OF SUPREME AUTHORITIES
I
_Of the Right of Supreme Authorities_[36]
Under every dominion the state is said to be Civil; but the entire body
subject to a dominion is called a Commonwealth, and the general business
of the dominion, subject to the direction of him that holds it, has the
name of Affairs of State. Next we call men Citizens, as far as they
enjoy by the civil law all the advantages of the commonwealth, and
Subjects, as far as they are bound to obey its ordinances or laws.
Lastly ... of the civil state there are three kinds--democracy,
aristocracy and monarchy. Now, before I begin to treat of each kind
separately, I will first deduce all the properties of the civil state in
general. And of these, first of all comes to be considered the supreme
right of the commonwealth, or the right of the supreme authorities.
It is clear that the right of the supreme authorities is nothing else
than simple natural right, limited, indeed, by the power, not of every
individual, but of the multitude, which is guided, as it were, by one
mind--that is, as each individual in the state of Nature, so the body
and mind of a dominion have as much right as they have power. And thus
each single citizen or subject has the less right, the more the
commonwealth exceeds him in power, and each citizen consequently does
and has nothing but what he may by the general decree of the
commonwealth defend.
If the commonwealth grant to any man the right, and therewith the
authority (for else it is but a gift of words) to live after his own
mind, by that very act it abandons its own right, and transfers the same
to him, to whom it has given such authority. But if it has given this
authority to two or more, I mean authority to live each after his own
mind, by that very act it has divided the dominion, and if, lastly, it
has given this same authority to every citizen, it has thereby destroyed
itself, and there remains no more a commonwealth, but everything returns
to the state of Nature; all of which is very manifest from what goes
before. And thus it follows, that it can by no means be conceived, that
every citizen should by the ordinance of the commonwealth live after his
own mind, and accordingly this natural right of being one's own judge
ceases in the civil state. I say expressly "by the ordinance of the
commonwealth," for if we weigh the matter aright, the natural right of
every man does not cease in the civil state. For man, alike in the
natural and in the civil state, acts according to the laws of his own
nature, and consults his own interest. Man, I say, in each state is led
by fear or hope to do or leave undone this or that; but the main
difference between the two states is this, that in the civil state all
fear the same things, and all have the same ground of security, and
manner of life; and this certainly does not do away with the
individual's faculty of judgment. For he that is minded to obey all the
commonwealth's orders, whether through fear of its power or through love
of quiet, certainly consults after his own heart his own safety and
interest.
Moreover, we cannot even conceive, that every citizen should be allowed
to interpret the commonwealth's decrees or laws. For were every citizen
allowed this, he would thereby be his own judge, because each would
easily be able to give a color of right to his own deeds, which by the
last section is absurd.
We see, then, that every citizen depends not on himself, but on the
commonwealth, all whose commands he is bound to execute, and has no
right to decide, what is equitable or iniquitous, just or unjust. But,
on the contrary, as the body of the dominion should, so to speak, be
guided by one mind, and consequently the will of the commonwealth must
be taken to be the will of all; what the state decides to be just and
good must be held to be so decided by every individual. And so, however
iniquitous the subject may think the commonwealth's decisions, he is
none the less bound to execute them.
But, it may be objected, is it not contrary to the dictate of reason to
subject oneself wholly to the judgment of another, and, consequently, is
not the civil state repugnant to reason? Whence it would follow that the
civil state is irrational, and could only be created by men destitute of
reason, not at all by such as are led by it. But since reason teaches
nothing contrary to Nature, sound reason cannot therefore dictate that
every one should remain independent, so long as men are liable to
passions, that is, reason pronounces against such independence. Besides,
reason altogether teaches to seek peace, and peace cannot be maintained,
unless the commonwealth's general laws be kept unbroken. And so, the
more a man is guided by reason, that is, the more he is free, the more
constantly he will keep the laws of the commonwealth, and execute the
commands of the supreme authority, whose subject he is. Furthermore, the
civil state is naturally ordained to remove general fear, and prevent
general sufferings, and therefore pursue above everything the very end,
after which every one, who is led by reason, strives, but in the natural
state strives vainly. Wherefore, if a man, who is led by reason, has
sometimes to do by the commonwealth's order what he knows to be
repugnant to reason, that harm is far compensated by the good, which he
derives from the existence of a civil state. For it is reason's own law,
to choose the less of two evils; and accordingly we may conclude that no
one is acting against the dictate of his own reason, so far as he does
what by the law of the commonwealth is to be done. And this any one will
more easily grant us, after we have explained how far the power and
consequently the right of the commonwealth extends.
For, first of all, it must be considered that, as in the state of Nature
the man who is led by reason is most powerful and most independent, so
too that commonwealth will be most powerful and most independent which
is founded and guided by reason. For the right of the commonwealth is
determined by the power of the multitude, which is led, as it were, by
one mind. But this unity of mind can in no wise be conceived, unless the
commonwealth pursues chiefly the very end which sound reason teaches is
to the interest of all men.
In the second place it comes to be considered that subjects are so far
dependent, not on themselves but on the commonwealth, as they fear its
power or threats, or as they love the civil state. Whence it follows,
that such things, as no one can be induced to do by rewards or threats,
do not fall within the rights of the commonwealth. For instance, by
reason of his faculty of judgment, it is in no man's power to believe.
For by what rewards or threats can a man be brought to believe that the
whole is not greater than its part, or that God does not exist, or that
that is an infinite being, which he sees to be finite, or, generally,
anything contrary to his sense or thought? So, too, by what rewards or
threats can a man be brought to love one whom he hates, or to hate one
whom he loves? And to this head must likewise be referred such things as
are so abhorrent to human nature, that it regards them as actually worse
than any evil, as that a man should be witness against himself, or
torture himself, or kill his parents, or not strive to avoid death, and
the like, to which no one can be induced by rewards or threats. But if
we still choose to say that the commonwealth has the right or authority
to order such things, we can conceive of it in no other sense than that
in which one might say that a man has the right to be mad or delirious.
For what but a delirious fancy would such a right be, as could bind no
one? And here I am speaking expressly of such things as cannot be
subject to the right of a commonwealth and are abhorrent to human nature
in general. For the fact that a fool or madman can by no rewards or
threats be induced to execute orders, or that this or that person,
because he is attached to this or that religion, judges the laws of a
dominion worse than any possible evil, in no wise makes void the laws of
the commonwealth, since by them most of the citizens are restrained. And
so, as those who are without fear or hope are so far independent, they
are, therefore, enemies of the dominion, and may lawfully be coerced by
force.
Thirdly, and lastly, it comes to be considered that those things are not
so much within the commonwealth's right, which cause indignation in the
majority. For it is certain, that by the guidance of Nature men conspire
together, either through common fear, or with the desire to avenge some
common hurt; and as the right of the commonwealth is determined by the
common power of the multitude, it is certain that the power and right of
the commonwealth are so far diminished, as it gives occasion for many to
conspire together. There are certainly some subjects of fear for a
commonwealth, and as every separate citizen or in the state of Nature
every man, so a commonwealth is the less independent, the greater reason
it has to fear. So much for the right of supreme authorities over
subjects. Now before I treat of the right of the said authorities as
against others, we had better resolve a question commonly mooted about
religion.
