_This Japanese soldier and tank are both permanently finished after an
attack on Marine lines._]
With the 165th Infantry on its right flank and the 24th Marines to its
left, the 25th Marines was poised on the north edge of Aslito airfield
late on D+2. Its patrols found the strip was abandoned, but the 165th,
assigned to capture it, decided to wait until the next day.
The division had finally approached the O-1 line, except on the left
flank where contact with the 2d Division was again broken, this time
near Mount Fina Susu.
This same day 17 June, saw a crucial command decision by Admiral
Spruance. With the powerful main Japanese fleet now approaching
Saipan, he ordered his fast carriers to meet the enemy ships, and that
night withdrew his transports and supply ships from their offshore
support positions to a safe distance from the Japanese threat.
[Sidebar (page 8):
[Illustration]
Major General Harry Schmidt was the leader of the 4th Marine Division
in the assaults at Roi-Namur in the Marshall Islands and then at Saipan
in the Marianas.
Born in 1886, he entered the Corps as a second lieutenant in 1909.
By extraordinary coincidence, his first foreign duty was at Guam in
the Marianas Islands, an area he would return to 33 years later under
vastly different circumstances!
The Philippines, Mexico, Cuba, and Nicaragua (where he was awarded
a Navy Cross--second only to the Medal of Honor), interspersed with
repeated stays in China, were the marks of a diverse overseas career.
At home there were staff schools, paymaster duties, and a tour as
Assistant Commandant.
By the end of World War II, he had been decorated with three
Distinguished Service Medals. Retiring in 1948 after 39 years of
service, he was advanced to the four-star rank of general. His death
came in 1968.
A contemporary described him as “a Buddha, a typical old-time Marine:
he’d been in China; he was regulation, Old Establishment, a regular
Marine.”
]
[Sidebar (page 9):
[Illustration:
Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 303240
]
Major General Thomas E. Watson, as a brigadier general and commander of
Tactical Group-1, built on the 22d Marines, led his men in the conquest
of Eniwetok Atoll in the Marshall Islands in February 1944. For this
he was awarded a Distinguished Service Medal, and the 22d Marines was
awarded a Navy Unit Commendation.
He took command of the 2d Marine Division in April 1944. In June he
directed his men in the conquest of Saipan and then Tinian, receiving a
second DSM.
Retirement came in 1950, and he died in March 1966, as a lieutenant
general.
With a birth date of 1892, and an enlistment date of 1912, he fully
qualified as a member of “the Old Corps.” After being commissioned in
1916, he served in a variety of Marine assignments in the Caribbean,
China, and the United States.
Given the nickname “Terrible Tommy,” Watson’s proverbial impatience
later was characterized by General Wallace M. Greene, Jr., as follows:
“He would not tolerate for one minute stupidity, laziness, professional
incompetence, or failure in leadership.... His temper in correcting
these failings could be fiery and monumental,” as both Marine and Army
officers found out at Eniwetok and later Saipan!
]
[Sidebar (page 10): Divisional Reorganization
The training before Saipan was based on a new Table of Organization
for the Marine divisions. Their size was reduced by 2,500 men to
17,465. The artillery regiments each lost one of its 75mm pack howitzer
battalions, but the infantry retained its previous units. Rifle squads,
however, were reorganized to total 13, using three “fire teams” of four
men with each team built around a Browning automatic rifle (BAR), a 50
percent increase in the division of this valuable weapon. The number of
60mm mortars in the division table of equipment was similarly expanded,
while the number of flamethrowers grew ten-fold. In addition, the tank
battalions were able to replace their antiquated light tanks with
mediums.
]
_D+3, 18 June_
When the infantrymen ashore woke the next morning, they looked out
in amazement at the empty ocean and a wave of uneasy questions raced
through their minds: “Where in hell are our ships? What about food
and ammunition we’ve got to have? Will we get back the daytime naval
supporting gunfire and also the star shell illumination?” The men in
frontline combat had no way of knowing that over 33,000 tons of cargo
had already been unloaded when the ships withdrew.
Both Marine divisions went on the attack, while the 105th Infantry
joined the 165th on the far right flank, enabling Ralph Smith to put
his 27th Division into motion to occupy Aslito airfield and attack
along the southern coast.
That same morning, 18 June, the 4th Marine Division attack objective
was the seizure of the O-3 line. This would mean reaching the east
coast of Saipan and splitting in two the Japanese forces. First,
however, the 23d Marines, reinforced by a battalion of the 24th
Marines, had to seize the portion of the O-2 line in its zone. This
was to be the division’s line of departure. The entire division, with
three infantry regiments abreast, jumped off at 1040. At 1340 the
25th Marines had reached O-3. The 24th Marines had tank-led Japanese
counterattacks on both flanks but was able to reach O-3 before dark.
