The ninth diet opened early in December, 1895, to which the Itō cabinet

proposed the first so-called _post-bellum_ measures to be carried out

within the ensuing ten years. Briefly stated, the additional

requirements on account of "ordinary" expenditures of states were to be

met by an increased taxation aggregating the sum of more than

thirty-three and one-half million _yen_; the expansion of the armament

and the establishment of an iron foundry were to be paid out of the

Chinese indemnity and other "extraordinary" items of revenue, which

altogether amounted to over 365 millions; and the improvement and

extension of railroads, telephone, and the like were calculated to be

covered by the issuance of public bonds. It is essential in our

discussion to keep in our minds the three sources of increased revenue.

As to the first, that is, the increased taxation, we must note as a

matter of great importance that many of the most interesting features of

the political history from this time on have been determined by whether

it was the landowners or the urban population who were called upon to

bear the bulk of the added imposition. In the present case the burden

fell on the latter class of people, and this fact was fortunate for the

reception of the bill in the house, which consisted almost wholly of

representatives of the landowning interest. The passage of the measure

was, however, entirely owing to the alliance between the government and

the Liberal Party. Unfortunately, some of the financial schemes of the

Itō cabinet were soon found to be falling short of the expectations of

their authors, and a large deficit of the revenue for the next fiscal

year, amounting to nearly ninety-three millions of _yen_, brought about

the downfall of the cabinet, which had otherwise proved the most

brilliant and powerful that had yet guided the affairs of the state

under the new régime.

The succeeding cabinet was headed by the great financier, Count

Matsukata, and was for a time supported by the Progressives, whose

leader, Count Ōkuma, occupied the portfolio of foreign affairs. The

tenth diet (1896-1897) ran its course smoothly, as there appeared no

important financial measure to stir up the partisan blood in the lower

house, but the next diet, which met in December, 1897, witnessed an

altogether different scene. In spite of the painful manipulations of the

items of the budget, and of the fact that the issues of the recently

raised taxes had reached the exchequer, a large deficit of over fourteen

million _yen_ stared the Matsukata cabinet in the face, and, moreover,

promised to rise considerably higher the next year. Count Matsukata now

resolved to increase the revenue by twenty-five millions by raising the

rates of certain taxes, one of which, the land tax, was probably among

the fairest sources of an increased income, but was destined to arouse a

stormy opposition of the representatives. No sooner was the count's

design known than the Progressives, with their versatile leader,

deserted the cabinet. This was the first time that the lower house, one

of whose old cries had been to revise land values and reduce the land

tax, was called upon to discuss a financial measure to which the

interest of the constituencies of their overwhelming majority was

diametrically opposed. We might perhaps consider the eleventh diet, for

this reason, as marking a new stage in which the question of class

interests, so promising of ominous consequences, began to manifest

itself. The determined opposition of the house against the cabinet was

quickly followed by the dissolution of the former and the fall of the

latter.

The year 1898 witnessed the most surprising political changes that have

taken place in any single year since the beginning of the constitutional

régime of Japan. In January Marquis Itō again held the reins of the

cabinet. The Liberals would not support him, nor would Count Ōkuma leave

his lieutenants behind in order to join the cabinet. The government thus

declaring itself clear of entangling alliances, the parties hastened to

their constituencies to prepare for the general election of March. The

nation had never seen such peculiar political conditions as then

prevailed all over the country. The new "transcendental" cabinet had

committed itself to no definite policy. There were practically no issues

on which the parties could address themselves to the people, who had not

been without some misgivings as to the conduct of their former

representatives in the lower house, and who could no longer be blinded

by the specter of the so-called sectionalism. The election resulted in

giving an absolute majority to neither the party members nor the

supporters of the government. After the election, however, political

issues quickly crystallized themselves as soon as it was known that the

cabinet would propose an increase of taxes, mainly the land tax, by

more than thirty-five millions of _yen_. The Liberals and the

Progressives, hitherto so jealous of each other, joined hands to reject

the proposition, for which act the house earned another dissolution, on

June 10. With an amazing celerity the two parties voluntarily

amalgamated themselves into the colossal "Constitutional Party," with

the realization of a party cabinet as its motto.

It will easily be seen that this precipitous move had been caused by the

common landed interest which the two former parties represented in the

house, and which had risen to its height of intensity at the repeated

appearance of the land tax bill, and by the plain fact that power and

spoil would fall into their hands the more readily by their combined

warfare with the authorities. In order to meet this united front of the

opposition, Marquis Itō again had a mind to organize a party of his own,

but was strenuously opposed in this desire by the other Elder Statesmen,

particularly Count Yamagata, who, together with the majority of the

peers, were stanch supporters of the literal interpretation of the

Constitution in respect to its theory of ministerial responsibility.

Nothing could have been more significant and characteristic of Marquis

Itō than his action at this critical juncture of the history of the

Constitution and of his own career. The organization of the

Constitutional Party had been publicly announced on June 22, and on the

24th the premier tendered his resignation, together with an earnest

recommendation to the throne that the leaders of the new party be

summoned to form a cabinet. This stroke was natural when we consider

that the quick vision of the marquis must have seen the impossibility of

building between the two fires of the party and the Elders. He, however,

could not have foreseen all the momentous consequences of this adroit

_coup_. The lightning speed of his act stunned friend and foe alike. The

party found itself utterly unprepared to grasp the opportunity so

suddenly thrust upon it. On the other hand, in the inverse proportion

that his conduct gratified the party, it was galling to his numerous

friends in the house of peers, in the privy council, and in the

government and the court, many of whom owed their training and

advancement to the veteran statesman, but who must now have felt as if

they had been deserted by him at the critical moment. The deep-seated

resentment against the marquis which was created among the peers, who

had always regarded him as the living exponent of the theory of the

non-partisan cabinet hereafter must be particularly borne in mind. Would

it not appear plain that they would oppose him if he should again become

premier with the aid of a party, and would it not be equally clear that

if another cabinet should be formed from among themselves, the party

politicians would present an obstinate opposition to it? It will be seen

later that all these things have since actually taken place. If we may

regard the first introduction of the land tax question into the house in

1897 as the beginning of the controlling influence of a class-interest,

the abrupt resignation of Marquis Itō in 1898 may be said to mark the

dawn of an era in which human feelings not altogether expressible in

words began to play an important rōle in parliamentary politics. When

feelings and interests, independent of principles and issues, come to

influence the course of events, the conflicts of their agents must

inevitably become at times bitter. As to the marquis himself, however,

June 24, 1898, was perhaps another of the turning points of his life,

through which he successfully extricated himself from a groove and made

a leap forward.

The most melodramatic spectacles of the year were yet to come. The new

Janus-like Constitutional Party, whose political composition was as

incongruous as its two masters, the idealistic Count Itagaki of the

Liberals and the nimble-witted Count Ōkuma of the Progressives, suddenly

found itself face to face with an opportunity which had for years been

its cherished goal, but which it was at this moment hardly prepared to

accept with alacrity. A mongrel cabinet was at last organized, with

Ōkuma as premier and foreign minister, Itagaki as home minister, two

more former Progressives and three Liberals receiving other portfolios,

and, finally, Marquis Saigō and Viscount Katsura as ministers of army

and navy. It should be noted that the marquis was one of the Elder

Statesmen, under whose wings the viscount also had shaped his political

career. The party thus failed to form a cabinet of purely its own

complexion, which fact must have been especially disheartening in

showing that the powerful military institutions of the empire could not

be controlled by the inexperienced politicians emerging from the lower

house of the diet. Such a matter, however, weighed little by the side of

the grave internal difficulties that beset the new party from its start.

The traditional sympathies of its two component parts proved too

different from one another, and the individual sense of honor and also

interest too little subservient to the common cause, for the members of

the new government to hold together for half a year. Moreover, the

executive authorities of the party at large instituted a shameless

movement of systematic office-hunting, in which the old Liberals and

Progressives vied against each other and among themselves. The same

disorganized condition characterized the general election of August when

a concerted action of the party could hardly be found anywhere in the

country. What finally precipitated the downfall of the cabinet was a

speech of Ozaki, the Progressive minister of education, which roundly

denounced the materialistic tendencies of the age, and declared that if

Japan should become a republic her people probably would not hesitate to

elect a Vanderbilt or an Astor for president. The former Liberals

adroitly chimed in with those chauvinists who pretended to have

discovered in the speech a sinister, disloyal motive, on the part of the

speaker, against the reigning family. When Ozaki's resignation was thus

forced, the premier, without listening to the overtures of the Liberals,

appointed another Progressive to the vacant post. At the end of October

the dissolution of the party began openly amid considerable bickerings,

and the cabinet, which had already been deserted by the non-partisan

ministers of army and of navy, and could no longer maintain itself,

tendered its resignation. Thus the first attempt at a party cabinet in

Japan came to an ignominious failure under extremely untoward

circumstances. The old parties parted more widely than before, and the

unfortunate ministry passed out of existence before it could face the

unfriendly house of peers and tackle the enormous national deficit

amounting to thirty-seven millions of _yen_.

Field Marshal Count Yamagata, who received an imperial summons, formed a

cabinet, on the eve of a new diet, in November, 1898, which consisted

entirely of Elder Statesmen and their sympathizers. The duty of carrying

out the _post-bellum_ measures had devolved upon the new cabinet. The

support of the peers could be safely relied upon, but in the lower

chamber nothing could be effected without the aid of some party. Perhaps

nothing could show more clearly the possibility of the ultimate

ministerial responsibility to the diet than the conduct of the field

marshal at this juncture. He and some of his colleagues, as well as the

majority of the peers, had been known as the most persistent believers

in the non-partisan government and in the responsibility of the cabinet

to the crown, and yet they could see absolutely no hope of performing

their official duties but by allying themselves with the party which

once supported Marquis Itō's _post-bellum_ measures. That party was the

Liberal, which now monopolized the name Constitutionalist. It demanded

certain portfolios, not from the spirit of office-hunting, but, as it

was explained, for the sake of establishing the principle that no

cabinet can be "transcendental," or absolutely non-partisan. According,

however, to an agreement arrived at between the cabinet and the

Constitutionalists, the latter satisfied themselves with a manifesto

made by Count Yamagata at a social gathering, to the effect that he

believed the coöperation of a party or parties commanding a majority in

the diet was essential for the discharge of the business of the state.

It was significant enough to hear these words from the mouth of the

premier from whom they could otherwise have been least expected, and yet

it is not too much to say that no cabinet, not excluding partisan

cabinets, has succeeded in making a greater use of a party than his. The

success was in no small measure due to Tōru Hoshi, formerly Japanese

minister at Washington, and at the time under discussion the house

leader of the Constitutionalists, who, with his wonderful talent for

political tactics, acted for the government as the trustworthy foreman

of his party. By his skillful maneuvers, an increase of the land tax,

which had, as we saw, failed after causing within half a year the

dissolution of two successive houses of representatives, was now,

despite the preponderant sympathy in the house with the landowning class

of the country, agreed to by a majority of 161 to 134. But for its

passage, the deficit of the next fiscal year would have reached beyond

forty-six millions of _yen_.

Let us pause a moment to examine the nature of the Japanese land tax,

without an understanding of which neither the past nor the future of the

parliamentary politics will be comprehended with sufficient clearness.

The reader will recall how before the fall of feudalism most of the

arable land in the country was held in fief, and how the tenants paid to

their lords onerous rents, ranging between thirty and seventy per cent.

of the product of the soil. When the imperial government assumed the

control of the state in 1868, it found itself confronted with the

colossal task of reorganizing the machinery of the state in nearly all

of its parts, and introducing new, urgent measures, some of which were

on a large scale, and all of which demanded a considerable outlay of

funds. To do this they were supplied with a miserably small income,

which hardly covered one-tenth of the necessary expenditures. It was

essential above all to institute a sound system of taxation, whose

basis, in those days of an insignificant foreign trade, could not but

consist in a reorganized land tax. Nothing could, however, be done in

that direction, so long as the local _daimios_ still held their fiefs,

to which the authority of the new government could not penetrate. It was

only when the fiefs were, in the manner already described in a previous

chapter, surrendered to the state that anything toward the establishment

of a secure system of taxation could be attempted. Pending the assessing

of the values of the arable land, which naturally required time, the

government resorted to the issuance of inconvertible notes and other

measures of purely temporary and irregular nature. The land tax itself

was, however, conceived and finally established in the most remarkable

manner, its principle being, in the first place, a complete

nationalization of land, and, then, the transferring of the ownership to

the individual holders who were actually tilling it. The duty of the new

owner to pay a tax to the state for his landed property was evidently

conceived by the government as a natural consequence of the ownership so

bountifully and so completely conferred upon him on their initiative.

With the land tax securely installed, the main structure of the new

system of national taxation had been finished, for the issue of this new

tax at its first complete return amounted to more than two-thirds of the

entire revenue of the state. It now remains to be told how the value of

each piece of land was assessed and its tax determined. The assessment

of value consisted, first, in taking the average of the harvest for five

years, then converting it into money at the basis of the average price

of rice ruling in the same period, and, finally, estimating the amount

of the capital which would be necessary to yield an interest equal to

the price just calculated. The estimated capitalization was considered

the value of the land in question. The assessment of land throughout the

country was completed in 1881. As to the tax itself, its rate was fixed

at three per cent. of the official value, and later reduced to two and a

half per cent. It would be difficult to overestimate the benefit that

accrued to the farmer under the new law. He passed at once from the

position of a tenant to that of an absolute owner, his former lord being

at the same time recompensed by the state with public bonds for the

fiefs he had surrendered. Thus the emancipation of the cultivator from

the feudal bondage of land, which still has a considerable hold upon

some of the former feudal communities in Europe, was in Japan definite

and final. Nor did the new owner find himself under such restrictions as

had existed under the feudal régime, either in the alienation of his

estate or in its utilization to the best advantage by raising upon it

whatever crop he liked. In return, his due to the state was only a sum,

no longer arbitrary or in kind, but fixed and in money, which, as has

been pointed out by some writers, was no more than one and one-fourth

per cent. of the market value of the land, or equal to a rent assessed

on the basis of an eighty-year purchase, which is less than a quarter of

the ordinary tenant's rent.[2] Add to this the important consideration

that between the time when the land tax law went into effect and the

year 1898 the price of rice rose nearly threefold, so that the real

burden of the tax lessened correspondingly by two-thirds. The market

value of land, also, had increased, even as early as 1888, on the

average of five or sixfold. If it be said that the farmer's quota in the

expenditures of the local government had in the meantime considerably

increased, there still remains the fact that the increase was hardly

commensurate with the growth of cultivated area and general land value

and the rise in both quantity and price of the crops.

To say, however, that the land tax was lenient is not equivalent to

saying that it was the most reasonable source for an increased

imposition. That it was so, in the opinion of the fair-minded people,

remains now to be shown. It should be remembered, in the first place,

that although in 1881 the income of the land tax amounted to more than

four-sevenths of the total revenue of the government, it had not since

increased, but rather fallen from over forty-two millions of _yen_ to

less than forty, while, on the other hand, the expenditures of the state

had risen from seventy-one and one-half millions in 1881 to eighty-five

and three-tenths in 1895, and then, so rapidly after the advent of the

_post-bellum_ measures that in 1899 they stood at 254 millions, or more

than three and one-half times as large as they were less than two

decades before. Such items of taxes as had been created or increased to

meet a part of these enormously swollen expenditures had nearly all

fallen on the urban population. The public bonds which were issued from

time to time and could not be much multiplied by fresh issues were also

absorbed mainly by the merchants and manufacturers, and the burden of

the indirect taxes, which in 1899 brought in the considerable sum of

sixteen millions, was borne by the consumers of foreign goods, who for

the most part lived in the cities. This increased assessment of the

urban population can be appreciated in contrast with the greatly

lightened land tax of the landowners, who gained much and lost little by

the rapid development of the economic resources of the country. Their

interests were further strengthened by the new régime, under which the

lower house of the imperial diet championed their cause with such a

decisive majority of its members that no dissolution could change the

situation. Some of the peers may have represented urban interests, but

their voice in financial measures was as small as the control over them

by the representatives was secure.

By the magnitude of these difficulties should be measured the signal

success of the Yamagata cabinet in obtaining the passage in the lower

house of the land tax bill, on December 20, 1898, by the majority of 161

to 134. It was, however, bought with a heavy cost both to the cabinet

and to its allies, the Constitutionalists. The former had been compelled

to relinquish its "transcendentalism," and the latter risked the

displeasure of their constituencies. Nor was the bill passed without a

hard struggle and serious amendments. The original proposition of the

government contemplated a permanent increase of the tax rate to four per

cent., but the bill as it was adopted fixed it at 3.3 per cent. (the

rate of the house land in the cities being, however, 5 per cent.), and

limited its validity to the short period of five years, so that the

estimated increase in the income of the tax, after its going into

plenary force, was only over eight million _yen_, or less than half the

originally intended increase. Even this reduced measure was not agreed

to until the government yielded to the demands to revise the land

valuation in the country in such a way as to cut the total assessed

value by 3,200,000 _yen_, and, what is more, to transfer the charge of

the prison expenditures, amounting to four millions, from the local to

the central exchequer. The net gain by the increased tax measure would

hardly rise above four million _yen_ annually, and this slight gain

would be temporary, while the losses entailed on the government from the

reassessment and prison expenditure would be permanent. After the

expiration of the five years the government would be left worse off than

at the beginning of the term.

In spite of these drawbacks, the credit of raising the income of the

land, income, and _saké_ taxes by forty-six millions of _yen_, and thus

enabling the _post-bellum_ measures to be carried out to any real

extent, belongs justly to the Yamagata cabinet. If we add to this

remarkable success the establishment of the gold standard in 1898 and

the passage of the new election law in 1900, and also remember that the

cabinet possessed a strong unity, it becomes difficult to understand why

it resigned in September, 1900, at the prime of its success. The reason

was probably the characteristic modesty and prudence of the field

marshal, who saw that he had attained to a success large enough to

satisfy any premier, while the prolongation of his office might involve

him in embarrassing relations with the new party just formed by Marquis

Itō, with which the retiring premier had little sympathy.

The attitude of Marquis Itō toward the Yamagata cabinet during the

latter's tenure of office was one of a cordial adviser to a modest

inquirer. When the late Ōkuma cabinet fell, the marquis was summoned by

the emperor to hasten back from China, where he had been traveling, but

before he touched the shores of the main island of Japan the

organization of the Yamagata cabinet had practically been completed. Itō

may have been somewhat chagrined, but it goes to the credit of himself

and of the field marshal that they maintained all through the twenty-two

months of the latter's administration the utmost mutual respect and

good-will that ever could exist between two men of temperaments so

widely different from each other. But the time came when Itō at last

found favorable opportunities to organize a large model party, which the

former Liberals (lately styled Constitutionalists) joined in a body. He

had seen too well in his tours round the country to what abuses the

existing party system had everywhere led, and how far the nation stood,

mainly owing to the flagrant defects of the present parties, from an

ideal constitutional government, the legal foundation for which he had

himself designed. Gradually and with increasing force he seems to have

convinced himself that there should exist a party powerful enough to

counteract the present evils, sufficiently organized and disciplined to

possess a distinct unity of conduct, and actuated solely by the best and

most logical motives of national progress. The patriotic intention of

the marquis himself in these ideas cannot for a moment be doubted: it

must have seemed plain to him that his assumption of leadership in a

party must mean a radical severance of himself from his past career and

friends, and even the silent resentment of the latter, while his

disciplinary measures would, even with his imposing prestige and

influence, become less binding on the party as the latter grew in size.

As soon, however, as his desires of organizing a new party were made

known, on August 25, men of all classes and motives flocked under his

standard in irresistible numbers. The public inauguration of the party,

under the name Constitutional Political Association (_Rikken Seiyū

Kwai_), took place on September 15, and eleven days later was followed

by the sudden resignation of the Yamagata cabinet. Upon Itō now

logically devolved the duty of taking the reins of the state in hand,

but it was only after a considerable hesitation and some unexpected

difficulties that the fourth Itō cabinet was finally organized on

October 19. Who can deny that this was a genuine party cabinet, in an

even fuller sense than the late Ōkuma cabinet, and that Marquis Itō was

after all deeply convinced of the futility of a "transcendental"

cabinet, which owes everything to the crown and nothing to the diet?

The new cabinet, with its illustrious leader, its absolute majority in

the lower house, and its immense following in the country, seems to have

been attended from its beginning by no inconsiderable difficulties, some

of which, indeed, proved more serious than could have been expected.

Foremost among them stood the financial ghost, which would never down,

but which now, with the dispatch of troops to North China, made an

unusually ominous appearance before the inchoate government. The

increased tax measures, mainly in sugar and _saké_ taxes and customs

duties, intended to raise twenty-one million _yen_, readily passed

through the house of representatives, where the landed interest still

outweighed the urban, but met a different treatment from the peers. That

these would be cool toward the cabinet may have been expected, but no

man had imagined that they would present so stubborn an opposition and

such adroit tactics as they did. Their stand was as determined, when it

was taken, as it had previously been unsuspected. Between February 25

and March 12, 1901, were employed in vain the persuasion of the premier,

reconciliation by four Elders, and two successive suspensions of the

diet. Never before in the history of the Japanese Constitution had the

house of peers so seriously opposed the government, nor had its action

ever caused a suspension of the imperial diet. The anomaly of the

situation becomes more evident when one recalls that the upper chamber

was now wielding its weapons against its creator, who had called it

into being as a conservative force to check the radicalism of the other

chamber. Above the fear of a dissolution, as they were, the peers caused

a complete deadlock. How it was removed by an imperial word, and how

unprecedented the procedure was, has been described in connection with

our account of the Constitution. The survival of the Itō cabinet through

this crisis, and the conduct of the premier in allowing his trouble to

be remedied by an aid from the throne, were not unattended by the

increased ill-will of the peers and even by some significant whispers

among the rank and file of his own party.

The cabinet did not, however, live much longer, as it resigned on May 2

from an entirely unforeseen cause, the like of which it is highly

improbable would recur. Within a week after the prorogation of the

imperial diet, which had passed the increased tax measures, Viscount

Watanabe, minister of finance, stunned the premier by declaring that the

only possible way of forestalling the impending financial dangers of the

government would be to postpone the public works contemplated for the

fiscal year of 1901, mainly consisting of the creation or the extension

of the iron foundry, railroads, telegraphs, and Formosan enterprises.

His argument was not without a plausible ground, as it was plain that

the issuing of the public bonds to the amount of more than sixty

millions of _yen_, part of which had been planned to meet the

expenditures of the public works, could not have been effected without

drawing upon the too scarce productive capital of the nation. But the

abrupt proposition of the viscount caused a veritable panic in the

cabinet, and in the business world, and was agreed to by his colleagues

after a considerable discussion. No sooner, however, did the finance

minister carry his point than he gave everyone a fresh surprise by

recommending an entire suspension of public works for the ensuing fiscal

year of 1902. The breach thus created in the cabinet was complete, and

the enigmatical Watanabe would not listen to the plaint of the premier.

When all the other ministers tendered their resignation it was seen that

the viscount alone was holding to his post, although he also soon joined

the rest. It does not seem perfectly clear why the obstinacy of a

minister was deemed a sufficient cause for the downfall of a cabinet

which commanded an absolute majority in the lower house, and which had

survived the deadlock and anomaly of two months before.

However that may be, the party cabinet, for such it was in practice,

did not recede from the government service without receiving deep scars

on the prestige of the party itself. The internal inharmony of the

cabinet so unfortunately caused by the inexplicable conduct of Viscount

Watanabe seriously reflected upon the credit of the leaders then in

office. For the cabinet and the party at large, however, perhaps no

event was of a more serious import than the immense power, followed by

the assassination, of Tōru Hoshi. A man of blameless character in his

home life and an indefatigable student of the world's new thought,

Hoshi, with undaunted courage and consummate talent for party

leadership, not unattended by unscrupulous conduct in money matters, had

become within a short time a peerless whip of the old Liberals. He was

probably the greatest instrument in their secession from the hasty union

with the Progressives. During the Yamagata administration the success of

the cabinet was mainly due to his efficient maneuvers in the lower

house, where he was at once the contractor and the foreman of his party.

When the Liberals joined in a body Marquis Itō's new party, no man could

have been at once more dangerous and more indispensable to its president

than Hoshi. The latter's word was as reliable and his success as assured

as his rule in the party was despotic and his means detested. In the

proportion that the new association was proclaimed by its founder and

expected by the nation to be a model party, the peers and other neutral

people deprecated Hoshi for his corrupt deeds and the marquis for

allowing them to pass under his eye. The politician, on his part, was

too proud to condescend to explain that he retained not a farthing for

himself, and that abuses were showered on him some of which should

belong to others. The respectable society looked askance at him, but in

the political world no one could resist the action of this intrepid and

clever politician. During the first months of the Itō cabinet Hoshi was

at once minister of state for transportation and a member of the

municipal council of Tōkyō, but it was not long before he incurred the

ire of the peers and others and resigned his former post. It was mainly

as a councilor of Tōkyō, however, that his influence was feared to

contaminate the municipal government in all its branches. Finally, on

June 21, 1901, he fell victim at the age of forty-one to the dagger of

an assassin. The latter, Sōtarō Iba by name, formerly a fencing master

and now a man of respectable social standing, and of the same age as

Hoshi, had been actuated by the simple fear of the widespread

corruption wrought by this engrossing enemy of the public, on whose

removal he staked his life. He was later sentenced to life imprisonment.

With the passing of Hoshi, the Constitutional Political Association and

its president lost their most powerful and most detested figure. Marquis

Itō was no longer subject to the calumny which had fallen upon him for

his close association with the deceased politician, nor could he again

count upon the coöperation of one whose talent and tactics had been the

badge of his discipline as leader, and whose concentration of censure

upon himself had relieved the marquis from the share which would

otherwise have been apportioned him. The political atmosphere was as

purified, as was the forecast of its immediate future rendered

uncertain, by the resignation of the Itō cabinet and the assassination

of Tōru Hoshi.

In the meantime the imperial mandate to organize a new cabinet lingered

between Marquis Saionji, Count Inouye, and Viscount Katsura, until

Katsura succeeded, a month after the fall of the last cabinet, in

forming its successor. It consisted of younger men of that school of

statesmen whose sympathy was with the Elders and peers, who, like their

typical field marshal, Yamagata, were known to be skeptical of the

wisdom of the party government. Hardly a more singular spectacle can be

imagined than the one afforded by this new cabinet, which was at once as

little respected from outside as internally it was united and tactful,

and which was as securely supported by the peers as its relation to the

representatives was precarious. The latter, particularly Marquis Itō's

followers, could not have loved the successor who seemed to have stolen

into the post vacated by their leader, whose untimely downfall from the

cabinet had embittered them. Nor could the feeling be suppressed that,

emerging from the house of peers, the new cabinet now had the use of the

very twenty-one millions of increased taxes to which its members were so

recently and so stubbornly opposed.

Again it was through the financial question that the struggle opened

between the government and the diet. The accounts of the fiscal year

1901 showed a deficit of 44 millions, and the proposed war loan of 50

millions to be floated in the United States failing at the eleventh

hour, the difficulty was tided over by ingenious manipulations. In the

budget for the next year, however, it was proposed to transfer from the

"extraordinary" to the "ordinary" class of accounts the works to be

defrayed by public bonds, representing 18 millions, as well as the net

income to the government from the Chinese indemnity, amounting to 38

millions. The Associationists opposed this budget on rather unimportant

grounds, but, at Itō's advice, consented to its passage with the pledge

of the cabinet to reorganize the official system of the government with

a view to eliminating spurious posts and retrenching administrative

expenditures. The marquis had, however, started, on September 18, on his

tour round the world, leaving an advice to his party that a friendly

neutrality should characterize its attitude toward the cabinet. He

attended the bicentennial celebration of Yale University, where he was

honored with the degree of Doctor of Laws. Thence he sailed to Europe,

receiving warm greetings from the governments of the countries through

which he passed. Shortly before he returned home on February 25, 1902,

however, an event took place which for the time being arrested the

attention of the whole world--the Anglo-Japanese alliance, agreed on

January 30 and published February 11.

The full contents and import of the agreement of this alliance will be

discussed later in connection with the diplomatic history of Japan. In

short, it declared unequivocally that the two governments were for peace

and order and against territorial aggressions in China and Korea; and

that, if one of them should be compelled to go to war with a third power

in order to protect its now vested interests in those countries against

the threatening conduct of the enemy, the other party would be neutral

and make efforts to prevent other powers from joining in hostilities

against its ally; but that if any other power or powers should join in

war against the ally, then the other party should come to its

assistance, and conduct the war in common. It may well be imagined with

what enthusiasm the news was received by both friends and foes of the

cabinet in the two houses of the diet, as it was there for the first

time made known to the world on February 11, when even the peers broke

their usual decorum and applauded. Nothing could have strengthened the

position of the Katsura cabinet more than this successful culmination of

a series of negotiations carried on in absolute secrecy with a great

power whose policy of "splendid isolation" had seemed to be traditional.

It would be only fair to say, however, that but for the international

fame which Japan had won for herself in the Chinese war of 1894-1895 and

latterly in the North China campaign of 1900, coupled with the tact and

influence of Viscount Aoki and Mr. Katō, former Japanese ministers at

London, even the increased common interests of the two powers in the

East and the combined effort of Baron Komura, the foreign minister, and

Viscount Hayashi and Sir Claude MacDonald, the respective

representatives of the two governments at London and Tōkyō, would not

perhaps have been sufficient to bring about the consummation of the

great diplomatic enterprise. It was even suspected in some quarters that

Germany also may have been instrumental in promoting the new alliance,

as her well-known policy of setting England and Russia against each

other for her own benefit would be best served in the Far East by

wedding England to the inveterate object of Russia's jealousy. A more

interesting question for us here regards the position in this affair of

Marquis Itō, who had recently held conferences with the Russian foreign

minister, Count Lamsdorf, at St. Petersburg, and had just been honored

by Edward VII. of England with a Grand Cross of Bath. Whether the former

fact indicated his preference for a Russian _entente_, or whether the

latter was a conclusive evidence of an eminent service he had rendered

toward the successful conclusion of the British agreement, has been a

matter of much speculation. There exists authoritative evidence to show

as conclusively that his negotiations with Lamsdorf had been carried out

with the full knowledge of the Katsura cabinet, as to prove that, on the

other hand, the latter's _pourparlers_ with the British government were

also continually intimated to the marquis during his tour. Probably his

negotiations at St. Petersburg were less successful, while the cabinet's

agreement with Great Britain was more readily concluded than he had

expected. Immediately after his return to Japan the tactful statesman

somewhat checked political gossip by intimating his agreement with the

cabinet in its British policy.

The formation of the alliance must have had some bearing on the success

of the Japanese government in floating the fifty million _yen_

($25,000,000) public bonds at London in the autumn of 1902, which had

been rejected a year before from the financial market of New York. The

income of this foreign loan was not devoted to new public works, but

employed to refill the deficiencies of the old accounts.

Aside from these successes, the path of the Katsura cabinet was thorny.

It could count upon no partisan support in the lower house, nor could

its personnel and prestige command high respect. Its main strength lay

in its remarkable unity, silence, tact, and apparent fairness. The last

quality was manifested anew in its impartial attitude during the general

election for the seventeenth diet. The previous diet was the first in

its history that had served its full term of four years without

dissolution, and the present election saw the first operation of the new

election law. Of the 376 elected representatives, the Constitutional

Political Association returned the absolute majority of 192, while the

Progressives numbered about 80. The house contained entirely new members

to the number of 227, but aside from this one fact, no particular

faction had made any appreciable gain or loss, so that the _status quo_

of all the parties was in fact maintained. Once convened, however, the

conduct of the house demonstrated how precarious therein was the

condition of the cabinet. The opposition of the house would probably not

have been so precipitate had not the interest dear to eight-tenths of

the representatives been directly assailed by the government's

proposition to retain the increased rate of the land tax, which, as will

be remembered, had been intended to return in 1904 from 3.3 to 2.5 per

cent.

Inasmuch as this proposition had arisen from the second _post-bellum_

measure of naval extension, it becomes necessary to say a few words

concerning the status of the Japanese navy. The first programme as

planned by the second Itō cabinet in 1895, and agreed to by the diet,

contemplated an increase of Japan's naval force, in ten years, from 33

war vessels and 26 torpedo boats, aggregating the 63,000 tons'

displacement of the fleet before the China war, to 67 vessels, besides

11 torpedo-boat destroyers and 115 torpedo boats, with a total

displacement of 258,000 tons, at the end of 1905. Of this tonnage at the

end of 1902 there was 252,180 tons, representing 72 vessels of all

kinds. Formidable as these figures would seem, it had long been plain to

the statesmen of the empire that deductions must be made for vessels

built more than twenty years before and for others whose terms of

usefulness must shortly expire one after another. Even if the present

force were maintained, each of the six great naval powers of the

world,--Great Britain, France, Russia, the United States, Germany, and

Italy,--would have completely outrun Japan by the end of 1908; while the

Japanese, after deducting vessels older than twenty years, would hardly

possess more than 145,000 tons. Japan's naval ambition was animated, not

so much by an inordinate elation as a civilized power as by the

necessity of maintaining her position in East Asia and guaranteeing her

own independence. When these matters are considered, the new programme

of naval expansion, as at last set forth by the Katsura cabinet, rather

surprises one with its modesty. It, in short, contemplated the

construction, in the course of eleven years, of three battleships each

of 15,000 tons' displacement, three armored cruisers each of 10,000

tons, and two second-class cruisers each of 5000 tons, totaling 85,000

tons' displacement, besides fifteen torpedo-boat destroyers and fifty

torpedo boats. No one could have seriously opposed this programme had it

not been for its financial side. The source of the estimated annual

outlay of 11.5 million _yen_ which the proposed plan entailed upon the

government could, according to its opinion, be found nowhere but in the

retention of the increased rate of the land tax, augmented by other

slight items of revenue. To the seventy or eighty per cent., however, of

the members of the lower house, who had pledged their word to their

constituencies to restore by all means the old rate of the tax, it was

no argument to say that the landowners had been inequitably lightly

taxed by the side of the urban population, nor to prove the

impossibility of raising the necessary expenditure by any other safe

means than the retention of the increased rate. Into their hands no

sharper weapon against the government could have fallen than the one

which the helpless cabinet gratuitously furnished them under the

pressure of an apparent necessity. Upon this juncture, what was the

attitude of Marquis Itō and his party, which controlled an absolute

majority in the lower house?

To answer this question is again to describe another turning point in

the remarkable career of this statesman. It was made known early in the

season, and no partisan view could well refute, that the marquis was in

sympathy with the cabinet so far as its naval programme was concerned,

which he was reported to have deemed even too moderate. As regarded the

land tax question, however, which he had once in the past years

considered it wise to increase even to four per cent., he now, either

from conviction or from policy, assumed an attitude of unusual

deliberation. Nothing could have been more disastrous to the cabinet,

and more decisive for the termination of his career as a party leader,

than his studied reticence about this important problem. The "whips" of

his party deliberately overrode him, and ordered its long expectant

local branches, soon after the general election, to forward to the

headquarters resolutions against both the naval extension and the

retention of the increased land tax. Resolutions accordingly poured in

thick and fast. At the same time, the marquis was flooded with personal

appeals to him to come out squarely against the unpopular government. It

is plain that the action of his subordinates was calculated to

intimidate him more than the cabinet. His authority as the president of

the Constitutional Political Association had been ignored, and he

yielded, perhaps in order to save others' and his own dignity. Shortly

before the opening of the diet, on November 26, the marquis, after a

deliberation lasting four weeks, conveyed to Premier Katsura his

opinion, reiterating that the naval expansion was necessary, that the

burden of the increased land tax was not particularly onerous, but that

he did not think it politic at present to prolong the term of the

increase, and, finally, that the naval expenditure might be met by

postponing or suspending some of the less urgent public works. After

further conferences, the premier, on December 3, personally assured the

marquis of his sense of gratitude for his counsel, but firmly announced

that, inasmuch as the budget had been sanctioned by his majesty, and as

it would be unwise for the cabinet to resign on the eve of the meeting

of the diet, it remained for him to make an effort to carry through his

proposed plan. After this friendly ultimatum was pronounced the outcome

of the measure could hardly be doubted, for the presence of the common

enemy speedily brought about a temporary alliance of the Associationists

and the Progressives. The irresistible coalition found its first

opportunity to assail the cabinet when the latter made an imprudent but

sincere move to connect three things--the budget, the navy bill, and the

land tax measure--declaring the absolute necessity of upholding them

together and the impossibility of an alternative course of action. The

allied parties in the lower house found herein a justification for

modifying Marquis Itō's suggestion to carefully study the budget with a

view to discovering adequate means to balance the naval expenditure

without resorting to the increased land tax. The committee on finance

straightway negatived the land tax bill, and in the afternoon of the

same day, December 16, when it came before the house, the chair read an

imperial mandate suspending the diet for five days. This was followed by

another suspension, and during this interval Prince Konoye, president of

the peers, and Baron Kodama, military governor of Formosa, sought in

vain to effect a compromise between the truculent lower house and the

cabinet. The latter, however, having expressed willingness to make

reasonable concessions, two representatives of each of the opposition

parties met the premier and the ministers of finance and navy, on

December 25, to discuss the compromise measure proposed by the latter.

This compromise reduced the tax rate to three per cent. and agreed to

make up the balance by postponing some public works and retrenching

general administrative expenses. When this new plan was submitted to the

parties at large, the latter roundly rejected it, Count Ōkuma, the

Progressive leader, going so far as to intimate that his party was

fundamentally opposed to the cabinet, which it considered

unconstitutional. Under these circumstances it was no longer possible

for the government to coöperate with the house, which was accordingly

dissolved on December 28.

When the year 1903 dawned upon Japan it found her political conditions

extremely unstable. The alliance of the Associationists and Progressives

seemed unnatural, and the discipline of Marquis Itō over the former

appeared no longer tenable. The coalition had been based on no positive

political principle, nor could the bulk of the Association be

successfully controlled by one, however personally respected, whose

double capacity as trusted Elder Statesman and an opposition leader was

ever liable to lead him into positions highly repugnant to those who

preferred an open and relentless warfare with the cabinet. The two

parties had already parted hands when the eighteenth diet was convened

for an extra session in May. As to the impossible situation of Marquis

Itō, to which reference has just been made, it was not long before it

was demonstrated anew and with a decisive effect. The occasion was again

in connection with the naval extension measure, the urgent character of

which was freshly brought home to the thoughtful people by the partial

failure of Russia to effect the second evacuation of Manchuria and her

simultaneous pressure upon the Peking court and the Korean frontier. The

cabinet presented to the house some supplementary estimates to the

budget for the fiscal year of 1903, together with eight bills, two of

which related to the navy and the new three per cent. land tax. The

manifest hostility of the house again called forth on May 21 a

suspension of the diet. On the 23d, at a general meeting of the

Association, Marquis Itō made an earnest appeal to his party to accept

the compromise measure which he, as an Elder Statesman, and under the

entreaties of his non-partisan friends, had agreed with the cabinet to

support. Under the terms of this agreement the government was understood

to reintroduce the land tax bill for show, but to consent finally to

raise the required annual naval expenditure of eleven and a half

millions by a yearly flotation of public bonds for six millions,

retrenchment in administrative expenses to the extent of one million,

and deflection from the outlay for railroads and other works to the sum

of four and a half millions. The appeal of the marquis was not accepted

by his party without a powerful opposition and a great sacrifice, which

we shall presently see. The painful compromise measure was further

mangled when the house cut the supplementary budget estimates by five

millions, covering the cost of a few important undertakings, and, in

return for the passage of the naval programme, exacted from the

government pledges to effect a drastic reorganization of finance and

administration, and to place the railroad accounts under the

"extraordinary" class of national expenditures. The climax was reached

when the defeat of an address to the throne proposed by the Progressive

members, censuring the cabinet, was quickly followed by the passage of a

resolution of similar censure which was proposed by the Associationists

themselves. It is unnecessary to say that the last act was no less a

blow to Marquis Itō than to the Katsura cabinet. The latter had,

moreover, to endure the displeasure of its best friends, the peers, who

passed a petition to the government to desist from the highly unwise

policy of resorting to a national loan, and a minority of whom even had

contemplated proposing an address to the throne deprecating the same

policy.

