XIV.

_MADAM,_

_If there be any sense and perception in Matter_, says your Author,[1]

_it must needs be Motion or Reaction of one part of matter against

another; and that all diversity of sense and perception doth

necessarily arise from the diversity of the Magnitude, Figure,

Posture, Vigour and Direction of Motion in Parts of the Matter; In

which variety of perceptions, Matter hath none, but such, as are

impressed by corporeal motions, that is to say, that are perceptions

of some actions, or modificated Impressions of parts of matter

bearing one against another._ I have declared, _Madam_, my opinion

concerning Perception in my former Letters, that all Perception is

not Impression and Reaction, like as a Seal is printed on Wax: For

example, the corporeal rational motions in the mind do not print,

but move figuratively; but the sensitive motions do carve, print,

engrave, and, as it were, pencil out, as also move figuratively in

productions, and do often take patterns from the rational figures, as

the rational motions make figures according to the sensitive patterns;

But the rational can move without patterns, and so the sensitive: For

surely, were a man born blind, deaf, dumb, and had a numb palsie in his

exterior parts, the sensitive and rational motions would nevertheless

move both in body and mind according to the nature of his figure; for

though no copies were taken from outward objects, yet he would have

thoughts, passions, appetites, and the like; and though he could not

see exterior objects, nor hear exterior sounds, yet no question but

he would see and hear interiously after the manner of dreams, onely

they might not be any thing like to what is perceiveable by man in the

World; but if he sees not the Sun-light, yet he would see something

equivalent to it; and if he hears not such a thing as Words, yet he

would hear something equivalent to words; for it is impossible, that

his sensitive and rational faculties should be lost for want of an Ear,

or an Eye; so that Perception may be without exterior object, or marks,

or patterns: for although the sensitive Motions do usually pattern out

the figures of exterior objects, yet that doth not prove, but they can

make interior figures without such objects. Wherefore Perception is not

always Reaction, neither is Perception and Reaction really one thing;

for though Perception and Action is one and the same, yet not always

Reaction; but did Perception proceed from the reaction of outward

objects, a blind and deaf man would not so much as dream; for he would

have no interior motion in the head, having no other exterior sense but

touch, which, if the body was troubled with a painful disease, he would

neither be sensible of, but to feel pain, and interiously feel nothing

but hunger and fulness; and his Mind would be as Irrational as some

imagine Vegetables and Minerals are. To which opinion I leave them,

and rest,

Madam,

_Your Faithful Friend_

_and Servant._

[1] _Of the Immortality of the Soul, l._ 2. _c._ 1. _a._ 1, 6, 7.

Philosophical Letters: or, modest Reflections upon some Opinions in Natural Philosophy · 第 67 / 169 题