Whether the Incontinent Man Sins More Gravely Than the Intemperate?
Objection 1: It would seem that the incontinent man sins more gravely
than the intemperate. For, seemingly, the more a man acts against his
conscience, the more gravely he sins, according to Luke 12:47, "That
servant who knew the will of his lord . . . and did not . . . shall
be beaten with many stripes." Now the incontinent man would seem to
act against his conscience more than the intemperate because,
according to _Ethic._ vii, 3, the incontinent man, though knowing how
wicked are the things he desires, nevertheless acts through passion,
whereas the intemperate man judges what he desires to be good.
Therefore the incontinent man sins more gravely than the intemperate.
Obj. 2: Further, apparently, the graver a sin is, the more incurable
it is: wherefore the sins against the Holy Ghost, being most grave,
are declared to be unpardonable. Now the sin of incontinence would
appear to be more incurable than the sin of intemperance. For a
person's sin is cured by admonishment and correction, which seemingly
are no good to the incontinent man, since he knows he is doing wrong,
and does wrong notwithstanding: whereas it seems to the intemperate
man that he is doing well, so that it were good for him to be
admonished. Therefore it would appear that the incontinent man sins
more gravely than the intemperate.
Obj. 3: Further, the more eagerly man sins, the more grievous his
sin. Now the incontinent sins more eagerly than the intemperate,
since the incontinent man has vehement passions and desires, which
the intemperate man does not always have. Therefore the incontinent
man sins more gravely than the intemperate.
_On the contrary,_ Impenitence aggravates every sin: wherefore
Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. serm. xi, 12, 13) that "impenitence is
a sin against the Holy Ghost." Now according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. vii, 8) "the intemperate man is not inclined to be penitent,
for he holds on to his choice: but every incontinent man is inclined
to repentance." Therefore the intemperate man sins more gravely than
the incontinent.
_I answer that,_ According to Augustine [*De Duab. Anim. x, xi] sin
is chiefly an act of the will, because "by the will we sin and live
aright" [*Retract. i, 9]. Consequently where there is a greater
inclination of the will to sin, there is a graver sin. Now in the
intemperate man, the will is inclined to sin in virtue of its own
choice, which proceeds from a habit acquired through custom: whereas
in the incontinent man, the will is inclined to sin through a
passion. And since passion soon passes, whereas a habit is "a
disposition difficult to remove," the result is that the incontinent
man repents at once, as soon as the passion has passed; but not so
the intemperate man; in fact he rejoices in having sinned, because
the sinful act has become connatural to him by reason of his habit.
Wherefore in reference to such persons it is written (Prov. 2:14)
that "they are glad when they have done evil, and rejoice in most
wicked things." Hence it follows that "the intemperate man is much
worse than the incontinent," as also the Philosopher declares (Ethic.
vii, 7).
Reply Obj. 1: Ignorance in the intellect sometimes precedes the
inclination of the appetite and causes it, and then the greater the
ignorance, the more does it diminish or entirely excuse the sin, in
so far as it renders it involuntary. On the other hand, ignorance in
the reason sometimes follows the inclination of the appetite, and
then such like ignorance, the greater it is, the graver the sin,
because the inclination of the appetite is shown thereby to be
greater. Now in both the incontinent and the intemperate man,
ignorance arises from the appetite being inclined to something,
either by passion, as in the incontinent, or by habit, as in the
intemperate. Nevertheless greater ignorance results thus in the
intemperate than in the incontinent. In one respect as regards
duration, since in the incontinent man this ignorance lasts only
while the passion endures, just as an attack of intermittent fever
lasts as long as the humor is disturbed: whereas the ignorance of the
intemperate man endures without ceasing, on account of the endurance
of the habit, wherefore it is likened to phthisis or any chronic
disease, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 8). In another respect
the ignorance of the intemperate man is greater as regards the thing
ignored. For the ignorance of the incontinent man regards some
particular detail of choice (in so far as he deems that he must
choose this particular thing now): whereas the intemperate man's
ignorance is about the end itself, inasmuch as he judges this thing
good, in order that he may follow his desires without being curbed.
Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7, 8) that "the incontinent
man is better than the intemperate, because he retains the best
principle [*_To beltiston, e arche_, 'the best thing, i.e. the
principle']," to wit, the right estimate of the end.
Reply Obj. 2: Mere knowledge does not suffice to cure the incontinent
man, for he needs the inward assistance of grace which quenches
concupiscence, besides the application of the external remedy of
admonishment and correction, which induce him to begin to resist his
desires, so that concupiscence is weakened, as stated above (Q. 142,
A. 2). By these same means the intemperate man can be cured. But his
curing is more difficult, for two reasons. The first is on the part
of reason, which is corrupt as regards the estimate of the last end,
which holds the same position as the principle in demonstrations. Now
it is more difficult to bring back to the truth one who errs as to
the principle; and it is the same in practical matters with one who
errs in regard to the end. The other reason is on the part of the
inclination of the appetite: for in the intemperate man this proceeds
from a habit, which is difficult to remove, whereas the inclination
of the incontinent man proceeds from a passion, which is more easily
suppressed.
Reply Obj. 3: The eagerness of the will, which increases a sin, is
greater in the intemperate man than in the incontinent, as explained
above. But the eagerness of concupiscence in the sensitive appetite
is sometimes greater in the incontinent man, because he does not sin
except through vehement concupiscence, whereas the intemperate man
sins even through slight concupiscence and sometimes forestalls it.
Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that we blame more the
intemperate man, "because he pursues pleasure without desiring it or
with calm," i.e. slight desire. "For what would he have done if he
had desired it with passion?"
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