cabinet on
this subject was of a friendly character, the Japanese social circles
and the local and foreign press attempted in every way to produce a
warlike ferment among the Japanese and to drive the government into an
armed conflict with Russia. Under the influence thereof the Tōkyō
cabinet began to formulate greater and greater demands in the
negotiations, at the same time taking most extensive measures to make
the country ready for war.
"All these circumstances could not, of course, disturb Russia's
equanimity, but they induced her also to take military and naval
measures. Nevertheless, to preserve peace in the Far East, Russia, so
far as her incontestable rights and interests permitted, gave the
necessary attention to the demands of the Tōkyō cabinet, and declared
herself ready to recognize Japan's privileged commercial and economic
position in the Korean peninsula, with the concession of the right to
protect it by military force in the event of disturbances in that
country. At the same time, while rigorously observing the fundamental
principle of her policy regarding Korea, whose independence and
integrity were guaranteed by previous understandings with Japan and by
treaties with other powers, Russia insisted on three points:
"(1.) On a mutual and unconditional guarantee of this principle.
"(2.) On an undertaking to use no part of Korea for strategic purposes,
as the authorization of such action on the part of any foreign power was
directly opposed to the principle of the independence of Korea.
"(3.) On the preservation of the full freedom of navigation of the
Straits of Korea.
"The project elaborated in this sense did not satisfy the Japanese
Government, which in its last proposals not only declined to accept the
conditions which appeared as the guarantee of the independence of Korea,
but also began at the same time to insist on provisions to be
incorporated in a project regarding the question of Manchuria. Such
demands on the part of Japan, naturally, were inadmissible, the question
of Russia's position in Manchuria concerning in the first place China,
but also all the powers having commercial interests in China. The
imperial government, therefore, saw absolutely no reason to include in a
special treaty with Japan regarding Korean affairs any provisions
concerning territory occupied by Russian troops.
"The imperial government, however, did not refuse, so long as the
occupation of Manchuria lasts, to recognize both the sovereignty of the
Emperor of China in Manchuria and also the rights acquired there by
other powers through treaties with China. A declaration to this effect
had already been made to the foreign cabinets. In view of this the
imperial government, after charging its representatives at Tōkyō to
present its reply to the latest proposal of Japan, was justified in
expecting the Tōkyō cabinet to take into account the considerations set
forth above and that it would appreciate the wish manifested by Russia
to come to a peaceful understanding with Japan. Instead of this the
Japanese Government, not even awaiting this reply, decided to break off
negotiations and to suspend diplomatic relations. The imperial
government, while laying on Japan the full responsibility for any
consequences of such a course of action, will await the development of
events, and the moment it becomes necessary will take the most decisive
measures for the protection of its rights and interests in the Far
East."
The official statement given by the Japanese foreign office on the night
of February 8 reads as follows:
"It being indispensable to the welfare and safety of Japan to maintain
the independence and territorial integrity of Korea, and to safeguard
her paramount interests therein, the Japanese Government finds it
impossible to view with indifference any action endangering the position
of Korea, whereas Russia, notwithstanding her solemn treaty with China
and her repeated assurances to the powers, not only continues her
occupation of Manchuria, but has taken aggressive measures in Korean
territory. Should Manchuria be annexed to Russia, the independence of
Korea would naturally be impossible. The Japanese Government,
therefore, being desirous of securing permanent peace for eastern Asia,
by means of direct negotiations with Russia, with the view of arriving
at a friendly adjustment of their mutual interests in both Manchuria and
Korea, where their interests meet, communicated toward the end of July
last such desire to the Russian Government, and invited its adherence.
To this the Russian Government expressed a willing assent. Accordingly,
on August 12, the Japanese Government proposed to Russia, through its
representative at St. Petersburg, the basis of an agreement which was
substantially as follows:
"(1.) A mutual agreement to respect the independence and territorial
integrity of the Chinese and Korean empires.
"(2.) A mutual engagement to maintain the principles of an equal
opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations with the
natives of those countries.
"(3.) A reciprocal recognition of Japan's preponderating interests in
Korea, and that Russia has special interests in railway enterprises in
Manchuria, and a mutual recognition of the respective rights of Japan
and Russia to take measures necessary for the protection of the
above-mentioned interests, so far as the principle of article 1 is not
infringed.
"(4.) The recognition by Russia of the exclusive rights of Japan to give
advice and assistance to Korea in the interests of reform and good
government.
"(5.) The engagement on the part of Russia not to impede the eventual
extension of the Korean railway into southern Manchuria, so as to
connect with the Eastern Chinese [_i. e._, Manchurian] and the
Shan-hai-kwan--Niu-chwang lines.
"It was the intention of the Japanese Government originally that a
conference should take place between its representatives at St.
Petersburg and the Russian authorities, so as to facilitate progress as
much as possible in reaching a solution of the situation, but the
Russian Government absolutely refused to do so, on the plea that the
Tsar planned a trip abroad; and for other reasons it was unavoidably
decided to conduct the negotiations at Tōkyō. It was not until October 3
that the Russian Government presented counter-proposals. She therein
declined to engage in respect to the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of China, and stipulate the maintenance of the principle of
equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in
China, and requested that Japan declare Manchuria and its littoral as
being entirely outside of her sphere of interest. She further put
several restrictions upon Japan's freedom of action in Korea; for
instance, while recognizing Japan's right to dispatch troops, when
necessary, for the protection of her interests in Korea, Russia refused
to allow her to use any portion of Korean territory for strategical
purposes; in fact, Russia went so far as to propose to establish a
neutral zone in Korean territory north of the thirty-ninth parallel.
"The Japanese Government failed utterly to see why Russia, who professed
no intention of absorbing Manchuria, should be disinclined to insert in
the convention a clause in complete harmony with her own repeatedly
declared principle respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity
of China. Furthermore, this refusal on the part of the Russian
Government impressed the Japanese Government all the more with the
necessity for the insertion of that clause.
"Japan has important commercial interests in Manchuria, and entertains
no small hopes of their future development; and politically she has even
greater interests there by reason of Manchuria's relations to Korea, so
she could not possibly recognize Manchuria as being entirely outside her
sphere of interest. These reasons decided Japan absolutely to reject the
Russian proposal.
"Accordingly, the Japanese Government explained the foregoing views to
the Russian Government, and at the same time it introduced other
necessary amendments in the Russian counter-proposals. They further
proposed, with regard to the neutral zone, that if one was to be created
it should be established on both sides of the boundary line between
Manchuria and Korea, with an equal width, say, of fifty kilometers.
"After repeated discussions at Tōkyō, the Japanese Government finally
presented to the Russian Government its definitive amendment on October
30. The Japanese Government then frequently urged the Russian Government
to give it an early reply, but this was again delayed, and only
delivered on December 11. In that reply Russia suppressed the clauses
relating to Manchuria so as to make the proposed convention apply
entirely to Korea, and maintained its original demand in regard to the
non-employment of Korean territory for strategical purposes, as well as
a neutral zone; but the exclusion of Manchuria from the proposed
convention being contrary to the original object of the negotiations,
which were to remove causes of conflict between the two countries by a
friendly arrangement of their interests, both in Manchuria and Korea,
the Japanese Government asked the Russian Government to reconsider the
question, and again proposed the removal of the restriction regarding
the use of Korean territory, and the entire suppression of the neutral
zone, on the ground that if Russia was opposed to the establishment of
one in Manchuria it should not establish one in Korea.
"The last reply of Russia was received at Tōkyō on January 6. In this
reply it is true Russia proposed to agree to insert the following clause
in the proposed agreement:
"'The recognition by Japan of Manchuria and its littoral as outside her
sphere of interest, while Russia, within the limits of that province,
would not impede Japan or any other power in the employment of rights or
privileges acquired by them under existing treaties with China exclusive
of the establishment of a settlement.'
"But this was proposed to be agreed upon only upon conditions
maintaining the clauses regarding a neutral zone in Korean territory and
the non-employment of Korean territory for strategical purposes, the
conditions whereof were impossible for Japan to accept, as had already
been fully explained to Russia. It should further be observed that no
mention was made at all of the territorial integrity of China in
Manchuria, and it must be self-evident to everybody that the engagement
now proposed by Russia would be of no practical value so long as it was
unaccompanied by a definite stipulation regarding the territorial
integrity of China in Manchuria, since treaty rights are only coexisting
with sovereignty. Eventually, the absorption of Manchuria by Russia
would annul at once those rights and privileges acquired by the powers
in Manchuria by virtue of treaties with China."
Both the negotiations and the general diplomatic relations between Japan
and Russia were severed by the former power on February 5. With this,
diplomacy passed into war.
FOOTNOTE:
[1] A ruble is equivalent to 51.5 cents.
Chapter XXI
THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH 1904--
The first hostile acts of the Russo-Japanese War were, as in the Chinese
war ten years before, committed before the war was formally declared by
the ruler of either belligerent nation, and were of even more decisive
nature in 1904 than in 1894. No sooner were the diplomatic relations
severed than a Russian force crossed the Korean border and entered the
peninsular empire. The Japanese were even more active. Knowing that the
Russian fleet, though its main squadron of seven battleships and several
cruisers was near Port Arthur, was divided also between Vladivostok,
Chemulpo, and Shanghai, Admiral Tōgō led his entire fleet of six
battleships and ten armored and protected cruisers from Sasebo directly
toward Port Arthur early on February 7, or within thirty hours after the
diplomatic rupture. Having captured a Russian merchantman off Fusan, the
fleet rendezvoused at Mokpo. A squadron of cruisers under command of
Rear Admiral Uryū was dispatched to Chemulpo to act as convoy of the
transports carrying thousands of Japanese soldiers to be landed at the
Korean port, while the remainder of the fleet proceeded toward Port
Arthur. At Chemulpo there were a French, a British, an American, and an
Italian war vessel, besides the Russian cruiser _Korietz_ and gunboat
_Variag_, as well as the Japanese cruiser _Chiyoda_. The last steamed
out of the harbor unnoticed during the night of February 7, and joined
Uryū's squadron, which came in sight of Chemulpo in the afternoon of the
8th. The _Korietz_, probably in an attempt to get to Port Arthur,
ventured out, and, meeting Japanese torpedo boats, fired at them and
then returned into the harbor. She was soon followed by three Japanese
cruisers and several transports, which, within a striking distance of
the Russian vessels, anchored in the harbor until the Japanese troops
from the transports were all landed on the morning of the 9th. A message
was then sent to the _Korietz_ by Uryū, saying that if the Russian
ships did not clear the port before noon his squadron would be obliged
to use forcible measures. The commanders of the neutral vessels in the
harbor might have agreed to protest against the committing of a hostile
act in a port which they regarded as neutral, had not the Russians, as
they did, cheerfully accepted the Japanese challenge and steamed out. In
the exchange of fire which ensued the _Variag_ was seriously injured,
and, protected by the gallant _Korietz_, returned into the harbor. There
fire was set to the magazine of the _Variag_, causing a terrific
explosion and immediate sinking of the vessel. The _Korietz_ was also
burned by the Russians and sank, while the transport _Sungari_ was
scuttled. The Japanese squadron sustained no loss and no injury. By this
engagement the mastery of Korea by the military forces of Japan was
practically assured.
The main section of the Japanese fleet continued its voyage toward Port
Arthur, after Uryū's squadron was sent to Chemulpo. The morning of the
8th found the sea calm and the temperature unusually mild. Late in the
afternoon the fleet headed for Chifu, while torpedo flotillas were sent
to Port Arthur and Dalny. The Russian fleet, which was still outside the
harbor of Port Arthur, was surprised, toward midnight, by a sudden
torpedo attack of the Japanese, who had stolen to the distance of 600
meters. The fire returned by the Russians had little effect, while they
sustained serious injuries on the battleships _Retvizan_ and
_Cesarevich_ and the cruiser _Pallada_. The main squadron of the
Japanese, which was not informed of the success of their torpedo craft
until 10 A. M., and was not even positive that the Russian vessels had
not left for Chemulpo, started early on the 9th toward Port Arthur for a
general attack. At noon Vice Admiral Tōgō signaled to the fleet from the
flagship _Mikasa_: "The decision of victory or defeat depends on this
battle; everyone will do his utmost." The battle lasted nearly an hour
in the middle of the day, in which the Russian fire again proved
comparatively ineffective, while the Japanese shells hit the already
damaged _Retvizan_ and injured the battleship _Poltava_ and the cruisers
_Diana_, _Askold,_ and _Novik_, all below the water-line. This was the
beginning of the complete mastery of the Yellow Sea which Japan was soon
to gain.
On the following day, the 10th, the emperors of both powers issued
proclamations declaring the existence of warfare between them. The
Russian manifesto read as follows: "We proclaim to all our faithful
subjects that, in our solicitude for the preservation of that peace so
dear to our heart, we have put forth every effort to assure tranquillity
in the Far East. To these pacific ends we declared our assent to the
revision, proposed by the Japanese Government, of the agreements
existing between the two empires concerning Korean affairs. The
negotiations initiated on this subject were, however, not brought to a
conclusion, and Japan, not even awaiting the arrival of our last reply
and the proposals of our government, informed us of the rupture of the
negotiations and of diplomatic relations with Russia.
"Without previously notifying us that the rupture of such relations
implied the beginning of warlike action, the Japanese Government ordered
its torpedo boats to make a sudden attack on our squadron in the outer
roadstead of the fortress of Port Arthur. After receiving the report of
our viceroy on the subject, we at once commanded Japan's challenge to be
replied to by arms.
"While proclaiming this our resolve, we, in unshakable confidence in the
help of the Almighty, and firmly trusting in the unanimous readiness of
all our faithful subjects to defend the Fatherland together with
ourselves, invoke God's blessing on our glorious forces of the army and
navy."
The rescript of the Japanese emperor was a formal declaration of war,
which may be read in connection with the similar document issued in 1894
at the beginning of the Chinese war. The rescript ran as follows: "We,
by the grace of Heaven, the Emperor of Japan, seated on the throne
occupied by the same dynasty from time immemorial, do hereby make
proclamation to all our loyal and brave subjects:
"We hereby declare war against Russia. We command our army and navy to
carry on hostilities against her with all their strength, and we also
command all our officials to make effort, in pursuance of their duties
and in accordance with their powers, to attain the national aim, with
all the means within the limits of the law of nations.
"We deem it essential to international relations, and make it our
constant aim, to promote the pacific progress of our empire in
civilization, to strengthen our friendly ties with other states, and
thereby to establish a state of things which would maintain enduring
peace in the East, and assure the future security of our empire without
injury to the rights and interests of other powers. Our officials also
perform their duties in obedience to our will, so that our relations
with all powers grow steadily in cordiality.
"It is thus entirely against our wishes that we have unhappily come to
open hostilities against Russia.
"The integrity of Korea has long been a matter of the gravest concern to
our empire, not only because of the traditional relations between the
two countries, but because the separate existence of Korea is essential
to the safety of our empire. Nevertheless, Russia, despite her explicit
treaty pledges to China and her repeated assurance to other powers, is
still in occupation of Manchuria, and has consolidated and strengthened
her hold upon it, and is bent upon its final absorption. Since the
possession of Manchuria by Russia would render it impossible to maintain
the integrity of Korea, and would, in addition, compel the abandonment
of all hope for peace in the Far East, we expected, in these
circumstances, to settle the question by negotiations and secure thereby
a permanent peace. With this object in view, our officials by our order
made proposals to Russia, and frequent conferences were held during the
last half year. Russia, however, never met such proposals in a spirit of
conciliation, but by her prolonged delays put off the settlement of the
pending question, and, by ostensibly advocating peace on the one hand,
and on the other secretly extending her naval and military preparations,
sought to bring about our acquiescence. It is not possible in the least
to admit that Russia had from the first a sincere desire for peace. She
has rejected the proposals of our empire; the safety of Korea is in
danger; the interests of our empire are menaced. At this crisis, the
guarantees for the future which the empire has sought to secure by
peaceful negotiations can now only be sought by an appeal to arms.
"It is our earnest wishes that, by the loyalty and valor of our faithful
subjects, peace may soon be permanently restored and the glory of our
empire preserved."
Night attacks by the Japanese destroyers were repeated several times
during the first two months of the war, and succeeded in inflicting some
damages on the Russian destroyers and gunboats. The Japanese also made
three attempts, on the nights of February 23-24, March 21-22, and May
2-3, to force a few old stone-laden steamers up to the mouth of the
harbor, in order to sink them there and thus block the entrance. The
glare of the Russian searchlights and the fierce fire from the shore
batteries and war vessels made it impossible for these heroic attempts
to be completely successful, and the channel remained partially open to
large vessels at high tide.
The indirect attacks and the laying of machine mines by the Japanese
were, however, much more successful. The former proved so damaging to
the Russian warships in the harbor that the lately arrived Vice Admiral
Makarov, whose spirited discipline had already begun to inspire the
squadron with courage and confidence, often steamed out with a few
vessels, and returned fire with fire. Mines were laid by the Japanese at
points where the brave Makarov always moved about. On the morning of
April 13 his squadron of seven vessels, including the flagship
_Peteropavlovsk_, was tempted by Japanese blockaders to a distance of
fifteen miles from the harbor, where it was suddenly encountered by
another Japanese detachment. Turning about and pursued by the enemy, the
Russian vessels retreated toward the harbor, when the _Peteropavlovsk_
struck a mine, at 10.32 A. M., and, after a terrific explosion, turned
turtle and immediately sank. Makarov and 600 men, with the artist
Vereshchagin, went down with the vessel, but the Grand Duke Cyril was
rescued. The Japanese fleet also lost, on May 15, the cruiser _Yoshino_
by collision, and the battleship _Hatsuse_ by twice striking Russian
mines. Other Japanese vessels sunk during the entire period of the war
by contact with the enemy's mines were: the battleship _Yashima_, the
cruisers _Takasago_, _Saiyen,_ and _Miyako,_ and two destroyers and
three gunboats.
After the disaster of April 13 the Russian vessels seldom ventured out
of the harbor in a large force. Realizing, however, that the Baltic
fleet might be unable to reach the eastern waters before the gradual
fall of the land forts at Port Arthur would expose the vessels to the
Japanese fire from the shore, the Russian squadron made two desperate
attempts, on June 23 and August 10, to force its way through the
blockading line and effect a junction with the Vladivostok squadron. On
the former occasion the Vladivostok vessels had just started on one of
their raiding expeditions, and torpedoed and sank three Japanese
transports, carrying 1400 soldiers. The entire Port Arthur squadron, led
by the gallant cruiser _Novik_, made a sortie in the morning at high
tide, and, toward the evening, was met by the Japanese fleet. Returning
toward the harbor, and finding that the tide was now too low at the
entrance for their larger vessels, the Russians anchored them bow out
and stern to the shore, and, under the protection of the shore
batteries, stood at bay over night. Admiral Tōgō gave an order for night
attack to his torpedo boats and destroyers, which, he reported later to
his government, "dashed ahead like a swift wind." Balancing themselves
amid the columns of waterspouts raised by the falling shells from the
enemy, the little boats made charge after charge against the narrow
front of the Russian vessels. It was seen the next morning that the
battleship _Pereviet_ had disappeared and two other vessels were towed
into the harbor.
The sortie of August 10 proved even more desperate and far more
disastrous to the Russians. Rear Admiral Witthoeft led out six
battleships and three protected cruisers southward in a hazy, but calm,
sea, and at noon was nearly thirty miles off the harbor. A little after
one o'clock began the first serious battle of the war, in which modern
armored vessels met on nearly equal terms. The battle was renewed a few
hours later, and on each occasion the Russians suffered from the heavy
shells from the 8-inch guns of the Japanese, aided by the latter's
superior gunnery and highly explosive powder. At 6.40 the flagship
_Cesarevich_ lost its steering gear, and the commanding Admiral
Witthoeft was also killed. Then the Russian vessels began utterly to
lose unity of command and action, and, under the withering fire of the
Japanese from three different directions, were completely routed and
scattered. The flagship and two cruisers reached Tsing-tau in battered
condition. One of the latter, the _Novik_, was later found off Sakhalin
and there sunk by Admiral Kamimura's squadron, and the other, the
_Askold_, and a gunboat reached Shanghai. The _Ryeshitelni_ arrived at
Chifu. The rest of the squadron hastened back toward Port Arthur, where
they were subjected to a night attack of the Japanese torpedo craft. Of
the vessels which finally retired into the harbor, not one was
uninjured, while the fire from the advancing land forces of the Japanese
was soon to make the position of these ships insufferable. The Japanese
fleet sustained no heavy injury on any of the vessels, and lost only 170
in killed and wounded. Of the Russian vessels which found shelter in
neutral ports, the _Cesarevich_ at Tsing-tau was promptly disarmed at
the request of the German governor of Kiao-chow, but those at Shanghai
neither were disarmed nor left the port for more than two weeks. The
_Diana_ reached Saigon, French Indo-China, and was there dismantled
without much delay. The _Ryeshitelni_ at Chifu, which was said to have
sent telegraphic messages to Vladivostok and St. Petersburg, and was
imperfectly disarmed, was finally forcibly captured by two Japanese
cruisers, which action caused wide criticism.
