Whether the Philosopher Suitably Assigns the Species of Anger?
Objection 1: It would seem that the species of anger are unsuitably
assigned by the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5) where he says that some
angry persons are "choleric," some "sullen," and some "ill-tempered"
or "stern." According to him, a person is said to be "sullen" whose
anger "is appeased with difficulty and endures a long time." But this
apparently pertains to the circumstance of time. Therefore it seems
that anger can be differentiated specifically in respect also of the
other circumstances.
Obj. 2: Further, he says (Ethic. iv, 5) that "ill-tempered" or
"stern" persons "are those whose anger is not appeased without
revenge, or punishment." Now this also pertains to the
unquenchableness of anger. Therefore seemingly the ill-tempered is
the same as bitterness.
Obj. 3: Further, our Lord mentions three degrees of anger, when He
says (Matt. 5:22): "Whosoever is angry with his brother, shall be in
danger of the judgment: and whosoever shall say to his brother, Raca,
shall be in danger of the council, and whosoever shall say" to his
brother, "Thou fool." But these degrees are not referable to the
aforesaid species. Therefore it seems that the above division of
anger is not fitting.
_On the contrary,_ Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxi]
says "there are three species of irascibility," namely, "the anger
which is called wrath [*_Fellea,_ i.e. like gall. But in I-II, Q.
46, A. 8, St. Thomas quoting the same authority has _Cholos_ which we
render 'wrath']," and "ill-will" which is a disease of the mind, and
"rancour." Now these three seem to coincide with the three aforesaid.
For "wrath" he describes as "having beginning and movement," and the
Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5) ascribes this to "choleric" persons:
"ill-will" he describes as "an anger that endures and grows old," and
this the Philosopher ascribes to "sullenness"; while he describes
"rancour" as "reckoning the time for vengeance," which tallies with
the Philosopher's description of the "ill-tempered." The same
division is given by Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 16). Therefore the
aforesaid division assigned by the Philosopher is not unfitting.
_I answer that,_ The aforesaid distinction may be referred either to
the passion, or to the sin itself of anger. We have already stated
when treating of the passions (I-II, Q. 46, A. 8) how it is to be
applied to the passion of anger. And it would seem that this is
chiefly what Gregory of Nyssa and Damascene had in view. Here,
however, we have to take the distinction of these species in its
application to the sin of anger, and as set down by the Philosopher.
For the inordinateness of anger may be considered in relation to two
things. First, in relation to the origin of anger, and this regards
"choleric" persons, who are angry too quickly and for any slight
cause. Secondly, in relation to the duration of anger, for that anger
endures too long; and this may happen in two ways. In one way,
because the cause of anger, to wit, the inflicted injury, remains too
long in a man's memory, the result being that it gives rise to a
lasting displeasure, wherefore he is "grievous" and "sullen" to
himself. In another way, it happens on the part of vengeance, which a
man seeks with a stubborn desire: this applies to "ill-tempered" or
"stern" people, who do not put aside their anger until they have
inflicted punishment.
Reply Obj. 1: It is not time, but a man's propensity to anger, or his
pertinacity in anger, that is the chief point of consideration in the
aforesaid species.
Reply Obj. 2: Both "sullen" and "ill-tempered" people have a
long-lasting anger, but for different reasons. For a "sullen" person
has an abiding anger on account of an abiding displeasure, which he
holds locked in his breast; and as he does not break forth into the
outward signs of anger, others cannot reason him out of it, nor does
he of his own accord lay aside his anger, except his displeasure wear
away with time and thus his anger cease. On the other hand, the anger
of "ill-tempered" persons is long-lasting on account of their intense
desire for revenge, so that it does not wear out with time, and can
be quelled only by revenge.
Reply Obj. 3: The degrees of anger mentioned by our Lord do not refer
to the different species of anger, but correspond to the course of
the human act [*Cf. I-II, Q. 46, A. 8, Obj. 3]. For the first degree
is an inward conception, and in reference to this He says: "Whosoever
is angry with his brother." The second degree is when the anger is
manifested by outward signs, even before it breaks out into effect;
and in reference to this He says: "Whosoever shall say to his
brother, Raca!" which is an angry exclamation. The third degree is
when the sin conceived inwardly breaks out into effect. Now the
effect of anger is another's hurt under the aspect of revenge; and
the least of hurts is that which is done by a mere word; wherefore in
reference to this He says: "Whosoever shall say to his brother Thou
fool!" Consequently it is clear that the second adds to the first,
and the third to both the others; so that, if the first is a mortal
sin, in the case referred to by our Lord, as stated above (A. 3, ad
2), much more so are the others. Wherefore some kind of condemnation
is assigned as corresponding to each one of them. In the first case
"judgment" is assigned, and this is the least severe, for as
Augustine says [*Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 9], "where judgment is to be
delivered, there is an opportunity for defense": in the second case
"council" is assigned, "whereby the judges deliberate together on the
punishment to be inflicted": to the third case is assigned
"hell-fire," i.e. "decisive condemnation."
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