_MADAM,_
That Matter is uncapable of Sense, your _Author_ proves by the example
of dead Carcasses;[1] _For,_ says he, _Motion and Sense being really
one and the same thing, it must needs follow, that where there is
motion, there is also sense and perception; but on the contrary, there
is Reaction in dead Carcasses, and yet no Sense._ I answer shortly,
That it is no consequence, because there is no animal sense nor
exterior perceptible local motion in a dead Carcass, therefore there
is no sense at all in it; for though it has not animal sense, yet it
may nevertheless have sense according to the nature of that figure,
into which it did change from being an animal. Also he says, _If any
Matter have sense, it will follow, that upon reaction all shall have
the like; and that a Bell while it is ringing, and a Bow while it is
bent, and every Jack-in-a-box, that School-boys play with, shall be
living animals._ I answer, It is true, if reaction made sense; but
reaction doth not make sense, but sense makes reaction; and though the
Bell hath not an animal knowledg, yet it may have a mineral life and
knowledg, and the Bow, and the Jack-in-a-box a vegetable knowledg; for
the shape and form of the Bell, Bow, and Jack-in-a-box, is artificial;
nevertheless each in its own kind may have as much knowledg as an
animal in his kind; onely they are different according to the different
proprieties of their Figures: And who can prove the contrary that they
have not? For certainly Man cannot prove what he cannot know; but Mans
nature is so, that knowing but little of other Creatures, he presently
judges there is no more knowledg in Nature, then what Man, at least
Animals, have; and confines all sense onely to Animal sense, and all
knowledg to Animal knowledg. Again says your Author, _That Matter is
utterly uncapable of such operations as we find in our selves, and
that therefore there is something in us Immaterial or Incorporeal;
for we find in our selves that one and the same thing, both hears,
and sees, and tastes, and perceives all the variety of objects that
Nature manifests unto us._ I answer, That is the reason there is but
one matter, and that all natural perception is made by the animate
part of matter; but although there is but one matter in Nature, yet
there are several parts or degrees, and consequently several actions
of that onely matter, which causes such a variety of perceptions,
both sensitive and rational: the sensitive perception is made by the
sensitive corporeal motions, copying out the figures of forreign
objects in the sensitive organs of the sentient; and if those sensitive
motions do pattern out forreign objects in each sensitive organ alike
at one and the same time, then we hear, see, taste, touch and smell,
at one and the same time: But Thoughts and Passions, as Imagination,
Conception, Fancy, Memory, Love, Hate, Fear, Joy, and the like, are
made by the rational corporeal motions in their own degree of matter,
to wit, the rational. And thus all perception is made by one and the
same matter, through the variety of its actions or motions, making
various and several figures, both sensitive and rational. But all this
variety in sense and reason, or of sensitive and rational perceptions,
is not made by parts pressing upon parts, but by changing their own
parts of matter into several figures by the power of self-motion: For
example, I see a Man or Beast; that Man or Beast doth not touch my
eye, in the least, neither in it self, nor by pressing the adjoyning
parts: but the sensitive corporeal motions streight upon the sight of
the Man or Beast make the like figure in the sensitive organ, the Eye,
and in the eyes own substance or matter, as being in the eye as well
as the other degrees of matter, to wit, the rational and inanimate,
for they are all mixt together. But this is to be observed, That the
rational matter can and doth move in its own substance, as being the
purest and subtillest degree of matter; but the sensitive being not so
pure and subtil, moves always with the inanimate Matter, and so the
perceptive figures which the rational Matter, or rational corporeal
Motions make, are made in their own degree of Matter; but those figures
which the sensitive patterns out, are made in the organs or parts of
the sentient body proper to such or such a sense or perception: as in
an animal Creature, the perception of sight is made by the sensitive
corporeal motions in the Eye; the perception of hearing, in the Ear,
and so forth. As for what your _Author_ says, _That we cannot conceive
any portion of Matter, but is either hard or soft_; I answer, That
these are but effects of Matters actions, and so is rare, and dense,
and the like; but there are some Creatures which seem neither perfectly
rare, nor dense, nor hard, nor soft, but of mixt qualities; as for
example, Quicksilver seems rare, and yet is dense; soft, and yet is
hard; for though liquid Quicksilver is soft to our touch, and rare to
our sight, yet it is so dense and hard, as not to be readily dissolved