Four days after the battle of the Yellow Sea, the Vladivostok squadron,
consisting of the splendid cruisers _Rurik_, _Rossia_, and
_Gromvoi_--for the other cruiser, _Bogatyr_, had run on the rocks near
the harbor--which had more than once eluded Admiral Kamimura, were
finally discovered by him north of the Tsushima Island. After a lively
engagement the _Rurik_ was sunk, and the other two Russian cruisers
narrowly escaped to Vladivostok.
[Illustration: JAPANESE ADVANCE TO LIAO-YANG]
During these six months between February and August, the Japanese army
on land in three different corps had been steadily advancing toward
Liao-yang. The first corps, under Lieutenant General Kuroki, which
landed at Korean ports, had encountered no serious opposition on its
march through the peninsula, until it reached the Yalu River on the
frontier. There took place on the last days of April and May 1 the first
important land battle between the contending armies. The Russian forces
under Zassulitch were overpowered by the superior artillery of the
enemy, and, after a desperate fight and disastrous retreat, fell back to
Feng-hwang-cheng, which again was abandoned on May 6. Then, taking
Sai-ma-tsi on June 7 after several attempts, Kuroki came to the
difficult pass of Mo-tien-ling, which he captured on July 4 after a hard
fight, and which the Russians made a costly, but unsuccessful, effort to
retake on July 17. Chiao-tow fell on July 19, and Yu-shu-lin-tsu and
Yang-tsu-ling on August 1. From the end of August, Kuroki coöperated
with the two other army corps which had simultaneously been closing upon
Liao-yang. Of these, the second corps, under Lieutenant General Oku,
landing on May 5 at Pi-tsu-wo on the northeastern coast of the Liao-tung
peninsula, immediately took Pu-lan-tien, and, after a sixteen-hour
battle of the most desperate character, had driven the enemy toward Port
Arthur from Kin-chow and Nanshan Hills on May 26. These actions
completely cut the forces at Port Arthur from the rest of the Russian
army in Manchuria. General Kuropatkin, commanding the army, however, now
possessed nearly 100,000 men south of Liao-yang, and, yielding to the
impossible request from St. Petersburg that he should make a supreme
effort to relieve Port Arthur, dispatched General Stakelberg with
perhaps 44,000 men on this difficult mission. He was attacked on June 13
at Telissu by General Oku's army of a nearly equal size, and, after a
savage battle of artillery fire and bayonet charges, was forced back
with heavy losses. Stakelberg's retreating army offered gallant
resistance to the Japanese at Hiung-yo-cheng on June 21, at Kai-ping
from July 6 to 9, at Taping-ling and Tashi-chiao from July 24 to 29, and
at Tomu-cheng between July 31 and August 1. At the later stage of these
engagements Oku's forces coöperated with divisions of the third army
corps, under General Nodzu, which had landed at Ta-ku-shan on May 19,
and had captured Siu-yen on June 8 and Feng-shui (Wafangao) Pass on June
27. The fall of Anshan-chan on August 27 to the second corps practically
opened the great battle of Liao-yang, the military center of southern
Manchuria, to which General Kuropatkin had retired.
The battle of Liao-yang while not the greatest, was in some respects the
most desperate, engagement of the war. The Japanese forces, under the
supreme command of Field Marshal Ōyama (who had arrived at Dalny on July
20), probably numbered 240,000 men, with 800 guns, and the Russian,
under General Kuropatkin, perhaps 200,000 men, with 572 guns. The
defenses around and in the city were most elaborate and extensive. The
Japanese attack was begun a little before its plans had completely
matured, and, for nearly a week, a complex series of fierce and
determined fightings raged in front of the walled city. On August 31 a
part of Kuroki's army crossed the Taitsu River and began its flanking
movement, and, against the determined effort of Kuropatkin to annihilate
this section of the Japanese, Kuroki succeeded after three days of
action in sending his entire forces across the stream. On September 4
Kuropatkin set the city on fire, and, by a masterly retreat, extricated
the remainder of his army from a threatened closure by Kuroki's
divisions, the entire Russian forces reaching Mukden September 20. He
had lost nearly 25,000 men, and Ōyama half of that number.
Heavy rains now intervened. Kuropatkin at Mukden proclaimed that his
forces were now for the first time strong enough to begin a forward
movement against the enemy. With nine army corps he advanced southward
on October 5, easily taking the railway station by the Sha River and
also the defenses of Bentsiaputse to the east. The cavalry outposts also
scored a few minor victories. Ōyama also now decided to take the
offensive, and marched forward with a wide front extending over fifty
miles from east to northwest to the Hun River. Both sides tried flanking
movements, none of which proved decisively successful. In the heavy
fighting which lasted till the 17th, in which the Russian and Japanese
losses probably amounted, respectively, to 69,000 and 13,300, Kuropatkin
was definitely forced back, and his original purpose to turn the tide of
the war failed. This is known as the battle of the Sha River.
In the meantime, ever since General Nogi landed early in June and at
once began desperate attacks on the outer forts, Port Arthur had been a
scene of prodigious acts of heroism by both the besiegers and the
besieged. Points were taken and retaken, and hundreds lost their lives
at each explosion of mines or terrific cannonading from the surrounding
forts. In the midst of this series of engagements, however, officers and
men of the hostile armies frequently met together to arrange for the
recovery of the dead bodies, always fraternizing in kindly spirit. The
besieging army steadily closed in, and, in the outer line of forts
having been reduced, the 203-Meter Hill of the western inner forts was
at length captured, on November 29-30. From this point Japanese shells
could sweep over the harbor. This was followed by the fall of the
eastern forts of Sung-shu and Ki-kwan, on December 19, which were blown
up by mines laid by the besiegers in tunnels dug directly under the feet
of the enemy. When ten days later the Erlung fort was taken, the
position of the gallant General Stoessel's defending army was no longer
tenable. He capitulated on January 1, 1905, with his remaining army of
nearly 25,000 men, and surrendered fifty forts and 546 guns to the
Japanese army. The war vessels in the harbor had, however, been blown up
and sunk by the Russians before the surrender of the forts. Officers,
including Stoessel, who wished to return were allowed to depart on
parole with their side-arms. In their informal meeting, on January 4,
Generals Nogi and Stoessel lauded the high qualities of each other's
army, the latter visibly moved by the news that Nogi had lost his two
sons in the war. Stoessel, with his wife and a few officers, left
Nagasaki on January 17 on their homeward voyage.
The Japanese veterans at Port Arthur, probably 50,000 or 60,000 in
number, were now ready to march northward to join Ōyama's army. Before
their arrival at the front, however, a severe battle took place in the
heart of winter, from January 25 to 31, at Hokau-tai, on the Hun River,
between General Grippenberg's second Russian army and Ōyama's forces.
The result was not a decisive gain to either side, but the Russians lost
twice as many men as the Japanese, nearly 15,000 of their numbers being
killed and wounded. It was after this battle that Grippenberg openly
declared his disagreement with his chief Kuropatkin, and resigned his
command and was succeeded by General Kaulbars.
With the addition of Nogi's army to the left of Oku's, and of General
Kawamura's to the right of Kuroki's, Ōyama now commanded five corps in
sixteen divisions, numbering at least 400,000 men and occupying a front
of nearly a hundred miles. This colossal army tried conclusions with the
at least 350,000 men under Kuropatkin at Mukden in what was probably the
greatest battle or series of battles in the history of the world. The
engagements began on February 20 and continued till March 16, resulting
in a decisive defeat of the Russians. Until March 7 Kuropatkin's left
was harassed by Kuroki, and his right was defending itself desperately
against the flanking movement of Nogi, while his center, under Linevitch
and Kaulbars, together with Rennenkampf's Cossacks, took a determined
stand against the onslaught of Nodzu and Oku. The retreat was ordered on
the night of this day, for a further delay would cause Kuropatkin's
divisions to be surrounded and annihilated. The Japanese closely pursued
the fleeing enemy, and gave him no time to rally before crossing the Hun
River. The blinding dust storm and the biting cold of March 9 did not
greatly detract from the rigor of the pursuit. Mukden was entered by
Ōyama early on March 10, and the strong defense and the great colliery
at Fushun to the east were taken the next day. The Russians now retired
to Tie-ling, forty miles to the north, in a complete rout, Linevitch's
army alone making an orderly retreat. Tie-ling was also taken on the
16th, the Russians receding further north. Their losses probably
aggregated 150,000 men, or more than forty per cent. of the entire army,
while the Japanese lost about one-third as many in killed and wounded.
The tsar at once convoked a war council, and resolved to dispatch to the
East another Russian army of 450,000 men. The day after the fall of
Tie-ling, he telegraphed Kuropatkin and, without a word of praise,
transferred the latter's command over the Manchurian army to Linevitch.
Kuropatkin retired to Harbin, and then returned to serve under the new
commander-in-chief.
The Baltic fleet of Russia, the departure of which for the East had been
announced several times, at last started from Kronstadt in the middle of
October, 1904, under Vice Admiral Rozhestvenski. Having been aroused to
a state of nervous apprehension by the unfounded rumor that Japanese
torpedo boats were in European waters, some officers of the Russian
fleet fancied that they descried two of these small war vessels among
the British fishing boats at Dogger Bank in the North Sea, on the night
of October 21, and fired upon them, sinking a trawler, killing two
fishermen, and injuring several others. The fleet then proceeded south
at full speed. It had also attacked, at different times, a Swedish, a
Norwegian, a Danish, and a German ship. When the news of the Dogger Bank
incident reached Hull on the 24th, all England was aflame, and the more
radical people counseled war with Russia. Owing to the calmness of the
British government, however, and also to the assistance of France, the
matter was referred to the investigation of an international court of
naval experts. The latter published the opinion of its majority, on
February 25, 1905, that the firing was unjustifiable and unduly
prolonged, but that it did not impair the military valor and the
humanitarian sentiment of the Russian admiral and his staff.
Soon after the North Sea incident the Baltic fleet was divided into two
sections, one under Admiral Voelkersam going by way of the Suez Canal
and the other under Rozhestvenski himself rounding the Cape of Good
Hope. The two squadrons reunited in January in the Indian Ocean, and
drilled their raw crews near the French Island of Madagascar. A third
section, under Admiral Nebokatov, left Libau on February 15, and joined
the main squadron before it entered the Chinese waters. The stay of the
fleet near Saigon and Kamranh Bay, French Indo-China, raised delicate
questions as to the rights of the hostile vessel in a neutral harbor,
but a friction was averted by the tardy, but definite, action taken by
the tsar and the French government in ordering away the Russian fleet
from the French territorial waters. Near the end of May the entire fleet
was headed toward its final destination.
Admiral Tōgō had visited Tōkyō after the fall of Port Arthur, and by his
natural modesty and force of character inspired the nation with an
unbounded confidence in his success in the coming contest with the
Baltic fleet. He avoided popular ovation, saying he had yet much to do,
and came and went like a plain farmer. Leaving Tōkyō on February 6,
1905, the very day when, a year before, he led his fleet from Sasebo
toward Port Arthur, he made every preparation to meet Rozhestvenski's
ships. A few days before the latter's arrival Tōgō was convinced that in
their attempt to reach Vladivostok they would make a dash through the
Korean Straits, instead of going by way of the Tsugaru or La Perouse
Straits, and kept his entire fleet at and near Masampo. At five o'clock
in the morning of May 27 Tōgō's scouts reported by wireless telegraphy
that Russian vessels were sighted near Quelpart Island. Thrilled by the
news, all the divisions immediately turned to their assigned missions.
The sea was overcast by a heavy fog and the waves were high from a sharp
southwest wind. Two of the Japanese cruiser squadrons advanced toward
the enemy, and, between 10 and 11 A. M., led him gradually toward the
Japan side of the straits, and then at 1.30 P. M. joined the main
squadron. The enemy's vessels were now visible in two main columns, the
battleships to the starboard and the cruisers and coast-defenders to the
port, and headed by the _Jemchug_ and the _Izumrud_, and followed by a
long line of smaller vessels, the entire formation extending over
several miles. The vessels were painted black, with the funnels whitish
yellow and the rims black, so that they were conspicuous on the sea,
while the Japanese ships were light green and gray, and not so easily
discernible as the Russian. Just before two o'clock Tōgō signaled to the
entire fleet: "The destiny of the empire depends on this one battle; let
everyone do his utmost." The battleship squadron under Tōgō's direct
command and the cruisers under Kamimura pressed the enemy eastward, and,
from a distance of 6000 meters, concentrated their terrific fire upon
the foremost Russian vessels, while other Japanese squadrons attacked
the enemy from the rear. The main issue was decided within an hour. The
_Oslabia_, the _Alexander III._, and the flagship _Kniaz Suvarov_,
caught fire and went out of action, as well as several smaller vessels
in the rear. The columns of smoke wafted by the wind over the sea
concealed the hostile fleets from each other's view, and the firing was
suspended by the main squadrons at 2.45. Admiral Voelkersam had been
killed, and Rozhestvenski himself wounded and transferred to a destroyer
in an unconscious state, the command being assumed by Nebogatov. From
three o'clock the Russian vessels made a desperate effort to flee
northward, but were so fiercely fired upon that they turned south. Now
the battle raged in several sections till sunset. The _Oslabia_, the
_Alexander III._, the _Borodino_, and the _Kniaz Suvarov_, all
battleships, and two special service boats, were sunk. At sundown the
Japanese torpedo craft, whose work had thus far been secondary, took the
field, and succeeded in throwing the enemy into a hopeless confusion,
sinking the battleship _Navarin_ and incapacitating the battleship
_Sissoi Veliki_ and the armored cruisers _Admiral Nakhimov_ and
_Monomakh_. The last three vessels sank the next day.
