_Still another cane field, with its hidden Japanese defenders lying in
wait, confronts these Marine riflemen._]
This day (D+7) was also marked by the arrival of P-47 Thunderbolts
of the 19th Fighter Squadron, U.S. Army Air Forces, which landed at
Aslito Field. They had been launched from Navy escort carriers. When
landed, they were fitted with launching racks for rockets by ground
crews who had come in earlier. Later that day, eight planes took off on
their first support mission of the Saipan campaign. (Only two Marine
observation squadrons, VMO-2 and VMO-4, were involved in the battle for
Saipan, but they provided invaluable artillery spotting for the two
Marine divisions.)
While these developments were taking place in the upper echelons,
down in the rock-bottom basic life of infantry platoons, the days of
relentless combat pressure were exemplified by their impact on the
constant duties and high stress levels on a platoon commander:
I made a final inspection of the platoon position and then sacked
in--exhausted. When it came my turn to stand watch, it took every
last reserve of willpower and strength to get up and go on duty.
Then for hours I alternated between fighting off my sleepiness and
sweating out the noises and movements that were all around us.
After a while, I spotted a shape, darker than the rest of the
surrounding shadows. It was the size of a man’s head. I watched
it for a long time, nerves on edge, finger on my carbine trigger.
Finally it seemed to move. I fired a shot. Nothing happened. It
would’ve been suicide to go over and investigate. In that darkness
and jungle my own men would’ve shot me in a second. So when it came
time for my relief, I pointed out the suspicious object to the next
man, told him to watch it closely, and collapsed into a dead-tired
sleep.
When dawn came on D+8, I was awakened, and the first thing I did
was to look over where I’d shot on the night before. There, lying
on top of a rock, was the gas mask of one of my men! The owner had
been sleeping right beside it. It was a miracle he hadn’t been hit.
The tremendous strain of the previous night did funny things to
your mind....
[Sidebar (page 11): Marine Artillery Regiments
The 10th Marines and the 14th Marines supported the 2d and 4th Marine
Divisions respectively. They had each had a significant reorganization
before Saipan. In early spring, the 5th Battalion in each changed its
designation. They were redesignated the 2d and 4th 155mm Artillery
Battalions, Corps Artillery, but administratively attached to the
10th and 14th Marines. Thus the 10th and 14th Marines each contained
two 75mm pack howitzer battalions (1st and 2d), two 105mm howitzer
battalions (3d and 4th), and a 155mm artillery battalion, armed with
the new M1 155mm howitzers, the first to be received by the Marine
Corps in the Pacific.
[Illustration: _Friendly artillery fire was a major asset for the
American troops, both in supporting their attacks and smothering
Japanese sorties. This camouflaged emplacement holds a Marine 105mm
howitzer._
Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 82550
]
]
_D+8-D+15, 23-30 June_
Complications of a serious nature arose in the execution of the battle
plan for 23 June. The battalion of the 105th Infantry still had not
cleaned out Nafutan Point; there were semantic and communications
differences between the two Smith generals as to orders about who
would do what and when; the 106th and 165th Infantry got all tangled
up in themselves during a march to take over the center portion of
the American lines and were too late to jump off in the attack, thus
delaying the attacks of the Marines. When the Army regiments did
move out, they found that the rugged terrain in their sector and the
determined enemy in camouflaged weapons positions in caves of the steep
slope leading up to Mount Tapotchau made forward progress slow and
difficult. The 27th Infantry Division was stalled.
The corps commander, Holland Smith, was very displeased with this
situation. It had started with the difficulties experienced in getting
that division ashore; it was exacerbated by the time it was taking to
secure Nafutan Point and the mix-up in orders there; now the advancing
Marine divisions were getting infiltration and enfilading fire on their
flanks because of the 27th’s lack of progress.
Accordingly, Lieutenant General Holland Smith met that afternoon with
Major General Sanderford Jarman, USA, who was slated to be the island
garrison commander, and asked him to press Major General Ralph Smith
for much more aggressive action by the 27th. Jarman later stated:
I talked to General (Ralph) Smith and explained the situation as
I saw it and that I felt from reports from the corps commander
that his division was not carrying its full share. He immediately
replied that such was true; that he was in no way satisfied with
what his regimental commanders had done during the day and that he
had been with them and had pointed out to them the situation. He
further indicated to me that he was going to be present tomorrow,
24 June, with his division when it made its jump-off and he
would personally see to it that the division went forward.... He
appreciated the situation and thanked me for coming to see him and
stated that if he didn’t take his division forward tomorrow he
should be relieved.
