FREEDOM OF THOUGHT AND SPEECH[41]
If men's minds were as easily controlled as their tongues, every king
would sit safely on his throne, and government by compulsion would
cease; for every subject would shape his life according to the
intentions of his rulers, and would esteem a thing true or false, good
or evil, just or unjust, in obedience to their dictates. However, ... no
man's mind can possibly lie wholly at the disposition of another, for no
one can willingly transfer his natural right of free reason and
judgment, or be compelled so to do. For this reason government which
attempts to control minds is accounted tyrannical, and it is considered
an abuse of sovereignty and a usurpation of the rights of subjects to
seek to prescribe what shall be accepted as true, or rejected as false,
or what opinions should actuate men in their worship of God. All these
questions fall within a man's natural right, which he cannot abdicate
even with his own consent.
I admit that the judgment can be biased in many ways, and to an almost
incredible degree, so that while exempt from direct external control it
may be so dependent on another man's words, that it may fitly be said to
be ruled by him; but although this influence is carried to great
lengths, it has never gone so far as to invalidate the statement that
every man's understanding is his own, and that brains are as diverse as
palates.
Moses, not by fraud, but by Divine virtue, gained such a hold over the
popular judgment that he was accounted superhuman, and believed to speak
and act through the inspiration of the Deity; nevertheless, even he
could not escape murmurs and evil interpretations. How much less then
can other monarchs avoid them! Yet such unlimited power, if it exists at
all, must belong to a monarch, and least of all to a democracy, where
the whole or a great part of the people wield authority collectively.
This is a fact which I think every one can explain for himself.
However unlimited, therefore, the power of a sovereign may be, however
implicitly it is trusted as the exponent of law and religion, it can
never prevent men from forming judgments according to their intellect,
or being influenced by any given emotion. It is true that it has the
right to treat as enemies all men whose opinions do not, on all
subjects, entirely coincide with its own; but we are not discussing its
strict rights, but its proper course of action. I grant that it has the
right to rule in the most violent manner, and to put citizens to death
for very trivial causes, but no one supposes it can do this with the
approval of sound judgment. Nay, inasmuch as such things cannot be done
without extreme peril to itself, we may even deny that it has the
absolute power to do them, or, consequently, the absolute right; for the
rights of the sovereign are limited by his power.
Since, therefore, no one can abdicate his freedom of judgment and
feeling; since every man is by indefeasible natural right the master of
his own thoughts, it follows that men, thinking in diverse and
contradictory fashions, cannot, without disastrous results, be compelled
to speak only according to the dictates of the supreme power. Not even
the most experienced, to say nothing of the multitude, know how to keep
silence. Men's common failing is to confide their plans to others,
though there be need for secrecy, so that a government would be most
harsh which deprived the individual of his freedom of saying and
teaching what he thought; and would be moderate if such freedom were
granted. Still we cannot deny that authority may be as much injured by
words as by actions. Hence, although the freedom we are discussing
cannot be entirely denied to subjects, its unlimited concession would be
most baneful; we must, therefore, now inquire, how far such freedom can
and ought to be conceded without danger to the peace of the state, or
the power of the rulers.
It follows, plainly, from the explanation given above, of the
foundations of a state, that the ultimate aim of government is not to
rule, or restrain by fear, nor to exact obedience, but, contrariwise, to
free every man from fear that he may live in all possible security; in
other words, to strengthen his natural right to exist and work without
injury to himself or others.
No, the object of government is not to change men from rational beings
into beasts or puppets, but to enable them to develop their minds and
bodies in security, and to employ their reason unshackled; neither
showing hatred, anger or deceit, nor watched with the eyes of jealousy
and injustice. In fact, the true aim of government is liberty.
