Whether Both Clemency and Meekness Are Virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that neither clemency nor meekness is a
virtue. For no virtue is opposed to another virtue. Yet both of these
are apparently opposed to severity, which is a virtue. Therefore
neither clemency nor meekness is a virtue.
Obj. 2: Further, "Virtue is destroyed by excess and defect" [*Ethic.
ii, 2]. But both clemency and meekness consist in a certain decrease;
for clemency decreases punishment, and meekness decreases anger.
Therefore neither clemency nor meekness is a virtue.
Obj. 3: Further, meekness or mildness is included (Matt. 5:4) among
the beatitudes, and (Gal. 5:23) among the fruits. Now the virtues
differ from the beatitudes and fruits. Therefore they are not
comprised under virtue.
_On the contrary,_ Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 5): "Every good man
is conspicuous for his clemency and meekness." Now it is virtue
properly that belongs to a good man, since "virtue it is that makes
its possessor good, and renders his works good also" (Ethic. ii, 6).
Therefore clemency and meekness are virtues.
_I answer that,_ The nature of moral virtue consists in the
subjection of appetite to reason, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic.
i, 13). Now this is verified both in clemency and in meekness. For
clemency, in mitigating punishment, "is guided by reason," according
to Seneca (De Clementia ii, 5), and meekness, likewise, moderates
anger according to right reason, as stated in _Ethic._ iv, 5.
Wherefore it is manifest that both clemency and meekness are virtues.
Reply Obj. 1: Meekness is not directly opposed to severity; for
meekness is about anger. On the other hand, severity regards the
external infliction of punishment, so that accordingly it would seem
rather to be opposed to clemency, which also regards external
punishing, as stated above (A. 1). Yet they are not really opposed to
one another, since they are both according to right reason. For
severity is inflexible in the infliction of punishment when right
reason requires it; while clemency mitigates punishment also
according to right reason, when and where this is requisite.
Wherefore they are not opposed to one another as they are not about
the same thing.
Reply Obj. 2: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5), "the habit
that observes the mean in anger is unnamed; so that the virtue is
denominated from the diminution of anger, and is designated by the
name of meekness." For the virtue is more akin to diminution than to
excess, because it is more natural to man to desire vengeance for
injuries done to him, than to be lacking in that desire, since
"scarcely anyone belittles an injury done to himself," as Sallust
observes [*Cf. Q. 120]. As to clemency, it mitigates punishment, not
in respect of that which is according to right reason, but as regards
that which is according to common law, which is the object of legal
justice: yet on account of some particular consideration, it
mitigates the punishment, deciding, as it were, that a man is not to
be punished any further. Hence Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 1):
"Clemency grants this, in the first place, that those whom she sets
free are declared immune from all further punishment; and remission
of punishment due amounts to a pardon." Wherefore it is clear that
clemency is related to severity as equity [the Greek _epieikeia_
[*Cf. Q. 120]] to legal justice, whereof severity is a part, as
regards the infliction of punishment in accordance with the law. Yet
clemency differs from equity, as we shall state further on (A. 3, ad
1).
Reply Obj. 3: The beatitudes are acts of virtue: while the fruits are
delights in virtuous acts. Wherefore nothing hinders meekness being
reckoned both virtue, and beatitude and fruit.
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