[Illustration: BATTLE OF THE SEA OF JAPAN RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR]
The fog lifted on May 28, and the main squadrons under Tōgō and Kamimura
were near Ulung Island about 5.30 A. M., when a Russian fleet,
consisting of two battleships, two coast-defenders, and two cruisers,
were discovered heading northeast. The different squadrons completely
surrounded the enemy near Liancourt Islands about 10.30, and Admiral
Nebogatov soon surrendered, although the cruiser _Izumrud_ alone
escaped. In the afternoon two Japanese destroyers found and pursued two
Russian destroyers, one of which, _Biedovy_, carrying the wounded
Rozhestvenski, surrendered, and the other escaped. The cruisers
_Svetlana_ and _Dmitri Donskoi_, the coast-defender _Oushakov_, and a
destroyer, were either sunk or driven aground, making the total Russian
loss during the two days six battleships, one coast-defender, five
cruisers, five destroyers, one converted cruiser, and four special
service vessels. Out of the 18,000 Russian sailors, nearly 12,000 must
have gone down with the sinking vessels. The Japanese lost only three
torpedo boats and 116 killed and 538 wounded, but captured two
battleships, two coast-defenders, and a destroyer. Of the Russian
vessels which escaped, the cruiser _Almaz_ and two destroyers reached
Vladivostok, but a destroyer and two special service boats which got to
Shanghai, and the cruisers _Aurora_, _Oleg_, and _Jemchug_, that went to
Manila, were dismantled. Admiral Tōgō reported, in his characteristic
manner, that the "miracle" of his victory was "entirely owing to the
illustrious virtues of the emperor, and was beyond all human
possibility," and that he could not but believe that "the comparatively
small losses were due to the protection of the spirits of the imperial
forefathers."
As soon as the decisive battle of the Sea of Japan was fought, Theodore
Roosevelt, President of the United States, who had once before failed,
in February, to induce Russia to agree to come treat for peace with
Japan, renewed his effort to bring the belligerent powers together to a
discussion of peace terms exclusively between themselves. In this effort
he was supported by the French government and the German emperor. After
preliminary consultations with Takahira and Count Cassini, the Japanese
and Russian representatives at Washington, Roosevelt addressed the
following note to the governments of St. Petersburg and Tōkyō: "The
President feels that the time has come when in the interest of all
mankind he must endeavor to see if it is not possible to bring to an end
the terrible and lamentable conflict now being waged. With both Russia
and Japan the United States has inherited ties of friendship and
good-will. It hopes for the prosperity and welfare of each, and it feels
that the progress of the world is set back by the war between those two
great nations.
"The President accordingly urges the Russian and Japanese Governments,
not only for their own sakes, but in the interest of the whole civilized
world, to open direct negotiations for peace with each other. The
President suggests that those peace negotiations be conducted directly
and exclusively between the belligerents, in other words, that there may
be a meeting of Russian and Japanese plenipotentiaries or delegates
without any intermediary, in order to see if it is not possible for
those representatives of the two powers to agree to terms of peace. The
President earnestly asks that the Russian Government do now agree to
such a meeting, and is asking the Japanese Government likewise to agree.
"While the President does not feel that any intermediary should be
called in in respect to the peace negotiations themselves, he is
entirely willing to do what he properly can, if the two powers concerned
feel that his services will be of aid, in arranging the preliminaries as
to the time and place of meeting. But if even these preliminaries can be
arranged directly between the two powers, or in any other way, the
President will be glad, as his sole purpose is to bring about a meeting
which the whole civilized world will pray may result in peace."
The Japanese government responded, saying that Japan would open
negotiations directly and exclusively with Russia regarding terms of
peace. The Russian reply, at first given orally and then made with some
reservation, was finally couched in substantially the same language as
the Japanese. Japan appointed as her peace envoys Baron Komura, minister
for foreign affairs, and Kogorō Takahira, minister at Washington.
Russia's choice of her chief envoy first fell on Nelidov, ambassador at
Paris, then on Muraviev, ambassador at Rome, but later was changed to
Count Serge Witte, president of the committee of ministers. The new
Russian ambassador at Washington, Baron Rosen, was appointed the second
envoy of Russia. As for the place of the conference, neither Paris,
suggested by Russia, nor Chifu, suggested by Japan, being acceptable to
the other party, respectively, the two governments finally agreed upon
Washington. Because of the excessive summer heat of the American
capital, however, it was decided that actual negotiations should be held
at the navy yard near the quiet historic town of Portsmouth, New
Hampshire. The envoys were announced to arrive by August 1.
In the meantime, before the end of July, the Russian Island of Sakhalin,
the southern half of which had till 1875 been claimed by Japan, was
occupied by the Japanese forces, which also seized a few points on the
coast of southeastern Siberia.
The envoys of the belligerent powers having arrived, they were
introduced to one another by President Roosevelt on the _Mayflower_ on
August 5, and then proceeded to Portsmouth, arriving there on the 8th.
They sojourned at the Hotel Wentworth on the small Island of New Castle
near Portsmouth, whither flocked many curious summer visitors and more
than a hundred newspaper correspondents from various parts of the world.
The first informal meeting of the envoys was held at the naval stores
building at the navy yard, but the actual business of the peace
negotiations began on the following day. On that day Baron Komura
presented, in writing, the entire list of twelve terms of peace, which
are believed to have covered the following points: 1, Japan's
preponderant interest in Korea, and the principle of the open door
therein; 2, evacuation of Manchuria by the Japanese and Russian armies;
3, restoration of Chinese administration in Manchuria; 4, China's
territorial integrity and the open door in Manchuria; 5, cession to
Japan of the Island of Sakhalin; 6, surrender to Japan of the lease of
the Kwan-tung district, containing Port Arthur, Dalny, and adjacent
islands; 7, transfer to Japan of the railway between Port Arthur (and
Dalny) and Harbin; 8, retention by Russia of the main Manchurian railway
from Mandchourie to Grotekovo; 9, reimbursement by Russia of Japan's
cost of war; 10, surrender by Russia of her war vessels interned in
neutral ports; 11, limitation of Russia's naval power in the Pacific;
and 12, the rights of the Japanese subjects to fish in the waters of the
Siberian littoral. To these terms Witte gave a written reply on the
12th, stating his assent to some points, willingness to discuss some
others, and absolute dissent from the rest. Then the envoys discussed
the terms one after another, and, within six days, found themselves in
agreement, in substance or in principle, on the first, second, third,
fourth, sixth, seventh, eighth, and twelfth terms. As regarded the other
four points, particularly the cession of Sakhalin and the payment of the
war expenditures, the Russian envoy considered them as incompatible with
the honor and dignity of the tsar's empire.
