Continued troubles with the Indians--English emissaries in
Kentucky--Mission of Antoine Gamelin--Preparations for war--Campaign of
General Harmar--Successive defeats of Colonel Hardin--Conduct of the
militia--Retreat of Harmar--Indian deputation to Lord Dorchester--Letter
of Sir John Johnson--Colonel Gordon--Letter of Brant to Colonel
McKee--Pacific views of Lord Dorchester--Renewed efforts of the United
States to bring the Indians to peace--Interposition of
Corn-planter--Mission of Corn-planter and Colonel Proctor--British
officers wish a mediation--Letter of Colonel Gordon--Colonel Pickering
holds an Indian Council at the Chemung--Red Jacket's course--Brant
interferes--Indian Councils at Buffalo--Influence of Colonel John Butler
and Brant--Mission of Colonel Proctor and Corn-planter
frustrated--Important position of Brant--Correspondence between the
Secretary of War and Governor Clinton--Colonel Pickering's Council with
the Indians at Painted Post--Mission of Hendrick, the Stockbridge
chief--Renewal of hostilities--Campaign of General St. Clair---His
defeat--Thayendanegea among the Indian captains--The panic that
followed--Clamor against St. Clair--His resignation--Wayne appointed his
successor--Refusal of Colonel Willett to embark in an Indian war.
Notwithstanding the treaties of peace concluded by General St. Clair with
all the Six Nations, the Mohawks excepted, and with several of the great
north-western tribes, the tranquility of the frontier settlements, now
extending four hundred miles along the Ohio, had not been secured. The
Shawanese, Miamis, and Wabash Indians [FN-1] still kept up a bloody war,
ravaging the settlements of Kentucky, and the territory now known as Ohio,
and causing serious apprehensions in the frontier settlements of Virginia.
The President had made every possible effort to conciliate the Indians by
just and pacific overtures, but in vain. [FN-2] Even the Indians with whom
one of the treaties had been formed, could not all of them be restrained
from the warpath. There was, moreover, another angry cloud lowering in the
western sky. The governments of the United States and Spain were at issue
on the question of the navigation of the Mississippi, respecting which
strong solicitude was felt by the people of the west--especially of
Kentucky. Not satisfied with fomenting discontents among the Indians at
the north, the English government, availing itself of the Spanish
question, and hoping, should the mouth of the Mississippi be ultimately
closed against the commerce of the United States, that disaffection might
ensue in the west, was believed to have despatched secret agents into
Kentucky, with propositions to test the fidelity of the people to the
Union. Among these emissaries was Lieutenant Colonel Connolly, of Detroit,
a loyalist formerly of Fort Pitt, who had espoused the cause of the crown
in the Revolution. He held several confidential conferences with some of
the most influential citizens of Kentucky, and attempted to seduce them
into a project for making a descent upon New Orleans, seizing the city,
and securing the navigation of the Mississippi by force, as a necessary
consequence. Information of these secret proceedings was transmitted to
the President, who, looking upon the intrigue as an attempt to divide the
Union, was prompt in concerting measures to detect any farther
machinations of the kind. [FN-3] What progress was made in sowing the
seeds of disaffection, or whether any, does not appear.
* * * * *
[FN-1] Such were the statements of the accounts of that day. In the early
part of the present year, however, Captain McKee, the active (British)
Indian Agent at Detroit, wrote to Captain Brant--"The Indians of the
Miamis, I understand, have been more quiet than usual this year, few
hostilities having been committed, and those by that nation alone." In
the same letter Captain McKee stated that a quarrel had arisen between
the Miamis and Delawares respecting the lands occupied by the latter,
who were so much offended as to be preparing to retire across to the
Spanish side of the Mississippi. The Captain added:--"Their withdrawing
themselves at this time will be extremely detrimental, not only to the
Indian confederacy, but to the country in general, as it will draw a
number of others after them who do not consider the consequences." McKee
invoked Captain Brant to send the disaffected Delawares a speech, to
prevent their separation. But if this request was complied with, it
failed of the desired effect. The Indians in question carried their
design of a removal into execution.
[FN-2] "The basis of our proceedings with the Indian nations has been,
and shall be, _justice_, during the period in which I have any thing to
do with the administration of this government"--_Letter of President
Washington to the Marquis de Lafayette, Aug._ 1790.
[FN-3] Sparks's Life and Correspondence of Washington, vol. ix. pages
473, '76. Letter of President Washington to Mr. Innes, and Notes. These
attempts upon the fidelity of Kentucky were made in 1788 and 1789. In the
following year, in the prospect of a war between Great Britain and Spain,
apprehensions of trouble between the United States and the former arose
from the same quarters, but upon a very different question. From certain
circumstances which came to the knowledge of the President, it was
believed that Lord Dorchester, in the event of a war with Spain, had it
in contemplation to send an expedition from Detroit for the invasion of
Louisiana. This could not be done without marching an army across the
whole breadth of the territory of the United States. On the 25th of
August, President Washington communicated his apprehensions to the
members of his cabinet, the Vice-President, and the Chief Justice, (Jay,)
requiring their opinions in writing upon the course proper to be pursued
by the Government of the United States in such an emergency.
In the Spring of 1790, Antoine Gamelin, an experienced Indian merchant,
was despatched to visit all the principal tribes of the west, as a
messenger of peace, with a view of ascertaining the general temper of the
Indians. Among the tribes who had entered into the treaty, he found the
old chiefs and warriors generally well disposed, and by no means hostile.
But with these exceptions, the war feeling was almost universal. Of the
spirit that prevailed, an idea may be formed from the following notes of
Gamelin, of his interview with the Ouiatanons and Kickapoos:--"After my
speech, one of the head chiefs got up and told me: 'You, Gamelin, my
friend and son-in-law, we are pleased to see in our village, and to hear
by your mouth the good words of the Great Chief. We thought to receive a
few words from the French people, [traders,] but I see the contrary. None
but the Big Knife is sending speeches to us. You know that we can
terminate nothing without the consent of our elder brethren, the Miamis.
I invite you to proceed to their village, and to speak to them. There is
one thing in your speech I do not like. I will not tell of it. Even was I
drunk, I would not perceive it; but our elder brethren will certainly take
notice of it in your speech. You invite us to stop our young men. It is
impossible to do it, being constantly encouraged by the British.'" Another
chief said: "The Americans are very flattering in their speeches; many
times our nation went to their rendezvous. I was once there myself. Some
of our chiefs died on the route, and we always came back all naked; and
you, Gamelin, you came with a speech, but with empty hands." Another chief
said: "Know ye that the village of Ouiatanon is the sepulchre of our
ancestors. The chief of America invites us to go to him, if we are for
peace; he has not his leg broke, being able to go as far as the Illinois.
