Whether Shamefacedness Is About a Disgraceful Action?
Objection 1: It would seem that shamefacedness is not about a
disgraceful action. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 9) that
"shamefacedness is fear of disgrace." Now sometimes those who do
nothing wrong suffer ignominy, according to Ps. 67:8, "For thy sake I
have borne reproach, shame hath covered my face." Therefore
shamefacedness is not properly about a disgraceful action.
Obj. 2: Further, nothing apparently is disgraceful but what is
sinful. Yet man is ashamed of things that are not sins, for instance
when he performs a menial occupation. Therefore it seems that
shamefacedness is not properly about a disgraceful action.
Obj. 3: Further, virtuous deeds are not disgraceful but most
beautiful according to _Ethic._ i, 8. Yet sometimes people are
ashamed to do virtuous deeds, according to Luke 9:26, "He that shall
be ashamed of Me and My words, of him the Son of man shall be
ashamed," etc. Therefore shamefacedness is not about a disgraceful
action.
Obj. 4: Further, if shamefacedness were properly about a disgraceful
action, it would follow that the more disgraceful the action the more
ashamed would one be. Yet sometimes a man is more ashamed of lesser
sins, while he glories in those which are most grievous, according to
Ps. 51:3, "Why dost thou glory in malice?" Therefore shamefacedness
is not properly about a disgraceful action.
_On the contrary,_ Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 15) and Gregory of
Nyssa [*Nemesius, (De Nat. Hom. xx)] say that "shamefacedness is fear
of doing a disgraceful deed or of a disgraceful deed done."
_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 41, A. 2; Q. 42, A. 3),
when we were treating of the passions, fear is properly about an
arduous evil, one, namely, that is difficult to avoid. Now disgrace
is twofold. There is the disgrace inherent to vice, which consists in
the deformity of a voluntary act: and this, properly speaking, has
not the character of an arduous evil. For that which depends on the
will alone does not appear to be arduous and above man's ability:
wherefore it is not apprehended as fearful, and for this reason the
Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that such evils are not a matter of
fear.
The other kind of disgrace is penal so to speak, and it consists in
the reproach that attaches to a person, just as the clarity of glory
consists in a person being honored. And since this reproach has the
character of an arduous evil, just as honor has the character of an
arduous good, shamefacedness, which is fear of disgrace, regards
first and foremost reproach or ignominy. And since reproach is
properly due to vice, as honor is due to virtue, it follows that
shamefacedness regards also the disgrace inherent to vice. Hence the
Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "a man is less ashamed of those
defects which are not the result of any fault of his own."
Now shamefacedness regards fault in two ways. In one way a man
refrains from vicious acts through fear of reproach: in another way a
man while doing a disgraceful deed avoids the public eye through fear
of reproach. In the former case, according to Gregory of Nyssa
(Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xx), we speak of a person "blushing," in the
latter we say that he is "ashamed." Hence he says that "the man who
is ashamed acts in secret, but he who blushes fears to be disgraced."
Reply Obj. 1: Shamefacedness properly regards disgrace as due to sin
which is a voluntary defect. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 6)
that "a man is more ashamed of those things of which he is the
cause." Now the virtuous man despises the disgrace to which he is
subject on account of virtue, because he does not deserve it; as the
Philosopher says of the magnanimous (Ethic. iv, 3). Thus we find it
said of the apostles (Acts 5:41) that "they (the apostles) went from
the presence of the council, rejoicing that they were accounted
worthy to suffer reproach for the name of Jesus." It is owing to
imperfection of virtue that a man is sometimes ashamed of the
reproaches which he suffers on account of virtue, since the more
virtuous a man is, the more he despises external things, whether good
or evil. Wherefore it is written (Isa. 51:7): "Fear ye not the
reproach of men."
Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 63, A. 3), though honor is not
really due save to virtue alone, yet it regards a certain excellence:
and the same applies to reproach, for though it is properly due to
sin alone, yet, at least in man's opinion, it regards any kind of
defect. Hence a man is ashamed of poverty, disrepute, servitude, and
the like.
Reply Obj. 3: Shamefacedness does not regard virtuous deeds as such.
Yet it happens accidentally that a man is ashamed of them either
because he looks upon them as vicious according to human opinion, or
because he is afraid of being marked as presumptuous or hypocritical
for doing virtuous deeds.
Reply Obj. 4: Sometimes more grievous sins are less shameful, either
because they are less disgraceful, as spiritual sins in comparison
with sins of the flesh, or because they connote a certain abundance
of some temporal good; thus a man is more ashamed of cowardice than
of daring, of theft than of robbery, on account of a semblance of
power. The same applies to other sins.
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