_As the fighting reached the interior of Saipan, the troops encountered
difficult foliage and terrain which impeded their movement. Note the
tops of the helmets of Marines peering from their foxholes._]
A furor arose, with bitter interservice recriminations, and the flames
were fanned by lurid press reports. Holland Smith summarized his
feelings three days after the relief. According to a unit history, _The
27th Infantry Division in World War II_, he stated, “The 27th Division
won’t fight, and Ralph Smith will not make them fight.” Army generals
were furious, and in Hawaii, Lieutenant General Robert Richardson,
commander of the U.S. Army in the Pacific (USARPAC) convened an Army
board of inquiry over the matter. The issue reached to the highest
military levels in Washington.
While the Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Joseph
T. McNarney, reviewed the matter, he found some faults with Holland
Smith, but then went on to say that Ralph Smith failed to exact the
performance expected from a well-trained division, as evidenced by poor
leadership on the part of some regimental and battalion commanders,
undue hesitancy to bypass snipers “with a tendency to alibi because
of lack of reserves to mop up,” poor march discipline, and lack of
reconnaissance.
The Army’s official summary, _United States Army in World War II, The
War in the Pacific, Campaign in the Marianas_ (published 15 years after
the operations) attributed some errors to Holland Smith’s handling of
a real problem, and it also gave full recognition to the difficult
terrain and bitter resistance that the Army regiments faced. The
history stated that:
... there is no doubt that the 106th Infantry Regiment of the 27th
Division was late in jumping off in the attack on the morning of 23
June--even though not so late as Holland Smith charged. On the 23d
and again on the 24th, the Army troops attacking Death Valley were
slow and faltering in their advance. According to the testimony of
General Jarman, who took over the division from Ralph Smith, the
unit leaders of the 106th Infantry were hesitant and apparently
confused. Although the Army troops in Death Valley sustained fairly
heavy casualties, the two Marine divisions on the flanks suffered
greater ones. Yet the Marines made considerable advances while the
165th Infantry registered only small gains--the 106th Infantry
almost none at all.
No matter what the extenuating circumstances were--and there were
several--the conclusion seems inescapable that Holland Smith had
good reason to be disappointed with the performance of the 27th
Infantry Division on the two days in question....
Back where the conflict was with the Japanese, the 4th Marine Division
had overrun most of the Kagman Peninsula by the night of D+10. The
shoreline cliffs provoked sobering thoughts in a young officer in the
24th Marines:
We were close to the northern shoreline of the peninsula. And right
there the Japs had dug a big emplacement. They hadn’t had time to
finish it, but we could see that it was situated so as to fire
right down the beach-line. Any troops landing on that beach would
have received a terrible enfilading fire from this gun position.
Not far from the emplacement were the guns that had been destined
to go into it: huge, 5-inch, dual-purpose naval guns. They were
deadly things, and I was glad the enemy had never gotten them into
action. Now they lay there on their wooden skids, thickly coated
with grease, wrapped in burlap--impotent.
This unfinished state of the Japanese defenses was, in fact, a critical
factor in the final American victory on Saipan. The blockading success
of far-ranging submarines of the U.S. Navy had drastically reduced
the supplies of cement and other construction materials destined
for elaborate Saipan defenses, as well as the number of troop ships
carrying Japanese reinforcements to the island. Then the quick success
of the Marshalls campaign had speeded up the Marianas thrust by three
months. This was decisive, for “one prisoner of war later said that,
had the American assault come three months later, the island would have
been impregnable.”
[Illustration: _When a Japanese survivor did emerge from a cave,
Marines were always on the alert for treachery. This enemy soldier had
a stick of dynamite in his hands, but was shot before he could throw
it._
Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 87137
]
The 4th Marine Division encountered more than cane fields in the
Kagman Peninsula--the cliffs near the ocean were studded with caves.
A 20-year-old private first class in Company E, 2d Battalion, 23d
Marines, Robert F. Graf, described the Marine system for dealing with
these and the others that were found all through the bitter campaign:
The firepower was intense, and we were working our way up to
where the shots originated. Quite often there would be multi cave
openings, each protecting another. Laying down heavy cover fire,
our specialist would advance to near the mouth of the cave. A
satchel charge would then be heaved into the mouth of the cave,
followed by a loud blast as the dynamite exploded. Other times it
might be grenades thrown inside the cave, both fragment type which
exploded sending bits of metal all throughout the cave, and other
times [white] phosphorous grenades that burned the enemy.
Also the flame thrower was used, sending a sheet of flame into the
cave, burning anyone that was in its path. Screams could be heard
and on occasions the enemy would emerge from the caves, near the
entrance, we would call upon the tanks, and these monsters would
get in real close and pump shells into the opening.
Graf went on to picture the use of flame-throwing tanks, the ultimate
weapon for dealing with the enemy deep in his hideouts. He continued:
Some of the caves had artillery mounted on tracks that could be
wheeled to the entrance, fired and pulled back, unobserved. There
were caves with reinforced metal doors that protected them from our
artillery. Perhaps a direct hit from a 16-inch naval gun could have
blasted it open, but nothing else.
[Illustration: _Displaying the bazooka which knocked out four Japanese
light tanks are bazooka men PFC Lauren N. Kahn, left, and PFC Lewis M.
Nalder. The two Marines fired all their ammunition at Japanese tanks
advancing in a counterattack on the night of D+1. Kahn then grabbed
some grenades, approached one tank from the side, and tossed the
grenade into its open turret. Their action saved a 37mm gun crew, the
objective of the tank. The gun crew, with its men wounded, was also out
of ammunition._
Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 85167
]
A fellow rifleman from Graf’s company told him this story:
You should go up and see the huge cave that I was just in. It was
large and contained a completely equipped operating room, all the
medical equipment, surgical tools, etc. The tools were made from
German surgical steel. When the battalion and regimental doctors
were told about it, they almost went crazy over finding such
excellent equipment. Each doctor wanted some tools for his use.
[Illustration: