Chapter XIII

THE FALL OF THE EDO GOVERNMENT. 1837-1868

In 1837 the first armed rebellion against the Tokugawa government since

the battle of Amakusa, which took place just two hundred years before,

occurred in Ōsaka under the leadership of Ōshio Heihachirō. Erudite and

energetic, he had found himself unable to use his ability owing to his

mean birth, and took advantage of the popular discontent caused by a

famine to raise the standard of revolt. He with his followers attacked

the castle of Ōsaka, but failed, and in consequence died by his own

hand. The government was yet far too powerful to be shaken by such a

small uprising, but the revolt of Ōshio has gained its place in history

as a sign of the growing decay and unpopularity of the Edo

administration. A far more decisive event, however, was soon to follow.

On July 8, 1853, Commodore Matthew C. Perry, envoy of the United States

of America, entered the Bay of Uraga with a squadron consisting of two

frigates, the _Susquehanna_ and the _Mississippi_, and two

sloops-of-war, the _Plymouth_ and the _Saratoga_, and sought to open

commercial relations with Japan. His visit exercised a powerful

influence, entirely unknown to himself, on the domestic affairs of the

country. Ever since the early part of the seventeenth century

anti-foreign feeling had been so intense that only the Chinese and the

Dutch had been allowed to carry on trade at Nagasaki, and other European

nations, owing to various circumstances, gave themselves little, if any,

concern about Japan. But from the beginning of the eighteenth century

the spirit of aggrandizement made itself felt in the Occident, and

Western states began to vie with one another in attempts to extend their

territories and commerce. Eastward of Japan across the Pacific lay the

United States of America, which had shaken off the yoke of Great

Britain, and the latter, deprived of this flourishing colony, sought

compensation in India and farther eastward, while France also, as well

as Russia, turned covetous eyes to the Orient. Nine years before the

arrival of the American squadron in Uraga Bay, or in 1844, the Dutch

addressed a letter to the Tokugawa government advising that Japan be

opened to all foreign nations, and subsequently they often repeated this

counsel, at the same time explaining the conditions of the various

states of Europe. Among the Japanese, many who had studied the Dutch

language and acquired some knowledge of Western affairs were in favor of

a liberal foreign policy, but among the bulk of the nation the

prejudices engendered by the violent and lawless conduct of the early

Christian propagandists remained as strong as ever. Moreover, fresh

reasons for resentment had been furnished by various encroachments of

the Russians between the Kwansei (1789-1800) and Bunka (1804-1817) eras,

and by disorderly conduct of English sailors in Nagasaki. Indeed, the

Tokugawa government had once gone so far as to order that any foreign

ship approaching the coast of Japan should be fired on, and any Japanese

whose studies of Dutch led them to advocate the opening of the country

were deprived of their official positions or otherwise punished.

In the last years of the eighteenth century the councilors of Edo

strongly advocated complete national seclusion, and at the time when the

American squadron visited Japan, Tokugawa Nariakira, commonly called

Rekkō, the feudal chief of Mito, a noble of statesman-like qualities,

ardently urged the policy of holding aloof from all foreign intercourse.

In 1846 two American men-of-war had come to Uraga and sought to open

trade relations, but their proposals were not entertained, and they had

to leave the country without accomplishing anything. Commodore Perry's

visit occurred seven years later; he came with credentials from

President Fillmore, as well as specimens of the products of the United

States, and made formal application that commerce be opened between his

country and Japan. The government replied that the matter being of the

gravest importance, no immediate reply could be given, but that an

answer would be ready the following year, whereupon Perry sailed away,

declaring that he would return the next year without fail. Thereafter

the Tokugawa government invited a council of the feudal barons,

including the lord of Mito, the matter being at the same time reported

to the emperor. During the general confusion incidental to this event,

the Shōgun Iyeyoshi died suddenly, his demise taking place in the very

month of Perry's coming. He was succeeded by his son Iyesada. The year

passed without any definite step being taken, and in February, 1854,

Perry once more made his appearance at Uraga and urgently asked for a

reply to the proposals he had submitted the preceding year. All the

feudal barons, including the Mito chief, united in advocating a policy

of seclusion, but the _rōjiu_, Abe Masahiro, and other chief officials

of the Edo castle were astute enough to see that such a policy would be

impracticable. They therefore insisted on concluding a treaty of amity

and commerce, without paying due attention to its terms. Repeated

conferences were held with the American envoy, and finally a treaty was

signed on March 31, providing that all American citizens driven to Japan

by stress of weather should be kindly treated; that American ships of

war should be supplied in Japanese ports with fuel, coal, provisions,

and other necessaries; and that the two ports of Shimoda and Hakodate

should be opened to American vessels. Subsequently ambassadors came from

Russia, France, and England, and conventions were concluded with them in

terms virtually the same as those of the American treaty. The government

pretended that they had concluded the treaties merely in order to gain

time for warlike preparations, but in truth they had been taken by

surprise. Moreover, natural calamities of a most disastrous character

visited the nation, to increase the financial embarrassment of Edo. In

the year of Commodore Perry's second coming violent earthquakes took

place in western Japan, only to be followed in the next year by a

severer shock, which overthrew immense numbers of the dwellings of the

upper and lower classes as well as of the feudal barons, and caused in

Edo a terrific fire in which 100,000 persons are said to have lost their

lives.

[Illustration: A PICNIC ON THE ASUKA HILL IN THE FLOWERY SEASON]

In 1856, Townsend Harris, consul-general, came duly accredited by the

government of the United States, and proposed that relations of

friendship should be established between the two countries, at the same

time asking on his own part for an audience with the shōgun. The _Rōjiu_

Hotta Masaatsu (Bitchu-no-kami), who had taken charge of foreign affairs

in place of Abe Masahiro, allowed Harris, after considerable hesitation,

to repair to the Edo castle. It was, however, decided not to give a

favorable answer to the American proposal without the sanction of the

emperor. Hitherto, despite the great importance of foreign affairs, the

Tokugawa administration had been allowed to take any steps it pleased

with reference to them without consulting the sovereign. But despite the

large measure of power enjoyed by the Edo government, it was no longer

able to effectually control the feudal barons. Hence it resolved to

consult the imperial wishes, and also to secure the advice of the feudal

chiefs. Such a vacillating and dependent method of procedure was

entirely opposed to the policy pursued by the Tokugawa ever since the

days of Iyeyasu. Now they exposed themselves to the criticism and

interference of both the court and the people, so that in this question

of foreign intercourse is to be sought the proximate cause of the

downfall of the Tokugawa.

At that time the throne was occupied by Kōmei, father of the present

emperor, who was in favor of keeping the country closed against the

ingress of foreigners. He therefore withheld his sanction when the

shōgun's representative came to Kyōto to seek it. At the same time, the

American envoy continually pressed the government to sign a treaty, and,

to make the matter worse, another trouble simultaneously presented

itself, namely, that, the shōgun having no son, friction arose about the

succession. Several of the most influential feudal barons desired that

Yoshinobu, son of Nariakira of Mito, who represented the Hitotsubashi

branch of the Tokugawa, should become heir in consideration of his high

abilities; but many of the principal officers and the court ladies were

opposed to the policy of Nariakira. The shōgun himself was not desirous

of making Yoshinobu his successor, but the steadily increasing influence

of the anti-foreign party in Kyōto, the recognized head of which was

Nariakira, gave new force to the claims of the latter. Meanwhile, as the

need of coming to some terms with the United States became more urgent,

the shōgun appointed to the post of _tairō_ the courageous Ii Naosuke

(Kamon-no-Kami). Ii was not a man to be guided by others whose opinions

he did not share. Under his counsel, it was now agreed that the five

ports of Nagasaki, Hakodate, Hyōgo, Kanagawa, and Niigata should be

opened to foreign trade, a convention in that sense being concluded

without reference to the emperor. This took place in June of 1858, and a

little later treaties of similar import were signed with Russia,

England, the Netherlands, and France, a report being sent to Kyōto,

after the event, to the effect that these measures had been unavoidable.

In the matter of the succession, Ii overrode the advice of the feudal

barons, and Iyemochi, then little more than a child, son of the lord of

Kii, became the fourteenth shōgun. The Tokugawa government thus disposed

finally of the question of foreign intercourse, but the domestic

affairs of the country grew more complicated than ever.

[Illustration: JAPANESE PORTS OPENED TO FOREIGN TRADE 1858]

The officials of Edo who were opposed to foreign intercourse claimed

that the country had been subjected to the shame of concluding a

commercial treaty under duress. The spread of this idea aroused

indignation against the Tokugawa government, and many of the barons,

especially Nariakira of Mito, addressed memorials to Kyōto, complaining

that the opening of the country to foreign trade and intercourse was

contrary to the best interests of the nation. Under these circumstances,

the relations between the courts in Kyōto and Edo were of the least

intimate character. Presently it began to be alleged against the

shōgun's councilors, even by men of Owari, Mito, and Echizen, who stood

in a position of close relationship and intimacy with the Tokugawa, that

by concluding treaties with five foreign countries without reference to

the emperor, the sovereign had been directly insulted. Loyalty to the

throne and the expulsion of aliens became rallying cries of the

exclusive party, and conflicts occurred in various places between the

people who would close the country and those who advocated its opening.

Loyalty to the throne was no new thought to the nation, but it now

acquired a new significance under new circumstances. The Tokugawa

shōguns had, like all other great military families that acquired

administrative control in Japan, asserted their authority largely at the

expense of that of the emperor, and the fact had begun to cause keen

regret to many among the _samurai_. Already, when Iyeshige was shōgun a

_rōnin_ named Takeuchi Shikibu, lamenting the decline of the imperial

power, urged the officials of Kyōto to devote themselves to military and

literary pursuits, so as to be able some day to overthrow the shōgunate.

He was exiled by the Tokugawa, who also arrested and put to death

several others of the same party.

With the growth of a taste for pure Japanese literature reverence for

the sovereign was intensified and propagated. Its influence was most

potent in Mito, the lord of which edited the "_Dai Nihon Shi_" (History

of Great Japan), which as scripture of loyalty was widely read. Another

work which exercised a similar influence was the "_Nihon-gaishi_" by Rai

Sanyō. Various motives so largely contributed to the growth of loyal

sentiment that ultimately a secret imperial rescript was issued to the

Mito vassals, instructing them to unite with the _tozama_ barons and

assist the shōgun to expel foreigners from the country. The _Tairō_ Ii,

vehemently attacked for exceeding the powers that properly belonged to

him, now took another resolute and decisive step. He dismissed all the

senior officials who opposed his policy, and retained in office only

those in harmony with him. He further announced that any person placing

obstacles in the way of measures adopted by the government should be

severely dealt with, and in pursuance of this declaration he placed in

confinement or dismissed from office civil nobles of highest

distinction, and inflicted penalties on six feudal barons of the

greatest magnitude. An equally drastic course was adopted in the case of

the leading Edo officials, and more than fifty prominent retainers of

noblemen, as well as _rōnin_, scholars, priests, and even women, were

seized and sent into exile. These decisive proceedings procured for the

period the name of the "Ansei Jail," but the _tairō_ had at least the

satisfaction of knowing that he had shown his courage and competence to

deal summarily with his opponents. Great excitement prevailed, however,

among all classes of the people, above all, the Mito _samurai_. On the

snowy morning of the 3d of the third month, 1860, as the _Tairō_ Ii was

_en route_ for the palace of the shōgun, he was attacked and killed by

eighteen Mito _rōnin_ under the leadership of Sano Takenosuke, and a

year later the _Rōjiu_ Andō Nobumasa, was attacked near the Sakashita

gate of the castle. In order to restore harmony between the courts of

Kyōto and Edo, the latter now arranged a marriage between the Shōgun

Iyemochi and the emperor's sister, but though the sovereign sanctioned

this union, it brought no peace for the country. Not only did the

anti-Tokugawa agitation continue in noble and official circles, but also

_rōnin_, partly in obedience to the exclusion policy, but chiefly

seeking to increase the embarrassments of Edo, attacked foreigners and

burned their houses, the shōgun's administration showing itself

powerless to check these outrages. By degrees the _samurai_, who had

separated themselves from their fiefs in order to carry on the

agitation, assembled in Kyōto, where were already gathered great numbers

of influential persons interested in the burning question of the day,

and where the emperor himself lent the sanction of his indorsement to

the doings of the malcontents. To the two most powerful among all the

barons, Shimazu Narishige, lord of Satsuma, and Mōri Yoshichika, lord of

Chōshū, secret commissions were specially given by the emperor. Before

anything decisive could be accomplished, however, Narishige died and was

succeeded by his younger brother, Hisamitsu, who, together with the

Chōshū chief, remained in Kyōto at the head of a large force of

_samurai_, with the avowed intention of restoring tranquillity to the

country. There they were joined by Yamanouchi Toyonobu, lord of Tosa,

and this triumvirate of puissant barons, Satsuma, Chōshū, and Tosa,

began to be spoken of throughout the length and breadth of the land as

the certain saviors of the situation.

The imperial court, in accordance with the advice of these three

powerful councilors, now dispatched an envoy to Edo conveying a command

that the shōgun should repair to Kyōto, that order should be established

in the affairs of the administration, and that foreigners should be

expelled from Japan. Prior to the receipt of this rescript the Tokugawa

government had released the persons then in confinement, had dismissed

all officials of proved incompetence, and had effected various reforms

in the state organization. After the arrival of the imperial rescript

these measures were supplemented by other changes, and punishments were

meted out to Andō and other officials who had been removed from office.

At the same period a most significant step was taken by the shōgun's

government: the system that required the presence of the feudal barons

in Edo was abolished--a step indicative of the marked decadence of the

Tokugawa power. For the first time in two centuries and a half the power

of the imperial court overshadowed that of the castle in Edo. An event

now occurred that tended to precipitate the impending crisis. As the

Satsuma chief, Shimazu Hisamitsu, was escorting the imperial envoy on

his return journey from Edo to Kyōto, a party of four English

equestrians met the procession near the village of Namamugi in Musashi,

and attempted to break through its ranks. This violation of Japanese

official etiquette, an act unpardonable in the eyes of the _samurai_,

was violently resented. Two of the foreigners were severely wounded, one

of them shortly afterward falling from his horse and dying by the

roadside. Incensed by this affair, the British government demanded that

the men who had perpetrated the deed and the personage under whose

direction it had been carried out should be arrested, and that an

indemnity of a hundred thousand dollars should be paid as blood-money, a

demand that greatly embarrassed the shōgun's ministers, who knew that,

even if they had possessed the power to comply in full, the attempt must

lead to the gravest domestic troubles.

In 1863 the Shōgun Iyemochi repaired to Kyōto. This was the first visit

paid to the imperial capital by a Tokugawa shōgun since the days of

Iyemitsu, two hundred years previously, and the event naturally produced

a strong impression upon the nation. At that time the numerous and

constantly increasing body of _samurai_ whose motto was "_sonnō jōi_"

(revere the sovereign and expel the foreigner) were exerting all their

energies, going hither and thither to popularize their views, and not

hesitating even to use the sword against those who opposed them. When

the shōgun arrived in Kyōto they brought strong pressure to bear on him

with the object of inducing him to adopt their policy, and after long

discussion he finally agreed to do so. Notice of this important decision

was given to the feudal barons on May 15 in the same year (1863). The

shōgun then returned without loss of time to Edo, apprehending that his

presence in Kyōto might lead to fresh complications and being further

advised that affairs in Edo needed his presence.

The Edo government now found itself in a dilemma. At once unwilling and

unable to give effect to its anti-foreign policy, it had nevertheless

received and accepted the imperial order to that effect. The ministers,

therefore, adopted the only course opened to them, namely, conveyed to

the foreign representatives an intimation that it would be necessary to

close the ports and put an end to foreign commerce, and, at the same

time, dispatched ambassadors directly to the Occident to explain the

state of affairs in Japan. These measures, however, proved of course

abortive. The anti-foreign sentiment was still further inflamed a few

months later by openly hostile acts committed by the feudal baron of

Chōshū, who fired upon foreign vessels attempting to pass the Strait of

Shimonoseki. Nevertheless, even in Kyōto there were some influential men

who boldly espoused the Tokugawa cause and placed themselves in

opposition to the party working for the overthrow of the Edo government.

A serious obstacle to the success of that party still existed in the

fact that no effective union had yet been brought about between the

powerful fiefs of Satsuma and Chōshū. The former advocated

reconciliation between the courts of Kyōto and Edo, and urged that both

should coöperate for the expulsion of foreigners; whereas the Chōshū

folks were in favor of more precipitate measures, involving the downfall

of the Tokugawa. In Kyōto the partisans of the extreme view urged the

emperor to honor the Chōshū chief by visiting him in his own fief,

subsequently worshiping at the sepulcher of Jimmu Tennō, and then, after

a visit to the shrine of Ise, to openly declare war against the shōgun.

But the programme encountered strong opposition in Kyōto at the hands of

a few other barons who regarded with deep regret and apprehension the

strong course to which the imperial court seemed in danger of being

committed. These nobles, forming a union with certain princes, zealously

opposed the court view; and finally succeeded so far as to procure the

expulsion from Kyōto of the Chōshū lord, who, on his return to his fief,

was accompanied by Sanjō Sanetomi, afterward destined to play a

prominent part in the events of the restoration, and six other court

nobles. The policy of the court was now directed to the reëstablishment

of friendly relations with Edo, and the dissatisfaction engendered by

this attitude led to _émeutes_ by _rōnin_ at Yamato, Tajima, and other

places, but they were speedily reduced to order. In the following year,

1864, the Shōgun Iyemochi again proceeded to Kyōto, where his reception

by the emperor was much more gracious than it had been on the previous

occasion, various commissions being given to him, with the result that

harmony was for the time restored between the two courts. Prior to this

a British squadron had proceeded to Kagoshima to exact an indemnity on

account of the Namamugi affair, and a sharp engagement had taken place

between the ships and the Satsuma forts. The Edo government, however,

paid the indemnity demanded by the foreign representatives. The affair

was thus brought to an amicable issue, and foreign intercourse continued

as before, though the policy of the shōgun's government toward it

remained apparently as undecided as ever.

In Mito "Rekkō" Nariakira had died, and the _samurai_ of the fief were

divided into two parties, one following the late lord's policy and the

other dissenting from it, which carried their enmity to such an extent

that great numbers of persons fell victims to the sword. Finally in

April, 1864, some of the ultra-conservative men of Mito renounced their

service to their lord, and assembled in arms at Mount Tsukuba, where

they were joined by a number of other malcontents, and became the center

of a widespread disorder. It was quickly subdued by the Tokugawa forces,

but while the Tsukuba insurgents were still in the field the Edo

government found itself involved in an open quarrel with a vastly more

formidable rival, the fief of Chōshū. The lord of Chōshū had been

forbidden to enter Kyōto in consequence of his obdurate hostility to the

policy of the Tokugawa, and the issue of such a mandate naturally caused

great umbrage to his lieges. In June, 1864, they presented a memorial to

the throne, setting forth their loyalty and praying that the ban of

exclusion from the capital might be removed from their feudal chief and

his son, as well as from Sanjō and the six other court nobles who had

fled with him to Chōshū for refuge. By degrees _rōnin_ from Chōshū

assembled in the environs of the imperial city, and after some

collisions they entered Kyōto. But they were totally defeated by the

troops of Aidzu and Satsuma, who guarded the city. This act of contumacy

provoked an imperial edict depriving the elder and younger lords of

Chōshū of their rank and commissioning the Shōgun Iyemochi to chastise

Chōshū. An expedition was organized in obedience to this edict, a very

powerful army being raised in western Japan. Just at this time a

squadron composed of British, American, French, and Dutch vessels of war

entered the Straits of Shimonoseki to exact reparation from the men of

Chōshū who had, as has already been related, fired upon foreign vessels

passing through the strait. Attempts to avert hostilities by negotiation

having proved abortive, the Chōshū forts were bombarded and dismantled

by the foreign vessels, and a peace was afterward concluded, the Chōshū

folks pledging themselves to give free passage to foreign ships, and to

pay an indemnity of three million dollars. This large sum, though

subsequently paid by the Tokugawa government, was denounced as excessive

by foreign jurists as well as Japanese statesmen, and the portion that

fell to the share of the United States of America was returned to Japan

more than twenty years afterward.

Pending the settlement of this Shimonoseki affair the Tokugawa military

operations against Chōshū were delayed, and as the latter put to death

three of the leaders of the disturbance in Kyōto, and made ample

apologies for their offense, the force destined for the invasion of

their fief was disbanded. There were, however, two parties in Chōshū;

the one in favor of submitting to the shōgun so as to avert misfortunes

otherwise apparently threatening the fief, and the other advocating

determined resistance to the Tokugawa. At the head of the latter party

was Takasugi Shinsaku, and he, having established relations with Sanjō

and the other court nobles then refugees in Chōshū, succeeded in

completely overcoming the pacific faction and obtaining ascendency in

the fief. The Edo government now found itself openly defied by Chōshū,

and a strong agitation arose in favor of inflicting summary punishment

by sending another large expedition. Against this counsel dissenting

voices were not unheard, but finally an expeditionary force was

organized and moved southward, the shōgun himself accompanying it. A

marked incident of this occasion was the refusal of the great Satsuma

baron to send a quota of troops for service with the shōgun. His fief

and Chōshū, whose mutual rivalry had at times amounted to bitter enmity,

had concluded at last that in their union lay the only hope of

accomplishing the purpose of unifying and consolidating the empire.

Foremost among the far-seeing statesmen was Saigō Takamori of Satsuma,

who never wavered in his conviction that no lasting amity could be

established between the courts of Kyōto and Edo, and that the only

solution of the national difficulties lay in the overthrow of the

Tokugawa. To this view his fellow-clansmen subscribed, and relations

were opened with Chōshū which finally led to the hearty coöperation of

the two fiefs. _En route_ for Chōshū the shōgun stopped at Ōsaka, where

he was approached by the representatives of Great Britain, the

Netherlands, and the United States, who insisted that Hyōgo should be

opened for trade according to the provisions of the Edo treaties, and

that the treaties should be ratified by the emperor. The shōgun, after

reference to the sovereign, declined to entertain this demand, and the

foreign representatives thereupon threatened to prefer it in person to

the throne. The emperor, much incensed at the course events were taking,

severely punished the chief officials of the shōgun who were directly

responsible for the treaties, and this having been done without

reference to the shōgun himself, placed the latter in such an

embarrassing position that he laid his resignation at the foot of the

throne and asked that Hitotsubashi Yoshinobu, of Mito, be appointed in

his stead. He accompanied this document with a memorial praying for the

imperial sanction to the treaties with foreign powers. The emperor

declined to accept the shōgun's resignation, but gave his sanction to

the treaties, the immediate opening of Hyōgo to foreign trade being,

however, refused. Subsequent to these events the expedition against

Chōshū was again put in motion, but the Chōshū men inflicted a crushing

defeat upon it, inasmuch as this was the first occasion of a shōgun's

taking the field in person since two hundred and fifty years before, the

consequences were disastrous to the prestige of the Tokugawa, many of

the feudal barons openly renouncing allegiance to them. While the

campaign was still in progress the Shōgun Iyemochi died in the castle of

Ōsaka, August, 1866, and was succeeded by Yoshinobu in December of the

same year. The Emperor Kōmei also died shortly after. Owing to this sad

event the expedition against Chōshū was finally abandoned. Thereafter

the shōgun found himself confronted by such difficulties both at home

and abroad that further tenure of office became impossible, and finally,

acting on the advice of the lord of Tosa, resigned the office as the

feudal overlord of Japan, and restored the administrative power into the

hands of the sovereign. This memorable event occurred on October 14,

1867.

Feudalism, which had for nearly seven centuries controlled the

administration of the empire, seemed now to have come to an end, but

institutions so deeply rooted in the life of the nation and so long

upheld by persons whose vital interests were interwoven therewith were

not to die away without a struggle. It was mortifying to the supporters

of the shōgun, who had so recently renounced his office from

disinterested motives, to see his policy reversed, his old enemies

raised to the highest posts of the new government, and he and his late

councilors completely excluded from official life. The Chōshū baron and

his son received the imperial pardon and reëntered Kyōto, while they as

well as Sanjō Sanetomi were restored to their former ranks; the soldiers

of Satsuma, Chōshū, Aki, Owari, and Echizen displaced the men of Aidzu

and Kuwana as guards of Kyōto; and radical changes were made in official

posts and emoluments, the offices of _sōsai_, _gijō_, and _sanyo_ being

newly established under the presidency of Prince Arisugawa. The first

_gijō_ were Princes Yoshiaki and Akira, together with Sanjō Sanetomi,

Iwakura Tomomi, and the barons of Satsuma, Echizen, and Tosa. The

_sanyo_ were Ōhara Shigenori, Saigō Takamori, and Ōkubo Toshimichi. More

than twenty court nobles were removed from office and the administrative

power was assumed in effect by a government under the direct control of

the sovereign.

[Illustration: DOWNFALL OF THE EDO GOVERNMENT 1867-1868]

On December 10 it was announced to the late shōgun, by order of the

emperor through the medium of the barons of Owari and Echizen, that his

administrative functions had been transferred to the emperor, and he was

at the same time privately instructed to resign his post of lord keeper

of the privy seal and to surrender the provinces hitherto forming his

fief. The news of these instructions produced great excitement among the

_fudai_ barons, and the shōgun, apprehending that they might resort to

violence on his behalf, petitioned the sovereign to allow him

temporarily to retain the post of lord keeper of the seal as well as to

hold the provinces of his fief, though he repeated his expression of

resolve to divest himself of all administrative authority. This course

did not, however, entirely allay the umbrage of the _fudai_ barons,

especially the lords of Aidzu and Kuwana. The shōgun himself, suspecting

that the order stripping him of his dignities and possessions had been

issued at the instigation of the chiefs of Satsuma and Chōshū, withdrew

from the Nijō palace and shut himself up in the castle of Ōsaka. There,

however, he was urgently counseled by the barons of Owari and Echizen to

abandon all resistance to the throne and to present himself peacefully

at the imperial court, and in obedience to this advice he was about to

enter Kyōto guarded by a powerful escort, when intelligence reached him

from Edo to the effect that a number of Satsuma _rōnin_, having

assembled at the Satsuma mansion in the city, had fired on a barrack

occupied by Tokugawa troops, and that the latter had consequently

attacked the mansion and driven out its occupants, who had taken refuge

in a warship anchored in Shinagawa Bay. Incensed by this news, the

shōgun, on January 3 in the first year of the Meiji era, 1868, issued

orders to the various clans to combine for the purpose of chastising

Satsuma. He commenced the campaign by mustering the troops of Aidzu and

Kuwana in Kyōto and marching to attack the forces of Satsuma and Chōshū.

But in the engagements that ensued at Fushimi and Toba the shōgun's army

was completely defeated, and Prince Yoshiaki was formally ordered by the

imperial court to lead a punitory expedition against Tokugawa, now an

open rebel. The latter retired to Edo by sea, accompanied by the forces

of Aidzu and Kuwana, when they and twenty-seven other feudal chiefs

were deprived by the emperor of all their ranks and offices, the duty of

breaking their power by force of arms being intrusted to the barons of

Aki, Chōshū, and Tosa. Also, special officers were dispatched to the

various provinces to restore peace, and their presence impressed the

feudal barons so strongly that no resistance was offered, and the

provinces to the west of Kyōto and Ōsaka surrendered without hesitation

to the imperial government. On February 9 Prince Arisugawa received the

commission of commander in chief, with instructions to bring the east

under control, and under his orders the imperial forces moved upon

Tōkai, Tōsan, and Hokuriku. The prince entered Sumpu on March 5 and made

preparations for the assault of Edo. Before the attack took place,

however, the shōgun retired to a temple in Edo, and dispatched Ōkubo

Tadahiro, Katsu Awa Yoshikuni, and others to open negotiations with

Saigō Takamori, general of the imperial forces then about to move on the

eastern capital. Both armies, the imperial and the feudal, were animated

with an uncontrollable desire to fight to the last, and the imminent

clash was barely averted by the word of honor exchanged between two

individuals, General Saigō of the emperor's army and Katsu, a vassal of

the shōgun. They had met each other only once, years before, but,

although circumstances had placed them in hostile camps, had entertained

so unbounded an admiration and confidence in each other's noble

character that now only a few words sufficed for them to pledge, on

their honor as _samurai_, to effect the surrender of the Tokugawa with

their dignity unimpaired, and to save Edo from an unnecessary

destruction of the lives and properties of its two million inhabitants.

On March 4 the van of the imperial army entered Edo and occupied the

castle, the Shōgun Yoshinobu being granted his life and confined in

Mito. On the 15th the prince entered Edo, and in May a grant of lands

yielding annually 700,000 _koku_ of rice in Suruga, Tōtōmi, and Mutsu

was made to the Tokugawa family for its maintenance.

When the imperial forces took possession of Edo castle, Enomoto Takeaki,

a naval officer of the Tokugawa government, fled to the northern Island

of Ezo, taking with him eight war vessels, and Ōtori Keisuke retired to

Kazusa and Shimōsa. Further, a number of the Tokugawa vassals, calling

themselves the _shōgitai_ (loyal band), took refuge in Uyeno, northeast

of Edo, and placing Prince Kozenbō, the lord abbot of Kwanyei-ji, at

their head, refused to surrender to the imperial government. They were

attacked by his majesty's forces and defeated after a sharp engagement,

while Ōtori and his comrades, routed at Utsunomiya and Nikkō, fled to

Aidzu, the feudal lord of which place had already returned thither, and

in conjunction with the barons of Mutsu and Dewa had made preparations

to uphold the Tokugawa cause by force of arms. But the imperial troops,

advancing from Tōsan, Tōkai, and Hokuriku, brought into subjection the

two clans of Sendai and Yonezawa, and entering Aidzu, took the Wakamatsu

castle on September 22, thus completely breaking the resistance of the

rebels and restoring tranquillity throughout the northern regions. In

December Matsudaira Katamori, the Aidzu lord, was sentenced to perpetual

confinement, and the fiefs of Sendai, Shōnai, and Morioka, which had

made act of submission after the fall of Wakamatsu, were confiscated,

and their lords confined. As for the Yonezawa fief, its territory was

reduced and its lord ordered to surrender the management of affairs to

his heir, while the fiefs of Mutsu and Dewa were divided into five and

two provinces, respectively. Meanwhile, Enomoto and his followers,

alleging the intention of reclaiming lands in Ezo, had occupied the

fortress at Hakodate and obtained possession of a great part of the

island. But they also finally in May, 1868, surrendered to the imperial

forces. In August the name Ezo was changed to Hokkaidō, and it was

divided into eleven provinces. The entire land of Japan thus passed

under the sway of the imperial government. Although some of the feudal

institutions still persisted, the Edo rule had in 1868 at last come to

an end--682 years since Minamoto Yoritomo organized the feudal

government of the empire.

PART III

THE NEW JAPAN. 1868-1893

Chapter XIV

INTERNAL AFFAIRS. 1868-1893

The organization of the new government had been started and pushed with

vigor even before the final deposition of the Tokugawa power took place.

In January, 1868, the _daijōkwan_, council of the state, was created,

which was soon divided into seven sections, namely, religion, home

affairs, foreign affairs, army and navy, treasury, justice, and law. The

ablest men of the various fiefs were selected to fill the posts of

councilors and legislative officials, and by degrees the government was

so organized as to put an end to the old system of hereditary office,

_samurai_ of comparatively low rank being nominated for high positions

according to their merits. On March 4 of that year the emperor proceeded

to the Shishinden palace, where, in the presence of the court nobles and

feudal barons, he solemnly pronounced the famous oath in five articles,

which has become the foundation of the constitutional government of new

Japan, that henceforth administrative affairs should be decided by

general deliberation; that both the government and the people should

labor for the good of the nation; that encouragement should be given to

industrial pursuits; that the evil customs hitherto prevailing should be

corrected; and that the country should be strengthened by adopting the

systems of defense employed in foreign lands. Shortly afterward the

administrative organization was recast, with the rule that no official

should be appointed at the same time to legislative, executive, and

judicial posts. The term of office was also fixed at four years, and the

system of appointment by merit received further development. Officials,

however, who showed themselves able and obtained popularity were allowed

to remain in office after the expiration of their first term of service.

On August 27 the coronation rites were duly performed at the Shishinden

palace. In accordance with the custom of changing the year-name on the

accession of an emperor, the era was called Meiji (enlightened

government). The emperor removed the capital to Tōkyō, formerly Edo, and

took up his residence in the castle there.

As regards local administration, the first division of the country after

the abolition of the shōgunate was into 28 _fu_, 273 _han_, and 21

_ken_, the _fu_ and _ken_ being governed by officials appointed by the

sovereign. The _han_, however, being still under the government of their

former feudal chiefs, no uniformity of administration was possible.

Moreover, of the total revenue of the state, namely, eleven million

_koku_ of rice, only 1-4/5 millions belonged to the _fu_ and _ken_,

which were under the direct control of the central government, the

remainder constituting the income of the _han_. The resources of the

imperial treasury proved quite inadequate to meet the heavy calls made

upon them, in spite of the fact that some of the barons contributed

liberally. Kido Takakoto, a distinguished _samurai_ of Chōshū, then

holding the post of councilor of state, appreciating the fundamental

necessity of the time, made such powerful representations to his liege

lord that the latter agreed to surrender his feudal domains and their

revenues to the sovereign. Kido subsequently took council on the same

subject with Ōkubo Toshimichi, a not less distinguished retainer of

Satsuma, and by the latter's advice the Satsuma lord was induced to

follow the course taken by Mōri of Chōshū. The barons of Hizen and Tosa

followed the example, and on January 20, 1868, these four great nobles

addressed to the throne a memorial over their joint signatures,

declaring their desire to restore their territories to the sovereign,

and their conviction that all the lands in the empire should come under

the direct control of the central government. Thereafter the various

other barons signified their wish to follow the same course, and in the

sequel of a consultation held with all the feudal chiefs, whom the

emperor summoned to Tōkyō for the purpose, an imperial edict was issued,

directing that all the fiefs should be restored to the sovereign,

appointing the feudal lords to the post of governor, and remodeling the

administrative organization of the _han_ so as to bring it into

conformity with that of the _fu_ and _ken_. One-tenth of the revenue

accruing from the fief lands was apportioned as the salary of the

governors. The distinctive terms of "court noble" (_kuge_) and "feudal

lord" (_shōkō_) were abolished, and all the nobles were included in the

general appellation of _kwazoku_. Relatives of the _kwazoku_ and

_samurai_ were all classed as _shizoku_, their pensions being at the

same time duly fixed.

Although the organization of the local government had been placed on a

fairly complete footing and uniformity of method had begun to be

discernible, both the military classes and the commoners in the various

fiefs were still disposed to pay more respect to their former lords than

to the new officials appointed by the central authorities. Under these

circumstances it was suggested by a governor, who had himself been a

great feudal baron, that the military monopoly of the _samurai_ should

be abolished and their pensions commuted, and that the army should be

recruited alike from the _shizoku_ and commoners. The versatile Kido

again recommended that the _han_ (fiefs) should be replaced by _ken_

(prefectures), so as to thoroughly centralize the administrative power.

It is remarkable that the view was at once seconded by many barons, who

memorialized the throne begging the latter to reorganize all their fiefs

into prefectures. The policy was finally adopted in 1871, when the 263

_han_ were completely abolished and replaced by 372 new _ken_, and ample

rewards at the same time given to the few baron-governors who had taken

the lead in urging this change. Thus the central government came into

full control of the lands and people that had been under the sway of

feudal chiefs ever since the Kamakura epoch. Subsequently, various

changes of boundaries were made, until in 1890 there were 43 prefectures

(_ken_) and 3 cities (_fu_), besides one board of administration (_cho_)

of Hokkaidō.

The abolition of the _han_ had its grave financial problem, for it now

became necessary for the central government to assume the responsibility

of the fiduciary notes previously issued by the various feudal lords. To

meet this liability the government issued, in lieu of the fiduciary

notes, bonds redeemable within fifty years, and for the purpose of

satisfying the claims of the _shizoku_ an envoy was sent to England to

raise a sum of ten million _yen_. This, Japan's first foreign debt, was

contracted in 1872. In the following year the system of commuting

annuities was fixed, those whose incomes ranged from 100 _koku_ downward

being allowed, on application, to commute at six years' purchase, half

of the commutation money being paid in cash and the remainder in public

bonds. The system was subsequently extended to larger incomes, and in

August, 1876, the method of commutation was made compulsory, applicable

to the income of all the _shizoku_, bonds being handed to them in the

following year. These bonds, carrying interest at different rates, were

to be liquidated annually by lot, their total redemption to be effected

in thirty years. At the same time, the _shizoku_, who from ancient times

had devoted themselves to military and literary pursuits, despising

industry and trade, now found themselves detached from their feudal

lords on whom they had relied, and deprived of their lands and pensions.

Receiving sums of money in commutation of their hereditary incomes, many

of them, without training or experience, turned at once to commerce and

agriculture, and in numerous instances those who had become merchants

fell victims to their own want of knowledge and to the craft of others,

losing everything they possessed and incurring the contempt of the

mercantile classes whom they had so long counted their inferiors.

The overthrow of the feudal tenure naturally affected the military

organization of the nation. Hitherto soldiers to form the imperial guard

had been raised in Satsuma, Chōshū, and Tosa, and the remaining force

had consisted of five garrison corps (_chindai_), quartered at different

places and recruited from cities and prefectures in the proportion of

five men per 10,000 _koku_ of rice crop.

In 1872 the military department (_hyōbushō_) was replaced by two

separate departments of war and the navy, and an imperial ordinance

provided that soldiers should be recruited from all parts of the empire

and all classes of the people, the monopoly of military service held by

the _samurai_ being thus abolished and the method existing a thousand

years previously restored. At the same time it was clearly indicated

that the command in chief of all the forces devolved on the sovereign.

All persons of twenty years or upward were liable for conscription, and

the army was divided into troops with the colors (_jōbi-hei_), the

reserve (_kōbi-hei_), and the militia (_kokumin-gun_). Subsequently all

of the castles in the fiefs were dismantled with the exception of

fifty-five, which were handed over to the war department, and the number

of the garrison corps was increased to six, their headquarters being

Tōkyō, Sendai, Nagoya, Ōsaka, Hiroshima, and Kumamoto. Various new

regulations relating to military matters were afterward issued from time

to time, or revisions of the old effected, a colonial militia for

Hokkaidō being among the new measures. Meanwhile, the naval department

established naval stations, built dockyards and ships of war, and opened

colleges, so that the organizations of the two branches of the military

service were placed on a satisfactory footing.

All these changes were radical in nature, and it was inevitable that the

conservative instincts educated among the people through centuries of

feudal training should often burst forth in opposition to the drastic

social revolution. Men conspicuous as advocates of innovation were

sometimes attacked and assassinated, and armed resistance was

occasionally planned. Sakuma Shōzan, Councilor Yokoi Heishirō, and

Senior Vice Minister of the Army Ōmura Masujiro all fell under the

swords of assassins in consequence of their ardent liberalism; while, on

the other hand, Kumoi Tatsuo of Yonezawa plotted with the old _samurai_

of Aidzu and Shizuoka to restore the feudal system by force. But this as

well as some minor attempts of a similar character in other parts of the

empire were quickly dealt with, the nation as a whole being emphatically

favorable to the new order of things. It was not so easy, however, to

pacify some of the larger insurrections which occurred in the southern

part of Japan. In January, 1874, Etō Shimpei, a member of the cabinet,

being opposed by the majority of his colleagues with respect to the

policy to be pursued toward Korea, retired from the government and

gathered about him in Saga, in Hizen, a number of discontented people

who were desirous of restoring feudalism and attacking Korea. They

plundered a sum of 200,000 _yen_ from the Ono Company, and made a

successful raid upon the prefectural offices of Kumamoto. The garrison

corps of the latter place received orders to subdue the rebels--Ōkubo

Toshimichi, minister of home affairs, being dispatched by the sovereign

to direct the operations. The insurgents suffered several defeats, and

were finally imprisoned in Saga castle, but they managed to effect their

escape thence under cover of darkness, and to cross the sea to

Kagoshima, where they landed, with the intention of striking a second

blow by the aid of Saigō Takamori, whose rebellion will presently

receive our attention. Failing in their purpose, however, they were

unable to offer any further resistance. Etō and the other ringleaders

were executed in April, and when Prince Yoshiaki arrived, who had been

dispatched from Tōkyō at the head of a considerable naval and military

force to crush the rebellion, he found that order had been restored. Two

years later there were simultaneous uprisings in Kumamoto and in Hagi

of Nagato, which were quickly subdued by the imperial forces.

No rebellion, however, proved more serious and more difficult to repress

than the revolt of Saigō in Satsuma. The genesis of this insurrection

must be traced to complex circumstances under which the leading

statesmen of the new government had been split into two factions, one of

which had its central figure in Saigō. The occasion for the rupture was

the dispute which arose among the ministers of the crown in regard to

the policy to be pursued by Japan toward Korea. Throughout the Tokugawa

period it had been customary for Korea, on each occasion of a coronation

in that country, to send an ambassador to confirm the friendly relations

between the two states. When the restoration took place in Japan her

government dispatched an envoy to Korea to convey intelligence of the

fact and to renew expressions of amity, but the Koreans refused to

recognize the envoy or accept his message, owing ostensibly to the fact

that the new term "Great Empire of Japan" was employed in the imperial

letter. At a later date the Japanese sent home certain Koreans who had

been shipwrecked on the coast of Japan, and took the opportunity of

renewing expressions of friendship by the mouths of the officials who

escorted the castaways. Korea received the shipwrecked sailors, but

declined to receive the officials accompanying them. The youthful

government contained men, particularly the Councilors Saigō Takamori,

Soyeshima Taneomi, Itagaki Taisuke, Gotō Shōjirō, and Etō Shimpei, who

deeply resented the conduct of Korea, and counseled the opening of the

peninsular kingdom by force of arms. Other chief officials of the

government, headed by Ōkubo Toshimichi, opposed this view, and being

supported by the minister of the left, Iwakura, who had just returned

from his travels through Europe and America, the peace party carried the

day. The advocates of recourse to arms resigned, and a new cabinet was

organized, under Iwakura and Ōkubo, which was the first cabinet change

in Japan since the restoration. The immediate effects of this change

were important. The revolt of Etō has already been related, and the case

of Itagaki and Gotō will soon be heard of. The name of Saigō has been

mentioned as one of the two heroes whose mutual trust had resulted in

averting the great battle imminent in Edo. A man of overmastering

sincerity, his position in the Tōkyō government, in which he was

commander in chief of the army, had been unique. When he resigned and

retired to Kagoshima in Satsuma, and established a private military

school, nearly all the ambitious young men of the province flocked to

the school. Many came from other prefectures also, for Saigō's

reputation as the chief agent in bringing about the restoration was

immense, and his simple, great personality commanded universal love and

respect. These students, little intent on studies, where animated by a

desire to raise Saigō to the leadership of a colossal opposition to the

new cabinet, whose policy and conduct they honestly abhorred. When the

Hagi and Kumamoto insurrections broke out in 1876 these truculent

students maintained correspondence with the rebels, but refrained from

openly imitating their example. By and by, some officials of the

imperial government who visited the province were seized by the students

and tortured into a false confession that they had come with a secret

commission to assassinate Saigō. The war department, apprehending

dangerous contingencies, now ordered that the powder stored in Kagoshima

should be transferred to Ōsaka, but the powder was seized _en route_ by

the students, who also managed to possess themselves of the arsenal and

implements of war belonging to the naval department in Kagoshima. Saigō

earnestly endeavored at first to restore order and discipline among

these turbulent disciples, but he finally yielded to the persuasion of

his chief followers, who represented that on him devolved the patriotic

duty of clearing away disloyal and crafty subjects from the foot of the

throne, and who showed him, at the same time, the false confession

extorted by torture from government officials. Saigō thereupon

circulated a letter throughout the adjacent provinces explaining the

necessity of resorting to arms. News of these events reached the emperor

in Kyōto, whither he had temporarily gone. He made that city his

headquarters, and gave to Prince Arisugawa a commission to quell the

rebellion, Yamagata Aritomo, minister of war, and Kawamura Sumiyoshi,

vice minister of the navy, being appointed chiefs of staff. The brigades

dispatched to the scene of disturbance were commanded by Major Generals

Nozu, Miyoshi, and Miura, and Saigō and his fellow-conspirators were

stripped of all their ranks and honors.

The insurgents assembled in Kagoshima now numbered some 15,000 picked

_samurai_ of desperate courage and great skill in the use of their

weapons. At the head of this force Saigō set out for Kumamoto on

February 15, 1876, and on the 22d of that month he sat down with his

whole army before Kumamoto castle, an error of strategy which ultimately

enabled the government to confine the insurrection to the Island of

Kiushū. Major General Tani Tateki, who held command of the garrison,

made a stubborn resistance, though many of the _samurai_ among his

troops went over to the rebels. The imperial army arriving in the

province of Higo, endeavored to reach Kumamoto from the northwest via

Takase. Severe fighting look place, but the forces of the government

pushed steadily on. At point after point the rebels made obstinate

stands, especially in the strong position of Tawara-saka, where a great

number of lives were lost by both sides, and the whole district was

devastated. The government troops, though victorious, found themselves

seriously weakened, and the insurgents fought with undiminished

desperation. Shortly before this, Yanagiwara Sakimitsu, a senator, was

sent by the emperor to Kagoshima to warn Shimazu Hisamitsu, the former

feudal chief of Satsuma, and his son, Tadayoshi, against connecting

themselves with the insurgents. He was accompanied on this mission by

Lieutenant General Kuroda Kiyotaka, an influential member of the Satsuma

fief, and the two labored so successfully that the dockyard and arsenal,

which had been dismantled by the rebels, were restored to a defensible

condition. It now became possible to advance upon the rear of the

rebels, and General Kuroda, being appointed chief of the staff, landed a

body of troops at Yatsushiro in order to attack Saigō from the south.

The insurgents were now assaulted from two directions, but they fought

so well that the imperial army could not yet effect the relief of

Kumamoto castle, which, having been besieged for over fifty days, was

being reduced to straits for want of provisions. The commander of the

garrison now managed to send an officer through the besieging army with

intelligence of his perilous condition, and on receipt of the message

General Kuroda set all his troops in rapid motion, and forced his way to

Kumamoto on April 14, the insurgents breaking up into two bodies, one of

which retreated into the province of Bungo and the other into the

Hitoyoshi valley in Higo, where the country offered excellent facilities

for resistance. Upon the retreat of the rebels from Kumamoto, Vice

Minister Kawamura Sumiyoshi was sent to Kagoshima, at the head of 8000

men, to attack the rebellion at its root, whereupon Saigō, who was with

the Hitoyoshi branch of the rebels, learning that Kagoshima had fallen

into the hands of the government's troops, issued orders for a retreat

in the directions of Satsuma and Osumi. The Hitoyoshi insurgents then

effected their escape with much adroitness into Hiuga province,

following three different routes, and the imperial army occupied the

Hitoyoshi position on June 1. The Bungo body of insurgents, meanwhile,

being hard pressed by the government forces, retired to a strong

position at Nobeoka, in Hiuga, and opened communications with the other

body, which had fortified itself at Miyazaki in the same province.

Several battles and skirmishes ensued, and it was not till the end of

July that Miyazaki was reduced, Nobeoka falling on August 14. The rebels

now retreated northward to Enotake, where they were closely besieged by

the imperial army, but on the 18th of the same month they succeeded,

with extraordinary celerity and address, in effecting a retreat right

through the besieging lines, and pushing rapidly on to Kagoshima, which

place they suddenly attacked and took. The imperial forces were now

concentrated about Kagoshima, and after a sanguinary engagement, lasting

ten days, the rebels were driven to Shiroyama, where their last fight

was fought on September 24. Saigō Takamori committed suicide, and

Toshiaki and the other rebel chiefs fell on the field of battle, the

rebellion being thus finally crushed. A provisional court was organized

in Kiushū under the presidency of Kōno Tokama, a secretary of the

senate, for the trial of those taken in the fighting, seventeen of whom

were sentenced to death. In this sanguinary struggle the whole of the

army and navy had been engaged, the old imperial bodyguard reorganized,

a band of swordsmen volunteers enrolled, and a company of policemen,

also for sword service, sent to the scene of the fighting. The Japanese

sword was used by both armies with great skill and deadly effect. The

total number of men engaged on the government side was 60,000, and the

entire outlay involved was 416 million _yen_. At one time, indeed, the

affair had threatened to assume almost uncontrollable dimensions, for in

the early days of the rebels' valiant fighting ominous signs of

disaffection made themselves apparent in the prefectures of Yamaguchi,

Kōchi, Fukuoka, and elsewhere. Much as the trouble cost, however, in

blood and treasure, its national uses were very great. By it the army

and navy gained invaluable experience, and all the institutions of the

central government were subjected to the test of severe practice, while

the people learned, once for all, that armed efforts to disturb the new

order of things were utterly hopeless, and that adverse opinion must be

limited to the channels of speech and pen. The treasury, however, found

itself seriously embarrassed. It had been obliged to borrow fifteen

million _yen_ from the Fifteenth National Bank, and also, most

reluctantly, to issue fiduciary notes aggregating 270,000,000 _yen_ in

addition to those already issued for the purpose of redeeming the fiat

paper of the _daijōkwan_, the _mimbushō_, and the former feudal barons.

[Illustration: THE INSURRECTION IN THE ISLAND OF KIUSHŪ 1877]

While the rupture of the cabinet had occasioned the immense rebellion of

Kagoshima and the tragic end of the great Saigō, his former colleagues,

Itagaki and Gotō, also did not accept the political defeat of their

faction without a struggle. Their struggle, however, produced widely

different results from those of Saigō's uprising. Itagaki and Gotō

addressed to the government a memorial urging the expediency of at once

establishing a national assembly in Japan. But the government rejected

the memorial on the ground that the time was not ripe for so radical a

measure. Nevertheless, the embryo of a deliberative assembly was in

truth formed about this time, for the local governors were all summoned

to Tōkyō, and invited to discuss together questions relating to roads,

rivers, bridges, the relief of the destitute, public meetings, and other

matters connected with their jurisdictions. Moreover, in 1875 a senate

_(genrō-in)_ was organized for legislative purposes, its members being

appointed from among men conspicuous for merit and capacity. In 1876 and

1877, owing to rebellious disturbances fomented by the seceding

councilors of state, the local governors were not summoned to Tōkyō for

consultation, but in 1878 they assembled in the capital and discussed

questions relating to local reorganization, to city and prefectural

assemblies--the bases of a future parliament--and to local taxes.

Subsequent to this meeting rules relating to the organization of towns,

villages, districts, and divisions were promulgated, as well as rules

relating to the collection of taxes, while in 1879 the system of local

assemblies was established in each city and prefecture. The members of

these assemblies were elected by the people from among themselves, and

were invested with extensive deliberative functions in relation to local

administration. In the following years the governors were again summoned

to Tōkyō for the purpose of deliberating about relief funds and revising

the rules discussed at their previous meeting, these rules being

supplemented by others relating to the organization of divisions, towns,

and villages. Meanwhile, the advocates of popular rights increased in

number and influence day by day. A newspaper press had arisen which made

this subject a favorite topic of discussion, and political associations

were formed agitating the establishment of a diet or petitioning the

government in that sense. In view of this growing excitement and to

avert contingencies incidental to it, regulations were issued for the

better control of newspapers and political meetings. In 1880 a political

party, the _Jiyū-tō_ (Liberals), destined subsequently to play a

prominent part in national affairs, was organized, under the leadership

of Itagaki Taisuke, while within the government Ōkuma Shigenobu, a

councilor of state, advocated the opening of a national assembly without

delay. The ministers of the crown, however, adhered to their former

decision that the time was not ripe. Not discouraged by this refusal,

the advocates of a parliamentary system continued their agitation, and

spared no pains to injure the credit of the cabinet with the nation. The

sovereign, therefore, judging it expedient to announce publicly the

intentions entertained by him, issued with the advice of his ministers,

in October, 1881, a rescript declaring that in the 23d year of Meiji

(1890) a constitutional government should be established. Ōkuma

Shigenobu, together with Kōno Hironaka and others, now resigned their

official positions and organized a political party, the _Kaishin-tō_

(Progressives), which, though occupying a common platform with the

_Jiyū-tō_ in respect of a national assembly, worked in general

opposition to the latter. At a much later date a third party, hostile to

both of the above, was formed, namely, the _Kokumin Kyōkai_, or National

Unionists.

Immediately after the issue of the rescript fixing the date for opening

the diet, the government set about drafting the constitution, the utmost

care and research being brought to bear on this important work. In the

spring of 1882 Itō Hirobumi was dispatched on a special mission to

Europe for the purpose of investigating the constitutional law of the

various states and its practical applications, and on his return a

legislative bureau, charged with the functions of drafting the

constitution, revising the laws, and remodeling the official

organization, was established. In 1884 titles of nobility--prince,

marquis, count, viscount, and baron--were created, patents being granted

to over five hundred of the former territorial and court nobles, as well

as to officials distinguished for services rendered to the state. In

February of the following year great changes were effected in the

administrative organization. The offices of _daijō daijin_, _sadaijin_,

_udaijin_, _sangi_, and ministers of departments were abolished, and in

their stead were created ministers of state for home affairs, foreign

affairs, finance, war, the navy, education, justice, agriculture and

commerce, and communications, these ministers constituting a cabinet

under the leadership of the minister president and the presidency of the

emperor himself. Outside the cabinet were the minister of the imperial

household, the lord keeper of the privy seal, and a number of court

councilors, while in each department there was a vice minister, as well

as a director and vice directors of each of its bureaus, together with

councilors and secretaries. These changes were much more radical than

anything previously effected during the Meiji era, all other reforms

having been mere modifications of the old system prescribed in the

Taihō Code of 701 A. D. At the same time regulations providing for the

appointment of civil officials by competitive examination were

promulgated, and various new laws and ordinances were issued. One of the

most important effects of this great reform was that it put an end

completely to the pernicious system of selecting officials from personal

considerations without regard to competence. No changes of a radical

character have since that time been effected in the administration.

Count Itō Hirobumi, the chief author of these reforms, became the first

minister president of state. In 1888 a privy council was established,

its members being selected from among old and distinguished officials,

and its function being to advise the sovereign with respect to any

matter submitted by his majesty for its deliberation. Count Itō became

its president, resigning his post of minister president of state to

Count Kuroda Kiyotaka. In the same year a large body of laws for the

reorganization of cities, towns, and villages was promulgated, to go

into effect from the year 1891, and these laws were followed in 1890 by

similar statutes for the organization of prefectures and districts, the

general purport of all this legislation being local autonomy.

The 11th of February in the 22d year of Meiji (1889) saw the

promulgation of the imperial Constitution. On this memorable occasion

the emperor delivered from the throne the following speech: "Whereas We

make it the joy and glory of Our heart to behold the prosperity of Our

country, and the welfare of Our subjects, We do hereby, in virtue of the

supreme power We inherit from Our Imperial Ancestors, promulgate the

present immutable fundamental law, for the sake of Our present subjects

and their descendants. The Imperial Founder of Our House and Our other

Imperial Ancestors, by the help and support of the forefathers of Our

subjects, laid the foundation of Our Empire upon a basis which is to

last forever. That this brilliant achievement embellishes the annals of

Our country, is due to the glorious virtues of Our Sacred Imperial

Ancestors, and the loyalty and bravery of Our subjects, their love of

their country, and their public spirit. Considering that Our subjects

are the descendants of the loyal and good subjects of Our Imperial

Ancestors, We doubt not but that Our subjects will be guided by Our

views, and will sympathize with all Our endeavors, and that,

harmoniously coöperating together, they will share with Us Our hope of

making manifest the glory of Our country, both at home and abroad, and

of securing forever the stability of the work bequeathed to Us by Our

Imperial Ancestors."

The promulgation of the Constitution took place in the throne room of

the Tōkyō palace, the princes of the blood, ministers of state, peers,

governors of cities and prefectures, presidents of city and prefecture

assemblies, the foreign representatives, and all officials of and above

_chokunin_ rank being present. The Constitution consisted of seventy-six

articles contained in seven chapters. It provided for the perpetuity of

the imperial succession; defined the imperial prerogatives and the

privileges granted to the people; declared the latter's obligation to

pay taxes and serve as soldiers, but guaranteed them against being

arrested, imprisoned, tried, or punished except by the process of law;

decreed the inviolability of person and property; granted freedom of

residence and conscience, and declared that no man's house could be

officially entered without a legal warrant. The law of the houses,

promulgated simultaneously, created a bicameral diet--a house of peers

and a house of representatives--to be convened every year, and in this

diet was vested legislative power without recourse to which no law could

be enacted or altered, and financial authority without the exercise of

which the annual budget could not become existent. The law of election,

which also formed one of the appended statutes of the Constitution,

provided for all affairs relating to the franchise and its exercise; the

law of finance regulated fiscal matters; and the imperial house law

determined affairs connected with the succession, the household, the

princes of the blood, and the like. The day of the promulgation of the

Constitution was observed as a grand national fête, amnesty was

proclaimed in the case of all political offenders, and largess was

freely distributed to the aged and indigent. It was certainly a subject

for national rejoicing and congratulation that this advanced stage of

governmental progress was reached in Japan without any of the scenes of

bloodshed and violence which had disfigured such changes in many other

countries.

The establishment of a constitutional form of government having long

been an object of ardent desire of the people, all classes, official and

private alike, had been preparing themselves for the welcome event. In

addition to the Liberal and Progressive parties mentioned, Count Gōto

Shōjirō had formed a third, the _Daidō Danketsu_ (Great Affiliation),

which, however, after a brief existence, split up into two or three

insignificant bodies. When the first general election for the new

national diet took place in July, 1890, there were several rival parties

and much political ardor, but everything passed off in an orderly and

quiet manner. In view of the assembly of the diet the old senate

(_genrō-in_) was abolished, most of its members being nominated members

of the upper house. By imperial edict the two houses were convoked in

Tōkyō on November 25 of the same year, and his majesty the emperor

opened the diet in person on November 29. The house of representatives

consisted of 300 members elected by the people in the various

localities; the house of peers, of the princes of the blood, the princes

and marquises, all of whom sat in their own right, a certain number of

counts, viscounts, and barons elected by their respective orders,

highest taxpayers elected by the prefectures, one for each, and a

proportion of members nominated by the sovereign in consideration of

meritorious services or proficiency in learning. So with 1890 began the

new régime of Japan.

Chapter XV

FOREIGN RELATIONS. 1868-1893

Under the Tokugawa rule a treaty was concluded between Japan and Russia

recognizing Karafuto (Sakhalin) as a joint possession of the two

empires. Later the Edo government sent an envoy to St. Petersburg with a

proposal that the 50th parallel of north latitude should be the boundary

between the two countries. No final decision was arrived at, however, on

that occasion, and it was resolved that each country should send an

ambassador to Karafuto the following year to survey the island and

determine the boundary. But domestic embarrassments so beset the

shōgun's government that the promised envoy was not sent from Japan. In

1866 there was talk of dispatching an ambassador for the purpose, but

nothing was done, while Russia was gradually pushing southward, until

she finally encroached upon the region indisputably recognized as

Japanese territory. The government of the shōgun was powerless at the

time to offer any opposition, and shortly afterward it had to surrender

the administration to the emperor. His majesty's ministers now proposed,

through the intermediary of the United States, that the parallel of 50°

north latitude should be taken as the boundary, but the Russian

government rejected the proposal. Subsequently, Admiral Enomoto was sent

as Japanese representative to St. Petersburg, and after much discussion

it was decided, by a convention concluded in 1875, that the whole of

Sakhalin should become Russian property, Japan receiving in exchange the

Chishima Islands (the Kuriles).

When in 1858 the first treaties were concluded by the shōgun's

government with five foreign powers, the Japanese plenipotentiaries,

being entirely ignorant of foreign affairs, intrusted the drafting of

the articles to the American minister, and merely indorsed the

provisions proposed by him. A clause was added, however, providing for

revision after the lapse of fourteen years, and when it was found that

the treaties contained much which was injurious to Japan's dignity and

embarrassing to her independence, a strong desire to effect revision

began to be generally felt. Moreover, as a result of the firing upon

foreign ships by the forts at Shimonoseki, England and France, in

addition to exacting an indemnity out of all proportion to the injury

suffered by the ships, took advantage of Japan's internal dissensions to

impose upon her greatly lowered tariff rates. At subsequent dates

treaties were concluded, necessarily on the same lines, with Portugal,

Prussia, Switzerland, Belgium, Italy, Denmark, Sweden, Spain,

Austria-Hungary, and Hawaii, and ministers plenipotentiary were

accredited to most of these countries. The knowledge thus gradually

acquired of Western states and of the international usages prevailing

among them, served to increase Japan's impatience against the unequal

conventional conditions to which she was herself compelled to submit.

The government, not less swayed by this sentiment, did everything in its

power to remove obstacles which foreigners alleged to be fatal to equal

international treatment of Japan. The penal laws were radically altered,

and codes consistent with the principles of Western jurisprudence were

promulgated. Meanwhile, the term of fourteen years fixed by the treaties

had elapsed, and the time for revision having arrived it was resolved to

dispatch an embassy to Europe and America for the purpose of making

known Japan's real condition and acquiring knowledge of foreign affairs.

In October, 1871, Iwakura Tomomi, minister of the right, was sent upon

this mission, together with a number of other prominent officials. In

the United States of America he met with a cordial reception, the

president promising to consider favorably the question of revision, and

Congress showing a disposition to return America's share of the

indemnity unjustly exacted from Japan in connection with the Shimonoseki

affair. (The indemnity was actually returned twelve years later.) In

European countries, also, the ambassador was courteously received, but

failed to obtain any serious attention for the subject of treaty

revision. The embassy returned to Japan in 1873. During the next years

domestic affairs engrossed the attention of the government to the

virtual exclusion of everything else, and it was not until after the

termination of the Satsuma rebellion in 1877 that the government found

itself in a position to approach foreign powers with the object of

recovering tariff autonomy and reserving the coastwise trade. The effort

again proved abortive. In 1879, however, an agreement was concluded

with the United States of America, the latter agreeing to a revised

treaty by which Japan's tariff and judicial autonomy was to be restored

and her coastwise trade reserved, with the proviso, however, that the

revised treaty should not go into force until a similar instrument had

been concluded with the other powers. In 1880 Inouye Kaoru, minister for

foreign affairs, opened negotiations with the plenipotentiaries of the

European powers in Tōkyō, but the proposed revision having been

improperly disclosed to the public, the negotiations were suspended.

Renewed shortly afterward, they were brought within apparent reach of

conclusion in 1887, after long and weary discussions. But in the

meanwhile public opinion in Japan had been growing more and more

impatient of the treatment meted out to the empire by foreign states,

and more and more sensible of the rights appertaining to an independent

country. On the other hand, the rivalry of foreign powers, the diversity

of their interests and the difficulty of dealing with them all together,

had involved the introduction of many irksome and humiliating conditions

into the draft of the revised treaty, and when it was published in 1887

it provoked opposition that caused its abandonment, Count Inouye

retiring from office. He was succeeded by Count Ōkuma Shigenobu, who

reopened the negotiations, but was enabled, owing to Japan's improved

position _vis à vis_ the outer world, to insist on conducting them

independently with each power, thus avoiding the insuperable difficulty

of simultaneously placating seventeen states all influenced by more or

less divergent interests. A revised treaty, on lines more favorable to

Japan than the former draft had been, was now concluded and signed by

America and Germany. But no sooner were its provisions published than

the nation again became excited, especially on account of an article

providing that foreigners, as well as natives, should be appointed to

the Japanese judiciary. The cabinet decided to again suspend the

negotiations, and a fanatic threw a bomb at Count Ōkuma which wounded

him severely, necessitating the amputation of his right leg. Some time

afterward he retired from office, together with the minister president,

Count Kuroda, and in 1889 Count Yamagata became minister president,

Viscount Aoki taking the portfolio of foreign affairs. The latter,

together with Count Gotō, minister of communications, and Count Saigō

Tsugumichi, minister of home affairs, were appointed joint

plenipotentiaries for the purposes of treaty revision. But in 1891

Count Yamagata and Viscount Aoki retired, the latter being succeeded by

Viscount Enomoto, who, in 1892, gave place to Mutsu Munemitsu. It was

under the foreign ministry of the latter that, in 1894, Great Britain

took the lead of all other powers to conclude a revised treaty with

Japan, which went into effect on July 17, 1899, and which removed the

consular jurisdiction from the open ports of Japan, in return for the

throwing open of the whole empire to the travel and traffic of all

foreigners. Coasting trade was also recognized as properly belonging to

the domain where Japan had the sovereign right of making regulations.

Tariff autonomy was largely recovered, and new import duties were drawn

up, export duties being entirely abolished. Japan thus became, at

length, not only a sovereign state free to look after its own internal

and external affairs, but also a member of the family of nations whose

legal status was considered on the basis of parity.

Meanwhile, the intercourse with foreign nations had grown more and more

intimate. Many princes, nobles, and celebrities came from the West to

visit Japan, and many Japanese statesmen and students traveled or

sojourned in Europe and America. No vestige seemed to remain of the old

sentiment of national seclusion. It may be interesting to say a word

here about some of the distinguished foreigners who visited Japan during

the Meiji era. Shortly after the restoration, the duke of Edinburgh,

second son of the queen of England, came, and was followed, in 1872, by

Prince Alexis of Russia, who was received by the emperor and was present

at naval and military reviews. In February, 1879, the future William II.

of Germany came to Tōkyō. In July of the same year General Grant,

ex-president of the United States, arrived, and was hospitably

entertained, the citizens of Tōkyō showing their appreciation of

America's sympathetic attitude toward Japan by entertaining him at an

evening party, as well as at a garden-party in Uyeno Park, at which the

emperor was present and various kinds of Japanese sports were shown. At

later dates Japan was visited by the nephew of King Humbert of Italy,

the czarevitch, afterward Nicholas II. of Russia, King Kalakaua of

Hawaii, a Grecian prince, and other distinguished personages.

Japan's relations with Asiatic countries were not always as cordial as

those with European and American states. In the year 1866, owing to the

misconduct of Chinese settlers, it became necessary to enact special

regulations for their control and to restrict the limits of their

residence at the open ports. When the war between the emperor and the

shōgun broke out all the foreign powers declared and maintained

neutrality except the Chinese, who secretly sold arms to the Tokugawa.

Hence their access to non-treaty ports was strictly prohibited. They

also contrived to kidnap and sell the children of indigent Japanese, and

instructions were consequently issued to local governments to guard

strictly against this outrage. In July, 1871, however, a treaty of

friendship and amity was concluded between the two empires.

In the winter of 1872 some inhabitants of the Loochoo Islands were cast

away on the eastern coast of Formosa and murdered by the natives, and in

the following year some shipwrecked sailors from the province of Bitchū

experienced the same fate. Soyeshma Taneomi was sent by the government

as plenipotentiary to Peking to complain of these outrages against

Japanese subjects, but the Chinese government made no satisfactory reply

and declined to acknowledge its responsibility for the acts of the

natives of Formosa. The Japanese government was thus compelled to take

into its own hands the task of exacting reparation. In April, 1874,

Lieutenant General Saigō Tsugumichi was appointed to the command of a

punitory expedition to Formosa. No serious opposition was encountered

except at the hands of one tribe, which, however, was overcome after

some fighting. On the eve of sending this expedition, Yanagiwara

Sakimitsu was dispatched by the Japanese government as ambassador to

China, but as he found the Chinese much incensed about Japan's action

and very anxious that her troops should at once leave Formosa, Ōkubo

Toshimichi, a leading member of the cabinet, was dispatched as

plenipotentiary to Peking. Meeting only with procrastination and

inconsistency on the part of the Chinese, he broke off the negotiations

and announced his intention of returning to Japan. But at this stage the

British minister in Peking mediated between the two empires, and the

Chinese finally agreed to pay 100,000 taels to the families of the

murdered Japanese subjects and 400,000 taels indemnity to Japan for the

cost of the expedition, undertaking at the same time to prevent the

recurrence of similar outrages in Formosa.

[Illustration: ISLAND POSSESSIONS OF JAPAN]

After the Formosan trouble another complication arose between Japan and

China with regard to the Islands of Loochoo. These had long been a

dependency of Japan. In the middle of the twelfth century the Minamoto

leader, Tametomo, driven to the province of Izu, made his way thence to

Loochoo, and, having quelled a civil war raging in the islands, placed

his son Shunten on the throne. Afterward, the Ashikaga shōgun,

Yoshinori, gave the islands to the Shimazu family as an adjunct of the

Satsuma fief, but from the time of Hideyoshi's Korean expedition,

Loochoo having neglected to discharge its duties as a dependency, the

Satsuma chief sent a force to the islands in 1609, took the king

prisoner and conveyed him to Edo, whence he was soon after restored to

his country. Shimazu then sent officials to superintend the affairs of

Loochoo, and from that time forth the revenue of the islands was

included in the yearly income of the Shimazu family. In 1873 Sho Tai,

king of Loochoo, came to Japan and was formally invested with the title

of feudal chief of Loochoo, a residence in Tōkyō being assigned to him

at the same time. Shortly afterward the name of the year period and the

Loochooan calendar were changed for those in use in Japan, and the laws

of the empire were declared operative in Loochoo. Finally, in April,

1879, the feudal title of the ex-king of Loochoo was abolished and the

islands were turned into the prefecture of Okinawa. The Chinese

government thereupon advanced a claim that Loochoo had once been a

tributary of the Middle Kingdom, and that it therefore belonged not less

to China than to Japan. The weight of evidence was on Japan's side,

however, and by the arbitration of General Grant, ex-president of the

United States of America, who happened to be on a visit to the East at

the time, the question was settled in Japan's favor.

Turning now to Korean affairs, it has already been related that an envoy

was sent from Japan at the time of the restoration, but that Korea

refused to receive him. It was on this occasion that Saigō Bakamari

proposed that he himself would proceed thither in the capacity of

ambassador, and that if Korea persisted in her unfriendly attitude, an

armed force should be sent against her. But, as has been related, this

proposal did not meet with the approval of the cabinet. In 1875 Japan

sent another envoy, but again Korea declined to open amicable relations.

An event then occurred which nearly involved the two countries in war. A

Japanese man-of-war, _en route_ for China, whither she was carrying a

Japanese plenipotentiary, called at Chemulpo, in August, 1875, to obtain

fuel and water, but her boats were fired on by the Koreans and two of

her men were wounded. Incensed at this outrage, the crew of the vessel

attacked and burned the Korean fortress. When the matter was reported in

Tōkyō, the government sent Lieutenant General Kuroda, a member of the

cabinet, and Inouye Kaoru to Korea, in the capacity of ambassador and

vice ambassador, respectively. This mission met with success, Korea sent

a letter of apology to Japan and declared her desire to contract

friendly relations. Lieutenant General Kuroda accordingly concluded a

treaty of commerce and amity, in which Korea's independence was

recognized by Japan, and in May, 1876, Korea sent an envoy to Japan,

opened the ports of Gensan and Chemulpo, and agreed that each country

should be represented at the court of the other. Thenceforth the Korean

government began to adopt some of the appliances of Western

civilization. She improved her administrative organization, established

a military training school where Japanese instructors were employed, and

sent youths to Japan to be educated. These innovations, however, proved

very distasteful to many conservatives in Korea, especially to

Taiwon-kun, father of the king, who had always been on bad terms with

the Bin family, to which the queen belonged, and which was at the time

favorable to reform. Affairs were precipitated by discontent among the

soldiery with reference to the removal of a minister, and being incited

by the Taiwon-kun, the troops attacked the palace in July, 1882, and

killed many of the Bin family, as well as several Japanese military

officers. The same night the Japanese legation was attacked by a mob,

and the minister, Hanabusa Yoshimoto, had to force his way through the

city, escorting the women and children of the legation, and push on

through the darkness to Chemulpo, where he escaped by boat, and being

picked up by an English man-of-war, the _Flying Fish_, returned to

Nagasaki on board her. He was speedily sent back by his government in a

vessel-of-war, and entering Seul, demanded an explanation from Korea.

China, meanwhile, had dispatched a squadron to the scene, seized the

Taiwon-kun, and carried him prisoner to Tientsin. Hanabusa subsequently

concluded with Korea a convention providing for the punishment of the

malefactors, the payment of an indemnity of 50,000 yen to the sufferers

and their families, and of 500,000 yen to the Japanese empire, the

guarding of the Japanese legation by Korean troops, and the dispatch of

an ambassador to apologize for the outrage. (Japan afterward returned to

Korea 400,000 yen of this indemnity.) China and Japan both stationed

bodies of men in the Korean capital, and Korea divided her forces into

two bodies, one of which was trained according to Japanese tactics, the

other according to Chinese. There were then two parties in the

peninsular kingdom, the Independents and the Conservatives, between whom

a state of strained relations constantly existed. In December, 1884,

they resorted to open hostilities, and the king, finding himself in

danger, sent an autograph letter to the Japanese legation, asking for

help. The Japanese _chargé d'affaires_ thereupon proceeded to the palace

with a small body of men. There he was attacked by a combined force of

Chinese and Koreans. During the fighting the king's mother was seized by

the Chinese soldiers, and the king having declared his intention of

placing himself in the hands of the Chinese in order to be with her, the

Japanese retired to their legation, which was afterward assaulted by a

Korean mob and set on fire. The _chargé d'affaires_ made his way to

Chemulpo and once more Japan was obliged to demand reparation from

Korea. This time the task of effecting an arrangement was intrusted to

Count Inouye Kaoru, who, proceeding to Korea as ambassador, escorted by

two men-of-war, concluded a treaty providing that Korea should send an

envoy to Japan to tender apologies; that the Koreans who had injured

Japanese persons and property should be duly punished; and that an

indemnity of 110,000 yen, together with 20,000 yen for the rebuilding of

the legation, should be paid. In March of the same year Count Itō

Hirobumi, a member of the cabinet, accompanied by Lieutenant General

Saigō, proceeded to China, and concluded Viceroy Li at Tientsin a

convention providing that China and Japan should withdraw their troops

from Korea; that neither power should thereafter send a force thither

without giving previous notice to the other, and that the Chinese

soldiers who had taken part in the attack on the Japanese in Seul should

be punished. Thus friendly relations were reëstablished between Japan

and China.

PART IV

CONSTITUTIONAL JAPAN. 1893--

Chapter XVI

THE CONSTITUTION IN THEORY AND IN PRACTICE

1893-1906

The "History of the Empire of Japan" was compiled in 1893, and it is

needless to say that since that time the empire has experienced a

remarkable development in all aspects of its national activity. The war

with China occurred in 1894-1895, the North China campaign in 1900, and

the great conflict with Russia in 1904-1905. Through these important

events the Japanese nation has undergone an immense change in the last

dozen years, in the position it occupies in the comity of nations, as

well as in its attitude toward the rest of the world. The industrial and

financial life of the people has also made a change hardly anticipated

in 1893. Their normal national budget, aside from extraordinary war

expenditures, has grown 260 per cent. as large as it then was, and their

foreign trade in commodities alone has increased nearly fourfold. The

state of internal politics also has taken an evolution correspondingly

significant. With this last subject we shall begin our brief survey of

Japan's national life during the thirteen years between 1893 and 1906.

Before entering into the narrative of the political life of recent

Japan, it would be well to acquire a fuller view of the formal, or

constitutional, side of that life. The reader will remember that the

organization of the two political parties, the _Jiyū-tō_ (1880) and the

_Kaishin-tō_ (1881), or, as generally translated, the Liberals and the

Progressives, preceded the promulgation of the Constitution, which

occurred in 1889. The latter was not granted by the government until the

agitation of the parties for its speedy promulgation had run to a

considerable height. From this fact, however, it does not follow, as has

been asserted by some writers, that the Constitution was wrested by the

enlightened nation from the hands of its reluctant ruler. Such a view is

apt to be easily formed by the superficial observer, but hardly accords

with the facts that stand recorded in history. The agitation of the

parties may, to some extent, have caused the Constitution to appear at

the particular time it did, but it is evident that the enlightenment had

dawned earlier among the authorities than among the parties, for it was

in 1867 that the famous Five-Article Oath was pronounced by the emperor,

the first two articles of which read as follows: "Assemblies and

councils shall be widely established, and all national affairs shall be

decided by public discussion; the government and the people shall be of

one mind and vigorously prosecute the policy of the nation." If these

words may be proven not to imply exactly the future establishment of a

regular system of national representation, no student will deny that

their author sincerely entertained the desire of consulting by some

effective means the intelligent section of the nation at every important

step to be taken in the government of the country. Only a detailed

knowledge of the modern constitutional form of government seems to have

been lacking for the above desire to take a definite shape. Such

knowledge was, however, soon acquired, as we are told by Itō himself,

when the Japanese embassy, of which he was a member, visited the

principal constitutional countries of Europe and America, and saw with

their observant eyes and were convinced that the comparative progress of

these nations and the relative backwardness of their own were in a large

measure due to the presence in the former and absence in the latter of a

regular constitutional machinery of government. The imperial oath

preceded by at least ten years, and the journey of the embassy by seven

years, the inauguration of party life in Japan. Nor should it be

forgotten that, during the long centuries of its existence, the imperial

house of Japan had seldom proved to be despotic, and, when its real

authority was restored in 1867 from the hands of the feudal overlord,

the movement had been started, not by a powerful imperial army, which

did not exist, but by the combined strength of men rising from all ranks

of the nation at large. While it is true that without the awakening of

the nation the Constitution would never have seen light, it was more

truly granted by the emperor and his advisers than wrested from them.

This fact, that the Constitution was granted by the emperor, may be said

to be the keynote of that remarkable document. It was hardly the result

of a compromise between the emperor and the nation. Still less did it

delegate to the former a part of the sovereignty of the latter. The

emperor, in the Japanese Constitution, assumes full sovereignty, and

graciously associates with him representatives of the nation in the

government of the country. The people are, therefore, not givers, but

receivers, of certain rights, the concession of which, however, does not

diminish the sovereignty vested in the emperor. This fundamental notion

clearly characterizes from beginning to end this document of 1889,

which, as we shall see later on, otherwise contains ambiguous and

expansive passages at a few critical points. "The emperor is the head of

the empire, combining in himself the rights of sovereignty, and

exercises them according to the provisions of the present Constitution."

(Article IV.) Whence does he derive his power? He is "sacred and

inviolable" (Article III.), as he is--says Itō, the framer and

commentator of the Constitution--Heaven-descended, divine, and sacred,

and, though he indeed has to pay due respect to the law, the law has no

power to hold him accountable to it. "The rights of sovereignty of the

state," says the emperor himself in the Preamble of the Constitution,

"We have inherited from Our Ancestors," who, according to tradition,

charged their descendants to reign over and govern the country for

eternity. Upon this peculiar Japanese theory of the divine right of the

emperor is based the noted Article I. of the Constitution, which merely

states in words the principle which has been upheld in history and is

universally and enthusiastically supported by the people, that "the

empire of Japan shall be reigned over and governed by a line of emperors

unbroken for ages eternal." From his sovereign powers it follows that

the emperor sanctions laws and orders them to be promulgated and

executed (VI.), convokes, opens, closes, and prorogues the imperial

diet, and dissolves the house of representatives (VII.), issues imperial

ordinances in the place of laws, in case of emergency, even about

financial matters, and also administrative ordinances, which shall not

alter the existing laws (VIII., XXXI., and IX.), appoints and dismisses

civil and military officers (X.), has the supreme command of the army

and navy, and determines the organization of their peace standing (XI.,

XII.), declares war, makes peace, and concludes treaties (XIII.),

confers titles of nobility, rank, orders, and other marks of honor

(XV.), and orders amnesty, pardon, commutation of punishments and

rehabilitation (XVI.), and no amendment of the provisions of the

Constitution shall be attempted by the diet except by imperial order

(LXXIII.).

It should be remembered that the enumeration of these extensive

prerogatives by no means indicates a limitation to the rights of the

emperor. Whatever rights he does not name he as sovereign may, in

theory, exercise. Yet he is assisted by other institutions, the privy

council, the cabinet, and the diet, to which he has made important

concessions. While the emperor controls the appointment, dismissal, and

payment of officers (X.), determines the organization of the peace

standing of the army and navy (XII.), and declares war and makes peace

(XIII.), how could he exercise these powers if the consent of the diet,

which is required for the expenditure and revenue of the state (LXIV.),

were withheld? The diet controls not only the purse, but also

legislation, for while it is stated that the emperor exercises the

legislative power with the consent of the diet (V.), the residuum of

that power vested in him independently of the diet is reduced almost to

_nil_ when it is said, in Article XXXI., that every law requires the

consent of the imperial diet. He may, indeed, if the diet is not

fitting, issue imperial ordinances for emergency, but they lose their

legal force as soon as the diet disapproves them at its next session

(VII.). As against the article that the emperor convokes, opens, closes,

and prorogues the diet, and dissolves the lower house (VII.), stands the

provision that the diet shall be convoked annually for three months

(XLI. and XLII.). Nor is the emperor's executive power unlimited, for

all laws, imperial ordinances and imperial rescripts, that relate to the

affairs of the state, require the countersignature of a minister of

state (LV.). The share of the emperor is least in the business of the

judiciary, the entire judicature being exercised by the courts of law,

the procedure and organization of which are determined by law (LVII.).

To these and other principles of the Constitution the emperor pledges

himself and his descendants, in the wielding of their sovereign rights,

always to conform (Preamble). In law, the full sovereignty is vested in

the emperor alone, and yet, also in law, the sovereignty is as divided

as in the subtle doctrine of the Trinity by his voluntary association

with the other great institutions of the state.

Behind these peculiar principles of the Japanese sovereignty should be

discerned the intense loyalty of the nation to the reigning house, which

during the last few decades has again and again startled the foreign

observers who had not comprehended it. It is not possible for us here to

discuss how this sentiment has developed, and how the emperor has

proved to be the strongest and the only permanent political institution

in the past history of Japan. To-day the precise position which he

occupies in the organism of the Japanese nation may perhaps be defined

as that of the gracious central figure of the social life and the

inspiring personification of the profound unity and absorbing ambition

of the people. It is not difficult to fancy that, but for the presence

in their midst of this commanding institution of the emperor, the

national career of the people would end itself abruptly under the

pressure of the excessive competitions abroad and untrained, blundering

struggles at home.

The new constitutional régime, which began in 1890, has not been without

a few interesting incidents illustrative of the political functions of

the emperor as an actual organ of the state. One of these incidents

follows: In March, 1901, the house of peers had unexpectedly and for the

first time rejected a bill, already passed by the other house, for

increasing the rates of certain taxes in order to meet necessary

expenditures of the state. All efforts of persuasion and mediation

miscarried, and the house of peers could not, in law, be dissolved. The

deadlock was finally removed by the appearance of an imperial word

intimating that the urgent circumstances of the nation made it desirable

for the measures of the proposed bill to receive the concurrence of the

peers, who now immediately and unanimously passed the bill. Thereupon

the opposition in the lower house seized the opportunity to bring

forward a resolution censuring the cabinet for having thus necessitated

the pronouncement of the imperial word. The speeches of the supporters

of the resolution seemed to imply that the cabinet should be held

responsible for creating a situation in which the emperor was obliged to

resort to a perhaps transconstitutional act on a matter so plainly

political, and thus compromise even in the slightest degree his serene

dignity, which should stand unsullied and express itself through the

normal constitutional channels. The late astute Hoshi, then the house

leader of the Liberals, who were supporting the cabinet, quickly seized

upon the carefully guarded implications of the opposition, and

triumphantly pointed out that the real issue contained in the resolution

was the question whether the imperial word was proper or not. He

proceeded to say that the Constitution was the manifestation of a part

of the full imperial sovereignty, the exercise of which should therefore

not be obstructed by the Constitution, and that the imperial word had

issued from the emperor through his special sovereign rights, and was

proper and legal. No exposure of the opponents' logic could be more

ruthless, nor a bolder enunciation of the emperor's "special sovereign

rights" could be imagined, than the trenchant argument of Hoshi. It

would seem that in this debate both parties conceded that the imperial

act was transconstitutional. Seen in this light, the statement made in

this connection by Premier Itō to the president of the upper house is

highly significant. Although the recent imperial word, said he, should

not be regarded as an imperial rescript, as it bore no countersignatures

of the ministers of state, it had been issued after a personal

conference between the emperor and the premier. The latter was, Marquis

Itō went on to declare, responsible for the act of the emperor, for,

constitutionally, the premier is held responsible for all the political

conduct of the sovereign. Coming from the very framer and commentator of

the Constitution, these words may be construed as establishing an

important precedent. The emperor is happily relieved of the

responsibility for his political conduct, but may he, under

extraordinary necessity, resort to a transconstitutional measure at

will, or, in other words, may the premier request the emperor to employ

such a measure by the simple assumption by the former of the

responsibility therefor? The marquis appears to answer the question in

the affirmative. The future political development of this point will be

a matter of great interest.

The fundamental conception of the Constitution being such as we have

described, it would appear as if the political life of Japan must in a

large measure depend upon the personal views and inclinations of the

emperor, to say nothing of those of his ministers. Such a conception,

however, ignores two considerations of utmost importance, namely, that

under the new régime are being created regular channels through which

the life of the state will more and more habitually run, and that the

tradition, whose force has accumulated through the long history of Japan

since her foundation as a state, is the spirit of conciliation on the

part of the subject and the habit of assuming political impersonality on

the part of the supreme ruler. Individual idiosyncrasies of the

sovereign will probably prove to be the least important factor of the

future political life of the Japanese nation.

Now, passing on to the imperial diet, it is observed that the

theoretical view of its legislative capacity is that with its consent

the emperor exercises his legislative power (V.), or, in the words of

the commentator, that the diet "takes part in legislation, but has no

share in the sovereign power; it has power to deliberate upon laws, but

none to determine them." This theoretical definition, however, should

not be taken as a practical limitation imposed upon the legislative

power of the diet, for, it will be remembered, every law of the state

must have its consent (XXXIII.), and it may disapprove imperial

ordinances issued while it was not in session (VIII.). Over and above

its legislative faculty, also, the diet enjoys four important rights:

the right to receive petitions directly from the people, the right to

put questions to the government and demand explanations, the right to

address the throne over the heads of the cabinet ministers, and, the

most effective of all, the right to control the management of the

finances. It is needless to say that the practical issue of conflict

must always lie, not between the diet and the emperor, but between the

diet and the government.

The diet consists of two houses, namely, of the peers and of the

representatives. The importance of the bicameral system is strongly

insisted upon by the commentator of the Constitution. The house of peers

is composed of the members of the imperial family and princes and

marquises, who sit of their own right; counts, viscounts, and barons,

who have been elected by their respective peers; persons who have been

specially nominated by the emperor on account of the meritorious

services they have rendered to the state or on account of their

erudition; and, finally, wealthy persons who have been elected, one

member for each city or prefecture, by the people of their own class.

All hold their seats for life, except the elected members, whose term is

seven years.

It would seem that this upper house was created to serve as a powerful

shield of the government. It contains men of wisdom and weight, and is

comparatively free from party affiliations. While no financial bill can

originate there, the house is above the fear of dissolution, and its

actions may be characterized by a greater continuity of policy than

those of the other house. "If the house of peers fulfills its

functions," writes Marquis Itō in his "Commentaries," "it will serve in

a remarkable degree to preserve an equilibrium between political powers,

to restrain the undue influence of political parties, to check the evil

tendencies of irresponsible discussions, to secure the stability of the

Constitution, to be an instrument for maintaining harmony between the

governing and the governed, and to permanently sustain the prosperity of

the country and the happiness of the people." It was an irony of fate

that a dozen years after these words were written their author, at that

time the premier, should find in this very organ the most stubborn

opposition to his measures that any constitutional cabinet of Japan has

ever experienced. The anomaly of the situation consisted in the fact

that these measures had already been passed through the lower house, so

that the traditionally pro-government peers were now found opposed to

the combined front of the cabinet and the representatives. Nothing of

the sort could have been imagined by the marquis when he first framed

the great document which brought the house of peers into existence. How

the deadlock thus caused was removed by a resort to another anomaly has

already been described. As to the reasons for the unexpectedly

determined opposition of the peers, they will be told in the next

chapter.

The house of representatives is made up of persons elected for the term

of four years from the electoral districts in accordance with the law of

election, which was originally promulgated simultaneously with the

Constitution in 1889 and was revised in 1900. The revised law provided

that the electoral district should be coextensive with the

administrative division, city, or prefecture, and defined the number of

members to be elected from each district. Under the earlier arrangement

the city or prefecture had been divided into smaller districts, each of

which returned one, sometimes two, members. The new larger districts

were calculated to do away with some of the evils of sectionalism which

had previously been unavoidable. The revised law also separated a

certain number of cities from rural districts, to which some of the

former had hitherto been connected to form single districts, the change

signifying the intention of the law to give the urban population a freer

voice in the house than was possible under the old system. The aggregate

number of the representatives was also materially increased from 300 to

369, the cities claiming 61 members, instead of less than twenty, as

heretofore. Another important feature of the law was the voting by

ballot and the provision that each elector should vote for only one

candidate, irrespective of the number of members returnable from the

same district. The obvious intention was to protect the rights of the

elector from the abuses of the political party, whose orderly and

organized action was also indirectly encouraged by this measure, and to

give a chance to the minorities to be represented. Again, while the

property qualifications of the voter and the candidate had been measured

by the payment of direct taxes of not less than ten yen by the former

and fifteen yen by the latter, the amount was now reduced to ten yen for

the elector and altogether removed from the eligible person. The numbers

of the electors in the country accordingly rose from some 460,000 to

about 800,000. It is curious to note that the original bill of the

revised election law introduced by the government was considerably more

liberal than the amended and finally passed articles of the lower house.

Thus it would appear that the representatives of the people showed

themselves reluctant to accept the premium offered by the government

whose conservatism they had been wont to attack, but the real situation

will be understood only when we come to study in the next section the

political maneuvers of the period. We may simply note here in passing

that 800,000 electors among the population of more than 46,000,000

cannot be considered adequate, even when allowance is made for the still

comparatively untrained political condition of the people. Although an

agitation for an enlarged electorate has not yet assumed a definite

form, there can be little doubt that progress will be made in this

respect in a not distant future.

The house elects its president and vice president, and submits to the

imperial decision the names of the three candidates for each position

who have received the highest votes for it, of whom the sovereign

invariably selects the first. The members then divide themselves into

committees, each with an elected chairman, which transact the more

important part of the business of the house before it reaches the

general session. The seats are decided by lot and without regard to the

division of parties. Disorderly scenes on the floor are said to be as

rare as specimens of grand oratory. Thrilling incidents are not,

however, wanting, particularly when an important interpellation of the

government or an address to the throne is under discussion, or on any

occasion when the concerted move of a large party is directed by its

leaders against the government, or against another party. The sentiment

of the house rises to its height when, as in October, 1894, and on March

25, 1904, the partisan spirit is for the moment sunk, opposition to the

government is laid aside, and the members, unanimously and

enthusiastically, voice the urgent wishes of the entire nation, the

latter itself being eminently capable at critical times of standing like

one man. The gallery is on such occasions thronged by interested

spectators, and the debate and its report arrest the attention of the

whole country.

Most of the officers of state, including cabinet members, are eligible

for seats in the lower house, but the ministers seldom appear as

candidates, and, in one solitary case, when one of them was elected

representative, he nearly always absented himself from the house. The

cabinet members may, however, voluntarily or on request make their

appearance to present the views of the administration on questions under

deliberation, and on such occasions they occupy seats assigned for

government officials. The presence, in this manner, of the various

ministers, as well as premier, is usually a sign of an important, or

perhaps exciting, session.

It is unnecessary to say that the representatives are not in theory

regarded as delegates from their constituencies, and the local interests

have not been found particularly engrossing. As to the practical

position which the house occupies in the national life of the

people--that is, as to the questions: What are the preponderant

interests represented therein, and in what way; what have been the

watchwords of the opposition, and how are the party lines drawn; how

much has the existence of the house helped or hindered the progress of

the nation during the past decade; what have been the effects of the

continual struggle between the house and the government on the tactics

and discipline of each, and which has shown the higher ability and

greater continuity of purpose; and what have been the mutual effects of

the action of the house and the more important domestic and foreign

problems of the empire--these queries may be only imperfectly answered

after the actual political history since the promulgation of the

Constitution is thoroughly mastered. The more direct and practical

question concerns the relation between the house or the diet in general

and the cabinet. Is the latter responsible to the former for its

political conduct?

Perhaps nothing in the fundamental law of Japan can be of greater

interest and importance than the question just stated, all the more so

because the text of the Constitution and Marquis Itō's "Commentaries" on

it, as well as his public utterances, seem, when closely examined,

significantly to leave much room for future development. Nor are the

eight changes of the cabinet which have taken place since the birth of

the diet all of a character to decide this momentous question. "The

respective ministers of state," says Article LV. of the Constitution,

"shall give their advice to the emperor, and be responsible for it."

What the last clause signifies is by no means made perfectly clear by

the commentator, who says: "He alone can dismiss a minister, who has

appointed him.... The appointment and dismissal of them [_i. e._, the

ministers] having been included by the Constitution in the sovereign

power of the emperor, it is only a legitimate consequence that the power

of deciding as to the responsibility of ministers is withheld from the

diet. But the diet may put questions to the ministers and demand open

answers from them before the public, and it may also present addresses

to the sovereign setting forth its opinions. Moreover, although the

emperor reserves to himself in the Constitution the right of appointing

his ministers at his pleasure, in making an appointment, the

susceptibilities of the public mind must also be taken into

consideration. This may be regarded as an indirect method of controlling

the responsibility of ministers. Thus, in the Constitution the following

conclusions have been arrived at:

"First, that the ministers of state are charged with the duty of giving

advice to the emperor, which is their proper function, and that they are

not held responsible on his behalf; second, that ministers are directly

responsible to the emperor and indirectly to the people; third, that it

is the sovereign and not the people that can decide as to the

responsibility of ministers, because the sovereign possesses the rights

of sovereignty of the state; fourth, that the responsibility of

ministers is a political one and has no relation to criminal or civil

responsibility, nor can it conflict therewith, neither can the one

affect the other. Save that all criminal or civil cases must be brought

before the ordinary courts of law, and that suits arising out of

administrative matters must be brought before a court of administrative

litigation, the cases of political responsibility are left to be dealt

with by the sovereign as disciplinary measures." The marquis further

emphatically repudiates the theory of joint responsibility of the

cabinet as a state of things that can never be approved of according to

the Japanese Constitution. The argument here again is that the ministers

are individually appointed by the sovereign, to whom they are

individually responsible for the business of their respective

departments, and that for the same reason the minister president, or

premier, cannot have control over the post of each minister, nor shall

the latter be dependent upon the former. The reader will readily see

that the whole line of Itō's argument is consistent with the fundamental

theory of the Japanese body politic, that is, the full sovereignty of

the emperor. No one can, however, fail to perceive between the lines

here quoted a great latitude for the future growth of another theory

whose gradual expansion might, imperceptibly, perhaps, but none the less

steadily, reduce the political responsibility of the minister to the

throne to the position of a mere legal fiction. As has already been

intimated, the past changes of the cabinet have not always been directly

occasioned by the opposition of the diet, nor has the majority of the

opposition in the lower house newly elected after its dissolution always

forced the ministers from their chairs. As will be seen in the next

chapter, the second Yamagata cabinet (1898-1900) resigned despite its

commanding a majority in the diet, and was succeeded by the fourth Itō

cabinet (1900-1901), which also retired for reasons quite independent of

the conditions of the legislative chambers, where it had the following

of an absolute majority of the representatives. On the other hand,

nearly all of the eight changes of the cabinet have been caused by

difficulties more or less financial in nature, and these are, it will be

remembered, under the effective control of the lower house, so that the

"indirect" responsibility of the cabinet to the diet already bids fair

to become more logical and perhaps less indirect. Moreover, the

sovereign has never appointed individual ministers of state at his

pleasure, but at the resignation of a cabinet he invariably summons the

statesman whose succession to the premiership is the most logical,

though not always desired by the latter himself, and leaves to him the

task of forming a new cabinet. It would not be too much to suppose that

if in the future a cabinet was compelled to resign under the powerful

and reasonable opposition of a great popular party in the lower house,

the leader of the party would receive the imperial mandate to form a new

cabinet. We feel almost safe in predicting that with the growth of an

adequate party system, which in Japan is still in its formative stage,

the ministerial responsibility to the diet will have become an

established usage.

It is interesting to note that Marquis Itō himself remarked, in his

address, in February, 1899, to the delegates from the cities, that the

English cabinet and party system must be more or less adopted in Japan

if a harmonious coöperation were to be secured between the cabinet and

the diet, and that the practice of government by party would in no way

impair the authority of the throne. The same statesman had an occasion

two years later to declare in the lower house, when an already mentioned

resolution censuring the cabinet for having caused an imperial word to

be pronounced was under discussion, that the passage of a resolution

would not shake his position as premier, which he owed to the confidence

of his majesty. "If the aim of the resolution is my resignation,"

exclaimed he, "why do you not propose an address to the throne, instead

of a resolution?" These statements made by the same framer of the

Constitution at two different occasions may not be interpreted as

necessarily contradictory to one another, for, if in 1901, an address

had been made to the throne, and if the throne had seemed still to

uphold the premier in spite of the diet, it is not impossible to imagine

that Itō would have quietly resigned. Weighing his statements side by

side, might it not be surmised that in the mind of the veteran statesman

the responsibility of the cabinet to the people must be commensurate

with the political training of the latter, especially in the form of a

well-organized and trained party system? At any rate, it would seem

inevitable that the actual state of things under the present régime

should move in that direction. As to the state of party politics in

Japan, to whose development the marquis himself has made a notable

contribution, we shall discuss it at length in the following chapter.

Finally, a reference should be made to the privy council, whose members,

twenty-five more or less in number, are appointed by the emperor, in

order to deliberate upon important matters of state. The ministers are

_ex officio_ privy councilors, but the cabinet is an administrative

body, while the privy council is a deliberative one. To the latter is

assigned the "task of planning far-sighted schemes of statecraft and of

effectuating new enactments, by leisurely meditation and calm

reflection, by thorough investigation into ancient and modern history,

and by consulting scientific principles" according to Itō's

"Commentaries." The councilors, therefore, must be men above party and

of wide experience and knowledge, and so conservative and impartial as

to be "the palladium of the Constitution and the law." Its opinions are

not given publicity, but when they are embodied in an imperial

ordinance, the latter states the fact in its preamble. The emperor in

theory may accept or reject at will the recommendations of the council,

but in practice has in no case overridden them, nor even shown his

personal preferences.

Those who are at all familiar with the political conditions of Japan

cannot fail to see through this institution of the privy council a group

of men who have in a large measure molded the destiny of new Japan. They

are collectively termed _Genrō_, or Elder Statesmen, and include those

who were prominent about the time of the revolution of 1868, and also

those who have since rendered eminent services to the state. At one time

they numbered among them the great Katsu, the most heroic and dramatic

figure of the revolution and the most sage-like statesman of modern

Japan. Marquis Itō now stands head and shoulders above the rest of the

veteran statesmen, and beside him are found Field Marshal Yamagata,

Count Matsukata, and others of equal note. It is highly significant that

the Constitution has created an institution by means of which those very

men whose wisdom and energy have tended to make Japan what she is were

attracted together around the person of the emperor. The ship of the

state is piloted by their far-sighted loyalty and patriotism, and the

influence these statesmen exercise over the fundamental policy of the

empire cannot easily be overestimated. The latest example of this

influence was the advice of the council to the throne to instruct the

peace envoys at Portsmouth to make large concessions in order

successfully to conclude a treaty with Russia. These concessions, which

made the restoration of peace possible, were radically opposed to the

wishes of the majority of the people, but were boldly counseled by the

Elder Statesmen regardless of personal consequences upon themselves.

Neither the diet nor the political parties could, however, effectively

assail the position of the council as such, for it was no executive

institution, but a purely deliberative organ closely in touch with the

throne. When the treaty was signed by the envoys, the council approved

it and the emperor ratified it, despite a great popular demonstration

for its rejection.

Chapter XVII

PARTIES AND POLITICS. 1893-1906[1]

Having examined the salient features of the machinery of the new régime,

we are now prepared to follow the history of the men and parties that

have operated the machinery, and of the issues which have in turn guided

the action of these political agents. Law and constitution are products

of history and legislation, but men and parties, as also issues at

stake, are the handiwork of mightier powers which can hardly be reduced

into syllogisms or molded by mere force of traditions and precedents. Of

all the political factors of a nation, the progress of the party and the

individuality of the man seem the least subject to human artifice and

control, while the problems, which must largely decide the course of

action of the different political forces at work, appear continually to

baffle one's imagination and forecast. It must then be a matter of great

interest to observe the conduct of the most prominent politicians in the

field and their eventful relations to the changing parties, and the

history of the issues, domestic and foreign, which have sometimes

astounded the actors on the scene by their unexpected emergence and

sometimes wearied them by their persistent and unwelcome reappearance.

What follows is a mere sketch of a period of the most bewildering

political vicissitudes that have ever visited a nation in a decade.

The period between 1890 and 1904 might be divided into three epochs.

Down to 1894, when the war with China broke out, the relation between

the government and the parties in the lower house was in the main one of

simple difference of political theories. With the war the nation

entered, externally, into the arena of world-politics, while, in the

diet, there dawned an era of varied coalitions among the parties and

also between them and the government. Desire for power seemed to begin

to affect the minds of the politicians whose aspirations had heretofore

been comparatively more idealistic. A grand party was finally created

by the combined influence of Marquis Itō, on the one hand, who

apparently aimed at organizing a model constitutional party, and, on the

other, of an enormous number of men the motives of some of whom were

anything but a copy of those of their leader. When the whips of this new

party, which controlled a majority in the diet, began to manifest

unwillingness to accept the discipline and to override the wishes of its

founder and leader, Marquis Itō, the politics of new Japan entered its

third stage, in which the controlling factors are found to be even more

personal and partisan and a matter of interests and feeling, than in the

second period. As soon as the nation entered upon the war with Russia,

however, the political atmosphere at once changed: the party lines and

the traditional differences between the diet and the government were

temporarily obliterated, and the nation--the cabinet, the two houses,

and the people--seemed to think and feel as one mind. The conclusion of

the treaty of peace with Russia, the terms of which displeased many

Japanese, has suddenly terminated this union and alienated the cabinet

and the privy council from some people, while the dividing lines between

the various parties are being again drawn on changed issues. When this

critical stage passes away, the political life of constitutional Japan

must inevitably enter its fourth epoch, but what its nature will be

remains to be seen. At this moment the future progress of the party life

of the Japanese nation appears to be as difficult to forecast as it was

in 1890, when the first diet was convened.

The first period, then, opens with the existence of two popular parties,

the Liberals and Progressives, led, respectively, by Count Itagaki and

Count Ōkuma. The members of the parties who sat in the first lower house

represented an overwhelmingly preponderant interest of the landowning

class of the country, so that a revision of land values and consequently

a reduction of the land tax were among their rallying cries. At the same

time they aimed at overthrowing the existing cabinet, which they

considered under the exclusive control of men of certain provinces of

the south, principally Satsuma and Nagato (Chōshū), which had once been

instrumental in upsetting the feudal régime and restoring the imperial

government. It is remarkable that the party men almost identified the

future downfall of sectionalism, as they deemed the foundation of the

administration to be, with the cause of the establishment of a

responsible cabinet, or a cabinet responsible to the throne as well as

to the diet. Needless to say that, from the party standpoint, a

responsible cabinet was _ipso facto_ a party cabinet. It will be

recalled that the Constitution, which had recently been promulgated and

according to whose provisions the diet had been called into being,

defined, so far as the explicit verbal meaning was concerned, that the

government was answerable for its political conduct to the emperor. The

theory of the full sovereignty of the throne was loyally and

enthusiastically supported by the entire nation, but the parties did not

fail to see the apparent possibility of reconciling it with a practical

control of the cabinet by the diet. It is little wonder that they

straightway crystallized their principle into the phrase, "a responsible

cabinet," which they at once conceived as merely the positive side of

another of their mottoes, "the downfall of sectionalism." The government

and the Elder Statesmen, it is not improbable, possessed a clearer

vision of the foibles of the young parties, and consequently a more

conservative but truer foresight of the future progress of the political

training of the nation. The question between the parties and the

government appears, in the last analysis, to have been largely a

question of time, the former harassing the latter for not giving them at

once what they probably knew it would cheerfully surrender when the

proper time came. Yet, by the law of reaction, the parties rashly

attacked the government, and the latter not infrequently resorted to

measures of self-defense which appeared to the partisan opponents

unwarranted and even arbitrary. Bitter feelings were not seldom aroused,

and the sentiment of the people at large was at times so highly wrought

that it was by no means uncommon to see neighbors in a village range

themselves according to their sympathy with either the government or the

party side in their heated controversies by the fireside. Election

scenes often presented exciting incidents. It should be noted that the

majority of the rural population sided with the anti-government

candidates, but that the two parties, the Liberals and Progressives,

seldom failed to struggle against each other in the election. Things

went on mainly in this condition until Count (now Marquis) Itō became

premier of the famous Itō cabinet, which lasted for an unusual period of

four years, during which, moreover, the victorious war with China took

place.

At first the count found the opposition of the lower house to his

so-called sectional government so powerful that he even contemplated the

advisability of creating a new political party of his own. Early in

1894 the diet was dissolved; the March election returned a majority of

the opposition and was followed by a second dissolution. Under such

circumstances it was no wonder that the late Chinese statesman, Li Hung

Chang, is alleged to have fancied at the time that Japan's hands were

too closely tied by the strife between the diet and the government to

resort to a decisive measure against China over Korea, which was then

the bone of contention between the two empires. But the war did come,

for the successful conduct of which the nation sank their party

considerations and supported with one mind the government and the army.

An account of this important warfare will be found in its proper place,

and it suffices here to point out its interesting effect on the

parliamentary politics of Japan. The new position in the comity of

nations which the world accorded her after the war naturally brought

with it new problems of unexpected importance. One of them was an

enormous increase of state expenditures caused by an increased armament

and by the plans for the development of the resources of the country.

Hereafter financial questions became the central issue to decide the

fate of the succeeding houses and cabinets, and their practical and

urgent character made it impossible for the cabinet to carry out its

proposed measures without the coöperation of the one or the other of the

parties in the house. Naturally an era of political coalitions dawned.

It may also be surmised that the parties, at least some of their

leaders, had been tired of a long fruitless struggle with the

government. However that may be, no one will deny that henceforth the

desire for power began to be manifested by the parties which, whatever

their faults, had in the main fought for a few abstract principles which

had originally brought them together. On the other hand, it is only just

to point out the important fact that the so loudly denounced

sectionalism had in reality become a phantom, particularly after the

inception of the constitutional régime in 1890 and the Chinese war in

1894-1895, both of which had a tremendous influence in arousing the

interest of the nation at large in its own affairs. The southern

provinces could still furnish men of experience and wisdom, but it was

less because the so-called sectionalism was still rampant than because

these men, who possessed the prestige of service and age, could not well

be replaced by the less experienced men of other localities. The Elder

Statesmen could no longer control the political situation of the

country, nor could they reasonably be charged with being animated with

any degree of provincialism. It would be no political apostasy for

either party to support a non-partisan cabinet whose policy appealed to

its cherished principles. Thus various circumstances seem to have

conspired to produce an epoch of political coalitions.