He might come here himself, and we should be glad to see him in our
village. We confess that we accepted the axe, but it was by the reproach
that we continually receive from the English and other nations, which
received the axe first, calling us women; at the same time they invite our
young men to war. As to the old people, they are wishing for peace." [FN]
* * * * *
[FN] Gamelin's Journal, Am. State Papers, Vol IV. p. 93.
All the endeavors of the President to give security to the parties by
peaceful arrangements having proved unavailing, vigorous offensive
measures were determined upon, and an expedition against the hostile
tribes was entrusted to General Harmar, a veteran of the revolution. His
force consisted of fourteen hundred and fifty men, three hundred and
twenty of whom were regular troops, and the residue levies of the
Pennsylvania and Kentucky militia. The object was to bring the Indians to
an engagement, if possible; if not, in any event to destroy their
settlements on the waters of the Scioto and Wabash. [FN-1] The expedition
left Fort Washington on the 30th of September, 1790. The Indians at first
abandoned their principal town, after applying the torch to it, but
rallied subsequently upon a detachment of two hundred and ten men,
commanded by Colonel Harden, thirty of whom were regulars, and gave
battle. At the first fire Harden's militia all ran away. The regulars
maintained their ground for a time, and fought bravely until but seven of
their number were able to escape. On the next day Col. Harden, at the head
of three hundred and sixty men, sixty of whom were regulars, undertook to
retrieve their disgrace. They were met by the Indians, and a bloody
conflict ensued near the junction of the St. Joseph and St. Mary rivers.
The militia, for a miracle, fought bravely on this occasion. Overpowered
by numbers, however, they were defeated, with the loss of several gallant
officers, and one hundred and eighty-three men--seventy-five of whom were
regulars. Among the former were Majors Fontaine and Wyllys, and Lieutenant
Frothingham. Ten militia officers were also among the slain. The Indians
lost about one hundred and twenty warriors. The battle was severely
fought, and ended in the flight of the Americans. General Harmar thereupon
returned to Fort Washington and claimed the victory--with what propriety
has never been ascertained. [FN-2]
* * * * *
[FN-1] Holmes--Marshall.
[FN-2] A letter to Captain Brant, written from Detroit, gave a still more
disastrous account of this affair than was admitted by the American
authorities. The following is an extract:--"I have to inform you that
there have been two engagements about the Miami towns, between the
Americans and the Indians, in which, it is said, the former had about
five hundred men killed, and that the rest have retreated. The loss was
only fifteen or twenty on the side of the Indians. The Shawanese, Miamis,
and Pottawattamies were, I understand, the principal tribes who were
engaged; but I do not learn that any of the nations have refused their
alliance or assistance, and it is confidently reported that they are now
marching against the frontiers on the Ohio. As Mr. McKee writes to the
chiefs at the Grand River, he will be able to state circumstances more
particularly than I can. The gentlemen of the garrison beg their
compliments."---MS. _Letter of John Smith to Captain Brant._
Flushed and emboldened by their success, the depredations of the Indians
became more frequent, and the condition of the frontier was more
deplorable than it had been previous to this ill-fated expedition. [FN-1]
Nor were their aggressions confined to the settlements along the Ohio and
the Kentucky border. Two of the Seneca Indians having been murdered by the
whites, that nation, with others among the warriors of the Six Nations,
were becoming more hostile; and the consequence was, that early in the
Spring of 1791, the Pennsylvania settlements along the Allegheny river,
above Pittsburgh, experienced repeated and fearful visitations of Indian
retribution. Several stations of the settlers were entirely broken up. The
murders of women and children were frequent, and were often attended with
circumstances of undiminished inhumanity, while many people were carried
into captivity. [FN-2]
* * * * *
[FN-1] "It appears, from the most indubitable testimony, that from 1783,
when peace was made, to October, 1790, when the United States commenced
offensive operations against them, on the Ohio and the frontiers, the
Indians killed and wounded, and took prisoners, about fifteen hundred
men, women, and children; besides taking away two thousand horses and a
large quantity of other property"--_Narrative and Sufferings of Massy
Harbison._
[FN-2] Idem.
News of the disastrous victory of General Harmar having reached the seat
of government, a regiment was added to tho permanent military
establishment, and the President was authorised to raise a body of two
thousand men for six months, to appoint a major and a brigadier general
to continue in command so long as he should think their services
necessary. [FN-1] No time was lost in calling this augmented force into
the field, and Major General Arthur St. Clair, Governor of the territory
north west of the Ohio, was appointed Commander-in-chief, and charged with
the conduct of the meditated expedition; the immediate objects of which
were to destroy the Indian villages on the Miamis, to expel the Indians
from that country, and to connect it with the Ohio by a chain of posts
which would prevent their return during the war. [FN-2]
* * * * *
[FN-1] Marshall's life of Washington.
[FN-2] Holmes's Annals.
It appears that on the repulse of Harmar, the confederated nations of the
Chippewas, Pottawattamies, Hurons, Shawanese, Delawares, Ottawas, Tustans,
and Six Nations--after a consultation at the foot of the Miami Rapids with
Capt. McKee,--deputed a representation of chiefs and warriors to visit
Lord Dorchester at Quebec, for the purpose of consultation, and also to
ascertain whether any, and if any, what, assistance might be expected from
the British or provincial government. Lord Dorchester's views were
doubtless at that time pacific, as also were those of Captain
Brant--provided always that the United States would establish the Ohio as
the boundary, and relinquish all claims of jurisdiction beyond that river.
On the 22d of February, 1791, Sir John Johnson addressed a letter to
Captain Brant, from Montreal, enclosing a copy of a letter from Lord
Dorchester to himself and another copy of the same to Captain McKee, the
purport of which can only be inferred from the letter of the Baronet. It
is accordingly inserted:--
"Sir John Johnson to Captain Brant. (Private.)
"_Montreal,_ 22_d Feb'y,_ 1791.
"Dear Joseph,
"As I think the Six Nations much interested in the business proposed by
the inclosed copy of a letter from Lord Dorchester, (another copy of which
I transmit to Mr. McKee,) I could not think of withholding it from you,
that you may take such steps, in concert with Mr. McKee and the western
nations, as you may judge most conducive to their interest and honor. As
you certainly are all free and independent, I think you will have a right
to insist upon disposing of whatever lands you judge fit to reserve for
the General Confederacy, in whatever manner, and to whomsoever you please.
