_MADAM,_
Your _Author_ is pleased, in Mirth, and to disgrace the opinion of
those which hold, that Perception is made by figuring, to bring in
this following example:[1] _Suppose_, says he, _one Particle should
shape it self into a_ George on Horse-back _with a Lance in his hand,
and another into an Inchanted Castle; this_ George on Horse-back
_must run against the Castle, to make the Castle receive his impress
and similitude: But what then? Truly the Encounter will be very
Unfortunate, for S._ George _indeed may easily break his Lance, but
it is impossible that he should by justling against the Particle in
the form of a Castle, conveigh the intire shape of himself and his
Horse thereby, such as we find our selves able to imagine of a man
on Horse-back; which is a Truth as demonstrable as any Theorem in
Mathematicks._ I answer, first, That there is no Particle single and
alone by it self; Next, I say, It is more easie for the rational
matter to put it self into such figures, and to make such encounters,
then for an Immaterial mind or substance to imagine it; for no
imagination can be without figure, and how should an Immaterial created
substance present such Figures, but by making them either in it self
or upon matter? For S. _George_ and the _Castle_ are figures, and
their encounters are real fighting actions, and how such figures and
actions can be in the mind or memory, and yet not be, is impossible
to conceive; for, as I said, those figures and actions must be either
in the incorporeal mind, or in the corporeal parts of matter; and if
the figures and motions may be in an incorporeal substance, much more
is it probable for them to be in a corporeal; nay if the figures and
their actions can be in gross corporeal matter, why should they not be
in the purest part of matter, which is the rational matter? And as for
being made known to the whole body, and every part thereof, it is not
necessary, no more then it is necessary, that the private actions of
every Man or Family should be made known to the whole Kingdom, or Town,
or Parish: But my opinion of self-corporeal motion and perception, may
be as demonstrable as that of Immaterial Natural Spirits, which, in
my mind, is not demonstrable at all, by reason it is not corporeal or
material; For how can that be naturally demonstrable, which naturally
is nothing? But your _Author_ believes the Mind or rational Soul
to be individable, and therefore concludes, that the Parts of the
same Matter, although at great distance, must of necessity know each
Particular act of each several Part; but that is not necessary; for
if there were not ignorance through the division of Parts, every man
and other creatures would know alike; and there is no better proof,
that matter, or any particular creature in nature is not governed by
a created Immaterial Spirit, then that knowledg is in parts; for the
hand doth not know what pain the head feels, which certainly it would
do, if the mind were not dividable into parts, but an individable
substance. But this is well to be observed, that some parts in some
actions agree generally in one body, and some not; as for example,
temperance and appetite do not agree; for the corporeal actions of
appetite desire to join with the corporeal actions of such or such
other parts, but the corporeal actions of temperance do hinder and
forbid it; whereupon there is a faction amongst the several parts: for
example, a Man desires to be drunk with Wine; this desire is made by
such corporeal actions as make appetite; the rational corporeal motions
or actions which make temperance, oppose those that make appetite,
and that sort of actions which hath the better, carryes it, the hand
and other parts of the body obeying the strongest side; and if there
be no wine to satisfie the appetite, yet many times the appetite
continues; that is, the parts continue in the same motions that make
such an appetite; but if the appetite doth not continue, then those
parts have changed their motions; or when by drinking, the appetite is
satisfied, and ceases, then those parts that made the appetite, have
altered their former motions. But oftentimes the rational corporeal
motions may so agree with the sensitive, as there may be no opposition
or crossing at all, but a sympathetical mutual agreement betwixt
them, at least an approvement; so that the rational may approve what
the sensitive covet or desire: Also some motions of the rational, as
also of the sensitive matter, may disagree amongst themselves, as we
see, that a man will often have a divided mind; for he will love and
hate the same thing, desire and not desire one and the same thing, as
to be in Heaven, and yet to be in the World: Moreover, this is to be
observed, That all rational perceptions or cogitations, are not so
perspicuous and clear as if they were Mathematical Demonstrations, but
there is some obscurity, more or less in them, at least they are not
so well perceivable without comparing several figures together, which
proves, they are not made by an individable, immaterial Spirit, but
by dividable corporeal parts: As for example, Man writes oftentimes
false, and seldom so exact, but he is forced to mend his hand, and
correct his opinions, and sometimes quite to alter them, according as
the figures continue or are dissolved and altered by change of motion,
and according as the actions are quick or slow in these alterations,
the humane mind is setled or wavering; and as figures are made, or
dissolved and transformed, Opinions, Conceptions, Imaginations,
Understanding, and the like, are more or less; And according as these
figures last, so is constancy or inconstancy, memory or forgetfulness,
and as those figures are repeated, so is remembrance; but sometimes
they are so constant and permanent, as they last as long as the figure
of the body, and sometimes it happens not once in an age, that the
like figures are repeated, and sometimes they are repeated every
moment: As for example; a man remembers or calls to mind the figure of
another man, his friend, with all his qualities, dispositions, actions,
proprieties, and the like, several times in an hour, and sometimes not
once in a year, and so as often as he remembers him, as often is the
figure of that man repeated; and as oft as he forgets him, so often is
his figure dissolved. But some imagine the rational motions to be so
gross as the Trotting of a Horse, and that all the motions of Animate
matter are as rude and course as renting or tearing asunder, or that
all impressions must needs make dents or creases. But as Nature hath
degrees of corporeal matter, so she hath also degrees of corporeal
motions, Matter and Motion being but one substance; and it is absurd to
judg of the interior motions of self-moving matter, by artificial or
exterior gross motions, as that all motions must be like the tearing
of a sheet of Paper, or that the printing and patterning of several
figures of rational and sensitive matter must be like the printing of
Books; nay, all artificial Printings are not so hard, as to make dents
and impresses; witness Writing, Painting, and the like; for they do
not disturb the ground whereon the letters are written, or the picture
drawn, and so the curious actions of the purest rational matter are
neither rude nor rough; but although this matter is so subtil and pure,
as not subject to exterior human senses and organs, yet certainly it
is dividable, not onely in several Creatures, but in the several parts
of one and the same Creature, as well as the sensitive, which is the
Life of Nature, as the other is the Soul; not the Divine, but natural
Soul; neither is this Soul Immaterial, but Corporeal; not composed of
raggs and shreds, but it is the purest, simplest and subtillest matter
in Nature. But to conclude, I desire you to remember, _Madam_, that
this rational and sensitive Matter in one united and finite Figure or
particular Creature, has both common and particular actions, for as
there are several kinds and sorts of Creatures, and particulars in
every kind and sort: so the like for the actions of the rational and
sensitive matter in one particular Creature. Also it is to be noted,
That the Parts of rational matter, can more suddenly give and take
Intelligence to and from each other, then the sensitive; nevertheless,
all Parts in Nature, at least adjoyning parts, have Intelligence
between each other, more or less, because all parts make but one body;
for it is not with the parts of Matter, as with several Constables in
several Hundreds, or several Parishes, which are a great way distant
from each other, but they may be as close as the combs of Bees, and yet
as partable and as active as Bees. But concerning the Intelligence of
Natures Parts, I have sufficiently spoken in other places; and so I'le
add no more, but that I unfeignedly remain;
Madam,
_Your faithful Friend_
_and Servant._
[1] _In the second Book of the Immortality of the Soul, ch._ 6.