OF HUMAN BLESSEDNESS AND THE ETERNITY OF THE MIND
_Human Blessedness: The Intellectual Love of God_
I
The third kind of knowledge proceeds from an adequate idea of certain
attributes of God to an adequate knowledge of the essence of things; and
the more we understand things in this manner, the more we understand
God; and therefore the highest virtue of the mind, that is to say, the
power or nature of the mind, or the highest effort, is to understand
things by the third kind of knowledge.
The better the mind is adapted to understand things by the third kind of
knowledge, the more it desires to understand them by this kind of
knowledge.
The highest virtue of the mind is to know God, or to understand things
by the third kind of knowledge. This virtue is greater the more the mind
knows things by this kind of knowledge, and therefore he who knows
things by this kind of knowledge passes to the highest human perfection,
and consequently is affected with the highest joy, which is accompanied
with the idea of himself and his own virtue; and therefore from this
kind of knowledge arises the highest possible peace of mind.
The effort or the desire to know things by the third kind of knowledge
cannot arise from the first kind, but may arise from the second kind of
knowledge. This proposition is self-evident. For everything that we
clearly and distinctly understand, we understand either through itself
or through something which is conceived through itself; or, in other
words, ideas which are clear and distinct in us, or which are related to
the third kind of knowledge, cannot follow from mutilated and confused
ideas, which are related to the first kind of knowledge, but from
adequate ideas, that is to say, from the second and third kinds of
knowledge.
II
Eternity is the very essence of God, in so far as that essence involves
necessary existence. To conceive things therefore under the form of
eternity, is to conceive them in so far as they are conceived through
the essence of God as actually existing things, or in so far as through
the essence of God they involve existence. Therefore our mind, in so far
as it conceives itself and its body under the form of eternity,
necessarily has a knowledge of God, and knows that it is in God and is
conceived through Him.
We delight in whatever we understand by the third kind of knowledge, and
our delight is accompanied with the idea of God as its cause.
From the third kind of knowledge necessarily springs the intellectual
love of God. For from this kind of knowledge arises joy attended with
the idea of God as its cause, that is to say, the love of God, not in so
far as we imagine Him as present, but in so far as we understand that
He is eternal; and that is what I call the intellectual love of God.
He who clearly and distinctly understands himself and his emotions
rejoices, and his joy is attended with the idea of God, therefore he
loves God, and (by the same reasoning) loves Him better the better he
understands himself and his emotions.
This intellectual love necessarily follows from the nature of the mind,
in so far as it is considered, through the nature of God, as an eternal
truth. If there were anything, therefore, contrary to this love, it
would be contrary to the truth, and consequently whatever might be able
to negate this love would be able to make the true false, which, as is
self-evident, is absurd. There exists, therefore, nothing in Nature
contrary to this intellectual love, or which can negate it.
III
This love to God above everything else ought to occupy the mind, for
this love is connected with all the modifications of the body, by all of
which it is cherished.
The idea of God which is in us is adequate and perfect, and therefore in
so far as we contemplate God do we act and consequently no sorrow can
exist with the accompanying idea of God; that is to say, no one can hate
God.
Love to God cannot be turned into hatred. But some may object, that if
we understand God to be the cause of all things, we do for that very
reason consider Him to be the cause of sorrow. But I reply, that in so
far as we understand the causes of sorrow, it ceases to be a passion,
that is to say, it ceases to be sorrow; and therefore in so far as we
understand God to be the cause of sorrow do we rejoice.
This love to God is the highest good which we can seek according to the
dictate of reason; is common to all men; and we desire that all may
enjoy it. It cannot, therefore, be sullied by the emotion of envy, nor
by that of jealousy, but, on the contrary, it must be the more
strengthened the more people we imagine to rejoice in it.
It is possible to show in the same manner that there is no emotion
directly contrary to this love and able to destroy it, and so we may
conclude that this love to God is the most constant of all the emotions,
and that, in so far as it is related to the body, it cannot be destroyed
unless with the body itself. What its nature is, in so far as it is
related to the mind alone, we shall see hereafter.