The idea of the States claiming a jurisdiction up to the line of
separation settled between Great Britain and them, must arise from a
supposition that the Indians, at some time or other, allowed that power
to our Provinces for the better government of their subjects. Whether or
not that is the case, I know not, nor can I at present find out; but
certain I am that without such a cession of power on the part of the
Indians, no just right or claim to such a power can be supported beyond
the line of 1768, and to the western line of the land ceded or sold by the
Indians to the States since the war. This is certainly a nice point, and
may not be proper to insist upon too positively; but in justice I believe
it is as I have stated. When the Indians allowed the English and French to
build forts for the protection and support of their subjects and trade,
they no doubt had a right to a certain jurisdiction or command round those
places, but I never believe it extended farther, or that the Indians meant
it should. Upon the whole, you understand your own rights better than I
do. I shall therefore say no more than to recommend coolness and a manly
firmness in whatever you may determine on. As I mean this letter as
entirely private, I shall acquaint you that I believe this measure has
been thought of by Lord Dorchester, in consequence of my writing to him
on receiving the account of the expedition carried on last Fall by the
Americans against the Miamis, at which time I took the liberty of saying
that the Americans had no claim to any part of the country beyond the
line established in 1768, at Fort Stanwix, between the Indians and the
Governors and agents of all the Provinces interested, and including the
sales made since the war; and that I therefore thought, as we could not
afford them assistance in arms, we should at least afford them our
mediation to bring about a peace between them and the States, on terms
just and honorable, or something to that purpose. You may converse with,
or write freely to Mr. McKee upon the subjects of this letter, but let it
be as from yourself--perhaps I may say something similar to him if time
will permit. I have wrote Lord Dorchester that an answer might be had to
his inquiries by some time the beginning of May, but I fear not; a great
deal will depend on you, however, in forwarding the packet to Mr. McKee,
which let me intreat you to lose no time in doing. My best wishes attend
you all, and believe me as ever sincerely yours,
"John Johnson.
"_Captain Brant._"
Colonel Gordon, commanding the British post at Niagara, was also at that
time and afterward, a friend of peace. On the 4th of March he addressed a
letter to Captain Brant, from which the following is an extract:--"I hope
you will embrace the present opportunity of the meeting of the chiefs of
the Five Nations in your neighborhood, to use your endeavors to heal the
wounds between the Indians and Americans. I dare say the States wish to
make peace on terms which will secure to the Indians their present
possessions in the Miami country, provided the young men are restrained
from committing depredations in future." The temper of the chief himself,
at this period, can best be determined by the following extracts from a
letter addressed by himself to Captain McKee, three days after the letter
from Colonel Gordon was written, and probably immediately on its
receipt:--
"Captain Brant to Captain McKee. (Extracts.)
"_Grand River, March_ 7, 1791."
* * * * *
"I have received two letters from the States, from gentlemen who have been
lately in Philadelphia; by which it appears the Americans secretly wish to
accommodate the matter--which I should by all means advise, if it could be
effected upon honorable and liberal terms, and a peace become general."
* * * * *
"I am happy to see in Sir John's last letter to me, that he has suggested
to his Lordship the necessity of their interference in bringing about a
peace between the Indians and the United States; by which it appears he
has an idea of recommending the line settled in 1768 [qu? 1765] between
the Indians and government, as the northern and western boundary of the
States in that quarter. I expect to hear more from him in the Spring on
that subject, as I have pressed him hard to give me his sentiments on the
utility of my interference in the present dispute."
Lord Dorchester's speech in reply to the deputation already mentioned, was
of a similar tenor to the preceding letter of Sir John Johnson. His
Lordship informed them that he should be glad to be instrumental in
restoring peace. He informed them that the line marked out in the treaty
of peace with the United States, implied no more than that beyond that
line the King their father would not extend his interference; and that the
King had only retained possession of the posts until such time as all the
differences between him and the United States should be settled. In regard
to the questions of the deputation, whether it was true that, in making
peace with the States, the King had given away their lands, his Lordship
assured them that such was not the fact, inasmuch as the King never had
any right to their lands, other than to such as had been fairly ceded by
themselves, with their own free consent, by public convention and sale.
On this point, his Lordship likewise referred to the treaty with Sir
William Johnson, at Fort Stanwix, in 1766. In conclusion, he assured the
deputation, that although the Indians had their friendship and good-will,
the Provincial Government had no power to embark in a war with the United
States, and could only defend themselves if attacked. He also informed
them that the command of the province was about to devolve upon General
Clarke; and that Prince Edward, [FN-1] who had just arrived with a chosen
band of warriors, would be the second in command. His Lordship himself was
on the eve of embarking for England, where it would afford him great
pleasure to hear that peace had been established between the Indians and
United States upon a just and solid foundation. [FN-2]
* * * * *
[FN-1] The late Duke of Kent, father of the present young Queen of
England.
[FN-2] Journal of Major General Lincoln, which will be more particularly
referred to hereafter.
This speech afforded but small encouragement to the Indians, and most
likely but ill corresponded with the expectations that had been raised by
McKee, and other subordinate officers in the British Indian Department at
the remote posts--of whom several, like McKee, were refugee Americans,
indulging bitter hatred toward the country which they had deserted in the
hour of its peril. Indeed, there is no reason to distrust the manly and
honorable conduct of Lord Dorchester during the greater part of this
singular border contest, the progress of which was marked by so many
vicissitudes of feeling and action on the part of many of the Provincial
authorities. And besides, the attitude of the two nations was at that
moment less seemingly belligerent than it shortly afterward became.
During these side negotiations in Canada, and while the preparations for
another campaign by the American government, as already mentioned, were
in progress, no relaxations of efforts to prevent the farther effusion of
blood were allowed to take place. Captain O'Bail, or the Corn-planter as
he was usually called, the principal chief of the Senecas, being in
Philadelphia in the month of December, after the defeat of General Harmar,
was induced not only to use his influence to prevent the warriors of the
Six Nations from taking a part in the contest, but also to undertake a
mission with other friendly Indians to the country of the Miamis, to
persuade them to peace, also, if possible. In March following, the
Corn-planter, with whom Colonel Proctor, an active officer in the
(American) Indian Department had been associated, set out upon the
mission. Meantime, measures were adopted to draw the Indians of the Six
Nations to a general conference at a distance from the theatre of war, in
order, not only to prevent their joining the war, but, if necessary, to
obtain some of their young warriors for the service against the Miamis and
the other hostile tribes. This attempt to create a diversion of the Six
Nations, however, was looked upon with displeasure by the Provincial
authorities in Canada, as will be seen by the annexed letter from Colonel
Gordon to Captain Brant. It also appears from this letter, that these
Provincials were ambitious of being appealed to by the government of the
United States as mediators in the controversy. Nor was this an individual
conceit of Colonel Gordon, inasmuch as Sir John Johnson had hinted the
same thing, as was evident from his letter, after consultation with Lord
Dorchester. It will farther appear by the address of the letter, that the
ever-vigilant Brant was already once more in the country of the Miamis,
although but a very few days previous he had been assisting at a private
council at Buffalo. His movements in all these matters, as in the war of
the Revolution, seem to have been as rapid as the light.
"Colonel Gordon to Captain Brant.
"_Niagara, June_ 11_th,_ 1791.
"Dear Sir,
"I was glad to find by your letter, from the foot of the Rapids, to
Colonel Butler, that you was in good health; and I very sincerely hope the
business you are engaged in, will be attended with success.
"From the inconsistent proceedings of the Americans, I am perfectly at a
loss to understand their full intentions. Whilst they are assembling
councils at different quarters with the avowed purpose of bringing about
a peace, the Six Nations have received a speech from General St. Clair,
dated at Pittsburgh, 23d April, inviting them to take up the hatchet
against their brothers the western nations.
"Can any thing be more inconsistent? or can they possibly believe the
Indians are to be duped by such shallow artifices? This is far from being
the case; the Indians at Buffalo Creek saw the business in its proper
light, and treated the invitation with the contempt it deserved. It must
strike you very forcibly, that in all the proceedings of the different
Commissioners from the American States, they have cautiously avoided
applying for our interference, as a measure they affect to think perfectly
unnecessary; wishing to impress the Indians with ideas of their own
consequence, and of the little influence, they would willingly believe,
we are possessed of. This, my good friend, is not the way to proceed. Had
they, before matters were pushed to extremity, requested the assistance of
the British Government to bring about a peace on equitable terms, I am
convinced the measure would have been fully accomplished long before this
time.
"I would, however, willingly hope they will yet see the propriety of
adopting this mode of proceeding; and that peace, an object so much to be
desired, will at length be permanently settled.
"I am the more sanguine in the attainment of my wishes, by your being on
the spot, and that you will call forth the exertion of your influence and
abilities on the occasion. Let me hear from time to time how matters are
going forward, and with my wishes for your health, believe me
"Your friend,
A. Gordon.
"_Captain Brant._"
The Council of the Six Nations, always excepting the Mohawks, was
successfully held by Colonel Timothy Pickering, in the Chemung country,
in the month of June. But the Corn-planter and Colonel Proctor met with
insurmountable difficulties in the prosecution of their mission. The
special object of that mission, after traversing the country of the Six
Nations, and exerting such wholesome influence upon them as might be in
their power, was to charter a vessel at Buffalo Creek, and proceed to
Sandusky, and if possible induce the Miamis to meet General St. Clair in
council on the Ohio. They were every where well received on the route from
Allegheny to Buffalo Creek, at which place a grand Council was called in
honor of their arrival, and attended by Red Jacket and other chiefs.
After having been welcomed by a speech from Red Jacket, Colonel Proctor
opened to them the message from General Washington, the great chief of the
Thirteen Fires. Red Jacket replied, that many persons had previously at
different times been among them, professing to come by the authority of
the Thirteen Fires, but of the truth of which declarations they were not
always convinced. In the course of the conversation, it was ascertained
that at a private council held at that place one week before, at which
Captain Brant and Colonel Butler, of the British Indian department, were
present, these officers had uttered the same doubts now started by Red
Jacket. Brant had advised the Indians to pay no attention to Proctor and
O'Bail, of whose approach and purpose he was aware, and to render them no
assistance in their projected visit to Sandusky, assuring them it should
do no good; but that Colonel Proctor, and all who would accompany him to
the country of the Miamis, would be put to death. They also ascertained,
that while holding the said private council, in anticipation of their
visit, Captain Brant had received secret instructions from
"head-quarters," [FN] to repair to Grand River, and from thence to
Detroit. It was believed by a French trader who gave the information, and
also by Captain Powell of the British service, who confirmed it, that the
Mohawk chief had been sent to the Indians hostile to the United States,
with instructions of _some_ kind; and the Indians at Buffalo Creek had
been charged by Brant to conclude upon nothing with Proctor and O'Bail
before his return.
* * * * *
[FN] The words used in Col. Proctor's narrative; but whether he meant the
British or Indian head-quarters, the author cannot say. Probably the
former.
Colonel Proctor and O'Bail continued at Buffalo from the 27th of April to
the 22d or 23d of May. The Indians collected in large numbers, and many
councils were held. On the 8th of May, the Fish-carrier, one of the
principal Cayuga chiefs, and the right hand man of Captain Brant, declared
in a speech that O'Bail had taken a course that was not approved by
them--that more than one half of the Indians there, _were not for peace,_
[FN-1] and that Captain Brant had been sent to the council-fire of the
Miamis. "We must, therefore," he added, "see his face, for we can't
determine until we know what they are about. So we beg you to grant our
request, to keep your mind easy; for we, who do this business, look on
you, and hold ourselves to be slaves in making of peace. Now, we all say
you must look for Captain Brant's coming, to hear the words that come from
his mouth, for then we can say to you, what towns will be for peace; and
this is all that we have to say to you for this time." [FN-2]
* * * * *
[FN-1] Proctor's Journal
[FN-2] American State papers--Indian Department.
An effort was made by Red Jacket to induce Proctor and O'Bail to go down
to the British fortress at Niagara to hold a consultation with Colonel
Butler; but Colonel Proctor declined the adoption of any such course. The
Indians thereupon despatched a messenger for Colonel Butler to meet them
at Buffalo Creek, which he accordingly did--but previously called a
separate council at Fort Erie. He afterward had an interview with Proctor,
and endeavored to dissuade him from visiting the country of the hostile
Indians,--proposing that the negotiations for a peace should be left to
Captain Brant and McKee, who, Colonel Butler thought, could best manage
the business. Of course a proposition going to clothe British subjects
with power to negotiate for the government of the United States, was
promptly rejected.
One of the leading objects of Colonel Proctor in meeting the Six Nations
at Buffalo, was to induce as many of their sachems and warriors as he
could, to accompany the Corn-planter and himself to the Miamis country,
to aid, by their influence, in bringing the hostile Indians into a more
pacific temper; but from the whole cast of the deliberations, it was
perfectly evident that the majority of the leading chiefs were under the
direct influence of the British officers, who, it was obvious, had now
suddenly become less pacific than they had very recently been. Colonel
Proctor met with but little success in persuading a portion of the
warriors to accompany him to the Miamis; and on applying to Colonel
Gordon, commanding at Niagara, for permission to charter a British
schooner on Lake Erie, to transport himself and such Indians as might
feel disposed to accompany himself and Corn-planter to Sandusky, the
request was peremptorily refused. The expedition was thus abruptly
terminated, and Colonel Proctor returned to Fort Washington.
Before leaving Buffalo, however, according to an entry in his journal,
Colonel Proctor seems to have been apprised of the fact, which will
subsequently appear, that Captain Brant had not gone to the Miamis as a
messenger, or an observer merely, but that he had actually gone to join
them with his warriors:--
"_May_ 21st. Being in private conversation this evening with Captain
O'Bail, and sitting between him and the New-Arrow sachem, I hinted to
Captain O'Bail that if he would go and join General St. Clair with
thirty-five or forty of his warriors, as well equipped as he could make
them, purely to counterbalance the force that Brant had taken with him to
the unfriendly Indians, I would use endeavors with the Secretary of War
to procure him a commission that should yield to him and his people a
handsome stipend. He replied, that the Senecas had received a stroke from
the bad Indians, by taking two prisoners, a woman and a boy, from Conyatt;
and that, should the hatchet be struck into the head of any of his people
hereafter, he would then inform me what he would undertake to do."