The eighteenth diet, which was prorogued on June 5, left the politics of

Japan in an even more confused state than before its opening. The

humiliation of the cabinet was only matched by the internal injuries

which the parties had suffered for their conduct. The former, whose

diplomatic duties in Korea and Manchuria were threatening to rise to a

hitherto unknown degree of difficulty, had been forced by the merciless

diet not only to retreat from the stand it originally took in regard to

the most important problem of the nation, but also to bear the burden of

the imposed responsibility of reorganizing the financial and

administrative machinery on an almost impossible basis. The Progressives

could scarcely conceal the inharmony of their leaders in regard to the

immediate policy the party should pursue. Far more demoralized was the

Association, which had been born under too favorable auspices, and

possessed too absorbing a desire for power, to maintain its mental

poise when it found itself as an opposition party. It had then appeared

to lack the tried perseverance of the Progressives, while its irritation

had been greatly intensified by the double position of Marquis Itō, who

would on the one hand come to an agreement with the cabinet in his

independent capacity as an Elder Statesman, and on the other maintain

his disciplinarian leadership of the opposition party. Nor can it be

concealed that the marquis, dignified statesman and brilliant counselor

as he is, hardly possesses attributes which appeal to the hearts of the

people and inspire the enthusiastic loyalty of his followers. It seemed

evident that the majority of the party from the beginning respected his

prestige and influence, which was considered as a political asset, more

than either his constitutional ideals or his personality. Since they saw

that the shortest road to power would lie in the direction of

unequivocally upholding the proprietary interest of the country, nothing

could have seemed more galling to some of them than a compromise which

would deprive their parliamentary warfare of these essential tactics.

Around this sentiment as a center there seem to have clustered various

other motives for disloyalty. Some Associationists resented the

autocratic rule of the president, and advocated a more republican form

of party organization, and others denounced the marquis for sacrificing

the dignity of the party for his position as an Elder. Desertion of

several members, including the late lamented president of the lower

house, Kataoka, and the present mayor of Tōkyō, Ozaki, was followed by

the dissolution of a few local branches. The culmination, however, was

the resignation of the president himself, which occurred on July 13. The

marquis had at length yielded to the arguments of his fellow-Elders,

which had long been becoming more and more solicitous, that his proper

mission was rather that of a trusted councilor to the throne than one of

party leadership. The Manchurian question was assuming a more serious

character than before, and the resumption by the marquis of the

presidency of the privy council appeared to the Elders, and perhaps also

to the emperor, as the most natural course of events. The appointment

was finally made on July 13, after Itō had given the matter his

characteristically careful consideration. His severance from the party

naturally followed, as no privy councilor might entertain partisan

connections. In the leadership of the Association he was succeeded, at

his own suggestion, by Marquis Saionji, his friend and also one of the

most promising statesmen of the day. Thus after a wandering of nearly

three years the prodigal son, with perhaps a valuable experience but

scarcely an added prestige, returned to the fold of the council and the

court. In accepting the post of the chief councilor, he said to the

emperor that it was his desire of seeing the perfect operation of the

Constitution, which he had had the honor of framing, that had induced

him to descend to a political party and lead it; but that, as he was

now, even before his work with the party had barely begun, graciously

called by his majesty to resume the chair of the council, he convinced

himself that it would be as much a contribution toward the realization

of the constitutional régime to "stand near the throne and reverently

answer imperial questions regarding important affairs of the state," as

to "move among the people as a party leader." No student of the Japanese

politics of to-day can fail to observe the large place Marquis Itō

occupies therein as the pilot of the state, and also his full

consciousness of the fact. His apparent failure as a partisan seems to

have brought him back to his normal position. It will soon be seen that

he returned thither in an opportune season. Her foreign affairs were

just drifting Japan toward an ocean of unknown difficulties.

In the meanwhile, Premier Katsura had tendered his resignation on the

just plea that an adequate conduct of the government was incompatible

with the slender means in which the diet had left the exchequer. Neither

this argument nor the somewhat reduced physical condition of the

viscount would, however, induce the throne to relinquish its confidence

in him. Thereupon the premier reminded the emperor, and it was agreed to

by his majesty, that his retention of the portfolio could mean nothing

else than a drastic retrenchment of the administrative and financial

expenditures of the state. This colossal task the cabinet set about with

characteristically quiet determination.

The arduous and cheerless life of the cabinet was somewhat brightened

when it received into its community, in July, General Baron Kodama,

military governor of Formosa, and latterly the able chief of Field

Marshal Oyama's staff, and, in September, three other able young men.

Nothing, however, could have been more gratifying to the cabinet than

the fact that, while its hold upon the lower house of the diet was next

to nothing, its apparent patriotism and sincerity, as well as its fair

degree of ability, had begun to be appreciated by the throne, the

Elders, and the peers, and perhaps somewhat by the people at large. The

confidence with which its general purpose was regarded by the nation was

best demonstrated in 1903-1904, during its protracted and otherwise

exasperating negotiations with Russia regarding Manchuria and Korea. It

was remarkable that, in spite of the increasing irritation which one

report after another of the Russian aggression in these territories

caused in the national mind, the Katsura cabinet appeared so little

inclined to stray from its policy of a firm but fair treatment of the

question, as did the people to force its hands to a rash action. If this

remarkable phenomenon was, in part, due to the deeper and more mature

feeling which was now inspiring the nation than had been experienced

before, it none the less redounded to the honest purpose of the cabinet.

Nor were its care and precision in all lines of its policy less

remarkable than its general sincerity.

The crisis in Korea and Manchuria was, in the meanwhile, advancing with

tragic certainty, until the apparently insignificant cabinet was called

upon to lead the nation through the greatest trial of its life. The war

with Russia, as we shall see in a later chapter, broke out in February,

1904, followed by nineteen months of the vast campaign and the brilliant

victories of the Japanese army and navy. The existence of the war, of

course, again united the entire nation, and completely changed the

conditions of Japan's domestic politics, which might otherwise have made

a prolonged life unendurable to the cabinet. Its financial measures were

supported by the diet, not without amendments, but on the whole with

practical unanimity. The 156 million _yen_ of the extraordinary war

expenditures disbursed under an imperial ordinance of December 28, 1903,

were willingly sanctioned by the twentieth session of the diet in March,

1904. It also passed the new tobacco manufacture monopoly law

elaborately drafted by the government, and approved the extraordinary

war expenditures for the fiscal year 1904-1905, amounting to 420 million

_yen_. This last act not only involved the raising of the public and

temporary loans and exchequer bonds to the amount of 131 millions, but

also an increase in tax rates and the imposition of new consumption

taxes on woolen textiles and kerosene oil. The next session of the diet

also met the requisitions of the government by further increasing the

tax rates and creating newer taxes, and approving 571 millions of new

national loans and 63 millions to be transferred from funds under the

so-called special accounts, making the total war expenditures of the

second period 780 million _yen_. The grand total of the war cost

approved by the diet in the two sessions thus aggregated 1356 millions.

This amount became inadequate, as the army in the field, especially

after the battle of Mukden, in February-March, 1905, was increased to an

unprecedented magnitude. A new foreign loan for 30 million pounds

floated, in July, in London, New York, and Berlin, brought the figure up

to 1656 million _yen_. Fortunately, the rice crop for 1904 was unusually

good; an early control of the sea held open the highways of Japan's

Eastern trade; the reduction of local impositions and expenditures

counterbalanced the rise in national taxes; and the savings and general

financial endurance of the people at large proved unexpectedly great.

The unforeseen successes of Japan's arms also contributed to the

temporary prestige of the cabinet.

The spell was broken the moment peace was restored. The broad

concessions made through the peace envoys at Portsmouth for the

conclusion of the Russo-Japanese treaty of September 5 brought upon the

cabinet (and the privy council) the greatest popular resentment ever

experienced by any constitutional government of Japan. Various motives

and circumstances combined to make the sentiment for a time almost

unanimous among the nation. The conclusion, on August 12, of the

agreement of a renewed and much extended alliance with Great Britain,

which was published on September 27, somewhat relieved the strained

situation, and the Constitutional Political Association, under the

leadership of Marquis Saionji, showed an inclination for a moderate

policy toward the treaty and the government. The relative position of

the different parties was again rendered uncertain, so that their

conduct in the coming session of the diet could hardly be forecast. As

to the cabinet, it must either succumb to an attack from the majority in

the lower house, or survive it only to be confronted by colossal

financial difficulties.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] The editor has been greatly helped in preparing this chapter by I.

Tokutomi's admirable pamphlet on the recent political life of Japan.

[2] Brinkley's "Oriental Series," vol. V. p. 16-17.

Chapter XVIII

ECONOMIC PROGRESS. 1893-1906

One of the most remarkable features of the economic evolution of Japan

since 1868 has been the slow increase of her rural population as

compared with the urban--a fact which at once indicates that the

agriculture of Japan can offer little to compare with the phenomenal

growth of her manufactures and commerce. Nor will a closer examination

establish an optimistic view regarding the future status of the Japanese

farmer. Although a sedimentary soil admirably suited for the culture of

cereals abounds in the country, and often yields in warmer regions two,

three, or even four different crops during the year, and although Japan

is blessed with a copious rainfall, it must be remembered that the

arable area is extremely limited, and can hardly be extended

commensurately with the fast growth of the population. Of the 94.5

million acres of land of Japan exclusive of Formosa, only 12.4 million

acres, or thirteen per cent., are under cultivation, while, as is well

known, there exists little or no pasture land in Japan. Even if all

sorts of land under fifteen degrees of the angle of inclination were

arbitrarily considered as reclaimable, they could not add to the arable

area more than 10.5 million acres. The actual reclamation outside of the

colony of Hokkaidō amounts annually to only twenty thousand acres more

or less. It seems evident that the future increase of the agricultural

resources of the country may be effected less by extensive breaking of

the soil than by intensive improvement. This is well illustrated by the

rice culture, the area of which has scarcely been increased during the

last twenty years but the actual product of which has in the meantime

risen nearly eighty per cent. The production of other cereals, beans,

and potatoes has grown even more appreciably, while the area of the

cotton, indigo, and sugar culture has, for commercial reasons,

remarkably declined. No illustration, however, of the limited

agricultural resources of the country is more impressive than the ratio

which her arable area bears to her population. The _per capita_

distribution would fall below half an acre. Under these circumstances it

is natural that the cultivated lots are diminutive, more than half of

the rice fields of the country being each less than one-eighth of an

acre. The farmer is obliged to exercise the utmost care in utilizing

every scrap of his land and every grain of its yield. A great majority

of the tenants, moreover, lack a sufficient fund, after the high rents

and interest are paid, even to buy manure, much less to make any

improvement on the land. The implements are as meager and primitive--the

outfit for the cultivation of an acre of field costing probably less

than eight and a half dollars in gold--as their wages are low, seldom

rising above thirty-five cents per day for the male and twenty cents for

the female. The government is making efforts to develop the agriculture

of the country by all possible means of education and encouragement, not

the least important of which has been the creation of the central and

local Hypothec Banks and the Credit Guilds. How much, however, these

methods will really reach the needy villagers is yet to be seen. On the

other hand, Japan cannot help realizing that her agriculture, while it

still constitutes the staple industry of the nation, has already ceased

either to supply her with all the necessary raw products for the

manufactures or to support the new population, which is growing annually

at the rate of more than half a million. Probably this serious problem

lies behind many an event of recent years that characterizes the

activities at home and abroad of the Japanese people.

The difference between the condition of agriculture and that of

manufactures and trade not only is clear, but also becomes increasingly

decisive as time advances. Until we realize this significant difference

we fail to grasp the most fundamental cause, excepting perhaps her

growing ambition as a nation, that impels Japan onward with an

irresistible force into a controlling position in the Far East. In

proceeding to explain the situation, manufactures and trade will be

considered together, as their influence is in a large measure mutual.