IV
All ideas, in so far as they are related to God, are true; that is to
say, are adequate, and therefore, (by the general definition of the
Emotions), God is free from passions. Again, God can neither pass to a
greater nor to a less perfection, and therefore He cannot be affected
with any emotion of joy or sorrow.
He who loves God cannot strive that God should love him in return. If a
man were to strive after this, he would desire that God, whom he loves,
should not be God, and consequently he would desire to be sad, which is
absurd.
V
God is absolutely infinite, that is to say, the nature of God delights
in infinite perfection accompanied with the idea of Himself, that is to
say, with the idea of Himself as cause, and this is what we have called
intellectual love. God loves Himself with an infinite intellectual love.
The intellectual love of the mind towards God is the very love with
which He loves Himself, not in so far as He is infinite, but in so far
as He can be manifested through the essence of the human mind,
considered under the form of eternity; that is to say, the intellectual
love of the mind towards God is part of the infinite love with which God
loves Himself.
Hence it follows that God, in so far as He loves Himself, loves men, and
consequently that the love of God towards men and the intellectual love
of the mind towards God are one and the same thing.
Hence it follows that God, in so far as He loves Himself, loves men, and
consequently that the love of the mind towards God are one and the same
thing.
Hence we clearly understand that our salvation, or blessedness, or
liberty consists in a constant and eternal love towards God, or in the
love of God towards men. This love or blessedness is called Glory in the
sacred writings, and not without reason. For whether it be related to
God or to the mind, it may properly be called repose of mind, which is,
in truth, not distinguished from glory. For in so far as it is related
to God, it is joy (granting that it is allowable to use this word),
accompanied with the idea of Himself, and it is the same thing when it
is related to the mind.
Again, since the essence of our mind consists in knowledge alone, whose
beginning and foundation is God, it is clear to us in what manner and by
what method our mind, with regard both to essence and existence, follows
from the divine nature, and continually depends upon God. I thought it
worth while for me to notice this here, in order that I might show, by
this example, what that knowledge of individual objects which I have
called intuitive or of the third kind is able to do, and how much more
potent it is than the universal knowledge, which I have called knowledge
of the second kind. For although I have shown generally that all things,
and consequently also the human mind, depend upon God both with regard
to existence and essence, yet that demonstration, although legitimate,
and placed beyond the possibility of a doubt, does not, nevertheless, so
affect our mind as a proof from the essence itself of any individual
object which we say depends upon God. The more we understand individual
objects, the more we understand God.
_The Eternity of the Mind_
I
The mind does not express the actual existence of its body, nor does it
conceive as actual the modifications of the body, except while the body
exists, and consequently it conceives no body as actually existing
except while its own body exists. It can therefore imagine nothing, nor
can it recollect anything that is past, except while the body exists.
An imagination is an idea by which the mind contemplates any object as
present. This idea nevertheless indicates the present constitution of
the human body rather than the nature of the external object. An
emotion, therefore (by the general definition of the Emotions), is an
imagination in so far as it indicates the present constitution of the
body, and therefore the mind, only so long as the body exists, is
subject to emotions which are related to passions.
Hence it follows that no love except intellectual love is eternal.
If we look at the common opinion of men, we shall see that they are
indeed conscious of the eternity of their minds, but they confound it
with duration, and attribute it to imagination or memory, which they
believe remain after death.
God is not only the cause of the existence of this or that human body,
but also of its essence, which therefore must necessarily be conceived
through the essence of God itself and by a certain eternal necessity.
This conception, moreover, must necessarily exist in God. In God there
necessarily exists an idea which expresses the essence of this or that
human body under the form of eternity.
In God there necessarily exists a conception or idea which expresses the
essence of the human body. This conception or idea is therefore
necessarily something which pertains to the essence of the human mind.
But we ascribe to the human mind no duration which can be limited by
time, unless in so far as it expresses the actual existence of the body,
which is manifested through duration, and which can be limited by time,
that is to say, we cannot ascribe duration to the mind except while the
body exists.
But, nevertheless, since this something is that which is conceived by a
certain eternal necessity through the essence itself of God, this
something which pertains to the essence of the mind will necessarily be
eternal.
