Whether Rapture Pertains to the Cognitive Rather Than to the
Appetitive Power?
Objection 1: It would seem that rapture pertains to the appetitive
rather than to the cognitive power. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom.
iv): "The Divine love causes ecstasy." Now love pertains to the
appetitive power. Therefore so does ecstasy or rapture.
Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Dial. ii, 3) that "he who fed the
swine debased himself by a dissipated mind and an unclean life;
whereas Peter, when the angel delivered him and carried him into
ecstasy, was not beside himself, but above himself." Now the prodigal
son sank into the depths by his appetite. Therefore in those also who
are carried up into the heights it is the appetite that is affected.
Obj. 3: Further, a gloss on Ps. 30:1, "In Thee, O Lord, have I hoped,
let me never be confounded," says in explaining the title [*Unto the
end, a psalm for David, in an ecstasy]: "_Ekstasis_ in Greek
signifies in Latin _excessus mentis,_ an aberration of the mind. This
happens in two ways, either through dread of earthly things or
through the mind being rapt in heavenly things and forgetful of this
lower world." Now dread of earthly things pertains to the appetite.
Therefore rapture of the mind in heavenly things, being placed in
opposition to this dread, also pertains to the appetite.
_On the contrary,_ A gloss on Ps. 115:2, "I said in my excess: Every
man is a liar," says: "We speak of ecstasy, not when the mind wanders
through fear, but when it is carried aloft on the wings of
revelation." Now revelation pertains to the intellective power.
Therefore ecstasy or rapture does also.
_I answer that,_ We can speak of rapture in two ways. First, with
regard to the term of rapture, and thus, properly speaking, rapture
cannot pertain to the appetitive, but only to the cognitive power.
For it was stated (A. 1) that rapture is outside the inclination of
the person who is rapt; whereas the movement of the appetitive power
is an inclination to an appetible good. Wherefore, properly speaking,
in desiring something, a man is not rapt, but is moved by himself.
Secondly, rapture may be considered with regard to its cause, and
thus it may have a cause on the part of the appetitive power. For
from the very fact that the appetite is strongly affected towards
something, it may happen, owing to the violence of his affection,
that a man is carried away from everything else. Moreover, it has an
effect on the appetitive power, when for instance a man delights in
the things to which he is rapt. Hence the Apostle said that he was
rapt, not only "to the third heaven"--which pertains to the
contemplation of the intellect--but also into "paradise," which
pertains to the appetite.
Reply Obj. 1: Rapture adds something to ecstasy. For ecstasy means
simply a going out of oneself by being placed outside one's proper
order [*Cf. I-II, Q. 28, A. 3]; while rapture denotes a certain
violence in addition. Accordingly ecstasy may pertain to the
appetitive power, as when a man's appetite tends to something outside
him, and in this sense Dionysius says that "the Divine love causes
ecstasy," inasmuch as it makes man's appetite tend to the object
loved. Hence he says afterwards that "even God Himself, the cause of
all things, through the overflow of His loving goodness, goes outside
Himself in His providence for all beings." But even if this were said
expressly of rapture, it would merely signify that love is the cause
of rapture.
Reply Obj. 2: There is a twofold appetite in man; to wit, the
intellective appetite which is called the will, and the sensitive
appetite known as the sensuality. Now it is proper to man that his
lower appetite be subject to the higher appetite, and that the higher
move the lower. Hence man may become outside himself as regards the
appetite, in two ways. In one way, when a man's intellective appetite
tends wholly to divine things, and takes no account of those things
whereto the sensitive appetite inclines him; thus Dionysius says
(Div. Nom. iv) that "Paul being in ecstasy through the vehemence of
Divine love" exclaimed: "I live, now not I, but Christ liveth in me."
In another way, when a man tends wholly to things pertaining to the
lower appetite, and takes no account of his higher appetite. It is
thus that "he who fed the swine debased himself"; and this latter
kind of going out of oneself, or being beside oneself, is more akin
than the former to the nature of rapture because the higher appetite
is more proper to man. Hence when through the violence of his lower
appetite a man is withdrawn from the movement of his higher appetite,
it is more a case of being withdrawn from that which is proper to
him. Yet, because there is no violence therein, since the will is
able to resist the passion, it falls short of the true nature of
rapture, unless perchance the passion be so strong that it takes away
entirely the use of reason, as happens to those who are mad with
anger or love.
It must be observed, however, that both these excesses affecting the
appetite may cause an excess in the cognitive power, either because
the mind is carried away to certain intelligible objects, through
being drawn away from objects of sense, or because it is caught up
into some imaginary vision or fanciful apparition.
Reply Obj. 3: Just as love is a movement of the appetite with regard
to good, so fear is a movement of the appetite with regard to evil.
Wherefore either of them may equally cause an aberration of mind; and
all the more since fear arises from love, as Augustine says (De Civ.
Dei xiv, 7, 9).
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