Whether the Operation of Contemplation Is Fittingly Divided into a
Threefold Movement, Circular, Straight and Oblique?
Objection 1: It would seem that the operation of contemplation is
unfittingly divided into a threefold movement, "circular,"
"straight," and "oblique" (Div. Nom. iv). For contemplation pertains
exclusively to rest, according to Wis. 8:16, "When I go into my
house, I shall repose myself with her." Now movement is opposed to
rest. Therefore the operations of the contemplative life should not
be described as movements.
Obj. 2: Further, the action of the contemplative life pertains to the
intellect, whereby man is like the angels. Now Dionysius describes
these movements as being different in the angels from what they are
in the soul. For he says (Div. Nom. iv) that the "circular" movement
in the angel is "according to his enlightenment by the beautiful and
the good." On the other hand, he assigns the circular movement of the
soul to several things: the first of which is the "withdrawal of the
soul into itself from externals"; the second is "a certain
concentration of its powers, whereby it is rendered free of error and
of outward occupation"; and the third is "union with those things
that are above it." Again, he describes differently their respective
straight movements. For he says that the straight movement of the
angel is that by which he proceeds to the care of those things that
are beneath him. On the other hand, he describes the straight
movement of the soul as being twofold: first, "its progress towards
things that are near it"; secondly, "its uplifting from external
things to simple contemplation." Further, he assigns a different
oblique movement to each. For he assigns the oblique movement of the
angels to the fact that "while providing for those who have less they
remain unchanged in relation to God": whereas he assigns the oblique
movement of the soul to the fact that "the soul is enlightened in
Divine knowledge by reasoning and discoursing." Therefore it would
seem that the operations of contemplation are unfittingly assigned
according to the ways mentioned above.
Obj. 3: Further, Richard of St. Victor (De Contempl. i, 5) mentions
many other different movements in likeness to the birds of the air.
"For some of these rise at one time to a great height, at another
swoop down to earth, and they do so repeatedly; others fly now to the
right, now to the left again and again; others go forwards or lag
behind many times; others fly in a circle now more now less extended;
and others remain suspended almost immovably in one place." Therefore
it would seem that there are only three movements of contemplation.
_On the contrary,_ stands the authority of Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv).
_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 119, A. 1, ad 3), the operation
of the intellect, wherein contemplation essentially consists, is
called a movement, in so far as movement is the act of a perfect
thing, according to the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 1). Since,
however, it is through sensible objects that we come to the knowledge
of intelligible things, and since sensible operations do not take
place without movement, the result is that even intelligible
operations are described as movements, and are differentiated in
likeness to various movements. Now of bodily movements, local
movements are the most perfect and come first, as proved in _Phys._
viii, 7; wherefore the foremost among intelligible operations are
described by being likened to them. These movements are of three
kinds; for there is the "circular" movement, by which a thing moves
uniformly round one point as center, another is the "straight"
movement, by which a thing goes from one point to another; the third
is "oblique," being composed as it were of both the others.
Consequently, in intelligible operations, that which is simply
uniform is compared to circular movement; the intelligible operation
by which one proceeds from one point to another is compared to the
straight movement; while the intelligible operation which unites
something of uniformity with progress to various points is compared
to the oblique movement.
Reply Obj. 1: External bodily movements are opposed to the quiet of
contemplation, which consists in rest from outward occupations: but
the movements of intellectual operations belong to the quiet of
contemplation.
Reply Obj. 2: Man is like the angels in intellect generically, but
the intellective power is much higher in the angel than in man.
Consequently these movements must be ascribed to souls and angels in
different ways, according as they are differently related to
uniformity. For the angelic intellect has uniform knowledge in two
respects. First, because it does not acquire intelligible truth from
the variety of composite objects; secondly, because it understands
the truth of intelligible objects not discursively, but by simple
intuition. On the other hand, the intellect of the soul acquires
intelligible truth from sensible objects, and understands it by a
certain discoursing of the reason.
Wherefore Dionysius assigns the "circular" movement of the angels to
the fact that their intuition of God is uniform and unceasing, having
neither beginning nor end: even as a circular movement having neither
beginning nor end is uniformly around the one same center. But on the
part of the soul, ere it arrive at this uniformity, its twofold lack
of uniformity needs to be removed. First, that which arises from the
variety of external things: this is removed by the soul withdrawing
from externals, and so the first thing he mentions regarding the
circular movement of the soul is "the soul's withdrawal into itself
from external objects." Secondly, another lack of uniformity requires
to be removed from the soul, and this is owing to the discoursing of
reason. This is done by directing all the soul's operations to the
simple contemplation of the intelligible truth, and this is indicated
by his saying in the second place that "the soul's intellectual
powers must be uniformly concentrated," in other words that
discoursing must be laid aside and the soul's gaze fixed on the
contemplation of the one simple truth. In this operation of the soul
there is no error, even as there is clearly no error in the
understanding of first principles which we know by simple intuition.
Afterwards these two things being done, he mentions thirdly the
uniformity which is like that of the angels, for then all things
being laid aside, the soul continues in the contemplation of God
alone. This he expresses by saying: "Then being thus made uniform
unitedly," i.e. conformably, "by the union of its powers, it is
conducted to the good and the beautiful." The "straight" movement of
the angel cannot apply to his proceeding from one thing to another by
considering them, but only to the order of his providence, namely to
the fact that the higher angel enlightens the lower angels through
the angels that are intermediate. He indicates this when he says:
"The angel's movement takes a straight line when he proceeds to the
care of things subject to him, taking in his course whatever things
are direct," i.e. in keeping with the dispositions of the direct
order. Whereas he ascribes the "straight" movement in the soul to the
soul's proceeding from exterior sensibles to the knowledge of
intelligible objects. The "oblique" movement in the angels he
describes as being composed of the straight and circular movements,
inasmuch as their care for those beneath them is in accordance with
their contemplation of God: while the "oblique" movement in the soul
he also declares to be partly straight and partly circular, in so far
as in reasoning it makes use of the light received from God.
Reply Obj. 3: These varieties of movement that are taken from the
distinction between above and below, right and left, forwards and
backwards, and from varying circles, are all comprised under either
straight [or] oblique movement, because they all denote discursions
of reason. For if the reason pass from the genus to the species, or
from the part to the whole, it will be, as he explains, from above to
below: if from one opposite to another, it will be from right to
left; if from the cause to the effect, it will be backwards and
forwards; if it be about accidents that surround a thing near at hand
or far remote, the movement will be circular. The discoursing of
reason from sensible to intelligible objects, if it be according to
the order of natural reason, belongs to the straight movement; but if
it be according to the Divine enlightenment, it will belong to the
oblique movement as explained above (ad 2). That alone which he
describes as immobility belongs to the circular movement.
Wherefore it is evident that Dionysius describes the movement of
contemplation with much greater fulness and depth.
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