This idea which expresses the essence of the body under the form of
eternity is, as we have said, a certain mode of thought which pertains
to the essence of the mind, and is necessarily eternal. It is
impossible, nevertheless, that we should recollect that we existed
before the body, because there are no traces of any such existence in
the body, and also because eternity cannot be defined by time, or have
any relationship to it. Nevertheless we feel and know by experience that
we are eternal. For the mind is no less sensible of those things which
it conceives through intelligence than of those which it remembers, for
demonstrations are the eyes of the mind by which it sees and observes
things.
Although, therefore, we do not recollect that we existed before the
body, we feel that our mind, in so far as it involves the essence of the
body under the form of eternity, is eternal, and that this existence of
the mind cannot be limited by time nor manifested through duration. Only
in so far, therefore, as it involves the actual existence of the body
can the mind be said to possess duration, and its existence be limited
by a fixed time, and so far only has it the power of determining the
existence of things in time, and of conceiving them under the form of
duration.
II
In so far as the mind conceives the present existence of its body does
it conceive duration which can be determined in time, and so far only
has it the power of conceiving things in relation to time. But eternity
cannot be manifested through duration, therefore the mind so far has not
the power of conceiving things under the form of eternity: but because
it is the nature of reason to conceive things under the form of
eternity, and because it also pertains to the nature of the mind to
conceive the essence of the body under the form of eternity, and
excepting these two things nothing else pertains to the nature of the
mind, therefore this power of conceiving things under the form of
eternity does not pertain to the mind except in so far as it conceives
the essence of the body under the form of eternity.
Things are conceived by us as actual in two ways; either in so far as we
conceive them to exist with relation to a fixed time and place, or in so
far as we conceive them to be contained in God, and to follow from the
necessity of the divine nature. But those things which are conceived in
this second way as true or real we conceive under the form of eternity,
and their ideas involve the eternal and infinite essence of God.
The mind conceives nothing under the form of eternity, unless in so far
as it conceives the essence of its body under the form of eternity, that
is to say, unless in so far as it is eternal. Therefore in so far as the
mind is eternal it has a knowledge of God, which is necessarily
adequate, and therefore in so far as it is eternal it is fitted to know
all those things which can follow from this knowledge of God, that is to
say, it is fitted to know things by the third kind of knowledge of
which, in so far as the mind is eternal, it is the adequate or formal
cause.
As each person therefore becomes stronger in this kind of knowledge, the
more is he conscious of himself and of God; that is to say, the more
perfect and the happier he is, a truth which will still more clearly
appear from what follows. Here, however, it is to be observed, that
although we are now certain that the mind is eternal in so far as it
conceives things under the form of eternity, yet, in order that what we
wish to prove may be more easily explained and better understood, we
shall consider the mind, as we have hitherto done, as if it had just
begun to be, and had just begun to understand things under the form of
eternity. This we can do without any risk of error, provided only we are
careful to conclude nothing except from clear premises.
The third kind of knowledge is eternal, and therefore the love which
springs from it is necessarily eternal.
Although this love to God has no beginning, it nevertheless has all the
perfections of love, just as if it had originated. Nor is there here any
difference, excepting that the mind has eternally possessed these same
perfections which we imagined as now accruing to it, and has possessed
them with the accompanying idea of God as the eternal cause. And if joy
consist in the passage to a greater perfection, blessedness must indeed
consist in this, that the mind is endowed with perfection itself.
III
The essence of the mind consists in knowledge. The more things,
therefore, the mind knows by the second and third kinds of knowledge,
the greater is that part which abides and consequently the greater is
that part which is not touched by emotions which are contrary to our
nature, that is to say, which are evil. The more things, therefore, the
mind understands by the second and third kinds of knowledge, the greater
is that part which remains unharmed, and the less consequently does it
suffer from the emotions.
We are thus enabled to understand that death is by so much the less
injurious to us as the clear and distinct knowledge of the mind is
greater, and consequently as the mind loves God more. Again, since from
the third kind of knowledge there arises the highest possible peace, it
follows that it is possible for the human mind to be of such a nature
that that part of it which we have shown perishes with its body, in
comparison with the part of it which remains, is of no consequence. But
more fully upon this subject presently.