from its nature; and if there be such contraries and mixtures in
one particular creature made of self-moving Matter, what will there
not be in Matter it self, according to the old saying: _If the Man
such praise shall have; What the Master that keeps the knave?_ So if
a particular Creature hath such opposite qualities and mixtures of
corporeal motions, what will the Creator have which is self-moving
Matter? Wherefore it is impossible to affirm, that self-moving Matter
is either all rare, or all dense, or all hard, or all soft; because by
its self-moving power it can be either, or both, and so by the change
and variety of motion, there may be soft and rare Points, and hard and
sharp Points, hard and contracted Globes, and soft and rare Globes;
also there may be pressures of Parts without printing, and printing
without pressures. Concerning that part of Matter which is the _Common
Sensorium_, your _Author_ demands, _Whether some point of it receive
the whole Image of the object, or whether it be wholly received into
every point of it?_ I answer, first, That all sensitive Matter is not
in Points; Next, That not any single part can subsist of it self; and
then that one Part doth not receive all parts or any part into it self;
but that Parts by the power of self-motion can and do make several
figures of all sizes and sorts, and can Epitomize a great object into
a very little figure; for outward objects do not move the body, but
the sensitive and rational matter moves according to the figures of
outward objects: I do not say always, but most commonly; _But_, says
your Author, _How can so smal a Point receive the Images of so vast
or so various objects at once, without obliteration or confusion._
First, I answer, That, as I said before, sensitive Matter is not bound
up to a Point, nor to be a single self-subsisting Part. Next, as for
confusion, I say, that the sensitive matter makes no more confusion,
then an Engraver, when he engraves several figures in a small stone,
and a Painter draws several figures in a small compass; for a Carver
will cut out several figures in a Cherry-stone, and a Lady in a little
black Patch; and if gross and rude Art is able to do this, what may
not Ingenious and Wise Nature do? And as Nature is ingenious and
knowing in her self, so in her Parts, and her Parts in her; for neither
whole nor Parts are ignorant, but have a knowledg, each according to
the motion of its own Parts; for knowledg is in Motion, and Motion
in Matter; and the diversity and variety of motion is the diversity
and variety of knowledg, so that every particular figure and motion
hath its particular knowledg, as well as its proper and peculiar
parts; and as the parts join or divide, so doth knowledg, which many
times causes Arts to be lost and found, and memory and remembrance in
Particular Creatures: I do not say, they are utterly lost in nature,
but onely in respect to particular Creatures, by the dissolving and
dividing of their particular figures. For the rational matter, by
reason it moves onely in its own parts, it can change and rechange
into several figures without division of parts, which makes memory
and remembrance: But men not considering or believing there might
be such a degree of onely matter, namely rational, it has made them
erre in their judgments. Nevertheless there is a difference between
sensitive and rational parts and motions, and yet they are agreeable
most commonly in their actions, though not always. Also the rational
can make such figures as the sensitive cannot, by reason the rational
has a greater power and subtiler faculty in making variety, then the
sensitive; for the sensitive is bound to move with the inanimate, but
the rational moves onely in its own parts; for though the sensitive
and rational oftentimes cause each other to move, yet they are not of
one and the same degree of matter, nor have they the same motions.
And this rational Matter is the cause of all Notions, Conceptions,
Imaginations, Deliberation, Determination, Memory, and any thing else
that belongs to the Mind; for this matter is the mind of Nature, and
so being dividable, the mind of all Creatures, as the sensitive is the
life; and it can move, as I said, more subtilly, and more variously
then the sensitive, and make such figures as the sensitive cannot,
without outward examples and objects. But all diversity comes by
change of motion, and motions are as sympathetical and agreeing, as
antipathetical and disagreeing; And though Nature's artificial motions,
which are her Playing motions, are sometimes extravagant, yet in her
fundamental actions there is no extravagancy, as we may observe by her
exact rules in the various generations, the distinct kinds and sorts,
the several exact measures, times, proportions and motions of all her
Creatures, in all which her wisdom is well exprest, and in the variety
her wise pleasure: To which I leave her, and rest,
Madam,
_Your faithful Friend,_
_and Servant._
[1] _Of the Immortality of the Soul, l._ 2. _c._ 2.