The natural import of this entry in Proctor's journal is, that Captain
Brant had at that time actually joined the Miamis in hostile array against
the United States. It is possible, however, that such was not _at that
time_ the fact; and it is certain that General Knox, the Secretary of War,
after the return of Colonel Proctor to Philadelphia, did not so construe
it. In writing to Colonel Pickering respecting the council which he was
then preparing to hold at the Painted Post on the 13th of June, the
Secretary speaks of Brant's journey to the western Indians as having
probably been undertaken for pacific purposes, under the direction of the
British officers, who were using him with a view to a peace, of which they
intended to claim the merit at some future time. And this construction
would comport with the idea of a British intervention, as heretofore
suggested by Colonel Gordon and Sir John Johnson.
But it is, nevertheless, a curious fact, which speaks largely of the
talents and address of Brant, and the high importance which was attached
to his influence; that if the British authorities were then thus using his
services, the American government was at the same time seeking his
assistance for the same object. Colonel Pickering was instructed to treat
him with "great kindness" if he could be persuaded to attend the council
at the Painted Post; and on the 12th of April, the Secretary of War
addressed a latter to Governor Clinton, from which the following is an
extract:
"Aware of your Excellency's influence over Captain Joseph Brant, I have
conceived the idea that you might induce him, by proper arrangements, to
undertake to conciliate the western Indians to pacific measures, and bring
them to hold a general treaty. This measure would be abundantly more
compatible with the feelings and interest of the United States than to
extirpate the Indians, which seems to be the inevitable consequence of a
war of long continuance with them. You are entirely able to estimate
Brant's talents, and the degree of confidence that might be placed in him
on such an occasion. Perhaps Colonel Willett, of whose talents in managing
the minds of men I have a high opinion, might accept of an agency on this
occasion, as it might respect Brant. If your Excellency should entertain
the opinion strongly that Brant might be employed with good effect, I
earnestly request that you would take the necessary measures for the
purpose, according to your own judgment."
Other topics were embraced in the Secretary's letter, to all of which
Governor Clinton replied on the 27th of April. The following extract
relates to the subject of this biography:--
"I have communicated to Colonel Willett your confidence in his talents and
desire for the interposition of his influence with Brant, but have it not
in my power to inform you of his explicit answer. . . . I had, in June
last, appointed an interview with Brant, contemplating the danger you
appear to apprehend from his address and his influence with several of the
Indian nations, (which, I am persuaded, is very considerable,) and from
different letters I have since received from him, I have reason to hope he
will give me the opportunity of a personal conference with him at this
place, (New York,) the beginning of the ensuing summer, if the proposed
convention, to which I will not venture to say he may not be opposed,
should not prevent it. But the good understanding between us, and the
friendly and familiar intercourse I have successfully endeavored to
preserve, will, I doubt not, predominate over any transient disgust that
the measures of the Union may have heretofore excited in his mind, and
enable me to procure an interview with him at any time and place not
particularly inconvenient. To accomplish this, however, with certainty,
it may require the personal application of some one expressly delegated,
and in whom he will confide."
Captain Brant has been charged with great vanity, and with attaching undue
importance to his position and influence. But how few are the men, Indians
or whites, who would not have stood in danger of being somewhat inflated,
on finding two such nations as Great Britain and the United States,
apparently out-bidding each other for his services and friendship? Still,
he was looked upon with no inconsiderable distrust by the American
Secretary of War. In his letter of reply to Governor Clinton, dated May
11th, the Secretary, after speaking of the hostility of Brant to the
Corn-planter, refers to the former design of the Mohawk chief to place
himself at the head of the great Indian confederacy, so often spoken of,
north-west of the Ohio, the Six Nations included; and cites a letter which
he had just received from the Rev. Mr. Kirkland, the Indian missionary,
intimating that he had not yet abandoned that project. Indeed, Brant
himself had then just written to Mr. Kirkland that he should yet like to
compass that measure, should he find it practicable. The United States
could not, of course, be favorable to the formation of any confederacy, by
which the whole of the then vast body of Indians might be moved by a
single impulse; and with a view of diverting him from such a purpose, and
of securing his friendship to the United States, Governor Clinton was
requested, if possible, to effect the interview of which he had spoken,
with Captain Brant. Authority was also given the Governor to enter into
any pecuniary engagements which he should judge necessary, to make sure of
his attachment to the United States.
It has already been observed that the council held with the Six Nations by
Colonel Pickering, at the Painted Post, in June, had been to a great
extent successful. Although the chiefs at Buffalo were for the most part
under the influence of the British officers in Upper Canada, and of course
not very friendly to the United States at that time, yet the warriors in
general were more amicably disposed. The women, moreover, were anxious for
peace, and addressed Colonel Proctor upon the subject. Before that officer
left Buffalo, the Indians began to draw off to meet Colonel Pickering, and
the council with him was well attended--serving, if no other good purpose,
to divert the attention of the Indians, and by the distribution of
presents to keep the young warriors from indulging their favorite
propensity, by stealing away and joining the Miamis. Colonel Pickering had
also induced Captain Hendrick Aupamut, the justly celebrated chief of the
Muhheconnuck, [FN] to undertake the mission to the Miamis, which Colonel
Proctor and Corn-planter had been prevented from performing. Captain
Brant, it was also reported to the War Department, about the 1st of
August, had returned to Niagara from the Miami town, accompanied by some
of the western chiefs. The Indians at Pickering's treaty had asserted
that, after all that had transpired, Brant's designs were still pacific;
and since Lord Dorchester, as already stated, had expressed himself
favorable to a pacification of the Indian tribes, and Sir John Johnson was
about to assemble the Six Nations again at Buffalo, strong hopes were
entertained by the American government, that the border difficulties would
soon be adjusted without the necessity of another appeal to arms.
* * * * *
[FN] The Stockbridge Indians, who had removed from Massachusetts to the
Oneida country in 1785.
But, notwithstanding these favorable indications, the preparations for
another offensive campaign were not relaxed. And it was well that they
were not. The movements of Brant, beyond doubt the most influential
warrior of his race, were yet mysterious, and his designs too cautiously
veiled to be penetrated. The unlimited power with which the President had
been clothed, the preceding year, to call mounted militia into the field,
had been exercised by General Washington as far as was deemed necessary,
and two expeditions had been conducted against the villages on the
Wabash,--the first led by General Scott, in May, and the second by General
Wilkinson.. These desultory excursions, however, were unattended by any
beneficial results. A few warriors had been killed, and a small number of
old men, women, and children captured. But such results were not
calculated to make any serious impression upon the savages, or to have any
particular influence on the war. It was likewise well known that the
Indians had received from the British posts large supplies of provisions
and ammunition, immediately after the defeat of General Harmar the
preceding Autumn. This fact, it is true, was disclaimed by Lord
Dorchester, but it was nevertheless certain; and it was also certain that,
in addition to the unfriendly influence of the British officers on the
frontiers the English and French traders, scattered among the Indian
towns, were constantly inciting them to acts of hostility.
