Whether Clemency and Meekness Are the Greatest Virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that clemency and meekness are the
greatest virtues. For virtue is deserving of praise chiefly because
it directs man to happiness that consists in the knowledge of God.
Now meekness above all directs man to the knowledge of God: for it is
written (James 1:21): "With meekness receive the ingrafted word," and
(Ecclus. 5:13): "Be meek to hear the word" of God. Again, Dionysius
says (Ep. viii ad Demophil.) that "Moses was deemed worthy of the
Divine apparition on account of his great meekness." Therefore
meekness is the greatest of virtues.
Obj. 2: Further, seemingly a virtue is all the greater according as
it is more acceptable to God and men. Now meekness would appear to be
most acceptable to God. For it is written (Ecclus. 1:34, 35): "That
which is agreeable" to God is "faith and meekness"; wherefore Christ
expressly invites us to be meek like unto Himself (Matt. 11:29),
where He says: "Learn of Me, because I am meek and humble of heart";
and Hilary declares [*Comment. in Matth. iv, 3] that "Christ dwells
in us by our meekness of soul." Again, it is most acceptable to men;
wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 3:19): "My son, do thy works in
meekness, and thou shalt be beloved above the glory of men": for
which reason it is also declared (Prov. 20:28) that the King's
"throne is strengthened by clemency." Therefore meekness and clemency
are the greatest of virtues.
Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 2) that
"the meek are they who yield to reproaches, and resist not evil, but
overcome evil by good." Now this seems to pertain to mercy or piety
which would seem to be the greatest of virtues: because a gloss of
Ambrose [*Hilary the deacon] on 1 Tim. 4:8, "Piety [Douay:
'Godliness'] is profitable to all things," observes that "piety is
the sum total of the Christian religion." Therefore meekness and
clemency are the greatest virtues.
_On the contrary,_ They are not reckoned as principal virtues, but
are annexed to another, as to a principal, virtue.
_I answer that,_ Nothing prevents certain virtues from being
greatest, not indeed simply, nor in every respect, but in a
particular genus. It is impossible for clemency or meekness to be
absolutely the greatest virtues, since they owe their praise to the
fact that they withdraw a man from evil, by mitigating anger or
punishment. Now it is more perfect to obtain good than to lack evil.
Wherefore those virtues like faith, hope, charity, and likewise
prudence and justice, which direct one to good simply, are absolutely
greater virtues than clemency and meekness.
Yet nothing prevents clemency and meekness from having a certain
restricted excellence among the virtues which resist evil
inclinations. For anger, which is mitigated by meekness, is, on
account of its impetuousness, a very great obstacle to man's free
judgment of truth: wherefore meekness above all makes a man
self-possessed. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 10:31): "My son, keep
thy soul in meekness." Yet the concupiscences of the pleasures of
touch are more shameful, and harass more incessantly, for which
reason temperance is more rightly reckoned as a principal virtue. as
stated above (Q. 141, A. 7, ad 2). As to clemency, inasmuch as it
mitigates punishment, it would seem to approach nearest to charity,
the greatest of the virtues, since thereby we do good towards our
neighbor, and hinder his evil.
Reply Obj. 1: Meekness disposes man to the knowledge of God, by
removing an obstacle; and this in two ways. First, because it makes
man self-possessed by mitigating his anger, as stated above;
secondly, because it pertains to meekness that a man does not
contradict the words of truth, which many do through being disturbed
by anger. Wherefore Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 7): "To be
meek is not to contradict Holy Writ, whether we understand it, if it
condemn our evil ways, or understand it not, as though we might know
better and have a clearer insight of the truth."
Reply Obj. 2: Meekness and clemency make us acceptable to God and
men, in so far as they concur with charity, the greatest of the
virtues, towards the same effect, namely the mitigation of our
neighbor's evils.
Reply Obj. 3: Mercy and piety agree indeed with meekness and clemency
by concurring towards the same effect, namely the mitigation of our
neighbor's evils. Nevertheless they differ as to motive. For piety
relieves a neighbor's evil through reverence for a superior, for
instance God or one's parents: mercy relieves a neighbor's evil,
because this evil is displeasing to one, in so far as one looks upon
it as affecting oneself, as stated above (Q. 30, A. 2): and this
results from friendship which makes friends rejoice and grieve for
the same things: meekness does this, by removing anger that urges to
vengeance, and clemency does this through leniency of soul, in so far
as it judges equitable that a person be no further punished.
_______________________