For it may be objected to us, Do not the civil state, and the obedience
of subjects, such as we have shown is required in the civil state, do
away with religion, whereby we are bound to worship God? But if we
consider the matter, as it really is, we shall find nothing that can
suggest a scruple. For the mind, so far as it makes use of reason, is
dependent, not on the supreme authorities, but on itself. And so the
true knowledge and the love of God cannot be subject to the dominion of
any, nor yet can charity towards one's neighbor. And if we further
reflect that the highest exercise of charity is that which aims at
keeping peace and joining in unity, we shall not doubt that he does his
duty, who helps every one, so far as the commonwealth's laws, that is,
so far as unity and quiet allow. As for external rites, it is certain,
that they can do no good or harm at all in respect of the true knowledge
of God, and the love which necessarily results from it; and so they
ought not to be held of such importance, that it should be thought worth
while on their account to disturb public peace and quiet. Moreover, it
is certain that I am not a champion of religion by the law of Nature,
that is, by the divine decree. For I have no authority, as once the
disciples of Christ had, to cast out unclean spirits and work miracles;
which authority is yet so necessary to the propagating of religion in
places where it is forbidden, that without it one not only, as they say,
wastes one's time[37] and trouble, but causes besides very many
inconveniences, whereof all ages have seen most mournful examples. Every
one therefore, wherever he may be, can worship God with true religion,
and mind his own business, which is the duty of a private man. But the
care of propagating religion should be left to God, or the supreme
authorities, upon whom alone falls the charge of affairs of state. But I
return to my subject.
After explaining the right of supreme authorities over citizens and the
duty of subjects, it remains to consider the right of such authorities
against the world at large, which is now easily intelligible from what
has been said. For since the right of the supreme authorities is nothing
else but simple natural right, it follows that two dominions stand
towards each other in the same relation as do two men in the state of
Nature, with this exception, that a commonwealth can provide against
being oppressed by another; which a man in the state of Nature cannot
do, seeing that he is overcome daily by sleep, often by disease or
mental infirmity, and in the end by old age, and is besides liable to
other inconveniences, from which a commonwealth can secure itself.
A commonwealth, then, is so far independent, as it can plan and provide
against oppression by another, and so far dependent on another
commonwealth, as it fears that other's power, or is hindered by it from
executing its own wishes, or, lastly, as it needs its help for its own
preservation or increase. For we cannot at all doubt, that if two
commonwealths are willing to offer each other mutual help, both together
are more powerful, and therefore have more right, than either alone.
But this will be more clearly intelligible if we reflect that two
commonwealths are naturally enemies. For men in the state of Nature are
enemies. Those, then, who stand outside a commonwealth, and retain
their natural rights, continue enemies. Accordingly, if one commonwealth
wishes to make war on another and employ extreme measures to make that
other dependent on itself, it may lawfully make the attempt, since it
needs but the bare will of the commonwealth for war to be waged. But
concerning peace it can decide nothing, save with the concurrence of
another commonwealth's will. When it follows that laws of war regard
every commonwealth by itself, but laws of peace regard not one, but at
the least two commonwealths, which are therefore called "contracting
parties."
This "contract" remains so long unmoved as the motive for entering into
it, that is, fear of hurt or hope of gain, subsists. But take away from
either commonwealth this hope or fear, and it is left independent, and
the link, whereby the commonwealths were mutually bound, breaks of
itself. And therefore every commonwealth has the right to break its
contract, whenever it chooses, and cannot be said to act treacherously
or perfidiously in breaking its word, as soon as the motive of hope or
fear is removed. For every contracting party was on equal terms in this
respect, that whichever could first free itself of fear should be
independent, and make use of its independence after its own mind; and,
besides, no one makes a contract respecting the future, but on the
hypothesis of certain precedent circumstances. But when these
circumstances change, the reason of policy applicable to the whole
position changes with them; and therefore every one of the contracting
commonwealths retains the right of consulting its own interest, and
consequently endeavors, as far as possible, to be free from fear and
thereby independent, and to prevent another from coming out of the
contract with greater power. If then a commonwealth complains that it
has been deceived, it cannot properly blame the bad faith of another
contracting commonwealth, but only its own folly in having entrusted its
own welfare to another party, that was independent, and had for its
highest law the welfare of its own dominion.
To commonwealths, which have contracted a treaty of peace, it belongs to
decide the questions which may be mooted about the terms or rules of
peace, whereby they have mutually bound themselves, inasmuch as laws of
peace regard not one commonwealth, but the commonwealths which contract
taken together. But if they cannot agree together about the conditions,
they by that very fact return to a state of war.