Under these circumstances, all the efforts of the United States to bring
the hostile Indians to a friendly council having failed, the conquest of
the Miami country and the expulsion of the Indians became necessary. The
most vigorous measures within the power of the Executive had failed in
raising the troops and bringing them into the field until the month of
September. On the 7th of that month General St. Clair moved from Fort
Washington, north, toward the Miamis--establishing, on his way, two
intermediate posts, at the distance of more than forty miles from each
other, as places whence to draw supplies should the army be in need, or
upon which to fall back in the event of disaster. At the farthest of these
posts, called Fort Jefferson, reinforcements of militia, to the number of
three hundred and sixty, were received--augmenting the army to about two
thousand men. With this force St. Clair moved forward, but the necessity
of opening a road through the forests rendered his progress slow. The
Indians hung in small scattered parties upon the flanks, and by the
skirmishing that took place, were somewhat annoying. Added to these
vexations, the militia began to desert; and as the army approximated more
nearly to the enemy's country, sixty of them went off in a body. It was
likewise reported to be the determination of those "brave defenders of
their country's soil" to fall upon the supplies in the rear; to prevent
which act of moral treason, it was judged necessary to detach Major
Hamtramck in pursuit.
After these reductions, the effective force of St. Clair that remained did
not exceed fourteen hundred men--including both regulars and militia.
Moving forward with these, the right wing commanded by General Butler and
the left by Lieutenant Colonel Darke, both, like the Commander-in-chief,
veterans of Revolutionary merit, on the 3d of November they had approached
within about fifteen miles of the Miamis villages. The army encamped for
the night on the margin of a creek, the militia crossing in advance, to
encamp on the other side. Here a few Indians were discovered; but these
fleeing with precipitation, the army bivouacked for the night--the
situation, and the dispositions both for defence and to guard against
surprise, being of the most judicious character.
This position had been selected with a view of throwing up a slight
defence, and awaiting the return of Major Hamtramck with the first
regiment. Both designs were anticipated and circumvented by the Indians.
About half an hour before sunrise on the morning of the 4th, just after
the soldiers were dismissed from parade, the militia, who were about a
quarter of a mile in front, were briskly attacked by the Indians. Like
most militiamen, their first impulse was to run--and that impulse was
obeyed in the greatest terror and wildest confusion. Rushing through the
main encampment, with the enemy close upon their heels, no small degree of
confusion was created there also. The lines had been formed at the firing
of the first gun; but the panic-stricken militia broke through, and thus
opened the way for the enemy--an advantage which was not lost upon him.
The officers endeavored to restore order in vain, although, for a time,
the divisions of Butler and Darke, which had encamped about seventy yards
apart, were kept in position. But the Indians charged upon them with great
intrepidity--bearing down upon the centre of both divisions in great
numbers. The artillery of the Americans was of little or no service, as
the Indians fought in their usual mode, lying upon the ground and firing
from behind the trees--springing from tree to tree with incredible
swiftness, and rarely presenting an available mark to the eye even of the
rifleman. Having, in the impetuosity of their pursuit of the fugitive
militia, gained the rear of St. Clair, they poured a destructive fire upon
the artillerists from every direction--mowing them down by scores, and
with a daring seldom practised by the Indians, leaping forward, and
completing the work of death at the very guns. General St. Clair was
himself sick, having been severely indisposed for several weeks. He
assumed his post, however, and though extremely feeble, delivered his
orders in the trying emergency with judgment and self-possession. But he
was laboring under the disadvantage of commanding militia upon whom there
was no reliance, and having few, if any, but raw recruits among his
regulars. These, too, had been hastily enlisted, and but little time for
drill or discipline had been allowed. Hence, though brave, and commanded
by officers of the highest qualities, they fought at great disadvantage.
General Butler fell early in the action, mortally wounded, and was soon
afterward killed outright, under circumstances of deep atrocity. Among the
Indian warriors were considerable numbers of Canadians, refugees from the
United States and half-breeds--young men born of Indian mothers in the
remote Canadian settlements. [FN] These motley allies of the savages were
even more savage than their principals. Among them was the noted and
infamous Simon Girty, whose name has occurred in a former part of the
present work. After the action, Girty, who knew General Butler, found him
upon the field, writhing from the agony of his wounds. Butler spoke to
him, and requested him to end his misery. The traitor refused to do this,
but turning to one of the Indian warriors, told him the wounded man was a
high officer; whereupon the savage planted his tomahawk in his head, and
thus terminated his sufferings. His scalp was instantly torn from his
crown, his heart taken out, and divided into as many pieces as there were
tribes engaged in the battle.
* * * * *
[FN] "A great many young Canadians, and, in particular, many that were
born of Indian women, fought on the aide of the Indians in this action;
a circumstance which confirmed the people of the States in the opinion
they had previously formed, that the Indians were encouraged and abetted
in their attacks upon them by the British. I can safely affirm, however,
from having conversed with many of these young men who fought against St.
Clair, that it was with the utmost secrecy they left their homes to join
the Indians, fearful lest the government should censure their
conduct."--_Wald's Travels in Canada._
The Indians had never fought with such fury before. The forest resounded
with their yells, and they rushed upon the troops, under their favorite
shelter of trees, until they had partially gained possession of the camp,
artillery and all. Ascertaining that the fire of their troops produced no
perceptible effect upon the Indians, recourse was had to the bayonet.
Colonel Darke made an impetuous charge at the head of the left wing, and
drove the enemy back about four hundred yards, with some loss. But not
having a sufficient number of riflemen to maintain his advantage, he gave
over the pursuit--being instantly pursued in turn under a deadly fire. The
same gallant officer was subsequently ordered to make a second charge,
which he performed with equal bravery--clearing for the moment that
portion of the camp to which his attention was directed. But the Americans
were now completely surrounded; and while he was driving the Indians in
one direction, clouds of them were seen to fall, "with a courage of men
whose trade is war," upon another point--keeping up a most destructive
fire from every quarter. The use of the bayonet was always attended with
temporary success, but each charge was also attended by severe loss,
especially of officers; nor in a single instance were the Americans able
to retain the advantage thus severely gained. Finally, a large proportion
of the best and bravest officers having fallen, nearly all that had been
preserved of order disappeared. The men huddled together in groups, and
were shot down without resistance. Having done all, under the
circumstances, that a brave man could do, and finding that the day was
lost past recovery, General St. Clair directed Colonel Darke, with the
second regiment, to charge a body of Indians who had gained the road in
the rear, and thus open a door of retreat. The order was promptly and
successfully executed, and a disorderly flight ensued. The victorious
Indians followed up their advantage to the distance of only four miles,
when, leaving the pursuit, they directed their attention to the plunder,
and ceased fighting to revel in "the spoils of the vanquished." The
fugitives continued their flight thirty miles, to Fort Jefferson. Here
they met Major Hamtrack with the first regiment; but it was not deemed
advisable to make a stand, and the remains of the army fell back to Fort
Washington, as Harmar had done the year before. The retreat was indeed
most disorderly and cowardly. "The camp and the artillery," says General
St. Clair in his narrative of the campaign, "were abandoned; but that was
unavoidable, for not a horse was left to draw it off, had it otherwise
been practicable. But the most disgraceful part of the business is, that
the greatest part of the men threw away their arms and accoutrements, even
after the pursuit had ceased. I found the road strewed with them for many
miles, but was not able to remedy it; for, having had all my horses
killed, and being mounted upon one that could not be pricked out of a
walk, I could not get forward myself, and the orders I sent forward,
either to halt the front, or prevent the men parting with their arms, were
unattended to."
This was one of the severest battles ever fought with the Indians--the
latter being unaided by any other description of force, excepting the wild
half-breed Canadians already mentioned. The loss of the Americans, in
proportion to the number engaged; was very severe. Thirty-eight
commissioned officers were killed on the field, and four hundred and
ninety-three non-commissioned officers and privates killed and missing.
Twenty-one commissioned officers were wounded, several of whom mortally,
and two hundred and forty-two non-commissioned officers and privates were
also wounded. General Butler, who fell early in the action, was a brave
man; and with many other excellent officers who fell, "had participated
in all the toils, the dangers, and the glory, of that long conflict which
terminated in the independence of their country." [FN]
* * * * *
[FN] Marshall's Life of Washington. For a ballad giving an account of
this disastrous battle, see Appendix, No. VII.
The loss of the Indians, was about one hundred and fifty killed and a
considerable number wounded. Their immediate booty was all the camp
equipage and baggage, six or eight field-pieces, and four hundred horses.
As the contest was one for land, the Indians, in their mutilations of the
dead, practised a bitter sarcasm upon the rapacity of the white men, by
filling their mouths with the soil they had marched forth to conquer. [FN]
* * * * *
[FN] Two years afterward, when the battle-ground was re-occupied by the
army of Wayne, its appearance was most melancholy. Within the space of
about three hundred and fifty yards square were found five hundred skull
bones, the most of which were collected and buried. For about five miles
in the direction of the retreat of the army, the woods were strewn with
skeletons and muskets. Two brass field-pieces were found in a creek not
far distant.--_Drake's Book of the Indians._
General St. Clair imputed no blame to his officers. On the contrary, he
awarded them the highest praise for their good conduct; and of those who
were slain, he remarked,--"It is a circumstance that will alleviate the
misfortune in some measure, that all of them fell most gallantly doing
their duty." From the fact of his being attacked at all points as it were
at the same moment, it was the General's opinion that he had been
overwhelmed by numbers. But from subsequent investigation it appeared that
the Indian warriors counted only from a thousand to fifteen hundred. But
they fought with great desperation. Their leader, according to the
received opinion, was _Meshecunnaqua,_ or, the _Little Turtle,_ a
distinguished chief of the Miamis. He was also the leader of the Indians
against General Harmar the year before. It is believed, however, that
though nominally the commander-in-chief of the Indians on this occasion,
he was greatly indebted both to the counsels and the prowess of another
and an older chief. One hundred and fifty of the Mohawk warriors were
engaged in this battle; and General St. Clair probably died in ignorance
of the fact, that one of the master-spirits against whom he contended, and
by whom he was so signally defeated, was none other than Joseph
Brant--Thayendaneqea. [FN] How it happened that this distinguished chief,
from whom so much had been expected as a peace maker, thus suddenly and
efficiently threw himself into a position of active hostility, unless he
thought he saw an opening for reviving his project of a great
north-western Confederacy, is a mystery which he is believed to have
carried in his own bosom to the grave.
* * * * *
[FN] This interesting fact has been derived by the author from
Thayendanegea's family. He has in vain sought for it in print. It is the
circumstance of Brant's having been engaged in this battle, that prompted
the author to give so full a narrative of the event, and the incidents
attending it, in this place. It would seem that the government of the
United States was sadly at fault as to the numbers and tribes of the
Indians who fought this battle; and when, in the month of January, 1798,
Captain Peter Pond and William Steedman were sent into the Indian country
as messengers, it was a part of their instructions to obtain information
upon these points.--Vide Indian State papers, vol. iv. p. 227.
The news of the decisive defeat of General St. Clair spread a gloom over
the whole country--deepened by the mourning for the many noble spirits who
had fallen. The panic that prevailed along the whole north-western border,
extending from the confines of New-York to the estuary of the Ohio, was
great beyond description. The inhabitants feared that the Indians,
emboldened by success, and with greatly augmented numbers, would pour
down upon them in clouds, and lay waste all the frontier settlements with
the torch and the tomahawk, even if some modern Alaric of the forest did
not lead his barbarians to the gates of Rome. Nor were these apprehensions
by any means groundless. During the twelve months that followed the rout
of St. Clair, the depredations of the savages became more furious and
ferocious than ever before; and some of the most tragical scenes recorded
in history took place on the extended line of the frontiers. [FN]
* * * * *
[FN] Thatcher's Lives of the Indian Chiefs--Little Turtle. As an example,
the author cites a well-authenticated case, occurring in what was then
perhaps the moat populous section of the west. The proprietor of a
dwelling-house in Kentucky, whose name was Merrill, being alarmed by the
barking of his dog, on going to the door received a fire from an
assailing party of Indians, which broke his right leg and arm. They
attempted to enter the house, but were anticipated in their movement by
Mrs. Merrill and her daughter, who closed the door so firmly as to keep
them at bay. They next began to cut their way through the door, and
succeeded in breaking an aperture, through which one of the warriors
attempted to enter. The lady, however, was prepared for the event, and
as he thrust his head within, she struck it open with an axe, and
instantly drew his body into the house. His companions, not knowing the
catastrophe, but supposing that he had worked his way through
successfully, attempted one after another, to follow. But Mrs. Merrill
dealt a fatal blow upon every head that pushed itself through, until
five warriors lay dead at her feet. By this time the party without had
discovered the fate of their more forward companions, and thought they
would effect an entrance by a safer process--a descent of the chimney.