It must be noted, in the first place, that when the country was thrown

open to the world's trade, her industrial conditions were altogether

inadequate to meet the marvelously rapid increase of the consumption of

new goods. The original five per cent. import duty, which peculiar

circumstances made almost equal to no duty, accelerated the impetuous

advance of imports over exports. Thus the first decade and more of the

new régime found the nation in a state of almost complete economic

dependence upon foreign countries. Old industries were largely

paralyzed, while capital and labor were not forthcoming for the new. It

was at this juncture that the government began to extend a helping hand,

by subsidies and by example, to the more important economic enterprises,

and not until then could the people begin to take an active interest in

railroads, industries, and export trade. The fact that the low import

tariff had been forced by the powers upon the Japanese government, whose

right of tariff autonomy they had thus ignored, was galling to the

nation in its ardent desire to regain its economic independence, and

tended powerfully to confirm its determination to effect a revision of

the treaties. These were revised in 1894, and the new treaties which

emancipated Japan from the consular jurisdiction of the foreign

residents and gave her a partial tariff autonomy came into force in

1899. It is unnecessary to examine the process of this revision, but it

suffices here to repeat that while consumption had advanced marvelously

under a virtual free trade, production began to grow only after the

government was compelled to aid it. From this point on trade and

industry have helped each other's progress by mutual reaction. The

tremendous expansion of economic resources thus rapidly opened in the

two great fields, manufactures and commerce, was clearly measured by the

enormous increase of population, which numbered less than thirty

millions in 1830, thirty-four millions in 1875, forty-two and a quarter

in 1895, and more than forty-seven to-day. At the same time, foreign

trade itself has grown from 40 million _yen_ in 1871 to 690 million

_yen_ in 1904, the _per capita_ share of the people in the growth rising

more than twelvefold. During the first half of 1905 the total foreign

trade in merchandise amounted to over 429 million _yen_, as compared

with 320 millions during the corresponding period in 1904. In other

words, Japan is changing from an agricultural to an increasingly

industrial and commercial nation, and her commerce is expanding mainly

abroad, as her domestic market has well-nigh reached its "saturation

point." This fact is strikingly illustrated by the rapid growth of the

exportation of manufactured goods, as well as the importation of raw

material, as compared with the relatively slow increase in the

importation of foreign manufactures. The exports of manufactured goods

in 1890 amounted to 10 million _yen_ of the total export trade of 55.7

millions, while ten years later the corresponding rate changed to 74.7

out of 193.8 millions. If raw silk, straw-plaits, and the like were

classed under agricultural, instead of manufactured, goods, the rate of

increase between 1890 and 1900 of different kinds of exports would run

as follows:

1890 1900

Per Cent. Per Cent.

Manufactured 18.0 38.0

Agricultural 51.6 37.8

Fishing 6.6 3.5

Mining 20.0 14.2

Miscellaneous 3.8 6.5

If the enumerated goods were transferred from the agricultural to the

manufactured list, the rate would be thus:

1898 1899 1900

Per Cent. Per Cent. Per Cent.

Manufactured 70.9 69.4 66.0

Agricultural 11.9 11.9 10.5

Others 17.2 18.7 23.5

While the rate of the manufactured exports seems to have fallen between

1898 and 1900, their absolute figures show that some new items appeared

in the list during the interval and that the total volume enormously

advanced. On the other hand, the imports, which increased together with

the purchasing power of the people, show more rapid growth in raw goods

and machinery than in manufactured articles. These changes have been

pointed out here in order to indicate the general nature of the economic

transition of the Japanese people. They will be found to possess a far

greater significance than we have seen when we come to examine further

the character of the trade tendencies of Japan.

Let us for a moment consider the qualifications of the Japanese as a

manufacturing nation, for upon them must ultimately depend their

economic as well as general national success. It would be impossible to

conceal from our view certain serious disadvantages which confront

industrial Japan, particularly in her want of the new form of labor and

experience and lack of certain raw materials and of capital. Regarding

labor, the old manual dexterity and individual apprenticeship have

hardly had time to be sufficiently converted into an organized and

specialized mechanical training, so that the foreign visitors report

continually the apparent inefficiency and ill discipline of the Japanese

mill-hand. On the other hand, Japan cannot forever count on the

cheapness of her labor, whose cost is still low, the average daily wage

of twenty-six principal classes of laborers being not more than

one-quarter of an American dollar, but it has risen more than twice

within the last fifteen years, and will continue to rise along with the

cost of living. The shortage of capital is natural when it is remembered

that Japan is just passing from an agricultural to a manufacturing

stage, but none the less constitutes the most serious drawback to her

industrial growth. Ingenuity and enterprise are not wanting, but owing

to the scarcity of capital Japan's exploitation of resources, both at

home and in Korea and China, is handicapped to an extent which is

exasperating. Latterly, however, particularly after the war, foreign

capitalists have been seeking investment in Japan, and they may be

expected to aid Japanese enterprise on the mainland. The lack of proper

business experience of the Japanese manufacturers is natural from their

comparatively recent appearance. They have been accused of

over-eagerness to rid themselves of foreign advisers and middlemen, who

could have supplied them with a better understanding and control of the

outside market than they themselves could command. The native maker,

however, will learn deeper by blundering more. A graver charge has

continually been made of the slack commercial veracity of the Japanese,

which is admitted by themselves to be real, but which has for certain

reasons been unduly magnified, while it is naturally being remedied by

experience. Another grave disadvantage of the Japanese manufacturer

consists in his want of such important raw materials as cotton, wool,

and iron. The growth of cotton in Japan is insignificant, while its

importation from India, China, and the United States amounts to more

than seventy million _yen_ annually. Wool has to be entirely supplied

from abroad, as pastures for sheep do not exist in Japan, while the

total annual output of iron is less than eighty thousand short tons.

Reflection will show, as experience has proven, that the enumerated

disadvantages are neither permanent nor irremediable. Labor and

practical wisdom will gain by time, and capital and raw material will

come in with greater ease and in larger quantities. Over against these

diminishing disadvantages Japan possesses an unrivaled geographical

position between the great Pacific on the one hand and the teeming

millions of the East Asiatic population on the other, the commercial

importance of both of which must grow wonderfully with the development

of canals and railroads in various parts of the world and the opening of

new markets in the yet slightly explored East. This superb

Phoenicia-like situation of Japan toward the outside world is supported

internally by a richly endowed soil and an eager and ambitious race. The

soil possesses an abundant water supply and extensive coal beds, the

latter already yielding well-nigh ten million tons, and produces tea and

silk the peculiar quality of which is hardly matched by the product of

another land. The ambition and docility of the people would seem to be

well exemplified by the phenomenal growth of silk and cotton textile

industries, which have risen twenty-fold in value during the last two

decades, and by the creation of certain new, prosperous industries,

particularly in matting, lucifer matches, straw braids, and cotton

yarns. The exportation of the six principal branches of manufactures

above enumerated amounted in 1888 to less than 31 million _yen_, and

nearly 195 millions in 1904. It should be remembered that none of these

articles have won their position without encountering embarrassing

difficulties at home and a sharp competition abroad, and that with a

relaxation of effort they would at once sink into insignificance.

Considering the foreign trade of Japan apart from her manufactures, it

is seen that its growth during the last eleven years has been rapid and

on the whole regular. During this space of time the exports in 1904

reached 319¼ million _yen_, which means a gain of 256 per cent. over

1893, and the imports 371-¼ millions, or a gain of 320 per cent., while

the total volume of trade amounted to 690-3/5 millions, that is, nearly

three times as much as it was a decade ago. The figures for 1905 will

possibly exceed the 850-million mark. This remarkable growth of trade

has advanced hand in hand with an even more striking development of

Japan's shipping industry. At the end of 1891 she owned 607 steam

vessels with a total tonnage of 95,588, while in 1903 her vessels

numbered 1088 and their capacity totaled 657,269 tons, so that Japan

stood in 1902 in the ninth place in tonnage in the world's merchant

marine, and the speed and general improvement of her ships were behind

only those of the four greatest shipping nations on the globe. The gross

income from freight and passengers in 1902 amounted to 12-3/5 million

_yen_. Japanese steamboats now ply regularly between her shores and the

ports in Siberia, Australia, India, Europe, and on the Pacific coast of

America, and, in Korea and China, they play an active part in the

coasting and inland navigation.

We conclude this section by briefly pointing out what appear to be the

most significant tendencies of Japan's trade and of her national growth

in general. The growth of imports, which have risen from 23-1/5 million

_yen_ in 1874 to 37-3/5 millions in 1904, is mainly due to causes which

may be classified as follows: First, the progress of industries,

resulting in an increasing demand, on the one hand, for machinery, and,

on the other, for raw materials, particularly cotton and iron; second, a

great advance in the standard of living among the people at large, which

caused a remarkable growth of the general consumption of imported

articles, including textiles, woolens, petroleum, and numerous other

items; third, the rapid increase of population, coupled with the

transition of the new nation from an agricultural to a manufacturing

state of industry, which, besides aiding the growth of general

consumption, necessitated a marked development of the importation of

foodstuffs, such as rice, beans, flour, and sugar. These three classes

of causes have all stimulated import trade to grow with rapidity, and

are apt to continue to do so in the future, but, as the figures plainly

show, in varying degrees from one another. And it is in this difference

that one of the striking indications of Japan's call in the East is to

be discovered. The increase of the imports due to the growth of the

general consumption of foreign goods has not been nearly so fast as

other classes of imports, as Japan is able to supply her people more and

more with the fruits of her own manufacture, which itself is progressing

rapidly. While the future increase of this class of imports must be

steady, it at the same time may not be rapid save in a few exceptional

articles. Nor may the importation of machinery, excepting the most

advanced, such as locomotives, be expected to grow more rapidly, the

reason for this supposition being again the increasing activity of

Japan's manufacturing life. The other two classes of imports, however,

that is, raw material for manufacture and foodstuff for the growing

population, have shown a wonderful advance, and may be said to command

the most assured promise for the future. A glance at the following table

will make an elaborate demonstration of our statement superfluous:

IMPORTATION OF RAW MATERIAL AND FOODSTUFF

(Unit of million _yen_)

1882 1892 1902 1903 1904

Cotton 0.46 12.32 79.78 69.52 73.42

Pig iron 0.09 0.24 0.98 1.25 2.24

Wool .... 0.30 3.40 4.81 9.97

Sugar 3.84 9.53 14.36 20.96 23.04

Rice 0.21[1] 1.86[1] 13.56[1] 51.96 59.70

Flour .... 0.27 3.28 10.32 9.62

Beans .... .... 4.95 6.37 8.12

Oil cakes 0.03 0.82 10.12 10.73 4.66

This remarkable showing of figures becomes highly significant when we

consider further that most of the articles the importation of which

increases the fastest come mainly from the East Asiatic countries. India

furnishes the bulk of cotton, China supplies some iron, sugar, and rice,

as well as some cotton, while North China and Manchuria send their beans

and oil cakes, and Korea is beginning to be a great supply region of

several cereals. Most flour and some iron, however, come from the United

States, which, as we shall see presently, occupies a unique relation to

Japan's trade. We have thus arrived at an important conclusion that

Japan is obliged to depend in an increasing degree for her most

important articles of importation on East Asia, to which she is

intimately connected both geographically and historically.

An analysis of the export figures of Japan leads us to a similar

conclusion from another direction. It has already been shown that, as

contrary to the tendency of her import trade, Japan's exportation

consists yearly more of manufactured articles and less of raw goods than

before. Here again a deeper significance is disclosed by an examination

of the destination of the exports. The time, if ever, seems very remote

when Japan will invade Europe and America with her manufactures and

compete with the fruits of their superior machinery and mechanical

experience. Her exportation to Western countries already has a clear

indication of settling down to two main classes of articles; such

unfinished goods as raw silk, copper, sulphur, and others, which might

rather be finished abroad than in Japan; and certain goods peculiar to

the soil of Japan, as, for instance, tea, _habutai_, and other light

silk fabrics, porcelain, matting, camphor, and the like. The exportation

of these articles must increase in varying degrees, according to the

state of the several determining factors that rule the domestic and

foreign markets, but its future on the whole may be said to be much

more limited and inelastic than that of Japan's exports to the East

Asiatic countries. Her close economic relation to them has become all

the more manifest since she began to be a manufacturing nation, while

they remained agricultural; she buys from them raw products and

foodstuff, and supplies them with her manufactured articles. The demand

for these last-named articles, also, by a fortunate combination of

circumstances, is at present what the still inferior skill of the

Japanese manufacturer can supply. The taste of the Eastern buyer is

still low and his wants still comparatively few, while their advance

will largely coincide with Japan's improvement in industries. Her

neighbors in Korea, Siberia, Manchuria, North and South China, India and

Further India, and the Philippines absorb her coal, matches, marine

products, cotton yarns and coarse cotton fabrics, and other similar

goods, to the amount of 134.5 million _yen_ (in 1901) while eleven years

before they consumed 23 millions and in 1882 only 6 millions. From these

data, the conclusion seems tenable that her geographical and economical

conditions render it natural for Japan to interpret the new Occidental

civilization for the old Orient, and create new wants in the latter for

the fruits of the former, herself reaping an important share of the

profits that accrue from the world-wide exchange. This share consists in

an even closer economic connection of East Asia, particularly Korea and

China, with Japan as her grand supply region of raw goods and market for

made articles. In comparison with this, Japan's trade with countries of

Western civilization may become more and more a mere complement to her

Eastern trade.

The solitary and striking exception to this general statement is found

in the Japanese trade with the United States, which is still to-day, as

she was twenty years ago, the largest single buyer of Japanese goods,

notably tea, raw silk, matting, porcelain, and camphor. In the import

trade, while the United States is second to Great Britain, the former

advanced in twenty years between 1882 to 1902 from 3 to 48.6 million

_yen_, and the latter only from 14 to 50.3 millions. The peculiar

features of Japan's trade with the American nation which are not found

in her European commerce may be said to lie in the fact that the latter

buys a considerable amount of the crude or unfinished Japanese

manufacture, and sells increasing quantities of raw cotton and flour and

other foodstuffs, thus participating in a large measure in the

peculiarities of the Japanese trade with the East. The United States

also furnishes Japan more cheaply certain products of modern industries

which the latter formerly bought from Europe.

We conclude our survey of Japan's foreign trade by appending a table

showing its distribution by the continents, which will speak for itself

without our comment:

(Unit of million _yen_.)

Europe, America, Asia, Australia,

and Others.