The 23d Marines, however, was stopped by intense enemy mortar and
machine gun fire coming from southeast of Lake Susupe right on the
boundary line between the two Marine divisions, making it unclear which
division had responsibility for wiping out these enemy positions. At
the same time, it was impossible to fire artillery on them for fear of
hitting friendly troops. As a result, the 23d Marines suffered heavy
casualties. So, by the end of the day, although all of the 4th Marine
Division’s regiments were in contact, a gap still existed between the
two Marine divisions.
The bizarre becomes commonplace in combat. For instance, one of the 23d
Marines’ 75mm half-tracks fired into a Japanese cave that day, and a
dense cloud of noxious fumes came pouring out. A gas alarm was sounded.
This meant serious trouble, for all the riflemen had long since
jettisoned their burdensome gas masks. Relief flooded through the men
as it was established that the fumes were not poisonous and came from
picric acid the Japanese had stored in the cave.
Over in the 2d Division’s zone, the 8th Marines saw some bitter
fighting over Hill 240. A heavily defended coconut grove required
saturation fire from the artillery of the 10th Marines before the
riflemen could smash their way in and clean out the grove.
The price for the two Marine divisions had been heavy. By the night of
D+3 they had been bled by more than 5,000 casualties.
[Sidebar (page 10): Ground Command List
The Marine and Army units assigned to the Saipan operation were under
these senior commanders:
V Amphibious Corps--LtGen Holland M. Smith
2d Marine Division--MajGen Thomas E. Watson
2d Marines--Col Walter J. Stuart
6th Marines--Col James P. Riseley
8th Marines--Col Clarence R. Wallace
10th Marines--Col Raphael Griffin
18th Marines--LtCol Russell Lloyd
4th Marine Division--MajGen Harry Schmidt
14th Marines--Col Louis G. DeHaven
20th Marines--LtCol Nelson K. Brown
23d Marines--Col Louis R. Jones
24th Marines--Col Franklin A. Hart
25th Marines--Col Merton J. Batchelder
27th Infantry Division--MajGen Ralph C. Smith, USA
105th Infantry--Col Leonard A. Bishop, USA
106th Infantry--Col Russell G. Ayres, USA
165th Infantry--Col Gerard W. Kelley, USA
Division Artillery--BGen Redmond F. Kernan, Jr., USA
XXIV Corps Artillery--BGen Arthur M. Harper, USA
Saipan Garrison Forces--MajGen George W. Griner, USA
]
_D+4-D+7, 19-22 June_
The most critical event of 19 June (and perhaps the most important
of the whole Saipan campaign) took place at sea, well out of sight
of the infantrymen ashore. The opposing carrier task forces clashed
in a gigantic air battle. When it was over that night, the Japanese
had suffered the catastrophic loss of 330 out of 430 planes they had
launched. Exultant U.S. Navy fliers labelled it “The Great Marianas
Turkey Shoot.” With the help of American submarines and additional
carrier plane attacks the next day, the Japanese attempt to relieve
Saipan by a decisive naval victory was smashed. As an official account
summarized the impact ashore, “the eventual doom of the enemy garrison
was assured.” And the American supply ships were able to return
offshore to unload their vital cargoes.
During the four-day span of D+4 to D+7, the 105th Infantry moved slowly
along the south coast and then joined the 165th Infantry in sealing off
the die-hard Japanese survivors in Nafutan Point, in the southeastern
corner of the island. Once the enemy was penned in, the 105th was
assigned to eliminate him. The rest of the 27th Division, now including
the 106th Infantry, was ordered north to be the Corps reserve.
This period, 19-22 June, marked a total shift in direction for the
American troops. Pivoting on the 2d Marines on the far left flank along
the western shore, the other Marine regiments swung around from their
drive which had reached the east coast to face north, with their right
flank on Magicienne Bay.
On 20 June, the 4th Division confronted a key objective. Lieutenant
Chapin had a ringside seat:
We had a perfect chance to watch a battalion of the 25th making an
attack.... It was in action about a quarter of a mile from us, and
the whole panorama was spread out before us. They were assaulting
Hill 500, the dominant terrain feature of the whole area, and it
was apparent that they were running into a solid wall of Jap fire.
But, using [artillery] timed fire, smoke, and tanks, they finally
stormed the top and took it. The use of those supporting arms
provided a magnificent spectacle. From our vantage point, we could
see the timed fire bursting in cave entrances, and moving down
the face of the hill as precisely as if ... it were going down
a stepladder. On the lower levels, the flamethrower tanks were
spouting their napalm jets upward into other caves. It was quite a
sight!
[Illustration: SAIPAN