The contents of a feather-bed were instantly emptied upon the fire,
creating a smoke so dense and pungent, as to bring two more warriors
headlong down upon the hearth in a state of half-suffocation. The moment
was critical, as the mother and daughter were guarding the door. The
husband, however, by the assistance of his little son, though sorely
maimed, managed to rid himself of those two unwelcome visitors by a
billet of wood. Meantime the wife repelled another assault at the
door--severely wounding another Indian; whereupon the assailants
relinquished the siege. For another highly interesting narrative of
border sufferings in the Spring of 1792, see Appendix, No. VIII.
There was another cause of disquietude. It was feared that, flushed with
this defeat of a second expedition, even the five of the Six Nations who
had concluded treaties with the United States, but of whose ultimate
fidelity many grains of distrust had been entertained, would now grasp
their hatchets, and rush to the ranks of the Miamis and their western
allies. The most earnest appeals to the government for protection were
therefore sent forward by the inhabitants of the border towns, to which a
deaf ear could not be turned.
The popular clamor against St. Clair, in consequence of his disastrous
defeat, was loud and deep. With the great mass of the people, it is
success only that constitutes the general, and St. Clair had been
unfortunate. The surrender of Ticonderoga in 1777, was an event which had
occasioned great disappointment and dissatisfaction at the time, and the
recollection was revived, in connection with this signal reverse. But in
neither instance did the fault lie at the door of the commanding General,
Ticonderoga was evacuated because indefensible, and the battle lost by the
cowardice of the militia. Fully conscious, himself, that no blame was
justly attributable to him, General St. Clair applied to the President
for an investigation by a court of inquiry. The request was denied, only
for the reason that there were not officers enough in the service, of the
requisite rank, to form a legal court for that purpose. [FN-1] Aware of
the prejudices excited against him in the public mind, the unfortunate
General spontaneously announced his intention of resigning his commission,
suggesting, however, that he should prefer retaining it until his conduct
could be investigated in some way; but as the military establishment at
that time allowed only one Major General, and as the service required the
speedy designation of a successor, this request was also denied, though
with reluctance, by the President. [FN-2] Complaints, it is true, were
poured into the ears of the President against him. Among others, General
John Armstrong, the hero of Kittaning, and an experienced Indian fighter
in Pennsylvania, addressed a letter to the President, censuring the
generalship of St. Clair. [FN-3] It is believed, however, that the veteran
Governor of the North-western Territory continued in the full enjoyment of
the President's confidence to the last.
* * * * *
[FN-1] Letter of President Washington to General St. Clair, March 28,
1792.
[FN-2] Letter of the President to General St. Clair, April 4, 1792.
[FN-3] Sparks's Life and Correspondence of Washington, Vol. X, p. 223.
The appointment of a successor to St. Clair as Commander-in-chief of the
army, was a source of no little perplexity to the President. His own
inclinations were in favor of Governor Henry Lee of Virginia; but it was
apprehended that difficulties would arise in procuring the services of
officers who had been his seniors in the army of the Revolution, as
subordinates under him. There appear to have been several candidates,
among whom were Generals Morgan and Scott, and Colonel Darke, who had
served under St. Clair during the last campaign. Ultimately the
appointment was conferred upon General Anthony Wayne. The selection was
most unpopular in Virginia; but the result demonstrated its wisdom. [FN]
* * * * *
[FN] Governor Lee wrote to President Washington on the 15th of June,
respecting the selection of a successor of General St. Clair at large,
and on the subject of Wayne's appointment in particular, he said:--"You
cannot be a stranger to the extreme disgust which the late appointment
to the command of the army excited among all orders in this state." To
this letter the President replied at length. The following paragraph
contains the answer to the remark of Governor Lee given above:--"How far
the appointment of General Wayne is a popular or an unpopular measure,
is not for me to decide. It was not the determination of the moment, nor
was it the effect of partiality or of influence; for no application (if
that in any instance could have warped my judgment) was ever made in his
behalf from anyone who could have thrown the weight of a feather into his
scale; but because, under a full view of all circumstances, he appeared
most eligible. To a person of your observation and intelligence it is
unnecessary to remark, that an appointment, which may be unpopular in one
place and with one set of men, may not be so in another place or with
another set of men, and _vice verse;_ and that to attempt to please
every body is the sure way to please nobody; because the attempt would be
as idle as the exertion would be impracticable. General Wayne has many
good points as an officer, and it is to be hoped that time, reflection,
good advice, and, above all, a due sense of the importance of the trust
which is committed to him, will correct his foibles or cast a shade over
them."
Rufus Putnam, a son of the veteran of Bunker Hill, who had served with
credit in the war of the Revolution, and who had settled in the
North-western Territory soon after the close of that contest, was
appointed a brigadier-general, to serve with Wayne. This appointment was
tendered to Colonel Willett of New-York, but declined by that gentleman
upon the ground of conscientious scruples with regard to fighting the
Indians. "It has been uniformly my opinion," said the Colonel in a letter
to the President, "that the United States ought to avoid an Indian war. I
have generally conceived this to be our wisest policy. The reasons alleged
in support of the present Indian war have never brought conviction to my
mind. From my knowledge and experience of these people, I am clear that it
is not a difficult thing to preserve peace with them. That there are bad
men among them, and that these will at times do acts which deserve
punishment, is very clear. But I hold, that to go to war is not the proper
way to punish them. Most of the Indians that I have had any knowledge of,
are conceited and vain. By feeding their vanity, you gain their good
opinion; and this in time procures their esteem and affection. By
conciliating their good-will, you will render them susceptible of almost
any impression. They are credulous, yet suspicious. They think a great
deal; and have in general good notions of right and wrong. They frequently
exhibit proofs of grateful minds; yet they are very revengeful. And though
they are not free from chicanery and intrigue, yet if their vanity is
properly humored, and they are dealt justly by, it is no difficult matter
to come to reasonable terms with them. The intercourse I have had with
these people, the treatment I have myself received from them, and which I
have known others to receive, make me an advocate for them. To fight with
them, would be the last thing I should desire. And yet, Sir, I declare,
from the experience I have had, I do not conceive it difficult to beat
them when brought to action. When in small parties they scatter
themselves along a frontier, they have always been found exceedingly
troublesome and dangerous. This kind of warfare is their forte; and in it
they are found to be truly tremendous. But when they attempt anything in
large bodies, I have found, notwithstanding their great dexterity in the
wilderness, and the advantage they usually derive from the admirable
position they take, that they are easily beat. In marching through woods,
where troops are exposed to attacks from Indians, particular attention
should be paid not only to the mode and line of march, but also to extend
small parties and single men far on the flanks in front and in rear. But
whenever a serious attack is made, which is usually furious, an
instantaneous charge, with huzzaing sufficiently loud to drown the noise
the Indians make, will never fail to repel them. And this stroke repeated
and pursued, will, I am well convinced, terminate in victory. And yet
victory even over Indians is generally paid for; but defeats are terrible.
The honour, however, of fighting and beating Indians, is what I do not
aspire after. If in any way I could be instrumental in effecting and
maintaining peace with them, it would be a source of great gratification."