Whether the Aforesaid Virtues Are Parts of Temperance?
Objection 1: It would seem that the aforesaid virtues are not parts
of temperance. For clemency mitigates punishment, as stated above (A.
2). But the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 10) ascribes this to equity, which
pertains to justice, as stated above (Q. 120, A. 2). Therefore
seemingly clemency is not a part of temperance.
Obj. 2: Further, temperance is concerned with concupiscences; whereas
meekness and clemency regard, not concupiscences, but anger and
vengeance. Therefore they should not be reckoned parts of temperance.
Obj. 3: Further, Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4): "A man may be said
to be of unsound mind when he takes pleasure in cruelty." Now this is
opposed to clemency and meekness. Since then an unsound mind is
opposed to prudence, it seems that clemency and meekness are parts of
prudence rather than of temperance.
_On the contrary,_ Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 3) that "clemency is
temperance of the soul in exercising the power of taking revenge."
Tully also (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) reckons clemency a part of
temperance.
_I answer that,_ Parts are assigned to the principal virtues, in so
far as they imitate them in some secondary matter as to the mode
whence the virtue derives its praise and likewise its name. Thus the
mode and name of justice consist in a certain _equality,_ those of
fortitude in a certain _strength of mind,_ those of temperance in a
certain _restraint,_ inasmuch as it restrains the most vehement
concupiscences of the pleasures of touch. Now clemency and meekness
likewise consist in a certain restraint, since clemency mitigates
punishment, while meekness represses anger, as stated above (AA. 1,
2). Therefore both clemency and meekness are annexed to temperance as
principal virtue, and accordingly are reckoned to be parts thereof.
Reply Obj. 1: Two points must be considered in the mitigation of
punishment. One is that punishment should be mitigated in accordance
with the lawgiver's intention, although not according to the letter
of the law; and in this respect it pertains to equity. The other
point is a certain moderation of a man's inward disposition, so that
he does not exercise his power of inflicting punishment. This belongs
properly to clemency, wherefore Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 3) that
"it is temperance of the soul in exercising the power of taking
revenge." This moderation of soul comes from a certain sweetness of
disposition, whereby a man recoils from anything that may be painful
to another. Wherefore Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 3) that "clemency
is a certain smoothness of the soul"; for, on the other hand, there
would seem to be a certain roughness of soul in one who fears not to
pain others.
Reply Obj. 2: The annexation of secondary to principal virtues
depends on the mode of virtue, which is, so to speak, a kind of form
of the virtue, rather than on the matter. Now meekness and clemency
agree with temperance in mode, as stated above, though they agree not
in matter.
Reply Obj. 3: _Unsoundness_ is corruption of _soundness._ Now just as
soundness of body is corrupted by the body lapsing from the condition
due to the human species, so unsoundness of mind is due to the mind
lapsing from the disposition due to the human species. This occurs
both in respect of the reason, as when a man loses the use of reason,
and in respect of the appetitive power, as when a man loses that
humane feeling whereby "every man is naturally friendly towards all
other men" (Ethic. viii, 1). The unsoundness of mind that excludes
the use of reason is opposed to prudence. But that a man who takes
pleasure in the punishment of others is said to be of unsound mind,
is because he seems on this account to be devoid of the humane
feeling which gives rise to clemency.
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