THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE MORAL LIFE
_Introductory_
I have briefly explained the causes of human impotence and want of
stability, and why men do not obey the dictates of reason. It remains
for me now to show what it is which reason prescribes to us, which
emotions agree with the rules of human reason, and which, on the
contrary, are opposed to these rules. Before, however, I begin to
demonstrate these things by our full method, I should like briefly to
set forth here these dictates of reason, in order that what I have in my
mind about them may be easily comprehended by all.
Since reason demands nothing which is opposed to Nature, it demands,
therefore, that every person should love himself, should seek his own
profit--what is truly profitable to him--should desire everything that
really leads man to greater perfection, and absolutely that every one
should endeavor, as far as in him lies, to preserve his own being. This
is all true as necessarily as that the whole is greater than its part.
Again, since virtue means nothing but acting according to the laws of
our own nature, and since no one endeavors to preserve his being except
in accordance with the laws of his own nature, it follows: _Firstly_,
That the foundation of virtue is that endeavor itself to preserve our
own being, and that happiness consists in this--that a man can preserve
his own being. _Secondly_, It follows that virtue is to be desired for
its own sake, nor is there anything more excellent or more useful to us
than virtue, for the sake of which virtue ought to be desired.
_Thirdly_, It follows that all persons who kill themselves are impotent
in mind, and have been thoroughly overcome by external causes opposed to
their nature.
Again, we can never free ourselves from the need of something outside us
for the preservation of our being, and we can never live in such a
manner as to have no intercourse with objects which are outside us.
Indeed, so far as the mind is concerned, our intellect would be less
perfect if the mind were alone, and understood nothing but itself. There
are many things, therefore, outside us which are useful to us, and
which, therefore, are to be sought. Of all these, none more excellent
can be discovered than those which exactly agree with our nature. If,
for example, two individuals of exactly the same nature are joined
together, they make up a single individual, doubly stronger than each
alone. Nothing, therefore, is more useful to man than man. Men can
desire, I say, nothing more excellent for the preservation of their
being than that all should so agree at every point that the minds and
bodies of all should form, as it were, one mind and one body; that all
should together endeavor as much as possible to preserve their being,
and that all should together seek the common good of all. From this it
follows that men who are governed by reason--that is to say, men who,
under the guidance of reason, seek their own profit--desire nothing for
themselves which they do not desire for other men, and that, therefore,
they are just, faithful, and honorable.
These are those dictates of reason which I purposed briefly to set forth
before commencing their demonstration by a fuller method, in order that,
if possible, I might win the attention of those who believe that this
principle--that every one is bound to seek his own profit--is the
foundation of impiety, and not of virtue and piety.
_The Essence of Virtue_
I
According to the laws of his own nature each person necessarily desires
that which he considers to be good, and avoids that which he considers
to be evil.
The more each person strives and is able to seek his own profit, that is
to say, to preserve his being, the more virtue does he possess; on the
other hand, in so far as each person neglects his own profit, that is to
say, neglects to preserve his own being, is he impotent.
No one, therefore, unless defeated by external causes and those which
are contrary to his nature, neglects to seek his own profit or preserve
his being. No one, I say, refuses food or kills himself from a necessity
of his nature, but only when forced by external causes. The compulsion
may be exercised in many ways. A man kills himself under compulsion by
another when that other turns the right hand, with which the man had by
chance laid hold of a sword, and compels him to direct the sword against
his own heart; or the command of a tyrant may compel a man, as it did
Seneca, to open his own veins, that is to say, he may desire to avoid a
greater evil by a less. External and hidden causes also may so dispose
his imagination and may so affect his body as to cause it to put on
another nature contrary to that which it had at first, and one whose
idea cannot exist in the mind; but a very little reflection will show
that it is as impossible that a man, from the necessity of his nature,
should endeavor not to exist, or to be changed into some other form, as
it is that something should be begotten from nothing.
The endeavor after self-preservation is the essence itself of a thing.
If, therefore, any virtue could be conceived prior to this of
self-preservation, the essence itself of the thing would be conceived as
prior to itself, which (as is self-evident) is absurd.
The endeavor after self-preservation is the primary and only foundation
of virtue. For prior to this principle no other can be conceived, and
without it no virtue can be conceived.
No one endeavors to preserve his own being for the sake of another
object. For if a man endeavored to preserve his being for the sake of
any other object, this object would then become the primary foundation
of virtue (as is self-evident), which is an absurdity.
No one can desire to be happy, to act well and live well, who does not
at the same time desire to be, to act, and to live, that is to say,
actually to exist.
II
To act absolutely in conformity with virtue is nothing but acting
according to the laws of our own proper nature. But only in so far as
we understand do we act. Therefore, to act in conformity with virtue is
nothing but acting, living, and preserving our being as reason directs,
and doing so from the ground of seeking our own profit.[30]
In so far as a man is determined to action because he has inadequate
ideas he suffers, that is to say, he does something which through his
essence alone cannot be perceived, that is to say, which does not follow
from his virtue. But in so far as he is determined to any action because
he understands, he acts, that is to say he does something which is
perceived through his essence alone, or which adequately follows from
his virtue.
_The Highest Virtue of Reason_
All efforts which we make through reason are nothing but efforts to
understand, and the mind, in so far as it uses reason, adjudges nothing
as profitable to itself excepting that which conduces to understanding.
The mind, in so far as it reasons, desires nothing but to understand,
nor does it adjudge anything to be profitable to itself excepting what
conduces to understanding. But the mind possesses no certitude, unless
in so far as it possesses adequate ideas, or in so far as it reasons. We
do not know, therefore, that anything is certainly good, excepting that
which actually conduces to understanding, and, on the other hand, we do
not know that anything is evil excepting that which can hinder us from
understanding.
The highest thing which the mind can understand is God, that is to say,
Being absolutely infinite, and without whom nothing can be nor can be
conceived, and therefore that which is chiefly profitable to the mind,
or which is the highest good of the mind, is the knowledge of God.
Again, the mind acts only in so far as it understands and only in so far
can it be absolutely said to act in conformity with virtue. To
understand, therefore, is the absolute virtue of the mind. But the
highest thing which the mind can understand is God (as we have already
demonstrated), and therefore the highest virtue of the mind is to
understand or know God.
_THE MORAL VALUE OF THE EMOTIONS_
I
_General Principles_
That which so disposes the human body that it can be affected in many
ways, or which renders it capable of affecting external bodies in many
ways, is profitable to man, and is more profitable in proportion as by
its means the body becomes better fitted to be affected in many ways,
and to affect other bodies; on the other hand, that thing is injurious
which renders the body less fitted to affect or be affected.
Whatever is effective to preserve the proportion of motion and rest
which the parts of the human body bear to each other is good, and, on
the contrary, that is evil which causes the parts of the human body to
have a different proportion of motion and rest to each other.
In what degree these things may injure or profit the mind will be
explained below. Here I observe merely that I understand the body to die
when its parts are so disposed as to acquire a different proportion of
motion and rest to each other. For I dare not deny that the human body,
though the circulation of the blood and the other things by means of
which it is thought to live be preserved, may, nevertheless, be changed
into another nature altogether different from its own. No reason compels
me to affirm that the body never dies unless it is changed into a
corpse. Experience, indeed, seems to teach the contrary. It happens
sometimes that a man undergoes such changes that he cannot very well be
said to be the same man, as was the case with a certain Spanish poet of
whom I have heard, who was seized with an illness, and although he
recovered, remained, nevertheless, so oblivious of his past life that he
did not believe the tales and tragedies he had composed were his own,
and he might, indeed, have been taken for a grown-up child if he had
also forgotten his native tongue. But if this seems incredible, what
shall we say of children? The man of mature years believes the nature of
children to be so different from his own, that it would be impossible
to persuade him he had ever been a child, if he did not conjecture
regarding himself from what he sees of others. But in order to avoid
giving to the superstitious matter for new questions, I prefer to go no
farther in the discussion of these matters.
II
_Value of Joy and Sorrow_
Joy is an emotion by which the body's power of action is increased or
assisted. Sorrow, on the other hand, is an emotion by which the body's
power of action is lessened or restrained, and therefore joy is not
directly evil, but good; sorrow, on the other hand, is directly evil.
III
_The Good Emotions_
Cheerfulness is joy, which, in so far as it is related to the body,
consists in this, that all the parts of the body are equally affected,
that is to say, the body's power of action is increased or assisted, so
that all the parts acquire the same proportion of motion and rest to
each other. Cheerfulness, therefore, is always good, and can never be
excessive. But melancholy is sorrow, which, in so far as it is related
to the body consists in this, that the body's power of action is
absolutely lessened or restrained, and melancholy, therefore, is always
evil.
Pleasurable excitement is joy, which, in so far as it is related to the
body, consists in this, that one or some of the parts of the body are
affected more than others. The power of this emotion may, therefore, be
so great as to overcome the other actions of the body. It may cling
obstinately to the body; it may impede the body in such a manner as to
render it less capable of being affected in many ways, and therefore may
be evil. Again, pain, which, on the contrary, is sorrow, considered in
itself alone cannot be good. But because its power and increase is
limited by the power of an external cause compared with our own power,
we can therefore conceive infinite degrees of strength of this emotion,
and infinite kinds of it, and we can therefore conceive it to be such
that it can restrain an excess of pleasurable excitement, and so far (by
the first part of this proposition) preventing the body from becoming
less capable. So far, therefore, will pain be good.
Love is joy with the accompanying idea of an external cause. Pleasurable
excitement, therefore with the accompanying idea of an external cause,
is love, and therefore love may be excessive. Again, desire is greater
as the emotion from which it springs is greater. Inasmuch, therefore, as
an emotion may overpower the other actions of a man, so also the desire
which springs from this emotion may also overpower the other desires,
and may therefore exist in the same excess which we have shown (in the
preceding proposition) that pleasurable excitement possesses.
Cheerfulness, which I have affirmed to be good, is more easily imagined
than observed; for the emotions by which we are daily agitated are
generally related to some part of the body which is affected more than
the others, and therefore it is that the emotions exist for the most
part in excess, and so hold the mind down to the contemplation of one
object alone, that it can think about nothing else; and although men are
subject to a number of emotions, and therefore few are found who are
always under the control of one and the same emotion, there are not
wanting those to whom one and the same emotion obstinately clings. We
see men sometimes so affected by one object, that although it is not
present, they believe it to be before them; and if this happens to a man
who is not asleep, we say that he is delirious or mad. Nor are those
believed to be less mad who are inflamed by love, dreaming about nothing
but a mistress or harlot day and night, for they excite our laughter.
But the avaricious man who thinks of nothing else but gain or money, and
the ambitious man who thinks of nothing but glory, inasmuch as they do
harm, and are, therefore, thought worthy of hatred, are not believed to
be mad. In truth, however, avarice, lust, etc., are a kind of madness,
although they are not reckoned amongst diseases.
IV
_The Evil Emotions_
The man whom we hate we endeavor to destroy, that is to say we endeavor
to do something which is evil. Therefore hatred can never be good.[31]
Envy, mockery, contempt, anger, revenge, and the other affects which are
related to hatred or arise from it, are evil.
Everything which we desire because we are affected by hatred is base and
unjust in the State.
I make a great distinction between mockery (which I have said is bad)
and laughter; for laughter and merriment are nothing but joy, and
therefore, provided they are not excessive, are in themselves good.
Nothing but a gloomy and sad superstition forbids enjoyment. For why is
it more seemly to extinguish hunger and thirst than to drive away
melancholy? My reasons and my conclusions are these: No God and no human
being, except an envious one, is delighted by my impotence or my
trouble, or esteems as any virtue in us tears, sighs, fears, and other
things of this kind, which are signs of mental impotence; on the
contrary, the greater the joy with which we are affected, the greater
the perfection to which we pass thereby, that is to say, the more do we
necessarily partake of the divine nature. To make use of things,
therefore, and to delight in them as much as possible (provided we do
not disgust ourselves with them, which is not delighting in them), is
the part of a wise man. It is the part of a wise man, I say, to refresh
and invigorate himself with moderate and pleasant eating and drinking,
with sweet scents and the beauty of green plants, with ornament, with
music, with sports, with the theater, and with all things of this kind
which one man can enjoy without hurting another. For the human body is
composed of a great number of parts of diverse nature, which constantly
need new and varied nourishment, in order that the whole of the body may
be equally fit for everything which can follow from its nature, and
consequently that the mind may be equally fit to understand many things
at once. This mode of living best of all agrees both with our
principles and with common practice; therefore this mode of living is
the best of all, and is to be universally commended. There is no need,
therefore, to enter more at length into the subject.
All emotions of hatred are evil and therefore the man who lives
according to the guidance of reason will strive as much as possible to
keep himself from being agitated by the emotions of hatred and,
consequently, will strive to keep others from being subject to the same
emotions. But hatred is increased by reciprocal hatred, and, on the
other hand, can be extinguished by love, so that hatred passes into
love. Therefore he who lives according to the guidance of reason will
strive to repay the hatred of another, etc., with love, that is to say,
with generosity. He who wishes to avenge injuries by hating in return
does indeed live miserably. But he who, on the contrary, strives to
drive out hatred by love, fights joyfully and confidently, with equal
ease resisting one man or a number of men, and needing scarcely any
assistance from fortune. Those whom he conquers yield gladly, not from
defect of strength, but from an increase of it. These truths, however,
all follow so plainly from the definitions alone of love and the
intellect, that there is no need to demonstrate them singly.
V
_Necessary Evils_
(i)
The emotions of hope and fear cannot exist without sorrow; for fear is
sorrow, and hope cannot exist without fear. Therefore these emotions
cannot be good of themselves, but only in so far as they are able to
restrain the excesses of joy.
We may here add that these emotions indicate want of knowledge and
impotence of mind, and, for the same reason, confidence, despair,
gladness, and remorse are signs of weakness of mind. For although
confidence and gladness are emotions of joy, they nevertheless suppose
that sorrow has preceded them, namely, hope or fear. In proportion,
therefore, as we endeavor to live according to the guidance of reason,
shall we strive as much as possible to depend less on hope, to liberate
ourselves from fear, to rule fortune, and to direct our actions by the
sure counsels of reason.
Humility is sorrow, which springs from this, that a man contemplates his
own weakness. But in so far as a man knows himself by true reason is he
supposed to understand his essence, that is to say, his power. If,
therefore, while contemplating himself, he perceives any impotence of
his, this is not due to his understanding himself, but, as we have
shown, to the fact that his power of actions is restrained. But if we
suppose that he forms a conception of his own impotence because he
understands something to be more powerful than himself, by the knowledge
of which he limits his own power of action, in this case we simply
conceive that he understands himself distinctly, and his power of action
is increased. Humility or sorrow, therefore, which arises because a man
contemplates his own impotence, does not spring from true contemplation
or reason, and is not a virtue, but a passion.
Repentance is not a virtue, that is to say, it does not spring from
reason; on the contrary, the man who repents of what he has done is
doubly wretched or impotent. For, in the first place, we allow ourselves
to be overcome by a depraved desire, and, in the second place, by
sorrow.
Inasmuch as men seldom live as reason dictates, therefore these two
emotions, humility and repentance, together with hope and fear, are
productive of more profit than disadvantage, and therefore, since men
must sin, it is better that they should sin in this way. For if men
impotent in mind were all equally proud, were ashamed of nothing, and
feared nothing, by what bonds could they be united or constrained? The
multitude becomes a thing to be feared if it has nothing to fear. It is
not to be wondered at, therefore, that the prophets, thinking rather of
the good of the community than of a few, should have commended so
greatly humility, repentance and reverence. Indeed, those who are
subject to these emotions can be led much more easily than others, so
that, at last, they come to live according to the guidance of reason,
that is to say, become free men, and enjoy the life of the blessed.
(ii)
Pity is sorrow, and therefore is in itself evil. The good, however,
which issues from pity, namely, that we endeavor to free from misery the
man we pity, we desire to do from the dictate of reason alone; nor can
we do anything except by the dictate of reason alone, which we are sure
is good. Pity, therefore, in a man who lives according to the guidance
of reason is in itself bad and unprofitable.
Hence it follows that a man who lives according to the dictates of
reason endeavors as much as possible to prevent himself from being
touched by pity.
The man who has properly understood that everything follows from the
necessity of the divine nature, and comes to pass according to the
eternal laws and rules of Nature, will in truth discover nothing which
is worthy of hatred, laughter, or contempt, nor will he pity any one,
but, so far as human virtue is able, he will endeavor to _do well_, as
we say, and to _rejoice_. We must add also, that a man who is easily
touched by the emotion of pity, and is moved by the misery or tears of
another, often does something of which he afterward repents, both
because from an emotion we do nothing which we certainly know to be
good, and also because we are so easily deceived by false tears. But
this I say expressly of the man who lives according to the guidance of
reason. For he who is moved neither by reason nor pity to be of any
service to others is properly called inhuman; for he seems to be unlike
a man.
VI
_Diseased Emotions_
The primary foundation of virtue is the preservation of our being
according to the guidance of reason. The man, therefore, who is ignorant
of himself is ignorant of the foundation of all the virtues, and
consequently is ignorant of all the virtues. Again, to act in conformity
with virtue is nothing but acting according to the guidance of reason,
and he who acts according to the guidance of reason must necessarily
know that he acts according to the guidance of reason. He, therefore,
who is ignorant of himself, and consequently (as we have just shown)
altogether ignorant of all the virtues, cannot in any way act in
conformity with virtue, that is to say, is altogether impotent in mind.
Therefore the greatest pride or despondency indicates the greatest
impotence of mind.
Hence follows, with the utmost clearness, that the proud and the
desponding are above all others subject to emotions.
Despondency, nevertheless, can be corrected more easily than pride,
since the former is an emotion of sorrow, while the latter is an emotion
of joy, and is therefore stronger than the former.
Pride is joy arising from a man's having too high an opinion of himself.
This opinion a proud man will endeavor, as much as he can, to cherish,
and therefore, will love the presence of parasites or flatterers (the
definitions of these people are omitted, because they are too well
known), and will shun that of the noble-minded who think of him as is
right.
It would take too much time to enumerate here all the evils of pride,
for the proud are subject to all emotions, but to none are they less
subject than to those of love and pity. It is necessary, however, to
observe here that a man is also called proud if he thinks too little of
other people, and so, in this sense, pride is to be defined as joy which
arises from the false opinion that we are superior to other people,
while despondency, the contrary to this pride, would be defined as
sorrow arising from the false opinion that we are inferior to other
people. This being understood, it is easy to see that the proud man is
necessarily envious, and that he hates those above all others who are
the most praised on account of their virtues. It follows, too, that his
hatred of them is not easily overcome by love or kindness and that he is
delighted by the presence of those only who humor his weakness, and from
a fool make him a madman.
Although despondency is contrary to pride, the despondent man is closely
akin to the proud man. For since the sorrow of the despondent man arises
from his judging his own impotence by the power of virtue of others, his
sorrow will be mitigated, that is to say, he will rejoice, if his
imagination be occupied in contemplating the vices of others. Hence the
proverb-- It is a consolation to the wretched to have bad companions in
their misfortunes. On the other hand, the more the despondent man
believes himself to be below other people, the more will he sorrow; and
this is the reason why none are more prone to envy than the despondent;
and why they, above all others, try to observe men's actions with a view
to finding fault with them rather than correcting them, so that at last
they praise nothing but despondency and glory in it; but in such a
manner, however, as always to seem despondent.
These things follow from this emotion as necessarily as it follows from
the nature of a triangle that its three angles are equal to two right
angles. It is true, indeed, that I have said that I call these and the
like emotions evil, in so far as I attend to human profit alone; but the
laws of Nature have regard to the common order of Nature of which man
is a part--a remark I desired to make in passing, lest it should be
thought that I talk about the vices and absurdities of men rather than
attempt to demonstrate the nature and properties of things. As I said, I
consider human emotions and their properties precisely as I consider
other natural objects; and, indeed, the emotions of man, if they do not
show his power, show at least the power and workmanship of Nature, no
less than many other things which we admire and delight to contemplate.
VII
_Reasonable Emotions_
If we live according to the guidance of reason, we shall desire for
others the good which we seek for ourselves. Therefore if we see one
person do good to another, our endeavor to do good is assisted, that is
to say, we shall rejoice, and our joy (by hypothesis) will be
accompanied with the idea of the person who does good to the other, that
is to say, we shall favor him. Favor is not opposed to reason, but
agrees with it, and may arise from it.
Indignation, as it is defined by us, is necessarily evil; but it is to
be observed that when the supreme authority, constrained by the desire
of preserving peace, punishes a citizen who injures another, I do not
say that it is indignant with the citizen, since it is not excited by
hatred to destroy him, but punishes him from motives of piety.
Self-satisfaction is the joy which arises from a man's contemplating
himself and his power of action. But man's true power of action or his
virtue is reason itself, which he contemplates clearly and distinctly.
Self-satisfaction therefore arises from reason. Again, man, when he
contemplates himself, perceives nothing clearly and distinctly or
adequately, excepting those things which follow from his power of
action, that is to say, those things which follow from his power of
understanding; and therefore from this contemplation alone the highest
satisfaction which can exist arises.
Self-satisfaction is indeed the highest thing for which we can hope, for
(as we have shown), no one endeavors to preserve his being for the sake
of any end. Again, because this self-satisfaction is more and more
nourished and strengthened by praise, and, on the contrary more and more
disturbed by blame, therefore we are principally led by glory, and can
scarcely endure life with disgrace.
Self-exaltation is not opposed to reason, but may spring from it.
What is called vainglory is self-satisfaction, nourished by nothing but
the good opinion of the multitude, so that when that is withdrawn, the
satisfaction, that is to say, the chief good which every one loves,
ceases. For this reason those who glory in the good opinion of the
multitude anxiously and with daily care strive, labor, and struggle to
preserve their fame. For the multitude is changeable and fickle, so that
fame, if it be not preserved, soon passes away. As every one, moreover,
is desirous to catch the praises of the people, one person will readily
destroy the fame of another; and consequently, as the object of
contention is what is commonly thought to be the highest good, a great
desire arises on the part of every one to keep down his fellows by every
possible means, and he who at last comes off conqueror boasts more
because he has injured another person than because he has profited
himself. This glory of self-satisfaction, therefore, is indeed vain, for
it is really no glory.
What is worthy of notice with regard to shame may easily be gathered
from what has been said about compassion and repentance. I will only add
that pity, like shame, although it is not a virtue, is nevertheless
good, in so far as it shows that a desire of living uprightly is present
in the man who is possessed with shame, just as pain is called good in
so far as it shows that the injured part has not yet putrefied. A man,
therefore, who is ashamed of what he has done, although he is sorrowful,
is nevertheless more perfect that the shameless man who has no desire of
living uprightly.
These are the things which I undertook to establish with regard to the
emotions of joy and sorrow. With reference to the desires, these are
good or evil as they spring from good or evil emotions. All of them,
however, in so far as they are begotten in us of emotions which are
passions, are blind, as may easily be inferred from what has been said,
nor would they be of any use if men could be easily persuaded to live
according to the dictates of reason alone.
_The Life of Virtue_
I
All our efforts or desires follow from the necessity of our nature in
such a manner that they can be understood either through it alone as
their proximate cause, or in so far as we are a part of Nature, which
part cannot be adequately conceived through itself and without the other
individuals.
II
The desires which follow from our nature in such a manner that they can
be understood through it alone, are those which are related to the mind,
in so far as it is conceived to consist of adequate ideas. The remaining
desires are not related to the mind, unless in so far as it conceives
things inadequately, whose power and increase cannot be determined by
human power, but by the power of objects which are without us. The first
kind of desires, therefore, are properly called actions, but the latter
passions; for the first always indicate our power, and the latter, on
the contrary, indicate our impotence and imperfect knowledge.
III
Our actions, that is to say, those desires which are determined by man's
power or reason, are always good; the others may be good as well as
evil.
IV
It is therefore most profitable to us in life to make perfect the
intellect or reason as far as possible, and in this one thing consists
the highest happiness or blessedness of man; for blessedness is nothing
but the peace of mind which springs from the intuitive knowledge of God,
and to perfect the intellect is nothing but to understand God, together
with the attributes and actions of God, which flow from the necessity
of His nature. The final aim, therefore, of a man who is guided by
reason, that is to say, the chief desire by which he strives to govern
all his other desires, is that by which he is led adequately to conceive
himself and all things which can be conceived by his intelligence.
V
There is no rational life, therefore, without intelligence and things
are good only in so far as they assist man to enjoy that life of the
mind which is determined by intelligence. Those things alone, on the
other hand, we call evil which hinder man from perfecting his reason and
enjoying a rational life.
VI
But because all those things of which man is the efficient cause are
necessarily good, it follows that no evil can happen to man except from
external causes, that is to say, except in so far as he is a part of the
whole of Nature, whose laws human nature is compelled to obey--compelled
also to accommodate himself to this whole of Nature in almost an
infinite number of ways.
VII
It is impossible that a man should not be a part of Nature and follow
her common order; but if he be placed amongst individuals who agree with
his nature, his power of action will by that very fact be assisted and
supported. But if, on the contrary, he be placed amongst individuals who
do not in the least agree with his nature, he will scarcely be able
without great change on his part to accommodate himself to them.
VIII
Anything that exists in Nature which we judge to be evil or able to
hinder us from existing and enjoying a rational life, we are allowed to
remove from us in that way which seems the safest; and whatever, on the
other hand, we judge to be good or to be profitable for the preservation
of our being or the enjoyment of a rational life, we are permitted to
take for our use and use in any way we may think proper; and absolutely,
every one is allowed by the highest right of Nature to do that which he
believes contributes to his own profit.
IX
Nothing, therefore, can agree better with the nature of any object than
other individuals of the same kind, and so (see Sec. VII) there is nothing
more profitable to man for the preservation of his being and the
enjoyment of a rational life than a man who is guided by reason. Again,
since there is no single thing we know which is more excellent than a
man who is guided by reason, it follows that there is nothing by which a
person can better show how much skill and talent he possesses than by so
educating men that at last they will live under the direct authority of
reason.
X
In so far as men are carried away by envy or any emotion of hatred
towards one another, so far are they contrary to one another, and
consequently so much the more are they to be feared, as they have more
power than other individuals of nature.
XI
Minds, nevertheless, are not conquered by arms, but by love and
generosity.
XII
Above all things is it profitable to men to form communities and to
unite themselves to one another by bonds which may make all of them as
one man; and absolutely, it is profitable for them to do whatever may
tend to strengthen their friendships.
XIII
But to accomplish this skill and watchfulness are required; for men are
changeable (those being very few who live according to the laws of
reason), and nevertheless generally envious and more inclined to
vengeance than pity. To bear with each, therefore, according to his
disposition and to refrain from imitating his emotions requires a
singular power of mind. But those, on the contrary, who know how to
revile men, to denounce vices rather than teach virtues, and not to
strengthen men's minds but to weaken them, are injurious both to
themselves and others, so that many of them through an excess of
impatience and a false zeal for religion prefer living with brutes
rather than amongst men; just as boys or youths, unable to endure with
equanimity the rebukes of their parents, fly to the army, choosing the
discomforts of war and the rule of a tyrant rather than the comforts of
home and the admonitions of a father, suffering all kinds of burdens to
be imposed upon them in order that they may revenge themselves upon
their parents.
XIV
Although, therefore, men generally determine everything by their
pleasure, many more advantages than disadvantages arise from their
common union. It is better, therefore, to endure with equanimity the
injuries inflicted by them, and to apply our minds to those things which
subserve concord and the establishment of friendship.
XV
The things which beget concord are those which are related to justice,
integrity, and honor; for besides that which is unjust and injurious,
men take ill also anything which is esteemed base, or that any one
should despise the received customs of the State. But in order to win
love, those things are chiefly necessary which have reference to
religion and piety.
XVI
Concord, moreover, is often produced by fear, but it is without good
faith. It is to be observed, too, that fear arises from impotence of
mind, and therefore is of no service to reason; nor is pity, although it
seems to present an appearance of piety.
XVII
Men also are conquered by liberality, especially those who have not the
means wherewith to procure what is necessary for the support of life.
But to assist every one who is needy far surpasses the strength or
profit of a private person, for the wealth of a private person is
altogether insufficient to supply such wants. Besides, the power of any
one man is too limited for him to be able to unite every one with
himself in friendship. The care, therefore, of the poor is incumbent on
the whole of society and concerns only the general profit.
XVIII
In the receipt of benefits and in returning thanks, care altogether
different must be taken.
XIX
The love of a harlot, that is to say, the lust of sexual intercourse,
which arises from mere external form, and absolutely all love which
recognizes any other cause than the freedom of the mind, easily passes
into hatred, unless, which is worse, it becomes a species of delirium,
and thereby discord is cherished rather than concord.
XX
With regard to marriage, it is plain that it is in accordance with
reason, if the desire of connection is engendered not merely by external
form, but by a love of begetting children and wisely educating them; and
if, in addition, the love both of the husband and wife has for its cause
not external form merely, but chiefly liberty of mind.
XXI
Flattery, too, produces concord, but only by means of the disgraceful
crime of slavery or perfidy; for there are none who are more taken by
flattery than the proud, who wish to be first and are not so.
XXII
There is a false appearance of piety and religion in dejection; and
although dejection is the opposite of pride, the humble dejected man is
very near akin to the proud.
XXIII
Shame also contributes to concord, but only with regard to those matters
which cannot be concealed. Shame, too, inasmuch as it is a kind of
sorrow, does not belong to the service of reason.
XXIV
The remaining emotions of sorrow which have man for their object are
directly opposed to justice, integrity, honor, piety, and religion; and
although indignation may seem to present an appearance of equity, yet
there is no law where it is allowed to every one to judge the deeds of
another, and to vindicate his own or another's right.
XXV
Affability, that is to say, the desire of pleasing men, which is
determined by reason, is related to piety. But if affability arise from
an emotion, it is ambition or desire, by which men, generally under a
false pretense of piety, excite discords and seditions. For he who
desires to assist other people, either by advice or by deed, in order
that they may together enjoy the highest good, will strive, above all
things, to win their love, and not to draw them into admiration, so
that a doctrine may be named after him, nor absolutely to give any
occasion for envy. In common conversation, too, he will avoid referring
to the vices of men, and will take care only sparingly to speak of human
impotence, while he will talk largely of human virtue or power, and of
the way by which it may be made perfect, so that men being moved not by
fear or aversion, but solely by the emotion of joy, may endeavor as much
as they can to live under the rule of reason.
XXVI
Excepting man, we know no individual thing in Nature in whose mind we
can take pleasure, nor any thing which we can unite with ourselves by
friendship or any kind of intercourse, and therefore regard to our own
profit does not demand that we should preserve anything which exists in
Nature excepting men, but teaches us to preserve it or destroy it in
accordance with its varied uses, or to adapt it to our own service in
any way whatever.
XXVII
The profit which we derive from objects without us, over and above the
experience and knowledge which we obtain because we observe them and
change them from their existing forms into others, is chiefly the
preservation of the body, and for this reason those objects are the most
profitable to us which can feed and nourish the body, so that all its
parts are able properly to perform their functions. For the more capable
the body is of being affected in many ways, and affecting external
bodies in many ways, the more capable of thinking is the mind. But there
seem to be very few things in Nature of this kind, and it is
consequently necessary for the requisite nourishment of the body to use
many different kinds of food; for the human body is composed of a great
number of parts of different nature, which need constant and varied food
in order that the whole of the body may be equally adapted for all those
things which can follow from its nature, and consequently that the mind
also may be equally adapted to conceive many things.
XXVIII
The strength of one man would scarcely suffice to obtain these things if
men did not mutually assist one another. As money has presented us with
an abstract of everything, it has come to pass that its image above
every other usually occupies the mind of the multitude, because they can
imagine hardly any kind of joy without the accompanying idea of money as
its cause.
XXIX
This, however, is a vice only in those who seek money not from poverty
or necessity, but because they have learned the arts of gain, by which
they keep up a grand appearance. As for the body itself, they feed it in
accordance with custom, but sparingly, because they believe that they
lose so much of their goods as they spend upon the preservation of their
body. Those, however, who know the true use of money, and regulate the
measure of wealth according to their needs, live contented with few
things.
XXX
Since, therefore, those things are good which help the parts of the body
to perform their functions, and since joy consists in this, that the
power of man, in so far as he is made up of mind and body, is helped or
increased, it follows that all things which bring joy are good. But
inasmuch as things do not work to this end--that they may affect us with
joy--nor is their power of action guided in accordance with our profit,
and finally, since joy is generally related chiefly to some one part of
the body, it follows that generally the emotions of joy (unless reason
and watchfulness be present), and consequently the desires which are
begotten from them, are excessive. It is to be added, that an emotion
causes us to put that thing first which is sweet to us in the present,
and that we are not able to judge the future with an equal emotion of
the mind.
XXXI
Superstition, on the contrary, seems to affirm that what brings sorrow
is good, and, on the contrary, that what brings joy is evil. But, as we
have already said, no one, excepting an envious man, is delighted at my
impotence or disadvantage, for the greater the joy with which we are
affected, the greater the perfection to which we pass, and consequently
the more do we participate in the divine nature; nor can joy ever be
evil which is controlled by a true consideration for our own profit. On
the other hand, the man who is led by fear, and does what is good that
he may avoid what is evil, is not guided by reason.
XXXII
But human power is very limited, and is infinitely surpassed by the
power of external causes, so that we do not possess an absolute power to
adapt to our service the things which are without us. Nevertheless we
shall bear with equanimity those things which happen to us contrary to
what a consideration of our own profit demands, if we are conscious that
we have performed our duty, that the power we have could not reach so
far as to enable us to avoid those things, and that we are a part of the
whole of Nature, whose order we follow. If we clearly and distinctly
understand this, the part of us which is determined by intelligence,
that is to say, the better part of us, will be entirely satisfied
therewith, and in that satisfaction will endeavor to persevere; for, in
so far as we understand, we cannot desire anything excepting what is
necessary, nor, absolutely, can we be satisfied with anything but the
truth. Therefore in so far as we understand these things properly will
the efforts of the better part of us agree with the order of the whole
of Nature.
FOOTNOTES:
[30] ... If it agreed better with a man's nature that he should hang
himself, could any reasons be given for his not hanging himself? Can
such a nature possibly exist? If so, I maintain (whether I do or do not
grant free will), that such an one, if he sees that he can live more
conveniently on the gallows than sitting at his own table, would act
most foolishly, if he did not hang himself. So any one who clearly saw
that, by committing crimes, he would enjoy a really more perfect and
better life and existence, than he could attain by the practice of
virtue, would be foolish if he did not act on his convictions. For, with
such a perverse human nature as his, crime would become virtue. _From a
letter to Wm. Blyenbergh_ (March 13, 1665).
[31] It is to be observed that here and in the following I understand by
hatred, hatred towards men only.