Whether the Incontinent in Anger Is Worse Than the Incontinent in Desire?
Objection 1: It would seem that the incontinent in anger is worse
than the incontinent in desire. For the more difficult it is to
resist the passion, the less grievous, apparently is incontinence:
wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7): "It is not wonderful,
indeed it is pardonable if a person is overcome by strong and
overwhelming pleasures or pains." Now, "as Heraclitus says, it is
more difficult to resist desire than anger" [*Ethic. ii. 3].
Therefore incontinence of desire is less grievous than incontinence
of anger.
Obj. 2: Further, one is altogether excused from sin if the passion be
so vehement as to deprive one of the judgment of reason, as in the
case of one who becomes demented through passion. Now he that is
incontinent in anger retains more of the judgment of reason, than one
who is incontinent in desire: since "anger listens to reason
somewhat, but desire does not" as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vii,
6). Therefore the incontinent in anger is worse than the incontinent
in desire.
Obj. 3: Further, the more dangerous a sin the more grievous it is.
Now incontinence of anger would seem to be more dangerous, since it
leads a man to a greater sin, namely murder, for this is a more
grievous sin than adultery, to which incontinence of desire leads.
Therefore incontinence of anger is graver than incontinence of desire.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that
"incontinence of anger is less disgraceful than incontinence of
desire."
_I answer that,_ The sin of incontinence may be considered in two
ways. First, on the part of the passion which occasions the downfall
of reason. In this way incontinence of desire is worse than
incontinence of anger, because the movement of desire is more
inordinate than the movement of anger. There are four reasons for
this, and the Philosopher indicates them, _Ethic._ vii, 6: First,
because the movement of anger partakes somewhat of reason, since the
angry man tends to avenge the injury done to him, and reason dictates
this in a certain degree. Yet he does not tend thereto perfectly,
because he does not intend the due mode of vengeance. On the other
hand, the movement of desire is altogether in accord with sense and
nowise in accord with reason. Secondly, because the movement of anger
results more from the bodily temperament owing to the quickness of
the movement of the bile which tends to anger. Hence one who by
bodily temperament is disposed to anger is more readily angry than
one who is disposed to concupiscence is liable to be concupiscent:
wherefore also it happens more often that the children of those who
are disposed to anger are themselves disposed to anger, than that the
children of those who are disposed to concupiscence are also disposed
to concupiscence. Now that which results from the natural disposition
of the body is deemed more deserving of pardon. Thirdly, because
anger seeks to work openly, whereas concupiscence is fain to disguise
itself and creeps in by stealth. Fourthly, because he who is subject
to concupiscence works with pleasure, whereas the angry man works as
though forced by a certain previous displeasure.
Secondly, the sin of incontinence may be considered with regard to
the evil into which one falls through forsaking reason; and thus
incontinence of anger is, for the most part, more grievous, because
it leads to things that are harmful to one's neighbor.
Reply Obj. 1: It is more difficult to resist pleasure perseveringly
than anger, because concupiscence is enduring. But for the moment it
is more difficult to resist anger, on account of its impetuousness.
Reply Obj. 2: Concupiscence is stated to be without reason, not as
though it destroyed altogether the judgment of reason, but because
nowise does it follow the judgment of reason: and for this reason it
is more disgraceful.
Reply Obj. 3: This argument considers incontinence with regard to its
result.
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