The more commonwealths there are, that have contracted a joint treaty of
peace, the less each of them by itself is an object of fear to the
remainder, or the less it has the authority to make war. But it is so
much the more bound to observe the conditions of peace; that is, the
less independent, and the more bound to accommodate itself to the
general will of the contracting parties.
But the good faith, inculcated by sound reason and religion, is not
hereby made void; for neither reason nor Scripture teaches one to keep
one's word in every case. For if I have promised a man, for instance, to
keep safe a sum of money he has secretly deposited with me, I am not
bound to keep my word, from the time that I know or believe the deposit
to have been stolen, but I shall act more rightly in endeavoring to
restore it to its owners. So likewise, if the supreme authority has
promised another to do something, which subsequently occasion or reason
shows or seems to show is contrary to the welfare of its subjects, it is
surely bound to break its word. As then Scripture only teaches us to
keep our word in general, and leaves to every individual's judgment the
special cases of exception, it teaches nothing repugnant to what we have
just proved.
But that I may not have so often to break the thread of my discourse,
and to resolve hereafter similar objections, I would have it known that
all this demonstration of mine proceeds from the necessity of human
nature, considered in what light you will--I mean, from the universal
effort of all men after self-preservation, an effort inherent in all
men, whether learned or unlearned. And therefore, however one considers
men are led, whether by passion or by reason, it will be the same thing;
for the demonstration, as we have said, is of universal application.
II
_Of the Functions of Supreme Authorities_[38]
The right of the supreme authorities is limited by their power; the most
important part of that right is, that they are, as it were, the mind of
the dominion, whereby all ought to be guided; and accordingly, such
authorities alone have the right of deciding what is good, evil,
equitable or iniquitous, that is, what must be done or left undone by
the subjects severally or collectively. And, accordingly, they have the
sole right of laying down laws, and of interpreting the same, whenever
their meaning is disputed, and of deciding whether a given case is in
conformity with or violation of the laws; and, lastly, of waging war,
and of drawing up and offering propositions for peace, or of accepting
such when offered.
As all these functions, and also the means required to execute them, are
matters which regard the whole body of the dominion, that is, are
affairs of state, it follows that affairs of state depend on the
direction of him only who holds supreme dominion. And hence it follows
that it is the right of the supreme authority alone to judge the deeds
of every individual, and demand of him an account of the same; to punish
criminals, and decide questions of law between citizens, or appoint
jurists acquainted with the existing laws, to administer these matters
on its behalf; and, further, to use and order all means to war and
peace, as to found and fortify cities, levy soldiers, assign military
posts, and order what it would have done, and, with a view to peace, to
send and give audience to ambassadors; and, finally, to levy the costs
of all this.
Since, then, it is the right of the supreme authority alone to handle
public matters, or choose officials to do so, it follows that that
subject is a pretender to the dominion, who, without the supreme
council's knowledge, enters upon any public matter, although he believe
that his design will be to the best interest of the commonwealth.
But it is often asked, whether the supreme authority is bound by laws,
and, consequently, whether it can do wrong. Now as the words "law" and
"wrong-doing" often refer not merely to the laws of a commonwealth, but
also to the general rules which concern all natural things, and
especially to the general rules of reason, we cannot, without
qualification, say that the commonwealth is bound by no laws, or can do
no wrong. For were the commonwealth bound by no laws or rules, which
removed, the commonwealth were no commonwealth, we should have to regard
it not as a natural thing, but as a chimera. A commonwealth then does
wrong, when it does, or suffers to be done, things which may be the
cause of its own ruin; and we can say that it then does wrong, in the
sense in which philosophers or doctors say that Nature does wrong; and
in this sense we can say, that a commonwealth does wrong, when it acts
against the dictate of reason. For a commonwealth is most independent
when it acts according to the dictate of reason; so far, then, as it
acts against reason, it fails itself, or does wrong. And we shall be
able more easily to understand this if we reflect that when we say, that
a man can do what he will with his own, this authority must be limited
not only by the power of the agent, but by the capacity of the object.