The conference now seemed to be ending in failure, when on August 18
occurred the visit of Baron Kaneko to President Roosevelt at Oyster Bay,
followed on the next day by the invitation extended to Baron Rosen to
come on from New Castle. Kaneko again called on Roosevelt on the 21st,
while Meyer, American ambassador at St. Petersburg, had a long interview
with the tsar two days after. The president was urging the two
governments, through these various channels, to arrive at some
compromise of their differences for the sake of peace. When Meyer had an
audience of the tsar, the Japanese government had already accepted
Roosevelt's suggestion for compromise by intimating its willingness to
drop the demands for the surrender of the interned vessels and for the
limitation of Russia's naval power, and to allow Russia to repurchase
the northern half of Sakhalin, which was in Japan's military occupation,
for 1,200,000 _yen_. The tsar, however, unequivocally declined to agree
to this compromise, for he considered the proposed repurchase as an
indemnity in disguise, to which he was opposed in principle. Despite
Ambassador Meyer's repeated appeal, Nicholas II. remained firm,
although--whether by his instruction or on Witte's own initiative is not
known--the southern half of Sakhalin was offered to Japan. In the
meantime, President Roosevelt appealed to Japan, until the deliberations
of the privy councilors at Tōkyō resulted in the emperor's instructions
to his envoys at Portsmouth to waive their demand for money and to
accept the southern half of Sakhalin. This final concession, which at
length made peace possible, was announced by Baron Komura at the morning
session of August 29, and came as a complete surprise to Witte and to
the whole world. The articles of the treaty were then drafted, and
signed by the envoys on September 5.
The concessions of the privy councilors greatly disappointed the
Japanese people, who had been somewhat flushed by their unexpected
victories over the mighty foe. The popular dissatisfaction, intensified
by local conditions, broke out in an open riot on the streets of Tōkyō
on September 5-7. In Russia, also, the treaty was not received with
unmixed joy even by the peace-loving peasants, for although peace was
welcome, the war and consequently the results of its failure, which were
embodied in the terms of the treaty, were considered by them as
unnecessary and ignominious. The sovereigns of both powers, however,
ratified the treaty on October 14. The following is the English version
of this memorable document:
"The Emperor of Japan on one part and the Emperor of All the Russias on
the other part, animated by a desire to restore the blessings of peace
to their countries, have resolved to conclude a treaty of peace and have
for this purpose named their plenipotentiaries, that is to say, for his
Majesty the Emperor of Japan, Baron Komura Jutarō Jusami, Grand Cordon
of the Imperial Order of the Rising Sun, his minister of foreign
affairs, and his Excellency Takahira Kogorō, Imperial Order of the
Sacred Treasure, his minister to the United States, and, for his Majesty
the Emperor of All the Russias his Excellency Serge Witte, his secretary
of state and president of the committee of ministers of the empire of
Russia, and his excellency Baron Roman Rosen, master of the imperial
court of Russia, his Majesty's ambassador to the United States, who,
after having exchanged their full powers, which were found to be in good
and due form, have concluded the following articles:
"Article One--There shall henceforth be peace and amity between their
majesties the Emperor of Japan and the Emperor of All the Russias and
between their respective States and subjects.
"Article Two--The Imperial Russian Government, acknowledging that Japan
possesses in Korea paramount political, military and economical
interests, engages neither to obstruct nor interfere with measures for
guidance, protection, and control which the Imperial Government of Japan
may find necessary to take in Korea. It is understood that Russian
subjects in Korea shall be treated in exactly the same manner as the
subjects and citizens of other foreign powers, that is to say, they
shall be placed on the same footing as the subjects and citizens of the
most favored nation. It is also agreed, in order to avoid causes of
misunderstanding, that the two high contracting parties will abstain on
the Russian-Korean frontier from taking any military measure which may
menace the security of Russian or Korean territory.
"Article Three--Japan and Russia mutually engage:
"First--To evacuate completely and simultaneously Manchuria, except the
territory affected by the lease of the Liao-tung peninsula, and in
conformity with the provisions of the additional Article One annexed to
this treaty, and,
"Second--To restore entirely and completely to the exclusive
administration of China all the portions of Manchuria now in occupation
or under the control of the Japanese or Russian troops, with the
exception of the territory above mentioned.
"The Imperial Government of Russia declare that they have not in
Manchuria any territorial advantages or preferential, or exclusive
concessions in the impairment of Chinese sovereignty, or inconsistent
with the principle of equal opportunity.
"Article Four--Japan and Russia reciprocally engage not to obstruct any
general measures common to all countries which China may take for the
development of the commerce or industry of Manchuria.
"Article Five--The Imperial Russian Government transfers and assigns to
the Imperial Government of Japan, with the consent of the Government of
China, the lease of Port Arthur, Ta-lien, and the adjacent territory and
territorial waters, and all rights, privileges, and concessions
connected with or forming part of such lease, and they also transfer and
assign to the Imperial Government of Japan all public works and
properties in the territory affected by the afore mentioned lease. The
two contracting parties mutually engage to obtain the consent of the
Chinese Government mentioned in the foregoing stipulation. The Imperial
Government of Japan on their part undertake that the proprietary rights
of Russian subjects in the territory above referred to shall be
perfectly respected.
"Article Six--The Imperial Russian Government engage to transfer and
assign to the Imperial Government of Japan without compensation and with
the consent of the Chinese Government the railway between Chang-chun-fu
and Kuan-chang-tsu and Port Arthur and all the branches, together with
all the rights, privileges, and properties appertaining thereto in that
region, as well as all the coal mines in said region belonging to or
worked for the benefit of the railway. The two high contracting parties
mutually engage to obtain the consent of the Government of China
mentioned in the foregoing stipulation.
"Article Seven--Japan and Russia engage to exploit their respective
railways in Manchuria exclusively for commercial and industrial purposes
and in nowise for strategic purposes. It is understood that this
restriction does not apply to the railway in the territory affected by
the lease of the Liao-tung peninsula.
"Article Eight--The Imperial Governments of Japan and Russia, with the
view to promote and facilitate intercourse and traffic, will, as soon as
possible, conclude a separate convention for the regulation of their
connecting railway services in Manchuria.
"Article Nine--The Imperial Russian Government cedes to the Imperial
Government of Japan in perpetuity and full sovereignty the southern
portion of the Island of Sakhalin, and all the islands adjacent thereto,
and the public works and properties thereon. The fiftieth degree of
north latitude is adopted as the northern boundary of the ceded
territory. The exact alignment of such territory shall be determined in
accordance with the provisions of the additional Article Eleven, annexed
to this treaty. Japan and Russia mutually agree not to construct in
their respective possessions on the Island of Sakhalin, or the adjacent
islands, any fortifications or other similar military works. They also
respectively engage not to take any military measures which may impede
the free navigation of the Strait of La Perouse and the Strait of
Tartary.
"Article Ten--It is reserved to Russian subjects, inhabitants of the
territory ceded to Japan, to sell their real property, and retire to
their country, but if they prefer to remain in the ceded territory they
will be maintained and protected in the full exercise of their
industries and rights of property, on condition of submitting to the
Japanese laws and jurisdiction. Japan shall have full liberty to
withdraw the right of residence in, or to deport from such territory any
inhabitants who labor under political or administrative disability. She
engages, however, that the proprietary rights of such inhabitants shall
be fully respected.
