Whether Anger Is a Sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that anger is not a sin. For we demerit by
sinning. But "we do not demerit by the passions, even as neither do
we incur blame thereby," as stated in _Ethic._ ii, 5. Consequently no
passion is a sin. Now anger is a passion as stated above (I-II, Q.
46, A. 1) in the treatise on the passions. Therefore anger is not a
sin.
Obj. 2: Further, in every sin there is conversion to some mutable
good. But in anger there is conversion not to a mutable good, but to
a person's evil. Therefore anger is not a sin.
Obj. 3: Further, "No man sins in what he cannot avoid," as Augustine
asserts [*De Lib. Arb. iii, 18]. But man cannot avoid anger, for a
gloss on Ps. 4:5, "Be ye angry and sin not," says: "The movement of
anger is not in our power." Again, the Philosopher asserts (Ethic.
vii, 6) that "the angry man acts with displeasure." Now displeasure
is contrary to the will. Therefore anger is not a sin.
Obj. 4: Further, sin is contrary to nature, according to Damascene
[*De Fide Orth. ii, 4, 30]. But it is not contrary to man's nature to
be angry, and it is the natural act of a power, namely the irascible;
wherefore Jerome says in a letter [*Ep. xii ad Anton. Monach.] that
"to be angry is the property of man." Therefore it is not a sin to be
angry.
_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Eph. 4:31): "Let all indignation
and anger [*Vulg.: 'Anger and indignation'] . . . be put away from
you."
_I answer that,_ Anger, as stated above (A. 1), is properly the name
of a passion. A passion of the sensitive appetite is good in so far
as it is regulated by reason, whereas it is evil if it set the order
of reason aside. Now the order of reason, in regard to anger, may be
considered in relation to two things. First, in relation to the
appetible object to which anger tends, and that is revenge. Wherefore
if one desire revenge to be taken in accordance with the order of
reason, the desire of anger is praiseworthy, and is called "zealous
anger" [*Cf. Greg., Moral. v, 45]. On the other hand, if one desire
the taking of vengeance in any way whatever contrary to the order of
reason, for instance if he desire the punishment of one who has not
deserved it, or beyond his deserts, or again contrary to the order
prescribed by law, or not for the due end, namely the maintaining of
justice and the correction of defaults, then the desire of anger will
be sinful, and this is called sinful anger.
Secondly, the order of reason in regard to anger may be considered in
relation to the mode of being angry, namely that the movement of
anger should not be immoderately fierce, neither internally nor
externally; and if this condition be disregarded, anger will not lack
sin, even though just vengeance be desired.
Reply Obj. 1: Since passion may be either regulated or not regulated
by reason, it follows that a passion considered absolutely does not
include the notion of merit or demerit, of praise or blame. But as
regulated by reason, it may be something meritorious and deserving of
praise; while on the other hand, as not regulated by reason, it may
be demeritorious and blameworthy. Wherefore the Philosopher says
(Ethic. ii, 5) that "it is he who is angry in a certain way, that is
praised or blamed."
Reply Obj. 2: The angry man desires the evil of another, not for its
own sake but for the sake of revenge, towards which his appetite
turns as to a mutable good.
Reply Obj. 3: Man is master of his actions through the judgment of
his reason, wherefore as to the movements that forestall that
judgment, it is not in man's power to prevent them as a whole, i.e.
so that none of them arise, although his reason is able to check each
one, if it arise. Accordingly it is stated that the movement of anger
is not in man's power, to the extent namely that no such movement
arise. Yet since this movement is somewhat in his power, it is not
entirely sinless if it be inordinate. The statement of the
Philosopher that "the angry man acts with displeasure," means that he
is displeased, not with his being angry, but with the injury which he
deems done to himself: and through this displeasure he is moved to
seek vengeance.
Reply Obj. 4: The irascible power in man is naturally subject to his
reason, wherefore its act is natural to man, in so far as it is in
accord with reason, and in so far as it is against reason, it is
contrary to man's nature.
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