CHAPTER VIII

ON CERTAIN OBJECTIONS TO THE WAGNERIAN DRAMA

In this chapter I propose to consider certain criticisms which are

often made on Wagner's treatment of the drama, which differ from some

of those mentioned before, in being intelligible and worthy of

respect, since they have not been made maliciously or through

ignorance. In so far as they are invalid they rest upon

misunderstandings which can easily be accounted for by Wagner's

unparalleled originality, by the novelty of his art, necessarily

involving a wide departure from the classic standards by which alone

the critic can form his judgment. To comprehend his work we must give

up many of those cherished canons which hitherto have passed

unquestioned.

Wagner's _Tristan_ has often--even by Lichtenberger--been

described as a philosophic work; and as abstract thought or

philosophy, it is said, is foreign to art, a work which admits it must

be condemned. Let us first understand what is meant by philosophy. It

is surely a train of thought in the mind of the spectator, not in the

object which he contemplates. Anything in the world may be the subject

of philosophic thought, or may suggest it; there is plenty of

philosophy to be drawn from a daisy, but we do not therefore call a

daisy a philosophic flower. So, too, we may philosophize about

Wagner's _Tristan_, but the philosophy is our own; it is not in

the work. What is meant no doubt is that the work itself is not a

concrete reality, but an exposition of an abstract conception.

Philosophy has only herself to blame if abstractions are in the naïf,

ordinary mind opposed to realities, for it is unhappily true that

nearly the whole of our current philosophy does consist of

abstractions which are mere "Hirngespinnste," rooted in words and not

in nature; philosophy itself has in art become a term of reproach from

being associated with unreality. We must, however, distinguish between

notions which are real but difficult to grasp and those which cannot

be grasped, because there is nothing in them, and this distinction

cannot be made without thought and labour from which the ordinary mind

shrinks, being too indolent or indifferent. Poetry is not opposed to

philosophy, and is not the less poetry when it concerns itself with

those higher notions which are outside the range of our more ordinary

comprehension, [Greek: ho¯s philosophias ousaes megistaes monsikaes].

Both poetry and philosophy deal in abstractions, only in both the

abstractions must be true, i.e. must be true general statements of

ideas found in nature; when this is the case poetry and philosophy

are indistinguishable, except by mere external and conventional

features. Under which heading are we to class, for example, Plato's

_Republic_? Or the _Upanishads_? or the book of _Job_? They

are generally thought of as philosophy, but all who have even partially

understood them will feel their poetic spell. Or if we take our greatest

poems, to mention only some of those most familiar to us: _Paradise

Lost_, Goethe's _Faust_ or Marlowe's, Tennyson's _In Memoriam_,

Fitzgerald's _Rubáiyát_--all of these might be just as well classed under

philosophy as under poetry. Only untrue philosophy is unpoetical, that

which has grown out of the reason of man. Abstractions manufactured

by human reason are no more philosophy than an account of centaurs

and gryphons is natural history. They are not to be found in Wagner's

_Tristan_.

The particular philosophy which Wagner's _Tristan_ is supposed to

set forth is that of Schopenhauer. But Schopenhauer's doctrine of

Negation of Will or Nirvâna--for it is identical with that of

Buddhism--is a negation of existence itself absolutely. The man who

puts an end to his own life does not attain Nirvâna; he is not

dissatisfied with life in itself, but only with its conditions, and he

passes through the endless cycle of Samsâra until the moment arrives

when, sickened with the wearisome struggle, he longs for complete

annihilation. The lovers in _Tristan_ look forward to a renewed

existence beyond the grave, in the "realm of night," where, freed from

the trammels of the senses their love will endure, purified from the

pollution of human lust in glory undimmed by the sordid conditions of

human life.

Sehnen hin zur heil'gen Nacht

Wo ur-ewig einzig wahr

Liebes-Wonne ihm lacht.

Such a future life would with Schopenhauer only be a renewal of the

misery of existence in another form. It is the Christian, not the

Buddhist, way of feeling that inspires the lovers. Christianity starts

from the insufficiency and misery of human life, but contemplates

redemption therefrom by love, whereas Buddhism conceives of no

possibility of redemption. Its release is annihilation, and it is a

religion of despair, not of hope.

It would be interesting, if it did not take us too far from our

present subject, to compare this conception of love with that of

Sokrates as set forth in the _Symposium_ of Plato. Sokrates

believed fully in immortality, but wisely refrained from speculating

on the conditions of existence after death. His _Eros_ is

confined to this life, but none the less he treats it as a divine

gift. Love is the mediator and interpreter between gods and men; and

love of the beautiful, which manifests itself in the procreation and

love of offspring, is the desire for immortality, the children being

the continuation of the immortal part of their parents.[29] This is

the lower mystery. The higher, which is not revealed to all, is the

gradual expansion of love until it comprehends the eternal Idea. The

beauty which we love in the individual becomes a stepping-stone from

which we may rise to the love of all beautiful things, passing from

one to many, from beautiful forms to beautiful deeds, from them to

beautiful thoughts, laws, institutions, sciences, until we contemplate

the vast sea of beauty in the boundless love of wisdom, a beauty which

does not grow and perish, but is eternal. There could be no finer

commentary on Wagner's _Tristan_ than this wondrous speech of

Sokrates in the _Symposium_.

[Footnote 29: It is worth noting in passing how this beautiful

conception of Plato coincides with views expressed in our own day by a

scientific man of the highest distinction, the foremost living

representative of Darwinian evolution, Professor Weismann. See his

_Essays on Heredity_.]

It is true, however paradoxical it may seem, that Wagner's very

stupendous power is itself a source of weakness; it is too great for

more limited minds to grasp. If love is really the one divine fact of

human existence, to which all else is as nothing; and if at the same

time a pure and burning love resolutely followed of necessity leads to

destruction, then how are we to live at all? Is this life to count for

nothing? I shall not attempt to answer this question. I cannot bring

the truth that all noble and generous actions are bound to end in

failure, to bring death upon their doers, within the scheme of a

divinely ordered universe. I will only observe that it is a truth

tacitly acknowledged by all who compose tragedies or take pleasure in

witnessing them. How else could we endure to contemplate the failure

and destruction of a Lear, a Wallenstein, a Deianira, an Antigone?

Here our attempts to extract philosophy out of the Tristan drama must

cease. My only purpose has been to show that its abstractions are warm

with the living breath of reality, and whatever is beyond this must be

left for the student to carry out for himself, from the point of view

of his own mind. Such exercises are interesting and salutary to the

philosophic mind, but for minds trained in the modern formulas of

"self-interest" and "liberty" they are only possible after a complete

reconstruction of the foundations of knowledge, a "revaluation of all

values."

The decisive part played by the magic love-potion has given rise to

much comment. Hostile critics ridicule it, and condemn the whole work

as turning on an absurdity, while those who are favourable try to

explain it away, but their explanations have always seemed to me more

unnatural than the thing explained. Why may we not accept it as it is

evidently intended? In art at least, rationalism has not yet--thanks

perhaps to Shakespearian traditions--prevailed so far that we must

exclude supernatural motives altogether. Wagner could scarcely have

used the myth and the names of Tristan and Isolde without introducing

the philtre with which they have always been associated. It would be

just as reasonable to explain away the ghost in _Hamlet_ as the

love-potion of Isolde; if we accept one we can accept the other, for

in both the prime mover of the tragedy is supernatural. Lessing, in

comparing the ghost of Hamlet's father with the ghost of Ninus in

Voltaire's _Semiramis_, has some remarks which are equally valid

for all supernatural motives in the drama. The principle which he

evolves is that a supernatural being to be admissible must interest us

for its own sake as a living and acting personage; in other words, it

must be an organic portion of the play, not a mere machine brought in

for stage effect. "Voltaire treats the apparition of a dead person as

a miracle, Shakespeare as a perfectly natural occurrence." I do not

think that the difference between what is allowable and what is not

could be more clearly put than in this last sentence. We are not

obliged to believe that the potion is the sole cause of their love;

that they hated each other as deadly enemies at one moment and became

lovers at the next. Such a notion would be altogether too crude. We

are justified in supposing that behind Isolde's rage and Tristan's

disdain there lies a deeper feeling, as yet unconfessed but

sufficiently deep-rooted to endure when the anger of the moment has

passed away, and that this is what is effected by the draught.

A very marked characteristic or mannerism of Wagner's dramas is the

tedious length of explanation in some scenes or soliloquies, and they

have often been severely criticized. There is one in _Tristan_,

King Marke's speech at the end of Act II., and I may say at once that

after all that has been said the objections cannot be entirely set

aside. It numbers nearly two hundred bars in slow tempo, and takes

about ten minutes. The argument generally used in defending it is that

the action is laid within, and the interest is in the music. But the

objection--to me at least--is not that the action is at a standstill,

but that the scene is undramatic, and much of it unmitigated prose.

The action has stood still nearly all through the act, but no one

would wish to miss a bar of any other portion. The king's reproaches

of his friend and vassal for his treachery, and the music with its

gloomy orchestration, mostly of horns, bassoons, viola, and lower

strings, with occasional English horn, and the deepest notes of the

clarinet interspersed with wails of the bass-clarinet, are profoundly

touching and proceed naturally out of the situation. Had there been

nothing more than these it might have been much shorter, but Wagner

has taken the occasion to try to throw some light upon the

circumstances that preceded the events of the play. If they were to be

told they should have been told earlier. Here we have forgotten our

perplexity at the beginning and are now thrilled with the situation,

not at all in the mood for hearing explanations. Nor does it really

explain; if the hearer does not already know why Isolde was brought to

be the bride of King Marke, he will scarcely learn it from Marke's

speech.

When I spoke just now of Wagner's predilection for long soliloquies

and prosy explanations as a mannerism, I do not think that I was

expressing myself too strongly. Thus in _Die Walküre_, in Wotan's

long speech to Brünnhilde in Act II., he sketches the main events of

_Das Rheingold_. In _Siegfried_ the amusing riddle scene, a

reminiscence of the Eddic _Alvísmál_, seems intended to relate

events which have gone before. In _Götterdämmerung_ it is

Siegfried who just before his death tells the story of the preceding

evening.[30] In _Parsifal_ Gurnemanz explains all the circumstances

to the Knappen. How undramatic are these explanations we shall

realize when we compare them with such soliloquies as Tannhäuser's

account of his pilgrimage or Siegmund's story of his life, which, though

equally lengthy, keep us spellbound from the first bar to the last,

because they directly lead up to and form part of the scene which is

actually before us. Tannhäuser's wild aspect and manner, Siegmund's

desolation and longing for community with other human beings, are in

direct connection with the story told.

[Footnote 30: From which we may conclude that Wagner when composing

the tetralogy contemplated the separate numbers being sometimes

performed singly. For this the explanations are again inadequate. Much

better it would have been to provide at the performance a short

printed or spoken introduction, a plan which in my humble opinion

might well be adopted in most plays.]

I am, of course, only expressing an individual opinion, because I feel

bound in giving a full account of the work to say how it appears to

me; others may very probably feel it differently. It matters little.

Even if I am right in thinking that Wagner has miscalculated the

effect on the stage, _Tristan_ will still remain a work

immeasurably superior to a thousand that are faultless.

Wagner's "Tristan und Isolde": An Essay on the Wagnerian Drama · 第 8 / 11 章