1881 Exports, 12.5 11.0 0.6 0.9

Imports, 21.0 1.8 7.6 0.5

1891 Exports, 23.9 31.1 20.9 1.8

Imports, 30.3 6.8 23.7 1.9

1901 Exports, 59.9 75.6 111.4 5.2

Imports, 96.7 42.9 109.0 7.0

1903 Exports, 70.3 85.7 126.7 6.7

Imports, 96.1 46.7 169.1 5.0

1904 Exports, 72.3 104.6 134.5 7.7

Imports, 120.5 58.9 182.5 9.3

FOOTNOTE:

[1] The average for the past ten years inclusive.

Chapter XIX

THE CHINO-JAPANESE WAR. 1894-1895

Seldom does history offer a more dramatic unfolding of international

relations than the evolution of the East Asiatic question, of which the

China-Japan War of 1894-1895, the Boxer campaign of 1900, and the

Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 are but successive stages of a

continuous and broadening process. The scene of this development now

covers those countries which are among the most resourceful in the world

and which comprise one-third of the human race. The future is unknown.

The origin of the drama, however, may at least in part be traced to the

adoption of a new career by Japan. Having been singularly well trained

by her long history in the past, and impelled by the dictates of her

vital interests, Japan had resolutely entered upon the new career, and

had step by step committed herself to an open and progressive policy

from which there could be no return, and which had to be carried forward

against all obstacles, if she would exist and grow as a nation. This

change of Japan's course of life was a cause of her wars with China and

Russia; by it the history of the Far East radically changed its

character and opened its new volume. At first, the determined attitude

of new Japan immediately caused a breach which continued to widen until

the war of 1894-1895 came as a logical result--for it at once appeared

that Japan had torn herself away from the ancient East Asiatic

civilization, of which China was the mentor and Korea the greatest

pupil, but of which Japan had never been so slavish a disciple as not to

develop her original traits. As soon as Japan proved receptive of

Western arts and sciences, there was resentment on the part of China and

Korea, which felt as if Japan had deserted the historic community of the

East and turned a renegade and servile imitator of the inferior

civilization of the barbarian. To an equal extent Japan desired, even

unconsciously, to demonstrate that her new career not only was not

misguided, but also was the only possible way to preserve herself and

save the East. Conflict with China became acute when Japan desired to

open to the world the tightly sealed kingdom of Korea, over which China

claimed suzerainty. Japan's attempt to open Korea, then, should be taken

as the starting point of our account of the war of 1894-1895.

To complete our general survey, it may again be emphasized that the same

problem which caused the breach of 1894 also produced the conflict of

1904. The interests at stake had, indeed, grown wider and deeper during

the ten intervening years, and Russia was a far more powerful and

aggressive power than China, but the fact still remained that, from

Japan's standpoint, her vital interests were at issue in 1904 as they

were in 1894, and, from that of the world, the conflict raged now as it

did then between an open and an exclusive policy.

As has been said above, Japan's attempt to open Korea as an independent

and sovereign nation was the occasion for the outbreak of the Chinese

war of 1894. Why did Japan desire to open Korea? Was it because Japan

would apply to Korea the treatment she herself had received from the

United States and other powers? Or was it an expression of the vigor of

a newly regenerated nation? Probably the motives were not so simple, for

it should be remembered that from the prehistoric ages the career of

Japan and of Korea had been so vitally entwined that their close

relationship of one kind or another was as inevitable as their

geographical proximity itself. Moreover, beyond the peninsula stood two

other powers, China and Russia, whose friendship Japan could not always

count upon. In providing against any possible danger from these powers,

the entire question seemed to hinge upon Korea, for with the fall of the

latter the very existence of Japan would be threatened. It seemed

essential for Japan, in order to protect her own life, either to annex

Korea before it fell prey to another power or to insure its effective

independence by opening its resources and reforming its rotten

administration. Japan chose the latter alternative. But this brought her

to a conflict with the Koreans themselves, for they were too thoroughly

imbued with Chinese civilization and too deeply corroded by official

corruption not to resent Japan's eagerness to modernize and revivify

Korea. Korea thus presented the singular spectacle of resisting the

suggestion of a friendly nation to insure her independence and power.

Japan was confronted with the colossal task of overcoming the Korean

misapprehension and breaking down the Chinese suzerainty over the

peninsula.

This double conflict began almost as soon as the imperial authority was

restored in Japan. In 1868 Japan sent a message to Korea with a view to

opening friendly relations with her. Korea, however, being ill informed

of the nature of the political change which had just taken place in

Japan, and acting under the false representation by China of Japan's

aggressive pretensions, resolutely declined to entertain these

overtures. Other similar attempts also miscarried, and, in 1872, a

Korean magistrate set a placard upon the gate of the residence of a

Japanese officer at Fusan, in which Japan was stigmatized as the

laughing stock of the world for her slavish imitation of barbarous

customs. The taunt ended in saying that Japan had been so insolent as to

impose the shameless policy upon Korea also, but the latter had too high

a sense of propriety to be so deluded. It is noteworthy that the

objections here raised were characteristically double, that Japan was

under the shadow of other powers and was losing her nationality, and

that she dared to force Korea to follow her unwise example. The former

was sufficiently repugnant, the latter made it unendurable. When in 1873

Japan demanded China's explanation for the repeated insults made by

Korea upon Japan in the latter's attempts to negotiate with her, the

Chinese government declared that it was not answerable for Korea's

conduct, for she was not its dependency. This aroused an outcry in Japan

that she should independently force Korea open, but a greater insult

from Korea was still to come. As a Japanese war vessel on its way to

Niu-chwang stopped at the Kang-hwa Island, not far from Chemulpo, in

August, 1875, it was fired upon by the inhabitants and two marines were

killed. The Japanese-Korean treaty, which was concluded as a result of

this incident, deserves a special note, not only because it was the

first modern treaty made by Korea with a foreign power, but also because

it for the first time showed clearly Japan's fundamental policy

regarding Korea, upon which policy has depended and will for a long time

depend many a serious event in the history of the Extreme Orient. By

this treaty Korea was declared independent, the two parties binding

themselves to treat each other on the basis of equality, and three

Korean ports were shortly to be opened to foreign trade. This

epoch-making treaty was concluded on February 26, 1876, at which date

Korea was at last conventionally independent and partially open to the

outside world.

We need not tarry to repeat the story already told of the strong

internal opposition that the moderate Korean policy of the government

had aroused in Japan, and of its far-reaching consequences in her

domestic politics. What mainly interests us here is the question as to

what effect did the treaty produce upon Korea herself, whose sovereignty

it recognized in unmistakable terms. This conventional independence of

Korea had hardly altered the state of her political mind. Korea, it

should always be remembered, had since prehistoric ages been trained in

that school of experience in which she found herself eking out her bare

existence between stronger surrounding nations, which she was wont

either to propitiate or to set one against another for her precarious

safety. The Koreans had thus by habit and by conviction grown up an

opportunist nation. They gratified Japan by complying with her wish to

declare them independent, while, at the same time, they courted China's

favor by maintaining their vague dependency upon that empire. As

indefinitely did China support her contention that Korea at once was and

was not dependent upon her.

The time soon came, however, when China was obliged to define her

position toward Korea, for the more apparent Japan's policy of upholding

Korean independence became to China, the more urgent was it for the

latter to reassert her suzerainty over the peninsula. The ambiguous

phraseology with which China had masked herself was suddenly cast aside

when an acute crisis came. In 1882 Tai-wen-kun, the father of the Korean

king, assumed the administrative power at Seul, and set about executing

with great rigor his anti-foreign policy. The old patriot believed, like

many a Japanese before the restoration, that exclusion and independence

were synonymous. On April 23 the Japanese legation was attacked by

Korean troops, its twenty-seven members barely escaping to Japan by way

of Chemulpo on an English vessel. With unusual rapidity the Peking

government sent forces to Korea, who captured Tai-wen-kun and carried

him off to China, demonstrating in this way the latter's assumed right

of forcible intervention in Korea. China thus asserted by deed her

suzerainty over Korea, and herein is already forecast an ultimate

conflict between her and Japan, although neither power may have expected

it as yet. Japan, on her part, contented herself by securing the

punishment of the guilty, payment of 50,000 _yen_ for the killed and

wounded, and also an indemnity amounting to half a million _yen_,

four-fifths of which were remitted the next year. She was, besides,

allowed to station troops at Seul for protecting her residents against

future emergencies.

This Korean trouble of 1882 was followed two years later by a greater

crisis, and again the occasion was a political disturbance at Seul. In

1884, when China was at war with France over Annam, the progressive

party in Korea, which had been inspired by the example of Japan, took

advantage of the situation and overthrew by violent force the

pro-Chinese, conservative government. Suddenly the defeated party,

together with 2000 Chinese troops, invaded the palace, murdered several

members of the new cabinet, and attacked and burned the Japanese

legation. The minister, Takezoye, fled for his life, while many of his

compatriots residing at Seul were outraged or killed. The king, who had

summoned Japanese soldiers to guard the court, now threw himself on the

protection of the Chinese. In Japan the cause of the trouble was

attributed to the mild Korean policy of the government. In 1885,

accordingly, an agreement was made with Korea whereby the latter again

promised to punish the guilty and indemnify the outrage. Korea was

settled, and China had now to be dealt with. To allay the censure

directed at himself by the nation, Itō proceeded in person to China,

where he concluded with the Chinese commissioner, Li Hung Chang, the

famous Tientsin Convention of April 18, 1885, which had so much to do

with the later breach with China in 1894. It was agreed by this

convention that Japan and China should withdraw troops from Korea, that

they should not furnish Korea with military instructors, and that if it

should become necessary at any future time for either party to send

soldiers to Korea, it should notify the other of its intention. It was

further stated, in a supplement, that there existed no definite evidence

that Chinese troops had killed Japanese residents at Seul, and

punishment would be inflicted on the guilty only when sufficient proof

was forthcoming. As a matter of fact, no investigation followed and no

punishment was meted out. On the contrary, the Chinese resident at Seul,

Yuan Shih-kai--now the powerful pro-Japanese viceroy of Chihli, but then

an astute promoter of China's ascendency over Korea--who was considered

to have been largely responsible for the conduct of the Chinese forces,

not only was not recalled, but was reinstated as Chinese minister at

Seul. The greatest displeasure of the Japanese nation, however, was felt

over the clause in the convention abrogating Japan's right, gained in

1882, of stationing troops in Seul to protect her citizens and their

interests. Itō was consequently denounced at home now more loudly than

before. China, on her part, equally resented the conclusion of the

convention, for she was thereby obliged to treat Japan on an equal

footing with herself in Korea. Both countries suffered equally, for

while Japan forfeited the rights she had previously acquired, China's

claim of suzerainty was seriously impaired. Things remained in this

strained condition until nine years later, in 1894, when an unforeseen

event forced them to a breaking point. It was the Tonghak rebellion,

which brought military forces of Japan and China face to face in Korea.

The Tonghak (or "Learning of the East") party was a secret organization,

whose doctrines were embodied in a collection of tenets based upon

Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism. Both the practical aims and the real

strength of the party were then little known. Its conduct in 1894,

however, led to an international crisis of which it could not have had

the slightest expectation. In May the society rose in insurrection

against the universal corruption and oppression of the Korean officials,

who were then under the powerful control of the family of the queen, the

Min. The Min, whose safety was thus threatened, despite an opposition in

the court against the proceeding, appealed, on their initiative, to the

assistance of China through the minister at Seul, who had really

suggested the move. Here was a long-awaited opportunity for China to

recover her lost ground in Korea and once more assert her suzerain

rights over the peninsula. The Peking government at once dispatched

forces toward Korea, at the same time notifying Japan, in accordance

with the Tientsin Convention, that China had been requested by Korea to

send troops to suppress the Tonghak rebellion, and that she had

consented to "protect the tributary state." On the same day, June 7,

Japan replied in two messages, one acknowledging the receipt of China's

notice, but declining to admit that Korea was tributary to her, and the

other announcing that Japan also would send soldiers to Korea. To this

China retorted, saying that as Japan had not been requested by Korea to

dispatch forces, the object of her expedition must be to protect

Japanese subjects in the peninsula, which circumstances made it

unnecessary for Japan to send too large forces or to allow them to go

too far into the interior. Japan's answer was that the sending of the

troops was in accordance with the Korean-Japanese convention of 1882,

and that she had the right to determine the number and disposition of

her own forces. The first detachment of the Japanese soldiers escorting

Minister Ōtori reached Seul on June 10, and the Chinese troops landed at

Asan the next day. If the order had been reversed, China might have

regained, temporarily at least, her control over the Korean kingdom, and

Japan's ardent wish to reform and strengthen Korea as an independent

state might have remained unfulfilled. From her vantage ground, however,

Japan made a move which in fact created the critical point of the

affair, for, on June 17, her foreign minister, Mutsu, proposed to China

to suppress the Tonghak insurrection by joint forces, and then reform

the Korean internal government also by joint action, so as to insure

stability and peace in the kingdom. It now rested with China to avoid

all danger by joining hands with Japan in eradicating evils in the

Korean administration, but she would hardly impede a reform upon Korea

which she would not tolerate at home. On the contrary, the more corrupt

and feeble Korea was, the more dependent upon China she would be. It is

little wonder, therefore, that the Peking government replied that a

joint suppression of the insurrection was unnecessary, as the latter had

already subsided, while a joint reform would be incompatible with the

sovereign right of Korea over her own affairs, and that what remained

for China and Japan to do was to withdraw their forces from the

peninsula.

This reply by the Chinese government may be said to have decided the

situation, for henceforth Japan felt obliged to take an independent

course of action in Korea. Thus she wrote to China, on June 22, that

Korea was constantly troubled by party strifes and disorders and was

unable to fulfill obligations as an independent state; that this state

of things seriously affected the interests of Japan, for she was near

and had important economic relations with Korea; that to discard the

matter would be not only against Japan's friendly attitude toward Korea,

but also against her own self-preservation; and that, therefore, a

reform could not be stopped, and evacuation would not be made "without

some understanding which would guarantee the future peace, order, and

good government of Korea."

The coöperation with China having miscarried, Japan proceeded to act

alone in Korea in the interest of the reform and good administration of

the latter. The Japanese minister at Seul, Ōtori, opened the arduous

execution of his policy by putting a direct question to the Korean

government, on June 28, whether or not it considered the kingdom as

independent. This pointed query seemed to have deeply disturbed the

politicians at Seul, for they at once found themselves divided between

three opinions: namely, first, that Korea was of course an independent

nation, and Japan was the first power to declare the fact before the

world; second, that she was an historic dependency of China; and, third,

that the displeasure of both Japan and China might be averted by not

giving a definite answer, but by merely referring them to the treaties.

Nothing reveals more clearly the fundamental weakness of the political

consciousness of the Korean people than their conduct at this critical

stage of their existence. A message was sent to Li Hung Chang in China

asking his instruction as to what answer should be given the Japanese

minister. The telegraph line toward Wiju was interrupted, and Li's

reply--recommending again the ambiguous definition that Korea was at

once dependent and independent--had not been received before Korea had

at length to reply after three days' deliberation that she was

independent.

This first question had been asked by Japan in order to clear the ground

for all subsequent steps in her diplomacy in the peninsula. Korea had

technically renounced the suzerainty of China, and Ōtori now suggested,

on July 3, a thorough reform in the official organization and the

financial, judicial, and military institutions. The king and the

government not only concurred with the Japanese minister, but also

issued edicts calling for a reform. Suddenly a change came, on the 18th,

when the Seul government declared that the presence of the Japanese

troops would hinder the execution of the necessary reform. It was of

course plain that, as soon as these troops left, all hopes of reform

would be lost. The change had apparently been caused by the arrival of

Li Hung Chang's telegram that an overwhelmingly large army was coming

from China to crush the Japanese forces in Seul. Ōtori at once repaired

to the Korean foreign office, where he expressed his surprise at the

sudden breach of faith on the part of Korea, and urged her answers

within three days to the following two demands: an order for the

evacuation of the Chinese troops from Asan, whose presence had become

unnecessary since the Tonghak insurrection died away; and a declaration

that the existing treaty between Korea and China which contained clauses

intimating the former's dependence upon the latter was henceforth null

and void. The three-day limit expired without eliciting any answer from

the government. By this time--July 22--the city of Seul was in a state

of intense excitement. Ōtori resolved to see the king in person, and,

early in the morning of the 23d, started toward the palace in a

palanquin under the escort of his guard. Korean soldiers fired at him,

the Japanese troops responded, and within fifteen minutes the Korean

guards were dispersed and the city gates were taken, followed in the

afternoon by a complete control of the entire capital by Japanese

forces. This was the first bloodshed, and unfortunately it was Korean

blood that was shed. It is necessary, however, to note that the Korean

resistance was a result of the extremely unstable politics at Seul which

had enabled the pro-Chinese, corruptionist family of the Min temporarily

to control the situation. With their fall Korea naturally turned about

and allied herself with Japan against China. The old patriot

Tai-wen-kun, father of the king, who again assumed the grand

councilorship, with his unabated rigor ordered punishment of the Min,

commenced a radical official reorganization, nullified the Chinese

treaty, and, what was more, requested the Japanese troops to drive away

Chinese soldiers from Asan. This last request at once placed the forces

of the two empires in certain hostilities with one another. It was

carried out on July 29, but before that, on the 25th, the first act of

war took place unexpectedly on sea.

Before relating this sea fight it is important to observe that China

evidently expected a war with Japan as early as July 16. It appears that

she was determined, though at first reluctantly, to resist by force of

arms Japan's efforts to realize the independence and reform of Korea,

for in no other light can be interpreted her dispatch by land and by sea

of large forces destined for Korea. China was resolved to make good her

suzerainty over the Korean peninsula by staking a conflict with Japan,

which she had hoped to overwhelm by superior numbers. It was generally

believed in Japan at the time that the Chinese statesmen had been led to

this miscalculation of Japan's capacity by the continuous feud which had

seemed to characterize the relation between the government and the

national diet. Li Hung Chang and others were thought to have imagined

that Japan's hands were too closely tied by this internal discord to

embark upon an undertaking which would require an intense concentration

of national resources. They could not have foreseen that all the

superficial differences would be, as they were, sunk before the national

cause, and that a profound patriotism would unconsciously and without

premeditation compel the entire nation--the government, parties, and

all--to stand like one man.

[Illustration: FIRST ENGAGEMENTS OF CHINO-JAPANESE WAR 1894]

Between July 21 and 23 ten transports conveying Chinese troops left Taku

for Korea. Three Japanese cruisers, the _Yoshino_, _Naniwa_, and

_Akitsushima_, which had since the 23d been cruising in the Korean

waters, met at 7 A. M., the 25th, near the Phung-do Island, not far from

Asan, the Chinese cruiser _Tsi-yuen_ and gunboat _Kwang-yi_. These

vessels had steamed out of Asan in order to meet another Chinese

gunboat, the _Tsao-kiang_, which was convoying a transport toward Asan.

The two Chinese vessels did not return the salute of the Japanese ships,

and when the latter turned to the southwest they were fired upon by the

former. After a brisk exchange of fire for over an hour the _Tsi-yuen_

effected an escape, and the _Kwang-yi_ was stranded south of Caroline

Bay, where its powder-magazine exploded. In the meantime the

_Tsao-kiang_ and a transport, the _Kow-shing_, flying a British flag and

conveying 1100 Chinese troops and stores, appeared on the scene. The

_Tsao-kiang_ was captured. The _Kow-shing_ was ordered to follow the

Japanese cruiser _Naniwa_ to the main squadron, but the Chinese soldiers

on board desired to return to Taku, and threatened to kill the English

captain, Galsworthy, who advised them to surrender and himself wished to

leave the vessel on a boat which the Japanese would send to him. After

the attempt of the _Naniwa_ to save the English mates had failed, it

hoisted a red flag at 1 P. M., or nearly four hours after it had stopped

the _Kow-shing_. Thereupon, the captain and the crew jumped overboard,

and the Chinese soldiers fired at them, killing all but the captain and

two others, who were rescued by the _Naniwa's_ boats. The _Kow-shing_

was then sunk. Only a few of those on board her, including a German,

Major von Hanneken, escaped by swimming ashore.

On the very day when the naval victory near Phung-do was won mixed

Japanese brigades numbering about 4000 men, under command of Major

General Ōshima, started from Seul on their march toward Asan, in order

to carry out the commission of the Korean government to drive away the

Chinese forces stationed there. The large reinforcements which they had

expected from China not having arrived, the Chinese troops, 3500 in

number, met the enemy at the strategic point Song-hwan, east of Asan.

During a sharp engagement lasting from 3 till 7.30 A. M., July 29, the

Chinese gradually lost their ground, until they fled toward Ping-yang,

leaving behind 500 killed and wounded. The Japanese losses amounted to

88 killed and wounded. Asan itself had been completely evacuated by the

Chinese. The victorious army returned to Seul early in the morning of

August 5, where a warm reception by the Korean authorities and Japanese

residents awaited its triumphant arrival.

These hostile acts were followed by the formal declarations of war of

the emperors of China and Japan. The Japanese proclamation may be

translated as follows:

"We, by the grace of Heaven, Emperor of Japan, seated on a throne

occupied by the same dynasty from time immemorial, do hereby make

proclamation to all our loyal and brave subjects, as follows:

"We hereby declare war against China. We command each and all of our

competent authorities, in obedience to our wish, to carry on hostilities

by sea and land against China, and to make effort to attain the

national aim. We command them, each according to his power, to use all

the means at their disposal, consistently with the Law of Nations.

"During the more than twenty years of our reign, our constant aim has

been to seek the progress of civilization by a peaceful government; and

being sensible of the evils of being involved in complications with

foreign states, we have instructed our ministers always to labor for the

promotion of friendly relations with the treaty powers. The relations

with those powers have fortunately yearly increased in good-will and

friendship. We never expected such a persistent want of amity and of

good faith as has been manifested by China in her conduct toward us in

connection with the Korean affair.

"Korea is an independent state which was first introduced into the

family of nations by the advice of Japan. China has, however, habitually

called Korea her dependency, and openly and secretly interfered with her

domestic affairs. At the time of the recent insurrection in Korea, China

dispatched troops thither, alleging that her purpose was to rescue the

dependent state from its difficulties. We, in virtue of the treaty

concluded with Korea in 1882, caused a military force to be sent to that

country, in order to be able to meet possible emergencies. Wishing to

free Korea for all time from disturbance and to insure her security for

the future, and thereby to maintain the general peace of the East, Japan

invited China's coöperation for the accomplishment of that object.

China, however, advanced several pretexts and declined Japan's

proposals. Thereupon, Japan advised Korea to reform her administration,

so that order and tranquility might be firmly established at home and

the rights and duties of an independent state might be maintained

abroad. Korea has already consented thereto, but China has

surreptitiously and persistently impeded the purpose. She has, moreover,

put forward various pretenses and caused delays, while at the same time

she was making warlike preparations on land and sea. When those

preparations were completed, China sent large forces to Korea, with a

view to the forcible attainment of her ambitions, and conducted herself

so arbitrarily as to open fire upon our ships in Korean waters. It is

beyond a doubt that China's plain object is to make it uncertain where

the responsibility of preserving peace and order in Korea resides; to

obscure the independent international position of Korea which Japan

first recognized, as well as the treaties declaring that position; and

thereby to injure the rights and interests of our empire and to deprive

the tranquillity of the East of its permanent guarantee. Carefully

judging her designs from her action, it must be concluded that China has

from the beginning been bent upon sacrificing peace to the attainment of

her sinister object. In this situation, ardent as our wish is to promote

at home and abroad the glory of our empire by strictly peaceful methods,

we are obliged openly to declare war [against China]. We rely upon the

loyalty and valor of our faithful subjects, and hope permanently to

restore peace and to complete the glory of our empire."

The Chinese emperor's proclamation was an interesting document, giving

an inaccurate statement of facts and revealing some of the main features

of China's warlike plans in the coming campaign. A translation of this

edict reads as follows:

"Korea has been under China's suzerainty for more than two hundred

years, and has rendered us annual tributes, as is well known at home and

abroad. For over a decade Korea has been troubled by repeated

insurrections. We, in sympathy with our small tributary, have often sent

troops to her aid, and suppressed the rebels, and also placed a resident

at Seul to render protection as needed. In the fourth moon of this year

[May, 1894] another rebellion took place in Korea, for the suppression

of which her king made to us an urgent appeal to send troops. We then

ordered Li Hung Chang to dispatch troops to Korea. As soon as they

reached Asan the rebels scattered. But the _Wojên_ [a familiar and

contemptuous name for the Japanese], without cause, sent their soldiers

suddenly into Seul, and reinforced them with more than ten thousand men.

Japan then forced Korea to change her system of administration, and

unreasonably made various demands. According to our method of ruling the

tributary state [Korea], the latter's internal affairs are left to its

self-government. Japan's treaty with Korea was as one country with

another; there is no law for sending large armies to intimidate her and

compel her to change her administrative system. The public opinion of

the various powers considers the conduct of the Japanese as

unjustifiable and unreasonable. We exhorted them to withdraw their

troops, but they paid no heed and offered no explanation. On the

contrary, Japan has continually dispatched more soldiers, until the

Korean peasants and Chinese merchants were every day more alarmed than

before. We therefore sent more troops to protect them. Greatly to our

surprise, a number of the _Wojên_ ships suddenly appeared and taking

advantage of our unpreparedness opened fire upon our transports off

Asan, thus causing us to suffer from their treacherous conduct, which

could not be foretold by us. Japan has observed neither treaties nor

international law, but is running rampant with her false and treacherous

actions, commencing hostilities herself, and laying herself open to

condemnation by the various powers at large. We therefore make it known

to the world that throughout the whole complications we have observed

the utmost benevolence and righteousness, while the _Wojên_ have broken

pledges and opened hostilities, which passes our patience to bear with.

Hence we command Li Hung Chang to give strict orders to our various

armies to hasten with all speed to exterminate the foe; to send

successive forces of valiant men in order to save the Koreans from the

dust of bondage. We also command the Tartar-generals, viceroys, and

governors of the maritime provinces, as well as the commanders in chief

of the various armies, to prepare for war and to make every effort to

fire on the _Wojên_ ships if they come into our ports, and utterly

destroy them. We exhort our generals to refrain from the least laxity in

obeying our commands in order to avoid severe punishment at our hands.

Let all know this edict as if addressed to them individually. Respect

this!"