If, for instance, I say that I can rightfully do what I will with this
table, I do not certainly mean that I have the right to make it eat
grass. So, too, though we say, that men depend not on themselves, but on
the commonwealth, we do not mean, that men lose their human nature and
put on another; nor yet that the commonwealth has the right to make men
wish for this or that, or (what is just as impossible) regard with
honor things which excite ridicule or disgust. But it is implied that
there are certain intervening circumstances which supposed, one likewise
supposes the reverence and fear of the subjects towards the
commonwealth, and which abstracted, one makes abstraction likewise of
that fear and reverence, and therewith of the commonwealth itself. The
commonwealth, then, to maintain its independence, is bound to preserve
the causes of fear and reverence, otherwise it ceases to be a
commonwealth. For the person or persons that hold dominion can no more
combine with the keeping up of majesty the running with harlots drunk or
naked about the streets, or the performances of a stage-player, or the
open violation or contempt of laws passed by themselves, than they can
combine existence with non-existence. But to proceed to slay and rob
subjects, ravish maidens, and the like, turns fear into indignation and
the civil state into a state of enmity.
We see, then, in what sense we may say, that a commonwealth is bound by
laws and can do wrong. But if by "law" we understand civil law, and by
"wrong" that which, by civil law, is forbidden to be done, that is, if
these words be taken in their proper sense, we cannot at all say that a
commonwealth is bound by laws or can do wrong. For the maxims and
motives of fear and reverence which a commonwealth is bound to observe
in its own interest, pertain not to civil jurisprudence, but to the law
of Nature, since they cannot be vindicated by the civil law, but by the
law of war. And a commonwealth is bound by them in no other sense than
that in which in the state of Nature a man is bound to take heed that
he preserve his independence and be not his own enemy, lest he should
destroy himself; and in this taking heed lies not the subjection, but
the liberty of human nature. But civil jurisprudence depends on the mere
decree of the commonwealth, which is not bound to please any but itself,
nor to hold anything to be good or bad, but what it judges to be such
for itself. And, accordingly, it has not merely the right to avenge
itself, or to lay down and interpret laws, but also to abolish the same,
and to pardon any guilty person out of the fullness of its power.
Contracts or laws, whereby the multitude transfers its right to one
council or man, should without doubt be broken, when it is expedient for
the general welfare to do so. But to decide this point, whether, that
is, it be expedient for the general welfare to break them or not, is
within the right of no private person, but of him only who holds
dominion; therefore of these laws he who holds dominion remains sole
interpreter. Moreover, no private person can by right vindicate these
laws, and so they do not really bind him who holds dominion.
Notwithstanding, if they are of such a nature that they cannot be broken
without at the same time weakening the commonwealth's strength, that is,
without at the same time changing to indignation the common fear of most
of the citizens, by this very fact the commonwealth is dissolved, and
the contract comes to an end; and therefore such contract is vindicated
not by the civil law, but by the law of war. And so he who holds
dominion is not bound to observe the terms of the contract by any other
cause than that, which bids a man in the state of Nature to beware of
being his own enemy, lest he should destroy himself.
III
_Of the Best State of a Dominion_[39]
We have shown that man is then most independent when he is most led by
reason, and, in consequence, that that commonwealth is most powerful and
most independent which is founded and guided by reason. But, as the best
plan of living, so as to assure to the utmost self-preservation, is that
which is framed according to the dictate of reason, therefore it follows
that that in every kind is best done, which a man or commonwealth does,
so far as he or it is in the highest degree independent. For it is one
thing to till a field by right, and another to till it in the best way.
One thing, I say, to defend or preserve oneself, and to pass judgment by
right, and another to defend or preserve oneself in the best way, and to
pass the best judgment; and, consequently, it is one thing to have
dominion and care of affairs of state by right, and another to exercise
dominion and direct affairs of state in the best way. And so, as we have
treated of the right of every commonwealth in general, it is time to
treat of the best state of every dominion.