This blunt meeting was followed the next morning (D+9) by an even
blunter message from Holland Smith to Ralph Smith:
Commanding General is highly displeased with the failure of the
27th Division on June twenty-third to launch its attack as ordered
at King hour and the lack of offensive action displayed by the
division in its failure to advance and seize objective O-5 when
opposed by only small arms and mortar fire.
The failure of the 27th to advance in its zone of action resulted
in the halting of attacks by the 4th and 2d Marine Divisions on
the flanks of the 27th in order to prevent dangerous exposure of
their interior flanks. It is directed that immediate steps be taken
to cause the 27th Division to advance and seize the objectives as
ordered.
These objectives were given dramatic names by the Army regiments:
Hell’s Pocket, Death Valley, and Purple Heart Ridge. It was certainly
true that the terrain was perfect for the dug-in Japanese defenders:
visibility from the slopes of Mount Tapotchau and from the ridge gave
them fields of fire to rake any attack up the valley. Holland Smith
didn’t fully recognize the severity of the opposition, and, by the
end of the day, the 106th Infantry had gained little, while the 165th
Infantry had been “thrown back onto the original line of departure.”
[Illustration: _From left, BGen Merritt A. Edson, Assistant Division
Commander of the 2d Marine Division, confers with Col James P. Riseley
and LtCol Kenneth F. McLeod, 6th Marines commander and executive
officer, respectively, during a pause in the action. LtCol McLeod was
killed several days after this photograph._
Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 82481
]
Meanwhile, the 2d Marine Division on the left was painfully slugging
its way forward in the tortuous environs around Mount Tapotchau. The
4th Marine Division (on the right) pivoted east, driving fast into the
Kagman Peninsula. There the ground was level, a plus, but covered with
cane fields, a big minus, as the rifle companies well knew.
A platoon leader remarked:
The terrain here consisted of countless cane fields--one after
another. And it was the same old story: in every field the company
would lose a man or two. It was wonderfully quieting to the nerves
to start into a growth of head-high cane, and wonder who would not
be coming out on the other side! The Jap snipers who were doing the
damage were dug in so deeply, and camouflaged so well, that it was
impossible to locate them before they fired. And then it was too
late; you were right on top of them, and they had nailed another
one of your men--or maybe you! Then there was always that next cane
field up ahead....
Some of the fields had been burnt out by the napalm-bombing of
our planes. This gave us greatly increased observation as we went
through them, but clouds of choking dust arose from the ashes to
plague us and dirty our weapons. With water so scarce, one of our
chief sources of liquid sustenance was sugar cane juice. We’d whack
off a segment of the cane with our combat knives, then chew and
suck on it till only the dry fibers were left. In these burnt-out
fields we weren’t even able to do this, as the cane was spoiled and
tasted lousy.
Along with the death toll in the cane fields came the physical demands
placed on the troops by the hot tropical climate. Lieutenant Chapin
noted small, human issues that loomed large in the minds of the assault
troops:
All this time the sun was broiling down on top of us. Our canteens
had been empty for hours. Everyone was absolutely parched....
Finally we did stop, as the effects of heat exhaustion and lack of
water started to become apparent. [Our company commander] arranged
for some water to be brought up to our position. When the cans
arrived, everyone crowded thirstily around, and we had to order the
men to disperse.... Then each platoon leader rationed out a can
of the precious liquid amongst his men. As was the age-old Marine
tradition, we waited till all our men had their share before we
took ours. The water was lukewarm, rusty, and oily as it came out
of the cans, but it still tasted like nectar!
[Illustration: _This Marine is demonstrating the dimensions of a large
enemy gun emplacement and undoubtedly giving thanks that the Japanese
were not able to complete construction._
Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 85336
]
While these local events transpired on the front lines, a major
upheaval was taking place in the rear. Seeing that the corps line
would be bent back some 1,500 yards in the zone of the 27th Infantry
Division, Holland Smith had had enough. He went to see Admirals
Spruance and Turner to obtain permission to relieve Ralph Smith of
command of his division.
After reviewing the Marine general’s deeply felt criticism of the 27th
Infantry Division’s “defective performance,” the admirals agreed to
the requested change, and Ralph Smith was superseded by Major General
Jarman on 24 June.
[Illustration: