Whether Clemency and Meekness Are Absolutely the Same?
Objection 1: It would seem that clemency and meekness are absolutely
the same. For meekness moderates anger, according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. iv, 5). Now anger is "desire of vengeance" [*Aristotle, Rhet.
ii, 2]. Since, then, clemency "is leniency of a superior in
inflicting punishment on an inferior," as Seneca states (De Clementia
ii, 3), and vengeance is taken by means of punishment, it would seem
that clemency and meekness are the same.
Obj. 2: Further, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) that "clemency
is a virtue whereby the mind is restrained by kindness when
unreasonably provoked to hatred of a person," so that apparently
clemency moderates hatred. Now, according to Augustine [*Ep. ccxi],
hatred is caused by anger; and this is the matter of meekness and
clemency. Therefore seemingly clemency and meekness are absolutely
the same.
Obj. 3: Further, the same vice is not opposed to different virtues.
But the same vice, namely cruelty, is opposed to meekness and
clemency. Therefore it seems that meekness and clemency are
absolutely the same.
_On the contrary,_ According to the aforesaid definition of Seneca
(Obj. 1) "clemency is leniency of a superior towards an inferior":
whereas meekness is not merely of superior to inferior, but of each
to everyone. Therefore meekness and clemency are not absolutely the
same.
_I answer that,_ As stated in _Ethic._ ii, 3, a moral virtue is
"about passions and actions." Now internal passions are principles of
external actions, and are likewise obstacles thereto. Wherefore
virtues that moderate passions, to a certain extent, concur towards
the same effect as virtues that moderate actions, although they
differ specifically. Thus it belongs properly to justice to restrain
man from theft, whereunto he is inclined by immoderate love or desire
of money, which is restrained by liberality; so that liberality
concurs with justice towards the effect, which is abstention from
theft. This applies to the case in point; because through the passion
of anger a man is provoked to inflict a too severe punishment, while
it belongs directly to clemency to mitigate punishment, and this
might be prevented by excessive anger.
Consequently meekness, in so far as it restrains the onslaught of
anger, concurs with clemency towards the same effect; yet they differ
from one another, inasmuch as clemency moderates external punishment,
while meekness properly mitigates the passion of anger.
Reply Obj. 1: Meekness regards properly the desire itself of
vengeance; whereas clemency regards the punishment itself which is
applied externally for the purpose of vengeance.
Reply Obj. 2: Man's affections incline to the moderation of things
that are unpleasant to him in themselves. Now it results from one man
loving another that he takes no pleasure in the latter's punishment
in itself, but only as directed to something else, for instance
justice, or the correction of the person punished. Hence love makes
one quick to mitigate punishment--and this pertains to
clemency--while hatred is an obstacle to such mitigation. For this
reason Tully says that "the mind provoked to hatred" that is to
punish too severely, "is restrained by clemency," from inflicting too
severe a punishment, so that clemency directly moderates not hatred
but punishment.
Reply Obj. 3: The vice of anger, which denotes excess in the
passion of anger, is properly opposed to meekness, which is directly
concerned with the passion of anger; while cruelty denotes excess in
punishing. Wherefore Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4) that "those are
called cruel who have reason for punishing, but lack moderation in
punishing." Those who delight in a man's punishment for its own sake
may be called savage or brutal, as though lacking the human feeling
that leads one man to love another.
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