OF THE FOUNDATIONS OF A STATE[32]
By the right and ordinance of Nature, I merely mean those natural laws
wherewith we conceive every individual to be conditioned by Nature, so
as to live and act in a given way. For instance, fishes are naturally
conditioned for swimming, and the greater for devouring the less;
therefore fishes enjoy the water, and the greater devour the less by
sovereign natural right. For it is certain that Nature, taken in the
abstract, has sovereign right to do anything she can; in other words,
her right is co-extensive with her power. The power of Nature is the
power of God, which has sovereign right over all things; and, inasmuch
as the power of Nature is simply the aggregate of the powers of all her
individual components, it follows that every individual has sovereign
right to do all that he can, in other words, the rights of an individual
extend to the utmost limits of his power as it has been conditioned.
Now it is the sovereign law and right of Nature that each individual
should endeavor to preserve itself as it is, without regard to anything
but itself; therefore this sovereign law and right belongs to every
individual, namely, to exist and act according to its natural
conditions. We do not here acknowledge any difference between mankind
and other individual natural entities, nor between men endowed with
reason and those to whom reason is unknown; nor between fools, madmen,
and sane men. Whatsoever an individual does by the laws of its nature it
has a sovereign right to do, inasmuch as it acts as it was conditioned
by Nature, and cannot act otherwise. Wherefore among men, so long as
they are considered as living under the sway of Nature, he who does not
yet know reason, or who has not yet acquired the habit of virtue, acts
solely according to the laws of his desire with as sovereign a right as
he who orders his life entirely by the laws of reason.
That is, as the wise man has sovereign right to do all that reason
dictates, or to live according to the laws of reason, so also the
ignorant and foolish man has sovereign right to do all that desire
dictates, or to live according to the laws of desire. This is identical
with the teaching of Paul, who acknowledges that previous to the
law--that is, so long as men are considered of as living under the sway
of Nature, there is no sin.
The natural right of the individual man is thus determined, not by sound
reason, but by desire and power. All are not naturally conditioned so as
to act according to the laws and rules of reason; nay, on the contrary,
all men are born ignorant, and before they can learn the right way of
life and acquire the habit of virtue, the greater part of their life,
even if they have been well brought up, has passed away. Nevertheless,
they are in the meanwhile bound to live and preserve themselves as far
as they can by the unaided impulses of desire. Nature has given them no
other guide, and has denied them the present power of living according
to sound reason; so that they are no more bound to live by the dictates
of an enlightened mind than a cat is bound to live by the laws of the
nature of a lion.
Whatsoever, therefore, an individual, considered as under the sway of
Nature, thinks useful for himself, whether led by sound reason or
impelled by the passions, that he has a sovereign right to seek and to
take for himself as he best can, whether by force, cunning, entreaty, or
any other means; consequently he may regard as an enemy any one who
hinders the accomplishment of his purpose.
It follows from what we have said that the right and ordinance of
Nature, under which all men are born, and under which they mostly live,
only prohibits such things as no one desires, and no one can attain: it
does not forbid strife, nor hatred, nor anger, nor deceit, nor, indeed,
any of the means suggested by desire.
This we need not wonder at, for Nature is not bounded by the laws of
human reason, which aims only at man's true benefit and preservation.
Her limits are infinitely wider, and have reference to the eternal order
of Nature, wherein man is but a speck. It is by the necessity of this
alone that all individuals are conditioned for living and acting in a
particular way. If anything, therefore, in Nature seems to us
ridiculous, absurd, or evil, it is because we only know in part, and are
almost entirely ignorant of the order and interdependence of Nature as a
whole, and also because we want everything to be arranged according to
the dictates of our human reason; in reality that which reason considers
evil is not evil in respect to the order and laws of Nature as a whole,
but only in respect to the laws of our reason.
Nevertheless, no one can doubt that it is much better for us to live
according to the laws and assured dictates of reason, for, as we said,
they have men's true good for their object. Moreover, every one wishes
to live as far as possible securely beyond the reach of fear, and this
would be quite impossible so long as every one did everything he liked,
and reason's claim was lowered to a par with those of hatred and anger.
There is no one who is not ill at ease in the midst of enmity, hatred,
anger and deceit, and who does not seek to avoid them as much as he can.
When we reflect that men without mutual help, or the aid of reason, must
needs live most miserably, ... we shall plainly see that men must
necessarily come to an agreement to live together as securely and well
as possible if they are to enjoy, as a whole, the rights which naturally
belong to them as individuals, and their life should be no more
conditioned by the force and desire of individuals, but by the power and
will of the whole body. This end they will be unable to attain if desire
be their only guide, for by the laws of desire each man is drawn in a
different direction; they must, therefore, most firmly decree and
establish that they will be guided in everything by reason, which nobody
will dare openly to repudiate lest he should be taken for a madman, and
will restrain any desire which is injurious to a man's fellows, that
they will do to all as they would be done by, and that they will defend
their neighbor's rights as their own.
How such a compact as this should be entered into, how ratified and
established, we will now inquire.
Now it is a universal law of human nature that no one ever neglects
anything which he judges to be good, except with the hope of gaining a
greater good, or from the fear of a greater evil; nor does any one
endure an evil except for the sake of avoiding a greater evil, or
gaining a greater good. That is, every one will, of two goods, choose
that which he thinks the greatest; and, of two evils that which he
thinks the least. I say advisedly that which he thinks the greatest or
the least, for it does not necessarily follow that he judges right. This
law is so deeply implanted in the human mind that it ought to be counted
among eternal truths and axioms.
As a necessary consequence of the principle just enunciated, no one can
honestly promise to forego the right which he has over all things,[33]
and in general no one will abide by his promises, unless under the fear
of a greater evil, or the hope of a greater good. An example will make
the matter clearer. Suppose that a robber forces me to promise that I
will give him my goods at his will and pleasure. It is plain (inasmuch
as my natural right is, as I have shown, co-extensive with my power)
that if I can free myself from this robber by stratagem, by assenting
to his demands, I have the natural right to do so, and to pretend to
accept his conditions. Or, again, suppose I have genuinely promised some
one that for the space of twenty days I will not taste food or any
nourishment; and suppose I afterwards find that my promise was foolish,
and cannot be kept without very great injury to myself; as I am bound by
natural law and right to choose the least of two evils, I have complete
right to break any compact, and act as if my promise had never been
uttered. I say that I should have perfect natural right to do so,
whether I was actuated by true and evident reason, or whether I was
actuated by mere opinion in thinking I had promised rashly; whether my
reasons were true or false, I should be in fear of a greater evil,
which, by the ordinance of Nature, I should strive to avoid by every
means in my power.
We may, therefore, conclude that a compact is only made valid by its
utility, without which it becomes null and void. It is therefore foolish
to ask a man to keep his faith with us forever, unless we also endeavor
that the violation of the compact we enter into shall involve for the
violator more harm than good. This consideration should have very great
weight in forming a state. However, if all men could be easily led by
reason alone, and could recognize what is best and most useful for a
state, there would be no one who would not forswear deceit, for every
one would keep most religiously to their compact in their desire for the
chief good, namely, the preservation of the state, and would cherish
good faith above all things as the shield and buckler of the
commonwealth. However, it is far from being the case that all men can
always be easily led by reason alone; every one is drawn away by his
pleasure, while avarice, ambition, envy, hatred, and the like so engross
the mind that reason has no place therein. Hence, though men make
promises with all the appearances of good faith, and agree that they
will keep to their engagement, no one can absolutely rely on another
man's promise unless there is something behind it. Every one has by
Nature a right to act deceitfully, and to break his compacts, unless he
be restrained by the hope of some greater good, or the fear of some
greater evil.
However, as we have shown that the natural right of the individual is
only limited by his power, it is clear that by transferring, either
willingly or under compulsion, this power into the hands of another, he
in so doing necessarily cedes also a part of his right; and, further,
that the sovereign right over all men belongs to him who has sovereign
power, wherewith he can compel men by force, or restrain them by threats
of the universally feared punishment of death. Such sovereign right he
will retain only so long as he can maintain his power of enforcing his
will; otherwise he will totter on his throne, and no one who is stronger
than he will be bound unwillingly to obey him.
In this manner a society can be formed without any violation of natural
right, and the covenant can always be strictly kept--that is, if each
individual hands over the whole of his power to the body politic, the
latter will then possess sovereign natural right over all things; that
is, it will have sole and unquestioned dominion, and every one will be
bound to obey, under pain of the severest punishment. A body politic of
this kind is called a Democracy, which may be defined as a society which
wields all its power as a whole. The sovereign power is not restrained
by any laws, but every one is bound to obey it in all things; such is
the state of things implied when men either tacitly or expressly handed
over to it all their power of self-defense, or in other words, all their
right. For if they had wished to retain any right for themselves, they
ought to have taken precautions for its defense and preservation. As
they have not done so, and indeed could not have done so without
dividing and consequently ruining the state, they placed themselves
absolutely at the mercy of the sovereign power; and, therefore, having
acted (as we have shown) as reason and necessity demanded, they are
obliged to fulfill the commands of the sovereign power, however absurd
these may be, else they will be public enemies, and will act against
reason, which urges the preservation of the state as a primary duty. For
reason bids us choose the lesser of two evils.
Furthermore, this danger of submitting absolutely to the dominion and
will of another, is one which may be incurred with a light heart: for we
have shown that sovereigns only possess this right of imposing their
will, so long as they have the full power to enforce it. If such power
be lost their right to command is lost also, or lapses to those who have
assumed it and can keep it. Thus it is very rare for sovereigns to
impose thoroughly irrational commands, for they are bound to consult
their own interests, and retain their power by consulting the public
good and acting according to the dictates of reason, as Seneca says,
"_violenta imperia nemo continuit diu_." No one can long retain a
tyrant's sway.
In a democracy, irrational commands are still less to be feared: for it
is almost impossible that the majority of a people, especially if it be
a large one, should agree in an irrational design: and, moreover, the
basis and aim of a democracy is to avoid the desires as irrational, and
to bring men as far as possible under the control of reason, so that
they may live in peace and harmony. If this basis be removed the whole
fabric falls to ruin.
Such being the ends in view for the sovereign power, the duty of
subjects is, as I have said, to obey its commands, and to recognize no
right save that which it sanctions.
It will, perhaps, be thought that we are turning subjects into slaves,
for slaves obey commands and free men live as they like; but this idea
is based on a misconception, for the true slave is he who is led away by
his pleasures and can neither see what is good for him nor act
accordingly: he alone is free who lives with free consent under the
entire guidance of reason.
Action in obedience to orders does take away freedom in a certain sense,
but it does not, therefore, make a man a slave; all depends on the
object of the action. If the object of the action be the good of the
state, and not the good of the agent, the latter is a slave and does
himself no good; but in a state or kingdom where the weal of the whole
people, and not that of the ruler, is the supreme law, obedience to the
sovereign power does not make a man a slave, of no use to himself, but
a subject. Therefore, that state is the freest whose laws are founded on
sound reason, so that every member of it may, if he will, be free;[34]
that is, live with full consent under the entire guidance of reason.
Children, though they are bound to obey all the commands of their
parents, are yet not slaves; for the commands of parents look generally
to the children's benefit.
We must, therefore, acknowledge a great difference between a slave, a
son, and a subject; their positions may be thus defined. A slave is one
who is bound to obey his master's orders, though they are given solely
in the master's interest; a son is one who obeys his father's orders,
given in his own interest; a subject obeys the orders of the sovereign
power, given for the common interest, wherein he is included.
I think I have now shown sufficiently clearly the basis of a democracy.
I have especially desired to do so, for I believe it to be of all forms
of government the most natural, and the most consonant with individual
liberty. In it no one transfers his natural right so absolutely that he
has no further voice in affairs; he only hands it over to the majority
of a society, whereof he is a unit. Thus all men remain, as they were in
the state of Nature, equals.
This is the only form of government which I have treated of at length,
for it is the one most akin to my purpose of showing the benefits of
freedom in a state.
I may pass over the fundamental principles of other forms of government,
for we may gather from what has been said whence their right arises
without going into its origin. The possessor of sovereign power, whether
he be one, or many, or the whole body politic, has the sovereign right
of imposing any commands he pleases; and he who has either voluntarily,
or under compulsion, transferred the right to defend him to another,
has, in so doing, renounced his natural right and is therefore bound to
obey, in all things, the commands of the sovereign power; and will be
bound so to do so long as the king, or nobles, or the people preserve
the sovereign power which formed the basis of the original transfer. I
need add no more.
The bases and rights of dominion being thus displayed, we shall readily
be able to define private civil right, wrong, justice, and injustice,
with their relations to the state; and also to determine what
constitutes an ally, or an enemy, or the crime of treason.
By private civil right we can only mean the liberty every man possesses
to preserve his existence, a liberty limited by the edicts of the
sovereign power, and preserved only by its authority. For when a man has
transferred to another his right of living as he likes, which was only
limited by his power, that is, has transferred his liberty and power of
self-defense, he is bound to live as that other dictates, and to trust
to him entirely for his defense. Wrong takes place when a citizen, or
subject, is forced by another to undergo some loss or pain in
contradiction to the authority of the law, or the edict of the sovereign
power.
Wrong is conceivable only in an organized community; nor can it ever
accrue to subjects from any act of the sovereign, who has the right to
do what he likes. It can only arise, therefore, between private persons,
who are bound by law and right not to injure one another. Justice
consists in the habitual rendering to every man his lawful due;
injustice consists in depriving a man, under the pretense of legality,
of what the laws, rightly interpreted, would allow him. These last are
also called equity and inequity, because those who administer the laws
are bound to show no respect of persons, but to account all men equal,
and to defend every man's right equally, neither envying the rich nor
despising the poor.
The men of two states become allies, when for the sake of avoiding war,
or for some other advantage, they covenant to do each other no hurt,
but, on the contrary, to assist each other if necessity arises, each
retaining his independence. Such a covenant is valid so long as its
basis of danger or advantage is in force: no one enters into an
engagement, or is bound to stand by his compacts unless there be a hope
of some accruing good, or the fear of some evil: if this basis be
removed the compact thereby becomes void: this has been abundantly shown
by experience. For although different states make treaties not to harm
one another, they always take every possible precaution against such
treaties being broken by the stronger party, and do not rely on the
compact, unless there is a sufficiently obvious object and advantage to
both parties in observing it. Otherwise they would fear a breach of
faith, nor would there be any wrong done thereby; for who in his proper
senses, and aware of the right of the sovereign power, would trust in
the promises of one who has the will and the power to do what he likes,
and who aims solely at the safety and advantage of his dominion?
Moreover, if we consult loyalty and religion, we shall see that no one
in possession of power ought to abide by his promises to the injury of
his dominion; for he cannot keep such promises without breaking the
engagement he made with his subjects, by which both he and they are most
solemnly bound.
An enemy is one who lives apart from the state, and does not recognize
its authority either as a subject or as an ally. It is not hatred which
makes a man an enemy, but the rights of the state. The rights of the
state are the same in regard to him who does not recognize by any
compact the state authority, as they are against him who has done the
state an injury. It has the right to force him, as best it can, either
to submit, or to contract an alliance.
Lastly, treason can only be committed by subjects, who by compact,
either tacit or expressed, have transferred all their rights to the
state. A subject is said to have committed this crime when he has
attempted, for whatever reason, to seize the sovereign power, or to
place it in different hands. I say, _has attempted_, for if punishment
were not to overtake him till he had succeeded, it would often come too
late, the sovereign rights would have been acquired or transferred
already.
I also say, _has attempted, for whatever reasons, to seize the sovereign
power_, and I recognize no difference whether such an attempt should be
followed by public loss or public gain. Whatever be his reason for
acting, the crime is treason, and he is rightly condemned. In war, every
one would admit the justice of his sentence. If a man does not keep to
his post, but approaches the enemy without the knowledge of his
commander, whatever may be his motive, so long as he acts on his own
motion, even if he advances with the design of defeating the enemy, he
is rightly put to death, because he has violated his oath, and infringed
the rights of his commander. That all citizens are equally bound by
these rights in time of peace, is not so generally recognized, but the
reasons for obedience are in both cases identical. The state must be
preserved and directed by the sole authority of the sovereign, and such
authority and right have been accorded by universal consent to him
alone. If, therefore, any one else attempts, without his consent, to
execute any public enterprise, even though the state might (as we said)
reap benefit therefrom, such person has none the less infringed the
sovereign's right, and would be rightly punished for treason.
In order that every scruple may be removed, we may now answer the
inquiry, whether our former assertion that every one who has not the
practice of reason, may, in the state of Nature, live by sovereign
natural right, according to the laws of his desires, is not in direct
opposition to the law and right of God as revealed. For as all men
absolutely (whether they be less endowed with reason or more) are
equally bound by the Divine command to love their neighbor as
themselves, it may be said that they cannot, without wrong, do injury to
any one, or live according to their desires.
This objection, so far as the state of Nature is concerned, can be
easily answered, for the state of Nature is, both in nature and in time,
prior to religion. No one knows by nature that he owes any obedience to
God,[35] nor can he attain thereto by any exercise of his reason, but
solely by revelation confirmed by signs. Therefore, previous to
revelation, no one is bound by a Divine law and right of which he is
necessarily in ignorance. The state of Nature must by no means be
confounded with a state of religion, but must be conceived as without
either religion or law, and consequently without sin or wrong. This is
how we have described it, and we are confirmed by the authority of Paul.
It is not only in respect of ignorance that we conceive the state of
Nature as prior to, and lacking the Divine revealed law and right; but
in respect of freedom also, wherewith all men are born endowed....
It may be insisted that sovereigns are as much bound by the Divine law
as subjects; whereas we have asserted that they retain their natural
rights, and may do whatever they like.
In order to clear up the whole difficulty, which arises rather
concerning the natural right than the natural state, I maintain that
every one is bound, in the state of Nature, to live according to Divine
law, in the same way as he is bound to live according to the dictates of
sound reason; namely, inasmuch as it is to his advantage, and necessary
for his salvation; but, if he will not so live, he may do otherwise at
his own risk. He is thus bound to live according to his own laws, not
according to any one else's, and to recognize no man as a judge, or as a
superior in religion. Such, in my opinion, is the position of a
sovereign, for he may take advice from his fellow men, but he is not
bound to recognize any as a judge, nor any one besides himself as an
arbitrator on any question of right, unless it be a prophet sent
expressly by God and attesting his mission by indisputable signs. Even
then he does not recognize a man, but God Himself as his judge.
If a sovereign refuses to obey God as revealed in His law, he does so at
his own risk and loss, but without violating any civil or natural
right. For the civil right is dependent on his own decree; and natural
right is dependent on the laws of Nature, which latter are not adapted
to religion, whose sole aim is the good of humanity, but to the order of
Nature--that is, to God's eternal decree unknown to us.
This truth seems to be adumbrated in a somewhat obscurer form by those
who maintain that men can sin against God's revelation, but not against
the eternal decree by which He has ordained all things....
FOOTNOTES:
[32] From the _Tr. Th.-P._, ch. xvi, same title.
[33] In the state of social life, where general right determines what is
good or evil, stratagem is rightly distinguished as of two kinds, good
and evil. But in the state of Nature, where every man is his own judge,
possessing the absolute right to lay down laws for himself, to interpret
them as he pleases, or to abrogate them if he thinks it convenient, it
is not conceivable that stratagem should be evil.
[34] Whatever be the social state a man finds himself in, he may be
free. For certainly a man is free, in so far as he is led by reason. Now
reason (though Hobbes thinks otherwise) is always on the side of peace,
which cannot be attained unless the general laws of the state be
respected. Therefore the more a man is led by reason--in other words,
the more he is free, the more constantly will he respect the laws of his
country, and obey the commands of the sovereign power to which he is
subject.
[35] When Paul says that men have in themselves no refuge, he speaks as
a man: for in the ninth chapter of the same Epistle he expressly teaches
that God has mercy on whom He will, and that men are without excuse,
only because they are in God's power like clay in the hands of a potter,
who out of the same lump makes vessels, some for honor and some for
dishonor, not because they have been forewarned. As regards the Divine
natural law whereof the chief commandment is, as we have said, to love
God, I have called it a law in the same sense, as philosophers style
laws those general rules of Nature, according to which everything
happens. For the love of God is not a state of obedience: it is a virtue
which necessarily exists in a man who knows God rightly. Obedience has
regard to the will of a ruler, not to necessity and truth. Now as we are
ignorant of the nature of God's will, and on the other hand know that
everything happens solely by God's power, we cannot, except through
revelation, know whether God wishes in any way to be honored as a
sovereign.
Again; we have shown that the Divine rights appear to us in the light of
rights or commands, only so long as we are ignorant of their cause: as
soon as their cause is known, they cease to be rights, and we embrace
them no longer as rights but as eternal truths; in other words,
obedience passes into love of God, which emanates from true knowledge as
necessarily as light emanates from the sun. Reason then leads us to love
God, but cannot lead us to obey Him; for we cannot embrace the commands
of God as Divine, while we are in ignorance of their cause, neither can
we rationally conceive God as a sovereign laying down laws as a
sovereign.