Over in the area of the 2d Division, the 8th Marines wheeled from
facing east to attack northward into the foot hills leading to Mount
Tapotchau.
The Marine divisions were now facing two major problems. First, their
drive north was confronted by General Saito’s main line of defense,
running west to east across the island. Secondly, the terrain into
which the attack had to go was a nightmare of ravines, caves, hills,
valleys, and cliffs--all fortified and defended to the death by the
Japanese.
June 21 brought a respite for the front line troops: “D+6 was enjoyed
by all--for a change! We rested on our positions; caught up on sorely
needed sleep; got some water (which had been conspicuous by its
absence); and even had a good hot meal. For we got our first 10-in-1
rations. Did they ever taste good to our hungry palates, surfeited as
they were with K rations!”
Simultaneously, intensive preparations were made for a coordinated
attack by both Marine divisions the next morning. A total of 18
artillery battalions were massed for supporting fire. Combat efficiency
was officially rated as “very satisfactory,” in spite of a sobering
total of 6,165 casualties.
The following day saw the Marines attack all along the line. The 6th
Marines overran parts of Mount Tipo Pali, while the 8th Marines worked
its painful way into the maze of ridges and gullies that formed the
foothills of Mount Tapotchau. On the right, the 24th Marines was forced
into the messy business of blasting caves honeycombed along Magicienne
Bay. In one of the mortar platoons, a weird encounter took place,
as described at the time to this author by the participant, First
Lieutenant Joseph J. Cushing:
[I] was bending over one of [my] mortars, checking the lay of it,
when [I] felt a tap on my shoulder, and a guy asked [me], “Hey,
Mac, are you a Marine?” [I] turned around and there was a Jap
officer standing about a foot from [me]. [I] dropped to the ground,
speechless with amazement, and [my] men riddled the Jap from head
to toe.
On the left of the 4th Division, the 25th Marines made a major advance
of 2,400 yards. The forward lines were now reaching an area where
the Kagman Peninsula jutted out to the east. This resulted in a
substantially increased frontage that the two Marine divisions could
not properly cover. To deal with this, Holland Smith decided to commit
his reserve, the 27th Infantry Division, to the center of the line,
leaving just one battalion of the 105th Infantry way back in the rear
to continue its long drawn-out attempt to eliminate the Japanese pocket
on by-passed Nafutan Point.
[Illustration: