OF HUMAN BONDAGE
_Introductory_
The impotence of man to govern or restrain the emotions I call bondage,
for a man who is under their control is not his own master, but is
mastered by fortune, in whose power he is, so that he is often forced to
follow the worse, although he sees the better before him. I propose in
this part to demonstrate why this is, and also to show what of good and
evil the emotions possess.
But before I begin I should like to say a few words about perfection and
imperfection, and about good and evil. If a man has proposed to do a
thing and has accomplished it, he calls it perfect, and not only he, but
every one else who has really known or has believed that he has known
the mind and intention of the author of that work will call it perfect
too. For example, having seen some work (which I suppose to be as yet
not finished), if we know that the intention of the author of that work
is to build a house, we shall call the house imperfect; while, on the
other hand, we shall call it perfect as soon as we see the work has been
brought to the end which the author had determined for it. But if we see
any work such as we have never seen before, and if we do not know the
mind of the workman, we shall then not be able to say whether the work
is perfect or imperfect.
This seems to have been the first signification of these words; but
afterwards men began to form universal ideas, to think out for
themselves types of houses, buildings, castles, and to prefer some types
of things to others; and so it happened that each person called a thing
perfect which seemed to agree with the universal idea which he had
formed of that thing, and, on the other hand, he called a thing
imperfect which seemed to agree less with his typal conception,
although, according to the intention of the workman, it had been
entirely completed. This appears to be the only reason why the words
_perfect_ and _imperfect_ are commonly applied to natural objects which
are not made with human hands; for men are in the habit of forming, both
of natural as well as of artificial objects, universal ideas which they
regard as types of things, and which they think Nature has in view,
setting them before herself as types too; it being the common opinion
that she does nothing except for the sake of some end. When, therefore,
men see something done by Nature which does not altogether answer to
that typal conception which they have of the thing, they think that
Nature herself has failed or committed an error, and that she has left
the thing imperfect.
Thus we see that the custom of applying the words _perfect_ and
_imperfect_ to natural objects has arisen rather from prejudice than
from true knowledge of them. For we have shown that Nature does nothing
for the sake of an end, for that eternal and infinite Being whom we call
God or Nature acts by the same necessity by which He exists; for we have
shown that He acts by the same necessity of nature as that by which He
exists. The reason or cause, therefore, why God or Nature acts and the
reason why He exists are one and the same. Since, therefore, He exists
for no end, He acts for no end; and since He has no principle or end of
existence, He has no principle or end of action. A final cause, as it is
called, is nothing, therefore, but human desire, in so far as this is
considered as the principle or primary cause of anything. For example,
when we say that the having a house to live in was the final cause of
this or that house, we merely mean that a man, because he imagined the
advantages of a domestic life, desired to build a house. Therefore,
having a house to live in, in so far as it is considered as a final
cause, is merely this particular desire, which is really an efficient
cause, and is considered as primary, because men are usually ignorant of
the causes of their desires; for, as I have often said, we are conscious
of our actions and desires, but ignorant of the causes by which we are
determined to desire anything. As for the vulgar opinion that Nature
sometimes fails or commits an error, or produces imperfect things, I
class it amongst those fictions mentioned above.[29]
Perfection, therefore, and imperfection are really only modes of
thought; that is to say, notions which we are in the habit of forming
from the comparison with one another of individuals of the same species
or genus, and this is the reason why I have said that by reality and
perfection I understand the same thing; for we are in the habit of
referring all individuals in Nature to one genus, which is called the
most general; that is to say, to the notion of being, which embraces
absolutely all the individual objects in Nature. In so far, therefore,
as we refer the individual objects in Nature to this genus, and compare
them one with another, and discover that some possess more being or
reality than others, in so far do we call some more perfect than others;
and in so far as we assign to the latter anything which, like
limitation, termination, impotence, etc., involves negation, shall we
call them imperfect, because they do not affect our minds so strongly as
those we call perfect, but not because anything which really belongs to
them is wanting, or because Nature has committed an error. For nothing
belongs to the nature of anything excepting that which follows from the
necessity of the nature of the efficient cause, and whatever follows
from the necessity of the nature of the efficient cause necessarily
happens.
With regard to good and evil, these terms indicate nothing positive in
things considered in themselves, nor are they anything else than modes
of thought, or notions which we form from the comparison of one thing
with another. For one and the same thing may at the same time be both
good and evil or indifferent. Music, for example, is good to a
melancholy person, bad to one mourning, while to a deaf man it is
neither good nor bad. But although things are so, we must retain these
words. For since we desire to form for ourselves an idea of man upon
which we may look as a model of human nature, it will be of service to
us to retain these expressions in the sense I have mentioned.
By _good_, therefore, I understand in the following pages everything
which we are certain is a means by which we may approach nearer and
nearer to the model of human nature we set before us. By _evil_, on the
contrary, I understand everything which we are certain hinders us from
reaching that model. Again, I shall call men more or less perfect or
imperfect in so far as they approach more or less nearly to this same
model. For it is to be carefully observed, that when I say that an
individual passes from a less to a greater perfection and _vice versa_,
I do not understand that from one essence or form he is changed into
another (for a horse, for instance, would be as much destroyed if it
were changed into a man as if it were changed into an insect), but
rather we conceive that his power of action, in so far as it is
understood by his own nature, is increased or diminished. Finally, by
perfection generally, I understand, as I have said, reality; that is to
say, the essence of any object in so far as it exists and acts in a
certain manner, no regard being paid to its duration. For no individual
thing can be said to be more perfect because for a longer time it has
persevered in existence; inasmuch as the duration of things cannot be
determined by their essence, the essence of things involving no fixed or
determined period of existence; any object, whether it be more or less
perfect, always being able to persevere in existence with the same force
as that with which it commenced existence. All things, therefore, are
equal in this respect.
_Definitions_
I.--By good, I understand that which we certainly know is useful to us.
II. By evil, on the contrary, I understand that which we certainly know
hinders us from possessing anything that is good.
With regard to these two definitions, see the close of the preceding.
III. I call individual things contingent in so far as we discover
nothing, whilst we attend to their essence alone, which necessarily
posits their existence or which necessarily excludes it.
IV. I call these individual things possible, in so far as we are
ignorant, whilst we attend to the cause from which they must be
produced, whether these causes are determined to the production of these
things.
V. By contrary emotions, I understand in the following pages those
which, although they may be of the same kind, draw a man in different
directions; such as voluptuousness and avarice, which are both a species
of love, and are not contrary to one another by nature, but only by
accident.
VI. I here call a thing past or future in so far as we have been or
shall be affected by it; for example, in so far as we have seen a thing
or are about to see it, in so far as it has strengthened us or will
strengthen us, has injured or will injure us. For in so far as we thus
imagine it do we affirm its existence; that is to say, the body is
affected by no mode which excludes the existence of the thing, and
therefore the body is affected by the image of the thing in the same way
as if the thing itself were present. But because it generally happens
that those who possess much experience hesitate when they think of a
thing as past or future, and doubt greatly concerning its issue,
therefore the emotions which spring from such images of things are not
so constant, but are generally disturbed by the images of other things,
until men become more sure of the issue.
However, it is to be observed that it is the same with time as it is
with place; for as beyond a certain limit we can form no distinct
imagination of distance--that is to say, as we usually imagine all
objects to be equally distant from us, and as if they were on the same
plane, if their distance from us exceeds 200 feet, or if their distance
from the position we occupy is greater than we can distinctly
imagine--so we imagine all objects to be equally distant from the
present time, and refer them as if to one moment, if the period to which
their existence belongs is separated from the present by a longer
interval than we can usually imagine distinctly.
VII. By end for the sake of which we do anything, I understand appetite.
VIII. By virtue and power, I understand the same thing; that is to say,
virtue, in so far as it is related to man, is the essence itself or
nature of the man in so far as it has the power of effecting certain
things which can be understood through the laws of its nature alone.
_Axiom_
There is no individual thing in Nature which is not surpassed in
strength and power by some other thing; but any individual thing being
given, another and a stronger is also given, by which the former can be
destroyed.
_Man's Place in Nature_
The power by which individual things and, consequently, man preserve
their being is the actual power of God or Nature, not in so far as it is
infinite, but in so far as it can be manifested by the actual essence of
man. The power therefore of man, in so far as it is manifested by his
actual essence is part of the infinite power of God or Nature, that is
to say, part of His essence. Again, if it were possible that man could
suffer no changes but those which can be understood through his nature
alone, it would follow that he could not perish, but that he would exist
forever necessarily; and this necessary existence must result from a
cause whose power is either finite or infinite, that is to say, either
from the power of man alone, which would be able to place at a distance
from himself all other changes which could take their origin from
external causes, or it must result from the infinite power of Nature by
which all individual things would be so directed that man could suffer
no changes but those tending to his preservation.
But the first case is absurd. The force by which man perseveres in
existence is limited, and infinitely surpassed by the power of external
causes. This is evident from the Axiom. Therefore if it were possible
for a man to suffer no changes but those which could be understood
through his own nature alone, and consequently (as we have shown) that
he should always necessarily exist, this must follow from the infinite
power of God; and therefore from the necessity of the divine nature, in
so far as it is considered as affected by the idea of any one man, the
whole order of Nature, in so far as it is conceived under the attributes
of thought and extension, would have to be deduced. From this it would
follow that man would be infinite, which (by the first part of this
demonstration) is an absurdity. It is impossible, therefore, that a man
can suffer no changes but those of which he is the adequate cause.
Hence it follows that a man is necessarily always subject to passions,
and that he follows and obeys the common order of Nature, accommodating
himself to it as far as the nature of things requires. The force and
increase of any passion and its perseverance in existence are not
limited by the power by which we endeavor to persevere in existence, but
by the power of an external cause compared with our own power.
_The Nature of Good and Evil_
We call a thing good which contributes to the preservation of our being,
and we call a thing evil if it is an obstacle to the preservation of our
being; that is to say, a thing is called by us good or evil as it
increases or diminishes, helps or restrains, our power of action. In so
far, therefore, as we perceive that any object affects us with joy or
sorrow do we call it good or evil, and therefore the knowledge of good
or evil is nothing but an idea of joy or sorrow which necessarily
follows from the emotion itself of joy or sorrow. But this idea is
united to the emotion in the same way as the mind is united to the body,
or, in other words, this idea is not actually distinguished from the
emotion itself; that is to say, it is not actually distinguished from
the idea of the modification of the body, unless in conception alone.
This knowledge, therefore, of good and evil is nothing but the emotion
itself of joy and sorrow in so far as we are conscious of it.
_The Control of the Emotions_
An emotion, in so far as it is related to the mind, is an idea by which
the mind affirms a greater or less power of existence for its body than
the body possessed before. Whenever, therefore, the mind is agitated by
any emotion, the body is at the same time affected with a modification
by which its power of action is increased or diminished. Again, this
modification of the body receives from its own cause a power to
persevere in its own being, a power, therefore, which cannot be
restrained nor removed unless by a bodily cause affecting the body with
a modification contrary to the first, and stronger than it. Thus the
mind is affected by the idea of a modification stronger than the former
and contrary to it; that is to say, it will be affected with an emotion
stronger than the former and contrary to it, and this stronger emotion
will exclude the existence of the other or remove it. Thus an emotion
cannot be restrained nor removed unless by an opposed and stronger
emotion.
An emotion, in so far as it is related to the mind, cannot be restrained
nor removed unless by the idea of a bodily modification opposed to that
which we suffer and stronger than it. For the emotion which we suffer
cannot be restrained nor removed unless by an opposed and stronger
emotion; that is to say, it cannot be removed unless by the idea of a
bodily modification stronger than that which affects us, and opposed to
it.
The force and increase of any passion and its perseverance in existence
are limited by the power of an external cause compared with our own
power and therefore the other actions or power of a man may be so far
surpassed by force of some passion or emotion, that the emotion may
obstinately cling to him.
An emotion is an idea by which the mind affirms a greater or less power
of existence for the body than it possessed before, and therefore this
idea has nothing positive which can be removed by the presence of the
truth, and consequently the true knowledge of good and evil, in so far
as it is true, can restrain no emotion. But in so far as it is an
emotion will it restrain any other emotion, provided that the latter be
the weaker of the two.
From the true knowledge of good and evil, in so far as this is an
emotion, necessarily arises desire, which is greater in proportion as
the emotion from which it springs is greater. But this desire (by
hypothesis), because it springs from our understanding, something truly
follows therefore in us in so far as we act, and therefore must be
understood through our essence alone, and consequently its strength and
increase must be limited by human power alone. But the desires which
spring from the emotions by which we are agitated are greater as the
emotions themselves are greater, and therefore their strength and
increase must be limited by the power of external causes, a power which,
if it be compared with our own, indefinitely surpasses it. The desires,
therefore, which take their origin from such emotions as these may be
much stronger than that which takes its origin from a true knowledge of
good and evil, and the former may be able to restrain and extinguish the
latter.
Desire is the very essence of man, that is to say, the effort by which a
man strives to persevere in his being. The desire, therefore, which
springs from joy, by that very emotion of joy is assisted or increased,
while that which springs from sorrow, by that very emotion of sorrow is
lessened or restrained, and so the force of the desire which springs
from joy must be limited by human power, together with the power of an
external cause, while that which springs from sorrow must be limited by
human power alone. The latter is, therefore, weaker than the former.
_How the Strength of the Emotions Varies_
I
The imagination is an idea by which the mind contemplates an object as
present, an idea which nevertheless indicates the constitution of the
human body rather than the nature of the external object. Imagination,
therefore, is an emotion in so far as it indicates the constitution of
the body. But the imagination increases in intensity in proportion as we
imagine nothing which excludes the present existence of the external
object. If, therefore, we imagine the cause of an emotion to be actually
present with us, that emotion will be intenser or stronger than if we
imagined the cause not to be present.
When I said that we are affected by the image of an object in the future
or the past with the same emotion with which we should be affected if
the object we imagined were actually present, I was careful to warn the
reader that this was true in so far only as we attend to the image alone
of the object itself, for the image is of the same nature whether we
have imagined the object or not; but I have not denied that the image
becomes weaker when we contemplate as present other objects which
exclude the present existence of the future object.
The image of a past or future object, that is to say, of an object which
we contemplate in relation to the past or future to the exclusion of the
present, other things being equal, is weaker than the image of a present
object, and consequently the emotion towards a future or past object,
other things being equal, is weaker then than the emotion towards a
present object.
The desire which springs from a knowledge of good and evil can be easily
extinguished or restrained, in so far as this knowledge is connected
with the future, by the desire of things which in the present are sweet.
II
In so far as we imagine any object to be necessary do we affirm its
existence, and, on the other hand, we deny its existence in so far as we
imagine it to be not necessary and therefore the emotion towards an
object which we imagine as necessary, other things being equal, is
stronger than that towards an object that is possible, contingent, or
not necessary.
In so far as we imagine an object as contingent, we are not affected by
the image of any other object which posits the existence of the first,
but, on the contrary (by hypothesis), we imagine some things which
exclude its present existence. But in so far as we imagine any object in
the future to be possible do we imagine some things which posit its
existence, that is to say, things which foster hope or fear, and
therefore the emotion towards an object which we know does not exist in
the present, and which we imagine as possible, other things being equal,
is stronger than the emotion towards a contingent object.
The emotion towards an object which we imagine to exist in the present
is stronger than if we imagined it as future, and is much stronger if we
imagine the future to be at a great distance from the present time. The
emotion, therefore, towards an object which we imagine will not exist
for a long time is so much feebler than if we imagined it as present,
and nevertheless is stronger than if we imagined it as contingent; and
therefore the emotion towards a contingent object is much feebler than
if we imagined the object to be present to us.
In so far as we imagine an object as contingent, we are affected with no
image of any other object which posits the existence of the first. On
the contrary, we imagine (by hypothesis) certain things which exclude
its present existence. But in so far as we imagine it in relationship to
past time are we supposed to imagine something which brings it back to
the memory or which excites its image and therefore so far causes us to
contemplate it as present. Therefore, the emotion towards a contingent
object which we know does not exist in the present, other things being
equal, will be weaker than the emotion towards a past object.
In these propositions I consider that I have explained why men are more
strongly influenced by an opinion than by true reason, and why the true
knowledge of good and evil causes disturbance in the mind, and often
gives way to every kind of lust, whence the saying of the poet, "_Video
meliora proboque, deteriora sequor._" The same thought appears to have
been in the mind of the Preacher when he said, "_He that increaseth
knowledge increaseth sorrow._" I say these things not because I would be
understood to conclude, therefore, that it is better to be ignorant than
to be wise, or that the wise man in governing his passions is nothing
better than the fool, but I say them because it is necessary for us to
know both the strength and weakness of our nature, so that we may
determine what reason can do and what it cannot do in governing our
emotions.
FOOTNOTES:
[29] Chapter Eight _ad fin._