The second battle on land took place at Ping-yang, on September 15, or

fifty days after the encounter at Song-hwan, between 13,000 to 15,000

Chinese and 16,000 Japanese. The former had arrived at Ping-yang on

August 4, and had made extensive preparations to defend themselves at

this almost impregnable stronghold. The offending force marched against

the walled city from several directions, and, finally converging there

on September 15, gallantly attacked it, practically under no cover, from

the north and from the southeast. The defense was powerful, but was

finally outmaneuvered by the unexpected attack of the Japanese from the

rear. At 4.30 P. M. the Chinese hoisted the white flag, and, taking

advantage of a heavy rain and a dark night, they left the city at 8

o'clock, moving toward the coast and Wiju. The Chinese losses were

estimated at 2000 killed and about twice as many wounded, while the

Japanese side numbered 102 killed, 433 wounded, and 33 missing. The

whole Japanese army entered the city of Ping-yang early on the 16th.

On the day of this decisive battle the military headquarters of Japan

moved forward from Tōkyō to Hiroshima, the emperor himself transferring

his seat thither, and, in his rude temporary quarters, attending to his

duties as the commander in chief of the imperial forces. It is needless

to say that the moral effect of this move upon the Japanese soldiers in

the field of action was thrilling.

The battle of Ping-yang had cleared Chinese troops out of Korea. Two

days after a naval engagement occurred near the mouth of the Yalu, which

opened for the Japanese the sea-route along the northeastern coast of

the Yellow Sea. Early in the morning of the 17th the Japanese squadron,

consisting of the battleship _Fusō_ (3709 tons' displacement), eight

cruisers (between 4278 and 2439 tons), a coast defense gunboat, and the

merchant-cruiser _Saikyō_, having on board Rear Admiral Kabayama,

discovered columns of smoke from twelve Chinese war vessels emerging one

after another upon the horizon. These vessels, which had landed troops

and stores at Ta-tung-kau on the preceding day, consisted of the two

armored battleships _Ting-yuen_ and _Chen-yuen_ (7430 tons each), the

battleships _Lai-yuen_ and _King-yuen_, the coast defender _Ping-yuen_,

six cruisers, and a torpedo-boat destroyer. The Chinese fleet excelled

in tonnage and the size of the guns, while the Japanese had the

advantage of the comparatively greater speed of their vessels and a

larger number of small rapid-firing guns. Fire was opened by the Chinese

at 12.45 at a range of 6000 meters, the Japanese replying only at 3000

meters, and lasted till near sunset. The Chinese flagship _Ting-yuen_

had her flag-pole shattered at an early stage of the battle, and

consequently the fleet, stoutly as it fought, could no longer maintain a

concerted movement. The cruiser _Chao-yung_ caught fire and sunk, the

cruisers _Yang-wei_ and _Chih-yuen_ and the battleship _King-yuen_ were

sunk, and the cruiser _Kwang-chia_ was stranded near Ta-lien-wan; the

battleship _Lai-yuen_ also caught fire and barely escaped to Port

Arthur, while one of the two greatest battleships, _Ting-yuen_, was

severely damaged. Although the other vessels escaped with less serious

injuries, the Chinese commanders reported to Li Hung Chang that not a

single ship was left in a seaworthy condition. The Japanese fleet lost

no vessel, although damages were suffered by several, all of which were,

however, soon repaired.

Again to return to the operations on land. After the battle of Ping-yang

the First Army Corps was definitely organized of the Fifth Provincial

Division from the district of Hiroshima, under Lieutenant General

Viscount Nodzu, and of the Third Provincial Division from the district

of Nagoya, under Lieutenant General Katsura (now Viscount Katsura,

premier). The Fifth Division consisted of the Ninth and Tenth Brigades

under, respectively, Major Generals Y. Ōshima, and Tatsumi; the Third

Division was divided into the Fifth and Sixth Brigades, under Major

Generals Ōseka and H. Ōshima. The command of the entire corps rested

with Marshal Count Yamagata (later replaced, on account of his illness,

by Viscount Nodzu, whose position as commander of the Fifth Division was

filled by Lieutenant General Oku).

The First Army Corps advanced toward the northern frontier of Korea. The

Chinese forces offered no determined resistance this side of the Yalu,

for they had decided, as did the Russians ten years after, to abandon

the indefensible Wiju but to defend Chiulien-cheng on the Chinese side

of the river. For about ten miles to the right and left of this

position, or from An-tung along the stream up to Hu-shan, over a hundred

redoubts and trenches had been built, behind which forts had been

constructed on eminences. General Sung-ching, commanding about 23,000

troops, stationed a powerful detachment upon Hu-shan, an important

outpost across the Ai River, which flows into the Yalu. During the night

of October 24, however, the Japanese army succeeded, undiscovered by the

enemy, in throwing a pontoon bridge across the Yalu in front of Hu-shan.

A severe storming of the outpost, replied to by an able firing, began at

5 P. M., on the 25th, continuing until it was deserted by the Chinese at

10.30. This strategic point having been captured, the main quarters at

Chiulien-cheng were vacated without further resistance during the night.

An-tung was also easily occupied by the Japanese, while Feng-hwang-cheng

was set on fire and deserted by the retreating forces. Thus the Japanese

crossed the Korean boundary and gained an entry into the Chinese

territory with the comparatively small loss of 4 killed and 140 wounded.

They organized a provisional civil administration at An-tung to govern

the Chinese population in the seized territory. Mr. Komura (now Baron

Komura, minister of foreign affairs) was appointed the temporary

director of the administration, to be later succeeded by Lieutenant

Colonel Fukushima.

After the capture of Chiulien-cheng, the First Army Corps divided itself

into two bodies, one under the command of Lieutenant General Katsura

following the Chinese troops that had fled toward Ta-ku-shan on the

coast, and the other pointing toward Mukden. Katsura's army took

Ta-tung-kau and Ta-ku-shan in succession, the latter on November 5, and

then turned northward and defeated the Chinese at Siu-yen on the 17th.

Tomu-cheng was captured on December 12, and Hai-cheng on the next day,

while Kang-wa-seh, where 10,000 Chinese had entrenched themselves, was

carried on the 18th. Meanwhile, the second division of the First Army

Corps had swept the enemy from Sai-ma-tsi and other points, and marched

toward Mukden in the depth of a severe Manchurian winter.

[Illustration: CAMPAIGNS IN KOREA AND MANCHURIA CHINO-JAPANESE WAR]

By this time a part of the Second Army Corps, commanded by Marshal Count

Ōyama and consisting of the First Provincial Division from the district

of Tōkyō, under Lieutenant General Baron Yamaji, and of the Twelfth

Brigade of the Sixth Provincial Brigade of the Kumamoto district, had

already captured the great Port Arthur. Having landed at a point near

Pi-tse-wo, about ninety miles northeast of Port Arthur, on October 24,

the First Division had taken Kin-chow on November 6 and Ta-lien-wan on

the following day. The entire section then, soon after midnight of

October 21, as soon as the moon rose, opened an assault from the rear

upon Port Arthur, which was defended by a magnificent physical position

and strengthened by the powerful forts and guns that had made the port

celebrated as an impregnable stronghold. After severe onsets under

terrific fires, all the important landward defenses, including the

Itsu-shan (Chair Hill) forts, had been carried by the Japanese by noon.

Among the shore forts, those on Hwang-chin-shan (Golden Hill) resisted

most stoutly, and did not fall till 5 P. M. During the night the Chinese

deserted all the other forts, leaving behind 57 large-caliber and 163

small-caliber guns. When the Japanese troops entered the city they were

treacherously fired upon from the houses, where many Chinese soldiers

had hidden themselves and put on civilian dress, so as to be able to

shoot the enemy unawares. The Japanese, on their part, retorted by an

indiscriminate search of the houses and killing of many adult males who

offered resistance, so that the number of the Chinese slain amounted to

almost 4000. The Japanese lost 29 killed and 233 wounded. At the same

time, the harbor not being defended by Chinese war vessels, the Japanese

men-of-war removed mines and entered Port Arthur on the night of October

24.

The Chinese made two successive attempts, on the 21st and 22d, to

recover Kin-chow, but were repulsed. A part of the Second Army Corps

then joined Lieutenant General Katsura's division of the First Army

Corps at Kai-ping, on December 10, and carried that town by charging it

over the slippery ice of the Kai-ping River.

The remainder of the Second Army Corps, consisting of the Second

Provincial Division from the Sendai district under command of Lieutenant

General Sakuma and of the Sixth Provincial Division from the district of

Kumamoto (excepting the Twelfth Brigade, which had already gone to the

Liao-tung peninsula) under Lieutenant General Kuroki, landed, without

resistance, at Yung-cheng in the Shan-tung province, between January 20

and 24, 1895. The object of this expedition was to effect a concerted

attack with the navy upon Wei-hai-Wei, where the Northern Fleet of the

Chinese navy had been concentrated. Leaving Yung-cheng on the 26th, the

Japanese army marched along two routes, expecting to converge at

Wei-hai-Wei early in February. The two divisions met vigorous resistance

from the Chinese on the way, particularly at Mo-tien-ling on the

northern route, opposite the strongly fortified Liu-kung Island, where

the enemy poured fire upon the assailants from the 68 guns planted on

twelve land forts and from the war vessels anchored only 2000 meters

away from the forts. Major General Ödera fell in this battle, and the

forts were carried only after nine hours of ceaseless fusillade. The

town of Wei-hai-Wei was deserted by the Chinese, and was occupied by the

invaders on February 2. This completed the work of the army, for the

task of reducing the forts on Jih and Liu-kung Islands, as well as of

dealing with the Chinese fleet, had been assigned to the navy.

[Illustration: MAP SHOWING WEI-HAI-WEI, FORMOSA AND PESCADORES]

The Chinese fleet at Wei-hai-Wei consisted of 15 war vessels including

the iron-clad battleships _Ting-yuen_ and _Chen-yuen_, besides 13

torpedo boats, as against 25 men-of-war and 16 torpedo-boats on the

Japanese side. The Japanese forces not only possessing a numerical

advantage on the sea, but also having captured the land forts from which

the army could coöperate with the fleet, a Chinese defeat appeared a

foregone conclusion. Under these circumstances, Admiral S. Itō,

commanding the Japanese fleet, sent to Admiral Ting Ju-chang, his

personal friend, who held supreme command of the enemy's squadron, a

touching letter in which former expressed his regret that the old

acquaintances had been obliged to meet each other in hostility, appealed

to the latter's enlightened patriotism by pointing out the retrogressive

policy which Ting had been called upon to defend and which could only

end in disaster, and then counseled him to prevent a certain defeat and

unnecessary loss of life by capitulating. Itō further advised Ting to

become Japan's honored guest till the end of the war, and then return to

his native land in order to aid China in setting her policy on a sound

basis. When Ting read this message he was visibly moved, and said to his

attendants: "Kill me," meaning probably that he wished to die alone and

let all others surrender. Then he again remarked: "I am thankful for the

admiral's friendship, but I cannot forsake my duties to the state. The

only thing now remaining for me to do is to die." The Japanese fleet,

which made Yung-cheng Bay its headquarters, began to attack the forts of

Jih and Liu-kung Islands on January 30, 1895, continuing with frequent

interruptions till February 7, when a steady general attack began.

During this time, the daring night attacks made by Japanese torpedo

boats had succeeded in sinking the _Ting-yuen_ and three other vessels,

and the thirteen torpedo boats of the Chinese fleet which tried to

escape toward Chifu had had six destroyed and all the others captured by

the Japanese. The _Ching-yuen_ was sunk on the 9th; soon afterward Jih

Island fell and the eastern forts of Liu-kung Island were silenced. On

the morning of the 12th Ching, commander of the _Kwang-ping_, approached

the Japanese flagship _Matsushima_ in a small gunboat flying a white

flag, and delivered a letter from Admiral Ting, containing a formal

surrender of all the war vessels in the harbor and the forts and stores

of Liu-kung Island. Ting requested that the Chinese and foreign

officers, troops, and civilians on land and sea around Wei-hai-Wei be

allowed to depart unmolested, and proposed that the commander of the

British China squadron should guarantee the faithful performance of the

conditions of surrender on the part of the Chinese. On receipt of this

letter Admiral Itō held a council of his officers, in which many of the

latter advised, as was later seconded by the army officers, that the men

should not be allowed to leave, but be taken prisoners. The admiral,

however, had so high an estimate of Ting's personality and service to

his country and so deep a sympathy with his difficult position that he

insisted that Ting's request should be cheerfully granted. In his reply,

therefore, Itō again advised Ting, for the sake of his own safety and of

the future good of China, to become Japan's guest, agreed to release all

the men on parole, and declined to accept the proposed guarantee by the

British commander as unnecessary, for Itō rested confidence in Ting's

honor as a soldier. The admiral also sent a present to Ting and

Commander Liu of the _Ting-yuen_. The next morning Ching again visited

the _Matsushima_, this time with the Chinese flag at half-mast, and

brought a reply from Ting, who, Ching sorrowfully announced, had

declined to accept Itō's present, and, with Liu and Commander Chang of

the Liu-kung Island, had committed suicide. All the arrangements

regarding the capitulation were then made with the utmost honor to the

deceased admiral, and his body was taken ashore in one of the captured

Chinese cruisers. The soldiers in the army and navy who were released on

parole aggregated 5124 men. The Japanese flag was hoisted on the

surrendered battleship _Chen-yuen_, cruisers _Ping-yuen_, _Tsi-yuen_,

and _Kwang-ping_, and six gunboats. With this pathetic fall of

Wei-hai-Wei the Japanese navy completely annihilated the Northern

Chinese Fleet, and gained an absolute control of the Gulf of Pechili.

Admiral Itō returned to Hiroshima on March 3.