Whether Anger Is the Most Grievous Sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that anger is the most grievous sin. For
Chrysostom says [*Hom. xlviii in Joan.] that "nothing is more
repulsive than the look of an angry man, and nothing uglier than a
ruthless* face, and most of all than a cruel soul." [*_Severo_. The
correct text is _Si vero._ The translation would then run thus . . .
"and nothing uglier." And if his "face is ugly, how much uglier is
his soul!"]. Therefore anger is the most grievous sin.
Obj. 2: Further, the more hurtful a sin is, the worse it would seem
to be; since, according to Augustine (Enchiridion xii), "a thing is
said to be evil because it hurts." Now anger is most hurtful, because
it deprives man of his reason, whereby he is master of himself; for
Chrysostom says (Hom. xlviii in Joan.) that "anger differs in no way
from madness; it is a demon while it lasts, indeed more troublesome
than one harassed by a demon." Therefore anger is the most grievous
sin.
Obj. 3: Further, inward movements are judged according to their
outward effects. Now the effect of anger is murder, which is a most
grievous sin. Therefore anger is a most grievous sin.
_On the contrary,_ Anger is compared to hatred as the mote to the
beam; for Augustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxi): "Lest anger grow
into hatred and a mote become a beam." Therefore anger is not the
most grievous sin.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 1, 2), the inordinateness of
anger is considered in a twofold respect, namely with regard to an
undue object, and with regard to an undue mode of being angry. As to
the appetible object which it desires, anger would seem to be the
least of sins, for anger desires the evil of punishment for some
person, under the aspect of a good that is vengeance. Hence on the
part of the evil which it desires the sin of anger agrees with those
sins which desire the evil of our neighbor, such as envy and hatred;
but while hatred desires absolutely another's evil as such, and the
envious man desires another's evil through desire of his own glory,
the angry man desires another's evil under the aspect of just
revenge. Wherefore it is evident that hatred is more grievous than
envy, and envy than anger: since it is worse to desire evil as an
evil, than as a good; and to desire evil as an external good such as
honor or glory, than under the aspect of the rectitude of justice. On
the part of the good, under the aspect of which the angry man desires
an evil, anger concurs with the sin of concupiscence that tends to a
good. In this respect again, absolutely speaking, the sin of anger is
apparently less grievous than that of concupiscence, according as the
good of justice, which the angry man desires, is better than the
pleasurable or useful good which is desired by the subject of
concupiscence. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 4) that
"the incontinent in desire is more disgraceful than the incontinent
in anger."
On the other hand, as to the inordinateness which regards the mode of
being angry, anger would seem to have a certain pre-eminence on
account of the strength and quickness of its movement, according to
Prov. 27:4, "Anger hath no mercy, nor fury when it breaketh forth:
and who can bear the violence of one provoked?" Hence Gregory says
(Moral. v, 45): "The heart goaded by the pricks of anger is
convulsed, the body trembles, the tongue entangles itself, the face
is inflamed, the eyes are enraged and fail utterly to recognize those
whom we know: the tongue makes sounds indeed, but there is no sense
in its utterance."
Reply Obj. 1: Chrysostom is alluding to the repulsiveness of the
outward gestures which result from the impetuousness of anger.
Reply Obj. 2: This argument considers the inordinate movement of
anger, that results from its impetuousness, as stated above.
Reply Obj. 3: Murder results from hatred and envy no less than from
anger: yet anger is less grievous, inasmuch as it considers the
aspect of justice, as stated above.
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