"Article Eleven--Russia engages to arrange with Japan for granting to
Japanese subjects rights of fishery along the coasts of the Russian
possessions in the Japan, Okhotsk, and Bering Seas. It is agreed that
the foregoing engagement shall not affect rights already belonging to
Russian or foreign subjects in those regions.
"Article Twelve--The treaty of commerce and navigation between Japan and
Russia having been annulled by the war, the Imperial Governments of
Japan and Russia engage to adopt as a basis for their commercial
relations pending the conclusion of a new treaty of commerce and
navigation, the basis of the treaty which was in force previous to the
present war, the system of reciprocal treatment on the footing of the
most favored nation, in which are included import and export duties,
customs formalities, transit, and tonnage dues, and the admission and
treatment of agents, subjects, and vessels of one country in the
territories of the other.
"Article Thirteen--So soon as possible after the present treaty comes in
force all prisoners of war shall be reciprocally restored. The Imperial
Governments of Japan and Russia shall each appoint a special
commissioner to take charge of the prisoners. All prisoners in the hands
of one government shall be delivered to and received by the commissioner
of the other government or by his duly authorized representative in such
convenient numbers and such convenient ports of the delivering state as
such delivering state shall notify in advance to the commissioner of the
receiving state. The governments of Japan and Russia shall present each
other so soon as possible after the delivery of the prisoners is
completed with a statement of the direct expenditures respectively
incurred by them for the care and maintenance of the prisoners from the
date of capture or surrender and up to the time of death or delivery.
Russia engages to repay to Japan so soon as possible after the exchange
of statement as above provided the difference between the actual amount
so expended by Japan and the actual amount similarly disbursed by
Russia.
"Article Fourteen--The present treaty shall be ratified by their
Majesties the Emperor of Japan and the Emperor of All the Russias. Such
ratification shall be with as little delay as possible and in any case
no later than fifty days from the date of the signature of the treaty,
to be announced to the Imperial Governments of Japan and Russia
respectively through the French minister at Tōkyō and the ambassador of
the United States at St. Petersburg and from the date of the later of
such announcements this treaty shall in all its parts come into full
force. The formal exchange of ratifications shall take place at
Washington so soon as possible.
"Article Fifteen--The present treaty shall be signed in duplicate in
both the English and French languages. The texts are in absolute
conformity, but in case of a discrepancy in the interpretation, the
French text shall prevail.
"In conformity with the provisions of Articles Three and Nine of the
treaty of peace between Japan and Russia of this date the undersigned
plenipotentiaries have concluded the following additional articles:
"Sub-Article to Article Three--The Imperial Governments of Japan and
Russia mutually engage to commence the withdrawal of their military
forces from the territory of Manchuria simultaneously and immediately
after the treaty of peace comes into operation, and within a period of
eighteen months after that date the armies of the two countries shall be
completely withdrawn from Manchuria except from the leased territory of
the Liao-tung peninsula. The forces of the two countries occupying the
front positions shall first be withdrawn.
"The high contracting parties reserve to themselves the right to
maintain guards to protect their respective railway lines in Manchuria.
The number of such guards shall not exceed fifteen per kilometer, and
within that maximum number the commanders of the Japanese and Russian
armies shall by common accord fix the number of such guards to be
employed as small as possible while having in view the actual
requirements.
"The commanders of the Japanese and Russian forces in Manchuria shall
agree upon the details of the evacuation in conformity with the above
principles and shall take by common accord the measures necessary to
carry out the evacuation so soon as possible and in any case no later
than the period of eighteen months.
"Sub-Article to Article Nine--So soon as possible after the present
treaty comes into force, a commission of delimitation composed of an
equal number of members is to be appointed respectively by the two high
contracting parties which shall on the spot mark in a permanent manner
the exact boundary between the Japanese and Russian possessions on the
Island of Sakhalin. The commission shall be bound so far as
topographical considerations permit to follow the fiftieth parallel of
north latitude as the boundary line, and, in case any deflections from
that line at any points are found to be necessary, compensation will be
made by correlative deflections at other points. It shall also be the
duty of said commission to prepare a list and a description of the
adjacent islands included in the cession, and finally the commission
shall prepare and sign maps showing the boundaries of the ceded
territory. The work of the commission shall be subject to the approval
of the high contracting parties.
"The foregoing additional articles are to be considered ratified with
the ratification of the treaty of peace to which they are annexed.
"Portsmouth, the Fifth Day of the Ninth Month of the Thirty-eight year
of Meiji, corresponding to the Twenty-third of August, 1905. (September
5, 1905.)
"In witness whereof the respective plenipotentiaries have signed and
affixed seals to the present treaty of peace.
"Done at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, this Fifth day of the Ninth Month of
the Thirty-eighth Year of the Meiji, corresponding to the Twenty-third
day of August, One Thousand Nine Hundred and Five."
No less important than the Russo-Japanese treaty is the renewed
agreement of the Anglo-Japanese alliance concluded between Lord
Lansdowne, the British foreign minister, and Baron Hayashi, the Japanese
minister at London, on August 12 at London, and published on September
27 simultaneously at London and Tōkyō. Its text reads as follows:
"The Governments of Great Britain and Japan, being desirous of replacing
the agreement concluded between them January 30, 1902, by fresh
stipulations, have agreed upon the following articles, which have for
their object:
"A--The consolidation and the maintenance of general peace in the
regions of Eastern Asia and India.
"B--The preservation of the common interests of all the powers in China
by insuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and the
principles of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all
nations in China.
"C--The maintenance of the territorial rights of the high contracting
parties in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India, and the defense of
their special interests in the said regions.
"Article 1--It is agreed that whenever in the opinion either of Great
Britain or Japan any of the rights and interests referred to in the
preamble to this agreement are in jeopardy, the two governments will
communicate with each other fully and frankly and will consider in
common the measures which should be taken to safeguard these menaced
rights or interests.
"Art. 2--Should either of the high contracting parties be involved in
war in defense of its territorial rights or special interests, the other
party will at once come to the assistance of its ally and both parties
will conduct a war in common and make peace in mutual agreement with any
power or powers involved in such war.
"Art. 3--Japan possessing paramount political, military, and economic
interests in Korea, Great Britain recognizes Japan's right to take such
measures for the guidance, control, and protection of Korea as she may
deem proper and necessary to safeguard and advance those interests,
providing the measures so taken are not contrary to the principle of
equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations.
"Art. 4--Great Britain having a special interest in all that concerns
the security of the Indian frontier, Japan recognizes her right to take
such measures in the proximity of that frontier as she may find
necessary for safeguarding her Indian possessions.
"Art. 5--The high contracting parties agree that neither will, without
consulting the other, enter into a separate arrangement with another
power to the prejudice of the objects described in the preamble.
"Art. 6--As regards the present war between Japan and Russia, Great
Britain will continue to maintain strict neutrality, unless some other
power or powers join in hostilities against Japan, in which case Great
Britain will come to the assistance of Japan, will conduct war in
common, and will make peace in mutual agreement with Japan.