Now the quality of the state of any dominion is easily perceived from
the end of the civil state, which end is nothing else but peace and
security of life. And therefore that dominion is the best, where men
pass their lives in unity, and the laws are kept unbroken. For it is
certain, that seditions, wars, and contempt or breach of the laws are
not so much to be imputed to the wickedness of the subjects, as to the
bad state of a dominion. For men are not born fit for citizenship, but
must be made so. Besides, men's natural passions are everywhere the
same; and if wickedness more prevails, and more offenses are committed
in one commonwealth than in another, it is certain that the former has
not enough pursued the end of unity, nor framed its laws with sufficient
forethought; and that, therefore, it has failed in making quite good its
right as a commonwealth. For a civil state, which has not done away with
the causes of seditions, where war is a perpetual object of fear, and
where, lastly, the laws are often broken, differs but little from the
mere state of Nature, in which every one lives after his own mind at the
great risk of his life.
But as the vices and inordinate license and contumacy of subjects must
be imputed to the commonwealth, so, on the other hand, their virtue and
constant obedience to the laws are to be ascribed in the main to the
virtue and perfect right of the commonwealth. And so it is deservedly
reckoned to Hannibal as an extraordinary virtue, that in his army there
never arose a sedition.
Of a commonwealth, whose subjects are but hindered by terror from taking
arms, it should rather be said, that it is free from war, than that it
has peace. For peace is not mere absence of war, but is a virtue that
springs from force of character: for obedience is the constant will to
execute what, by the general decree of the commonwealth, ought to be
done. Besides, that commonwealth whose peace depends on the
sluggishness of its subjects, that are led about like sheep to learn
but slavery, may more properly be called a desert than a commonwealth.
When, then, we call that dominion best, where men pass their lives in
unity, I understand a human life, defined not by mere circulation of the
blood, and other qualities common to all animals, but above all by
reason, the true excellence and life of the mind.
But be it remarked that, by the dominion which I have said is
established for this end, I intend that which has been established by a
free multitude, not that which is acquired over a multitude by right of
war. For a free multitude is guided more by hope than fear; a conquered
one, more by fear than by hope: inasmuch as the former aims at making
use of life, the latter but at escaping death. The former, I say, aims
at living for its own ends, the latter is forced to belong to the
conqueror; and so we say that this is enslaved, but that free. And,
therefore, the end of a dominion, which one gets by right of war, is to
be master, and have rather slaves than subjects. And although between
the dominion created by a free multitude, and that gained by right of
war, if we regard generally the right of each, we can make no essential
distinction; yet their ends, as we have already shown, and further the
means to the preservation of each are very different.
But what means a prince, whose sole motive is lust of mastery, should
use to establish and maintain his dominion, the most ingenious
Machiavelli has set forth at large,[40] but with what design one can
hardly be sure. If, however, he had some good design, as one should
believe of a learned man, it seems to have been to show, with how little
foresight many attempt to remove a tyrant, though thereby the causes
which make the prince a tyrant can in no wise be removed, but, on the
contrary, are so much the more established, as the prince is given more
cause to fear, which happens when the multitude has made an example of
its prince, and glories in the parricide as in a thing well done.
Moreover, he perhaps wished to show how cautious a free multitude should
be of entrusting its welfare absolutely to one man, who, unless in his
vanity he thinks he can please everybody, must be in daily fear of
plots, and so is forced to look chiefly after his own interest, and, as
for the multitude, rather to plot against it than consult its good. And
I am the more led to this opinion concerning that most far-seeing man,
because it is known that he was favorable to liberty, for the
maintenance of which he has besides given the most wholesome advice.
FOOTNOTES:
[36] From _A Political Treatise_, ch. iii, same title.
[37] Literally, "oil and trouble"--a common proverbial expression in
Latin.
[38] From _A Political Treatise_, ch. iv, same title.
[39] From _A Political Treatise_, ch. v, same title.
[40] In his book called "Il Principe," or "The Prince."