Whether It Is Lawful to Be Angry?
Objection 1: It would seem that it cannot be lawful to be angry. For
Jerome in his exposition on Matt. 5:22, "Whosoever is angry with his
brother," etc. says: "Some codices add 'without cause.' However, in
the genuine codices the sentence is unqualified, and anger is
forbidden altogether." Therefore it is nowise lawful to be angry.
Obj. 2: Further, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) "The soul's
evil is to be without reason." Now anger is always without reason:
for the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that "anger does not listen
perfectly to reason"; and Gregory says (Moral. v, 45) that "when
anger sunders the tranquil surface of the soul, it mangles and rends
it by its riot"; and Cassian says (De Inst. Caenob. viii, 6): "From
whatever cause it arises, the angry passion boils over and blinds the
eye of the mind." Therefore it is always evil to be angry.
Obj. 3: Further, anger is "desire for vengeance" [*Aristotle, Rhet.
ii, 2] according to a gloss on Lev. 19:17, "Thou shalt not hate thy
brother in thy heart." Now it would seem unlawful to desire
vengeance, since this should be left to God, according to Deut.
32:35, "Revenge is Mine." Therefore it would seem that to be angry is
always an evil.
Obj. 4: Further, all that makes us depart from likeness to God is
evil. Now anger always makes us depart from likeness to God, since
God judges with tranquillity according to Wis. 12:18. Therefore to be
angry is always an evil.
_On the contrary,_ Chrysostom [*Hom. xi in the Opus Imperfectum,
falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says: "He that is angry
without cause, shall be in danger; but he that is angry with cause,
shall not be in danger: for without anger, teaching will be useless,
judgments unstable, crimes unchecked." Therefore to be angry is not
always an evil.
_I answer that,_ Properly speaking anger is a passion of the
sensitive appetite, and gives its name to the irascible power, as
stated above (I-II, Q. 46, A. 1) when we were treating of the
passions. Now with regard to the passions of the soul, it is to be
observed that evil may be found in them in two ways. First by reason
of the passion's very species, which is derived from the passion's
object. Thus envy, in respect of its species, denotes an evil, since
it is displeasure at another's good, and such displeasure is in
itself contrary to reason: wherefore, as the Philosopher remarks
(Ethic. ii, 6), "the very mention of envy denotes something evil."
Now this does not apply to anger, which is the desire for revenge,
since revenge may be desired both well and ill. Secondly, evil is
found in a passion in respect of the passion's quantity, that is in
respect of its excess or deficiency; and thus evil may be found in
anger, when, to wit, one is angry, more or less than right reason
demands. But if one is angry in accordance with right reason, one's
anger is deserving of praise.
Reply Obj. 1: The Stoics designated anger and all the other passions
as emotions opposed to the order of reason; and accordingly they
deemed anger and all other passions to be evil, as stated above
(I-II, Q. 24, A. 2) when we were treating of the passions. It is in
this sense that Jerome considers anger; for he speaks of the anger
whereby one is angry with one's neighbor, with the intent of doing
him a wrong.--But, according to the Peripatetics, to whose opinion
Augustine inclines (De Civ. Dei ix, 4), anger and the other passions
of the soul are movements of the sensitive appetite, whether they be
moderated or not, according to reason: and in this sense anger is not
always evil.
Reply Obj. 2: Anger may stand in a twofold relation to reason. First,
antecedently; in this way it withdraws reason from its rectitude, and
has therefore the character of evil. Secondly, consequently, inasmuch
as the movement of the sensitive appetite is directed against vice
and in accordance with reason, this anger is good, and is called
"zealous anger." Wherefore Gregory says (Moral. v, 45): "We must
beware lest, when we use anger as an instrument of virtue, it
overrule the mind, and go before it as its mistress, instead of
following in reason's train, ever ready, as its handmaid, to obey."
This latter anger, although it hinder somewhat the judgment of reason
in the execution of the act, does not destroy the rectitude of
reason. Hence Gregory says (Moral. v, 45) that "zealous anger
troubles the eye of reason, whereas sinful anger blinds it." Nor is
it incompatible with virtue that the deliberation of reason be
interrupted in the execution of what reason has deliberated: since
art also would be hindered in its act, if it were to deliberate about
what has to be done, while having to act.
Reply Obj. 3: It is unlawful to desire vengeance considered as evil
to the man who is to be punished, but it is praiseworthy to desire
vengeance as a corrective of vice and for the good of justice; and to
this the sensitive appetite can tend, in so far as it is moved
thereto by the reason: and when revenge is taken in accordance with
the order of judgment, it is God's work, since he who has power to
punish "is God's minister," as stated in Rom. 13:4.
Reply Obj. 4: We can and ought to be like to God in the desire for
good; but we cannot be altogether likened to Him in the mode of our
desire, since in God there is no sensitive appetite, as in us, the
movement of which has to obey reason. Wherefore Gregory says (Moral.
v, 45) that "anger is more firmly erect in withstanding vice, when it
bows to the command of reason."
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