He who possesses a body fitted for doing many things is least of all
agitated by those emotions which are evil, that is to say, by emotions
which are contrary to our nature, and therefore he possesses the power
of arranging and connecting the modifications of the body according to
the order of the intellect, and consequently of causing all the
modifications of the body to be related to the idea of God; in
consequence of which he is affected with a love to God, which must
occupy or form the greatest part of his mind, and therefore he
possesses a mind of which the greatest part is eternal.
Inasmuch as human bodies are fit for many things, we cannot doubt the
possibility of their possessing such a nature that they may be related
to minds which have a large knowledge of themselves and of God, and
whose greatest or principal part is eternal, so that they scarcely fear
death. To understand this more clearly, it is to be here considered that
we live in constant change, and that according as we change for the
better or the worse we are called happy or unhappy. For he who passes
from infancy or childhood to death is called unhappy, and, on the other
hand, we consider ourselves happy if we can pass through the whole
period of life with a sound mind in a sound body. Moreover, he who, like
an infant or child, possesses a body fit for very few things, and,
almost altogether dependent on external causes, has a mind which,
considered in itself alone, is almost entirely unconscious of itself, of
God, and of objects. On the other hand, he who possesses a body fit for
many things possesses a mind which, considered in itself alone, is
largely conscious of itself, of God, and of objects. In this life,
therefore, it is our chief endeavor to change the body of infancy, so
far as its nature permits and is conducive thereto, into another body
which is fitted for many things, and which is related to a mind
conscious as much as possible of itself, of God, and of objects; so that
everything which is related to its memory or imagination, in comparison
with the intellect is scarcely of any moment, as I have already said.
The more perfect a thing is, the more reality it possesses, and
consequently the more it acts and the less it suffers. Inversely also it
may be demonstrated in the same way that the more a thing acts the more
perfect it is. Hence it follows that that part of the mind which abides,
whether great or small, is more perfect than the other part. For the
part of the mind which is eternal is the intellect, through which alone
we are said to act, but that part which, as we have shown, perishes, is
the imagination itself, through which alone we are said to suffer.
Therefore that part which abides, whether great or small, is more
perfect than the latter.
These are the things I proposed to prove concerning the mind, in so far
as it is considered without relation to the existence of the body, and
from these, and other propositions, it is evident that our mind, in so
far as it understands, is an eternal mode of thought, which is
determined by another eternal mode of thought, and this again by
another, and so on _ad infinitum_, so that all taken together form the
eternal and infinite intellect of God.
_Conclusion_
The primary and sole foundation of virtue or of the proper conduct of
life is to seek our own profit. But in order to determine what reason
prescribes as profitable, we had no regard to the eternity of the mind.
Therefore, although we were at that time ignorant that the mind is
eternal, we considered as of primary importance those things which we
have shown are related to strength of mind and generosity; and
therefore, even if we were now ignorant of the eternity of the mind, we
should consider those commands of reason as of primary importance.
The creed of the multitude seems to be different from this; for most
persons seem to believe that they are free in so far as it is allowed
them to obey their lusts, and that they give up a portion of their
rights, in so far as they are bound to live according to the commands of
divine law. Piety, therefore, and religion,[42] and absolutely all those
things that are related to greatness of soul, they believe to be burdens
which they hope to be able to lay aside after death; hoping also to
receive some reward for their bondage, that is to say, for _their_ piety
and religion. It is not merely this hope, however, but also and chiefly
fear of dreadful punishments after death, by which they are induced to
live according to the commands of divine law, that is to say, as far as
their feebleness and impotent mind will permit; and if this hope and
fear were not present to them, but if they, on the contrary, believed
that minds perish with the body, and that there is no prolongation of
life for miserable creatures exhausted with the burden of their piety,
they would return to ways of their own liking. They would prefer to let
everything be controlled by their own passions, and to obey fortune
rather than themselves.
This seems to me as absurd as if a man, because he does not believe that
he will be able to feed his body with good food to all eternity, should
desire to satiate himself with poisonous and deadly drugs; or as if,
because he sees that the mind is not eternal or immortal, he should
therefore prefer to be mad and to live without reason--absurdities so
great that they scarcely deserve to be repeated.
Blessedness consists in love towards God, which arises from the third
kind of knowledge, and this love, therefore, must be related to the mind
in so far as it acts. Blessedness, therefore, is virtue itself. Again,
the more the mind delights in this divine love or blessedness, the more
it understands, that is to say, the greater is the power it has over its
emotions and the less it suffers from emotions which are evil.
Therefore, it is because the mind delights in this divine love or
blessedness that it possesses the power of restraining the lusts; and
because the power of man to restrain the emotions is in the intellect
alone, no one, therefore, delights in blessedness because he has
restrained his emotions, but, on the contrary, the power of restraining
his lusts springs from blessedness itself.
I have finished everything I wished to explain concerning the power of
the mind over the emotions and concerning its liberty. From what has
been said we see what is the strength of the wise man, and how much he
surpasses the ignorant who is driven forward by lust alone. For the
ignorant man is not only agitated by external causes in many ways, and
never enjoys true peace of soul, but lives also ignorant, as it were,
both of God and of things, and as soon as he ceases to suffer ceases
also to be. On the other hand, the wise man, in so far as he is
considered as such, is scarcely ever moved in his mind, but, being
conscious by a certain eternal necessity of himself, of God, and of
things, never ceases to be, and always enjoys true peace of soul.
If the way which, as I have shown, leads hither seem very difficult, it
can nevertheless be found. It must indeed be difficult since it is so
seldom discovered; for if salvation lay ready to hand and could be
discovered without great labor, how could it be possible that it should
be neglected almost by everybody? But all noble things are as difficult
as they are rare.
FOOTNOTES:
[42] Everything which we desire and do, of which we are the cause in so
far as we possess an idea of God, or in so far as we know God, I refer
to _Religion_. The desire of doing well which is born in us, because we
live according to the guidance of reason, I call _Piety_.
APPENDIX
Spinoza's _Ethics_, demonstrated in geometrical order, consists of five
parts; from these parts the following selections have been taken:
Part I. _Of God_
Definitions, Axioms, and the Appendix.
Propositions: 11; 15-18; 26; 27; 29; 33.
Part II. _Of the Nature and Origin of the Mind_
Preface, Definitions, and Axioms.
Propositions: 1; 4-7; 11-13; 15-18; 24-26;
28-32; 35; 36; 38-49.
Part III. _Of the Origin and Nature of the Emotions_
Preface, Definitions, and Postulates; Definitions
of the Emotions.
Propositions: 1; 2; 4; 6; 9; 11; 14; 16;
18; 25; 27-32; 40; 41; 43-46; 48-51; 56; 57.
Part IV. _Of Human Bondage or Of the Strength of the
Emotions_
Preface, Definitions, Axioms, and the Appendix.
Propositions: 3-9; 11-27; 38; 39; 41-47;
50-54; 56-58.
Part V. _Of the Power of the Intellect or Of Human
Liberty_
Preface and Axioms.
Propositions: 1-28; 30-42.
THE END
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| Transcriber's Notes |
| |
| Page vii: "affectiones" _sic_ |
| Page xxvi: "villified" amended to "vilified" |
| Page xxvii: "chose" amended to "choose" (twice); |
| "forego" _sic_ |
| Page xxxvi: "antedeluvian" amended to "antediluvian" |
| Page lix: "goverance" amended to "governance" |
| Page 1: "oursleves" amended to "ourselves" |
| Page 6: "superstitition" amended to "superstition" |
| Page 9: "conprehension" amended to "comprehension" |
| Page 26: "chose" amended to "choose" |
| Page 28: "interpretating" amended to "interpreting" |
| Page 45: "phophet" amended to "prophet" |
| Page 51: "came" amended to "come" |
| Page 69: "patriachs" amended to "patriarchs" |
| Page 84: "refer" amended to "prefer" |
| Page 135: "appetities" amended to "appetites" |
| Page 204: "thy" amended to "they" and "thir" amended to |
| "their" |
| Page 229: "Explanations" amended to "Explanation" |
| Page 276: "others" amended to "other" |
| Page 284: "mutitude" amended to "multitude" |
| Page 362: "propositon" amended to "proposition" |
| |
| Abbreviations in footnotes and references have been |
| standardized. |
| |
| Accents and hyphenation have generally been standardised. |
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End of Project Gutenberg's The Philosophy of Spinoza, by Baruch de Spinoza