OF HUMAN FREEDOM
_Introductory_
I pass at length to the other part of ethics which concerns the method
or way which leads to liberty. In [the following], therefore, I shall
treat of the power of reason, showing how much reason itself can control
the emotions, and then what is freedom of mind or blessedness. Thence we
shall see how much stronger the wise man is than the ignorant. In what
manner and what way the intellect should be rendered perfect, and with
what art the body is to be cared for in order that it may properly
perform its functions, I have nothing to do with here; for the former
belongs to logic, the latter to medicine. I shall occupy myself here, as
I have said, solely with the power of the mind or of reason, first of
all showing the extent and nature of the authority which it has over the
emotions in restraining them and governing them; for that we have not
absolute authority over them we have already demonstrated. The Stoics
indeed thought that the emotions depend absolutely on our will, and that
we are absolutely masters over them; but they were driven, by the
contradiction of experience, though not by their own principles, to
confess that not a little practice and study are required in order to
restrain and govern the emotions. This one of them attempted to
illustrate, if I remember rightly, by the example of two dogs, one of a
domestic and the other of a hunting breed; for he was able by habit to
make the house dog hunt, and the hunting dog, on the contrary, to desist
from running after hares.
To the Stoical opinion Descartes much inclines. He affirms that the soul
or mind is united specially to a certain part of the brain called the
pineal gland, which the mind by the mere exercise of the will is able to
move in different ways, and by whose help the mind perceives all the
movements which are excited in the body and external objects. This
gland, he affirms, is suspended in the middle of the brain in such a
manner that it can be moved by the least motion of the animal spirits.
Again, he affirms that any variation in the manner in which the animal
spirits impinge upon this gland is followed by a variation in the manner
in which it is suspended in the middle of the brain, and moreover that
the number of different impressions on the gland is the same as that of
the different external objects which propel the animal spirits toward
it. Hence it comes to pass that if the gland, by the will of the soul
moving it in different directions, be afterwards suspended in this or
that way in which it had once been suspended by the spirits agitated in
this or that way, then the gland itself will propel and determine the
animal spirits themselves in the same way as that in which they had
before been repelled by a similar suspension of the gland. Moreover, he
affirmed that each volition of the mind is united in Nature to a certain
motion of the gland. For example, if a person wishes to behold a remote
object, this volition will cause the pupil of the eye to dilate, but if
he thinks merely of the dilation of the pupil, to have that volition
will profit him nothing, because Nature has not connected a motion of
the gland which serves to impel the animal spirits towards the optic
nerve in a way suitable for dilation or contraction of the pupil with
the volition or dilation or contraction, but only with the volition of
beholding objects afar off or close at hand. Finally, he maintained that
although each motion of this gland appears to be connected by Nature
from the commencement of our life with an individual thought, these
motions can nevertheless be connected by habit with other thoughts, a
proposition which he attempts to demonstrate in his "Passions of the
Soul" (art. 50, pt. 1).
From this he concludes that there is no mind so feeble that it cannot,
when properly directed, acquire absolute power over its passions; for
passions, as defined by him, are "perceptions, or sensations, or
emotions of the soul which are related to it specially, and which (N.B.)
are produced, preserved, and strengthened by some motion of the
spirits." (See the "Passions of Soul," art. 27, pt. 1.) But since it is
possible to join to a certain volition any motion of the gland, and
consequently of the spirits, and since the determination of the will
depends solely on our power, we shall be able to acquire absolute
mastery over our passions provided only we determine our will by fixed
and firm decisions by which we desire to direct our actions and bind
with these decisions the movements of the passions we wish to have.
So far as I can gather from his own words, this is the opinion of that
distinguished man, and I could scarcely have believed it possible for
one so great to have put it forward if it had been less subtle. I can
hardly wonder enough that a philosopher who firmly resolved to make no
deduction except from self-evident principles, and to affirm nothing but
what he clearly and distinctly perceived, and who blamed all the
Schoolmen because they desired to explain obscure matters by occult
qualities, should accept a hypothesis more occult than any occult
quality.
What does he understand, I ask, by the union of the mind and body? What
clear and distinct conception has he of thought intimately connected
with a certain small portion of matter? I wish that he had explained
this union by its proximate cause. But he conceived the mind to be so
distinct from the body that he was able to assign no single cause of
this union, nor of the mind itself, but was obliged to have recourse to
the cause of the whole universe, that is to say, to God. Again, I should
like to know how many degrees of motion the mind can give to that pineal
gland, and with how great a power the mind can hold it suspended. For I
do not understand whether this gland is acted on by the mind more slowly
or more quickly than by the animal spirits, and whether the movements of
the passions, which we have so closely bound with firm decisions, might
not be separated from them again by bodily causes, from which it would
follow that although the mind had firmly determined to meet danger, and
had joined to this decision the motion of boldness, the sight of the
danger might cause the gland to be suspended in such a manner that the
mind could think of nothing but flight. Indeed, since there is no
relation between the will and motion, so there is no comparison between
the power or strength of the body and that of the mind, and consequently
the strength of the body can never be determined by the strength of the
mind. It is to be remembered also that this gland is not found to be so
situated in the middle of the brain that it can be driven about so
easily and in so many ways, and that all the nerves are not extended to
the cavities of the brain.
Lastly, I omit all that Descartes asserts concerning the will and the
freedom of the will, since I have shown over and over again that it is
false. Therefore, inasmuch as the power of the mind, as I have shown
above, is determined by intelligence alone, we shall determine by the
knowledge of the mind alone the remedies against the emotions--remedies
which every one, I believe, has experienced, although there may not have
been any accurate observation or distinct perception of them, and from
this knowledge of the mind alone shall we deduce everything which
relates to its blessedness.
_Axioms_
I. If two contrary actions be excited in the same subject, a change must
necessarily take place in both, or in one alone, until they cease to be
contrary.
II. The power of an emotion is limited by the power of its cause, in so
far as the essence of the emotion is manifested or limited by the
essence of the cause itself.
_The Strength of the Emotions_
The emotion towards an object which we imagine to be free is greater
than towards one which is necessary, and consequently still greater
than towards one which we imagine as possible or contingent. But to
imagine an object as free can be nothing else than to imagine it simply,
while we know not the causes by which it was determined to action. An
emotion, therefore, towards an object which we simply imagine is, other
things being equal, greater than towards one which we imagine as
necessary, possible, or contingent, and consequently greatest of all.
The mind understands all things to be necessary and determined by an
infinite chain of causes to existence and action, and therefore so far
enables itself to suffer less from the emotions which arise from these
things, and to be less affected towards them.
The more this knowledge that things are necessary is applied to
individual things which we imagine more distinctly and more vividly, the
greater is this power of the mind over the emotions--a fact to which
experience also testifies. For we see that sorrow for the loss of
anything good is diminished if the person who has lost it considers that
it could not by any possibility have been preserved. So also we see that
nobody pities an infant because it does not know how to speak, walk, or
reason, and lives so many years not conscious, as it were, of itself.
But if a number of human beings were born adult, and only a few here and
there were born infants, every one would pity the infants, because we
should then consider infancy not as a thing natural and necessary, but
as a defect or fault of Nature. Many other facts of a similar kind we
might observe.
We do not contemplate an object as absent by reason of the emotion by
which we imagine it, but by reason of the fact that the body is affected
with another modification, which excludes the existence of that object.
The emotion, therefore, which is related to an object which we
contemplate as absent, is not of such a nature as to overcome the other
actions and power of man, but, on the contrary, is of such a nature that
it can in some way be restrained by those modifications which exclude
the existence of its external cause. But the emotion which arises from
reason is necessarily related to the common properties of things, which
we always contemplate as present for nothing can exist which excludes
their present existence, and which we always imagine in the same way.
This emotion, therefore, always remains the same, and consequently the
emotions which are contrary to it, and which are not maintained by their
external cause, must more and more accommodate themselves to it until
they are no longer contrary to it. So far, therefore, the emotion which
springs from reason is the stronger.
A number of simultaneous causes can do more than if they were fewer, and
therefore the greater the number of the simultaneous causes by which an
emotion is excited, the greater it is.
An emotion is bad or injurious only in so far as it hinders the mind
from thinking and therefore that emotion by which the mind is determined
to the contemplation of a number of objects at the same time is less
injurious than another emotion equally great which holds the mind in the
contemplation of one object alone or of a few objects, so that it cannot
think of others. Again, since the essence of the mind, that is to say,
its power, consists in thought alone, the mind suffers less through an
emotion by which it is determined to the contemplation of a number of
objects at the same time than through an emotion equally great which
holds it occupied in the contemplation of one object alone or of a few
objects. Finally, this emotion, in so far as it is related to a number
of external causes, is therefore less towards each.
_The Power of the Intellect Over the Emotions_
I
_General Principles_
The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and
connection of things, and _vice versa_, the order and connection of
things is the same as the order and connection of ideas. Therefore, as
the order and connection of ideas in the mind is according to the order
and connection of the modifications of the body it follows _vice versa_,
that the order and connection of the modifications of the body is
according to the order and connection in the mind of the thoughts and
ideas of things.
If we detach an emotion of the mind from the thought of an external
cause and connect it with other thoughts, then the love or hatred
towards the external cause and the fluctuations of the mind which arise
from these emotions will be destroyed.
An emotion which is a passion is a confused idea. If, therefore, we form
a clear and distinct idea of this emotion, the idea will not be
distinguished--except by reason--from this emotion, in so far as the
emotion is related to the mind alone, and therefore the emotion will
cease to be a passion.
In proportion, then, as we know an emotion better is it more within our
control, and the less does the mind suffer from it.
Those things which are common to all cannot be otherwise than adequately
conceived and therefore there is no modification of the body of which we
cannot form some clear and distinct conception.
Hence it follows that there is no emotion of which we cannot form some
clear and distinct conception. For an emotion is an idea of a
modification of the body, and this idea therefore must involve some
clear and distinct conception.
Since nothing exists from which some effect does not follow, and since
we understand clearly and distinctly everything which follows from an
idea which is adequate in us, it is a necessary consequence that every
one has the power, partly at least, if not absolutely, of understanding
clearly and distinctly himself and his emotions, and consequently of
bringing it to pass that he suffers less from them. We have therefore
mainly to strive to acquire a clear and distinct knowledge as far as
possible of each emotion, so that the mind may be led to pass from the
emotion to think those things which it perceives clearly and distinctly,
and with which it is entirely satisfied, and to strive also that the
emotion may be separated from the thought of an external cause and
connected with true thoughts. Thus not only love, hatred, etc., will be
destroyed, but also the appetites or desires to which the emotion gives
rise cannot be excessive. For it is above everything to be observed
that the appetite by which a man is said to act is one and the same
appetite as that by which he is said to suffer. For example, we have
shown that human nature is so constituted that every one desires that
other people should live according to his way of thinking, a desire
which in a man who is not guided by reason is a passion which is called
ambition, and is not very different from pride; while, on the other
hand, in a man who lives according to the dictates of reason it is an
action or virtue which is called piety. In the same manner, all the
appetites or desires are passions only in so far as they arise from
inadequate ideas, and are classed among the virtues whenever they are
excited or begotten by adequate ideas; for all the desires by which we
are determined to any action may arise either from adequate or
inadequate ideas. To return, therefore, to the point from which we set
out: there is no remedy within our power which can be conceived more
excellent for the emotions than that which consists in true knowledge of
them, since the mind possesses no other power than that of thinking and
forming adequate ideas, as we have shown above.
II
_The Natural Basis of Rational Control_
The greater the number of objects to which an image or emotion is
related, the greater is the number of causes by which it can be excited
and cherished. All these causes the mind contemplates simultaneously by
means of the emotion (by hypothesis), and therefore the more constant is
the emotion, or the more frequently does it present itself, and the
more does it occupy the mind.
Things which we clearly and distinctly understand are either the common
properties of things or what are deduced from them, and consequently are
more frequently excited in us; and therefore it is easier for us to
contemplate other things together with these which we clearly and
distinctly understand than with any others, and consequently it is
easier to connect things with these which we clearly and distinctly
understand than with any others.
The greater the number of other things with which any image is
connected, the more frequently does it present itself. For the greater
the number of other things with which an image is connected, the greater
is the number of causes by which it may be excited.
There is no modification of the body of which the mind cannot form some
clear and distinct conception and therefore it can cause all the
modifications of the body to be related to the idea of God.
III
_The Function of the Intellectual Order_
The emotions which are contrary to our nature, that is to say, which are
evil, are evil so far as they hinder the mind from understanding. So
long, therefore, as we are not agitated by emotions which are contrary
to our nature, so long the power of the mind by which it endeavors to
understand things is not hindered, and therefore so long does it possess
the power of forming clear and distinct ideas, and of deducing them the
one from the other. So long, consequently, do we possess the power of
arranging and connecting the modifications of the body according to the
order of the intellect.
Through this power of properly arranging and connecting the
modifications of the body we can prevent ourselves from being easily
affected by evil emotions. For a greater power is required to restrain
emotions which are arranged and connected according to the order of the
intellect than is required to restrain those which are uncertain and
unsettled. The best thing, therefore, we can do, so long as we lack a
perfect knowledge of our emotions, is to conceive a right rule of life,
or sure maxims (_dogmata_) of life--to commit these latter to memory,
and constantly to apply them to the particular cases which frequently
meet us in life, so that our imagination may be widely affected by them,
and they may always be ready to hand. For example, amongst the maxims of
life we have placed this, that hatred is to be conquered by love or
generosity, and is not to be met with hatred in return. But in order
that we may always have this prescript of reason in readiness whenever
it will be of service, we must think over and often meditate upon the
common injuries inflicted by men, and consider how and in what way they
may best be repelled by generosity; for thus we shall connect the image
of injury with the imagination of this maxim, and it will be at hand
whenever an injury is offered to us. If we also continually have regard
to our own true profit, and the good which follows from mutual
friendship and common fellowship, and remember that the highest peace of
mind arises from a right rule of life, and also that man, like other
things, acts according to the necessity of Nature, then the injury or
the hatred which usually arises from that necessity will occupy but the
least part of the imagination, and will be easily overcome: or supposing
that the anger which generally arises from the greatest injuries is not
so easily overcome, it will nevertheless be overcome, although not
without fluctuation of mind, in a far shorter space of time than would
have been necessary if we had not possessed those maxims on which we had
thus meditated beforehand.
Concerning strength of mind, we must reflect in the same way for the
purpose of getting rid of fear, that is to say, we must often enumerate
and imagine the common dangers of life, and think upon the manner in
which they can best be avoided and overcome by presence of mind and
courage. It is to be observed, however, that in the ordering of our
thoughts and images we must always look to those qualities which in each
thing are good, so that we may be determined to action always by an
emotion of joy.
For example, if a man sees that he pursues glory too eagerly, let him
think on its proper use, for what end it is to be followed, and by what
means it can be obtained; but let him not think upon its abuse and
vanity, and on the inconstancy of men, and things of this sort, about
which no one thinks unless through disease of mind. For with such
thoughts do those who are ambitious greatly torment themselves when they
despair of obtaining the honors for which they are striving; and while
they vomit forth rage, wish to be thought wise. Indeed it is certain
that those covet glory the most who are loudest in declaiming against
its abuse and the vanity of the world. Nor is this a peculiarity of the
ambitious, but is common to all to whom fortune is adverse and who are
impotent in mind; for we see that a poor and avaricious man is never
weary of speaking about the abuse of money and the vices of the rich,
thereby achieving nothing save to torment himself and show to others
that he is unable to bear with equanimity not only his own poverty but
also the wealth of others. So also a man who has not been well deceived
by his mistress thinks of nothing but the fickleness of women, their
faithlessness, and their other oft-proclaimed failing--all of which he
forgets as soon as he is taken into favor by his mistress again. He,
therefore, who desires to govern his emotions and appetites from a love
of liberty alone will strive as much as he can to know virtues and their
causes, and to fill his mind with that joy which springs from a true
knowledge of them. Least of all will he desire to contemplate the vices
of men and disparage men, or to delight in a false show of liberty. He
who will diligently observe these things (and they are not difficult),
and will continue to practice them, will assuredly in a short space of
time be able for the most part to direct his actions in accordance with
the command of reason.
IV
_Summary_
I have, in what has preceded, included all the remedies for the
emotions, that is to say, everything which the mind, considered in
itself alone, can do against them. It appears therefrom that the power
of the mind over the emotions consists--
1. In the knowledge itself of the emotions.
2. In the separation by the mind of the emotions from the thought of an
external cause, which we imagine confusedly.
3. In duration, in which the emotions which are related to objects we
understand surpass those related to objects conceived in a mutilated or
confused manner.
4. In the multitude of causes by which the emotions which are related to
the common properties of things or to God are nourished.
5. In the order in which the mind can arrange its emotions and connect
them one with the other.
But that this power of the mind over the emotions may be better
understood, it is to be carefully observed that we call the emotions
great when we compare the emotion of one man with that of another, and
see that one man is agitated more than another by the same emotion, or
when we compare the emotions of one and the same man with one another,
and discover that he is affected or moved more by one emotion than by
another.
For the power of any emotion is limited by the power of the external
cause as compared with our own power. But the power of the mind is
limited solely by knowledge, whilst impotence or passion is estimated
solely by privation of knowledge, or, in other words, by that through
which ideas are called inadequate; and it therefore follows that that
mind suffers the most whose largest part consists of inadequate ideas,
so that it is distinguished rather by what it suffers than by what it
does, while, on the contrary, that mind acts the most whose largest part
consists of adequate ideas, so that although it may possess as many
inadequate ideas as the first, it is nevertheless distinguished rather
by those which belong to human virtue than by those which are a sign of
human impotence. Again, it is to be observed that our sorrows and
misfortunes mainly proceed from too much love towards an object which is
subject to many changes, and which we can never possess. For no one is
troubled or anxious about any object he does not love, neither do
wrongs, suspicions, hatreds, etc., arise except from love towards
objects of which no one can be truly the possessor.
From all this we easily conceive what is the power which clear and
distinct knowledge, and especially that third kind of knowledge whose
foundation is the knowledge itself of God, possesses over the emotions;
the power, namely, by which it is able, in so far as they are passions,
if not actually to destroy them, at least to make them constitute the
smallest part of the mind. Moreover, it begets a love towards an
immutable and eternal object of which we are really partakers; a love
which therefore cannot be vitiated by the defects which are in common
love, but which can always become greater and greater, occupy the
largest part of the mind, and thoroughly affect it.
I have now concluded all that I had to say relating to this present
life. For any one who will attend to what has been urged will easily be
able to see the truth of what I said--that in these few words all the
remedies for the emotions are comprehended. It is time, therefore, that
I should now pass to the consideration of those matters which appertain
to the duration of the mind without relation to the body.