Whether Incontinence Is a Sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that incontinence is not a sin. For as
Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18): "No man sins in what he cannot
avoid." Now no man can by himself avoid incontinence, according to
Wis. 8:21, "I know [Vulg.: 'knew'] that I could not . . . be
continent, except God gave it." Therefore incontinence is not a sin.
Obj. 2: Further, apparently every sin originates in the reason. But
the judgment of reason is overcome in the incontinent man. Therefore
incontinence is not a sin.
Obj. 3: Further, no one sins in loving God vehemently. Now a man
becomes incontinent through the vehemence of divine love: for
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "Paul, through incontinence of
divine love, exclaimed: I live, now not I" (Gal. 2:20). Therefore
incontinence is not a sin.
_On the contrary,_ It is numbered together with other sins (2 Tim.
3:3) where it is written: "Slanderers, incontinent, unmerciful," etc.
Therefore incontinence is a sin.
_I answer that,_ Incontinence about a matter may be considered in two
ways. First it may be considered properly and simply: and thus
incontinence is about concupiscences of pleasures of touch, even as
intemperance is, as we have said in reference to continence (Q. 155,
A. 2). In this way incontinence is a sin for two reasons: first,
because the incontinent man goes astray from that which is in accord
with reason; secondly, because he plunges into shameful pleasures.
Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 4) that "incontinence is
censurable not only because it is wrong"--that is, by straying from
reason--"but also because it is wicked"--that is, by following evil
desires. Secondly, incontinence about a matter is considered,
properly--inasmuch as it is a straying from reason--but not simply;
for instance when a man does not observe the mode of reason in his
desire for honor, riches, and so forth, which seem to be good in
themselves. About such things there is incontinence, not simply but
relatively, even as we have said above in reference to continence (Q.
155, A. 2, ad 3). In this way incontinence is a sin, not from the
fact that one gives way to wicked desires, but because one fails to
observe the mode of reason even in the desire for things that are of
themselves desirable.
Thirdly, incontinence is said to be about a matter, not properly, but
metaphorically, for instance about the desires for things of which
one cannot make an evil use, such as the desire for virtue. A man may
be said to be incontinent in these matters metaphorically, because
just as the incontinent man is entirely led by his evil desire, even
so is a man entirely led by his good desire which is in accord with
reason. Such like incontinence is no sin, but pertains to the
perfection of virtue.
Reply Obj. 1: Man can avoid sin and do good, yet not without God's
help, according to John 15:5: "Without Me you can do nothing."
Wherefore the fact that man needs God's help in order to be
continent, does not show incontinence to be no sin, for, as stated in
_Ethic._ iii, 3, "what we can do by means of a friend we do, in a
way, ourselves."
Reply Obj. 2: The judgment of reason is overcome in the incontinent
man, not necessarily, for then he would commit no sin, but through a
certain negligence on account of his not standing firm in resisting
the passion by holding to the judgment formed by his reason.
Reply Obj. 3: This argument takes incontinence metaphorically and not
properly.
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