Now we have seen that in forming a state the power of making laws must
either be vested in the body of the citizens, or in a portion of them,
or in one man. For, although men's free judgments are very diverse, each
one thinking that he alone knows everything, and although complete
unanimity of feeling and speech is out of the question, it is impossible
to preserve peace unless individuals abdicate their right of acting
entirely on their own judgment. Therefore, the individual justly cedes
the right of free action, though not of free reason and judgment; no one
can act against the authorities without danger to the state, though his
feelings and judgment may be at variance therewith; he may even speak
against them, provided that he does so from rational conviction, not
from fraud, anger or hatred, and provided that he does not attempt to
introduce any change on his private authority.
For instance, supposing a man shows that a law is repugnant to sound
reason, and should therefore be repealed; if he submits his opinion to
the judgment of the authorities (who alone have the right of making and
repealing laws), and meanwhile acts in nowise contrary to that law, he
has deserved well of the state, and has behaved as a good citizen
should; but if he accuses the authorities of injustice, and stirs up the
people against them, or if he seditiously strives to abrogate the law
without their consent, he is a mere agitator and rebel.
Thus we see how an individual may declare and teach what he believes,
without injury to the authority of his rulers, or to the public peace;
namely, by leaving in their hands the entire power of legislation as it
affects action, and by doing nothing against their laws, though he be
compelled often to act in contradiction to what he believes, and openly
feels, to be best.
Such a course can be taken without detriment to justice and dutifulness,
nay, it is the one which a just and dutiful man would adopt. We have
shown that justice is dependent on the laws of the authorities, so that
no one who contravenes their accepted decrees can be just, while the
highest regard for duty, as we have pointed out, is exercised in
maintaining public peace and tranquillity. These could not be preserved
if every man were to live as he pleased. Therefore it is no less than
undutiful for a man to act contrary to his country's laws, for if the
practice became universal the ruin of states would necessarily follow.
Hence, so long as a man acts in obedience to the laws of his rulers, he
in nowise contravenes his reason, for in obedience to reason he
transferred the right of controlling his actions from his own hands to
theirs. This doctrine we can confirm from actual custom, for in a
conference of great and small powers, schemes are seldom carried
unanimously, yet all unite in carrying out what is decided on, whether
they voted for or against. But I return to my proposition.
From the fundamental notions of a state, we have discovered how a man
may exercise free judgment without detriment to the supreme power: from
the same premises we can no less easily determine what opinions would be
seditious. Evidently those which by their very nature nullify the
compact by which the right of free action was ceded. For instance, a
man who holds that the supreme power has no rights over him, or that
promises ought not to be kept, or that every one should live as he
pleases, or other doctrines of this nature in direct opposition to the
above-mentioned contract, is seditious, not so much from his actual
opinions and judgment, as from the deeds which they involve; for he who
maintains such theories abrogates the contract which tacitly, or openly,
he made with his rulers. Other opinions which do not involve acts
violating the contract, such as revenge, anger, and the like, are not
seditious, unless it be in some corrupt state, where superstitious and
ambitious persons, unable to endure men of learning, are so popular with
the multitude that their word is more valued than the law.
However, I do not deny that there are some doctrines which, while they
are apparently only concerned with abstract truths and falsehoods, are
yet propounded and published with unworthy motives.... Reason should
nevertheless remain unshackled. If we hold to the principle that a man's
loyalty to the state should be judged, like his loyalty to God, from his
actions only--namely, from his charity towards his neighbors; we cannot
doubt that the best government will allow freedom of philosophical
speculation no less than of religious belief. I confess that from such
freedom inconveniences may sometimes arise, but what question was ever
settled so wisely than no abuses could possibly spring therefrom? He who
seeks to regulate everything by law is more likely to arouse vices than
to reform them. It is best to grant what cannot be abolished, even
though it be in itself harmful. How many evils spring from luxury,
envy, avarice, drunkenness and the like, yet these are tolerated--vices
as they are--because they cannot be prevented by legal enactments. How
much more, then, should free thought be granted, seeing that it is in
itself a virtue and that it cannot be crushed! Besides, the evil results
can easily be checked, as I will show, by the secular authorities, not
to mention that such freedom is absolutely necessary for progress in
science and the liberal arts: for no man follows such pursuits to
advantage unless his judgment be entirely free and unhampered.
But let it be granted that freedom may be crushed, and men be so bound
down that they do not dare to utter a whisper, save at the bidding of
their rulers; nevertheless this can never be carried to the pitch of
making them think according to authority, so that the necessary
consequences would be that men would daily be thinking one thing and
saying another, to the corruption of good faith, that mainstay of
government, and to the fostering of hateful flattery and perfidy, whence
spring stratagems, and the corruption of every good art.
It is far from possible to impose uniformity of speech, for the more
rulers strive to curtail freedom of speech the more obstinately are they
resisted; not indeed by the avaricious, the flatterers, and other
numskulls, who think supreme salvation consists in filling their
stomachs and gloating over their money-bags, but by those whom good
education, sound morality, and virtue have rendered more free. Men, as
generally constituted, are most prone to resent the branding as criminal
of opinions which they believe to be true, and the proscription as
wicked of that which inspires them with piety towards God and man;
hence they are ready to forswear the laws and conspire against the
authorities, thinking it not shameful but honorable to stir up seditions
and perpetuate any sort of crime with this end in view. Such being the
constitution of human nature, we see that laws directed against opinions
affect the generous minded rather than the wicked, and are adapted less
for coercing criminals than for irritating the upright; so that they
cannot be maintained without great peril to the state.
Moreover, such laws are almost always useless, for those who hold that
the opinions proscribed are sound, cannot possibly obey the law; whereas
those who already reject them as false, accept the law as a kind of
privilege, and make such boast of it, that authority is powerless to
repeal it, even if such a course be subsequently desired.
... And, lastly, how many schisms have arisen in the Church from the
attempt of the authorities to decide by law the intricacies of
theological controversy! If men were not allured by the hope of getting
the law and the authorities on their side, of triumphing over their
adversaries in the sight of an applauding multitude, and of acquiring
honorable distinctions, they would not strive so maliciously, nor would
such fury sway their minds. This is taught not only by reason but by
daily examples, for laws of this kind prescribing what every man shall
believe and forbidding any one to speak or write to the contrary, have
often been passed as sops or concessions to the anger of those who
cannot tolerate men of enlightenment, and who, by such harsh and crooked
enactments, can easily turn the devotion of the masses into fury and
direct it against whom they will.
How much better would it be to restrain popular anger and fury, instead
of passing useless laws, which can only be broken by those who love
virtue and the liberal arts, thus paring down the state till it is too
small to harbor men of talent. What greater misfortune for a state can
be conceived than that honorable men should be sent like criminals into
exile, because they hold diverse opinions which they cannot disguise?
What, I say, can be more hurtful than that men who have committed no
crime or wickedness should, simply because they are enlightened, be
treated as enemies and put to death, and that the scaffold, the terror
of evil-doers, should become the arena where the highest examples of
tolerance and virtue are displayed to the people with all the marks of
ignominy that authority can devise?
He that knows himself to be upright does not fear the death of a
criminal, and shrinks from no punishment. His mind is not wrung with
remorse for any disgraceful deed. He holds that death in a good cause is
no punishment, but an honor, and that death for freedom is glory.
What purpose, then, is served by the death of such men, what example is
proclaimed? The cause for which they die is unknown to the idle and the
foolish, hateful to the turbulent, loved by the upright. The only lesson
we can draw from such scenes is to flatter the persecutor, or else to
imitate the victim.
If formal assent is not to be esteemed above conviction, and if
governments are to retain a firm hold of authority and not be compelled
to yield to agitators, it is imperative that freedom of judgment should
be granted, so that men may live together in harmony, however diverse,
or even openly contradictory their opinions may be. We cannot doubt that
such is the best system of government and open to the fewest objections,
since it is the one most in harmony with human nature. In a democracy
(the most natural form of government) every one submits to the control
of authority over his actions, but not over his judgment and reason;
that is, seeing that all cannot think alike, the voice of the majority
has the force of law, subject to repeal if circumstances bring about a
change of opinion. In proportion as the power of free judgment is
withheld we depart from the natural condition of mankind, and
consequently the government becomes more tyrannical.
In order to prove that from such freedom no inconvenience arises which
cannot easily be checked by the exercise of the sovereign power, and
that men's actions can easily be kept in bounds, though their opinions
be at open variance, it will be well to cite an example. Such an one is
not very far to seek. The city of Amsterdam reaps the fruit of this
freedom in its own great prosperity and in the admiration of all other
people. For in this most flourishing state, and most splendid city, men
of every nation and religion live together in the greatest harmony, and
ask no questions before trusting their goods to a fellow-citizen, save
whether he be rich or poor, and whether he generally acts honestly, or
the reverse. His religion and sect is considered of no importance: for
it has no effect before the judges in gaining or losing a cause, and
there is no sect so despised that its followers, provided that they harm
no one, pay every man his due, and live uprightly, are deprived of the
protection of the magisterial authority.
On the other hand, when the religious controversy between Remonstrants
and Counter-Remonstrants began to be taken up by politicians and the
States, it grew into a schism, and abundantly showed that laws dealing
with religion and seeking to settle its controversies are much more
calculated to irritate than to reform, and that they give rise to
extreme license. Further, it was seen that schisms do not originate in a
love of truth, which is a source of courtesy and gentleness, but rather
in an inordinate desire for supremacy. From all these considerations it
is clearer than the sun at noonday, that the true schismatics are those
who condemn other men's writings, and seditiously stir up the
quarrelsome masses against their authors, rather than those authors
themselves, who generally write only for the learned, and appeal solely
to reason. In fact, the real disturbers of the peace are those who, in a
free state, seek to curtail the liberty of judgment which they are
unable to tyrannize over.
I have thus shown:--I. That it is impossible to deprive men of the
liberty of saying what they think. II. That such liberty can be conceded
to every man without injury to the rights and authority of the sovereign
power, and that every man may retain it without injury to such rights,
provided that he does not presume upon it to the extent of introducing
any new rights into the state, or acting in any way contrary to the
existing laws. III. That every man may enjoy this liberty without
detriment to the public peace, and that no inconveniences arise
therefrom which cannot easily be checked. IV. That every man may enjoy
it without injury to his allegiance. V. That laws dealing with
speculative problems are entirely useless. VI. Lastly, that not only may
such liberty be granted without prejudice to the public peace, to
loyalty, and to the rights of rulers, but that it is even necessary for
their preservation. For when people try to take it away, and bring to
trial, not only the acts which alone are capable of offending, but also
the opinions of mankind, they only succeed in surrounding their victims
with an appearance of martyrdom, and raise feelings of pity and revenge
rather than of terror. Uprightness and good faith are thus corrupted,
flatterers and traitors are encouraged, and sectarians triumph, inasmuch
as concessions have been made to their animosity, and they have gained
the state sanction for the doctrines of which they are the interpreters.
Hence they arrogate to themselves the state authority and rights, and do
not scruple to assert that they have been directly chosen by God, and
that their laws are Divine, whereas the laws of the state are human, and
should therefore yield obedience to the laws of God--in other words, to
their own laws. Every one must see that this is not a state of affairs
conducive to public welfare. Wherefore, the safest way for a state is to
lay down the rule that religion is comprised solely in the exercise of
charity and justice, and that the rights of rulers in sacred, no less
than in secular matters, should merely have to do with actions, but that
every man should think what he likes and say what he thinks.
FOOTNOTES:
[41] From the _Tr. Th.-P._, ch. xx, same title.